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The Ethics of Using Plastination to Save Lives


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#1 reason

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Posted 08 September 2015 - 11:38 AM


Plastination is a potential alternative to cryonics for the long-term preservation of the brain following death, a way to maintain the fine neural structure that encodes the data of the mind. Given the pace of technological progress, preserved individuals can expect some unknown chance at restoration to active life in the future. The types of technology required for that feat are well understood, and include a near complete control over cellular biochemistry, along with a molecular nanotechnology industry capable of reconstruction of cells and sequestration of preservation chemicals. Whatever the odds for survival turn out to be, they are considerably better than the other option, which is the grave and oblivion. There is no better path to longevity for the billions who will age to death prior to the widespread availability of rejuvenation therapies, and it is perhaps the greatest shame of our age that cryonics and plastination remain niche concerns.

Plastination has been shown to be feasible as the basis for a preservation technology to much the same degree as cryonics, but unlike cryonics it has not yet developed into a practicing industry. While this lengthy article focuses on plastination, the points are also applicable to cryopreservation:

For the most part bioethics is understandably a conservative business. In the past there has been little tolerance for taking life extension seriously. If the possibility was not scorned as wishful thinking it was dismissed as being selfish and a grave danger to society, usually without any real argument. Yet a new generation of scientists and bioethicists are no longer willing to dismiss radical life extension and have begun to seriously examine these issues. The techno-progressive community as well as the general public are also much more informed about the every increasing pace of technology and are less willing to dismiss potential life extension technologies.

Once the information-theoretic definition of death and the fact that a person is their connectome are accepted, any technique that can preserve the information in the brain has the potential for life extension. In chemical brain preservation, rather than using low temperatures to lock the brain in place as is done in cryonics, the brain is placed in stasis by chemical bonding, a procedure also known as plastination. However, the difference between cryonics and chemical brain preservation is no absolute. Newer forms of cryonics use a process called vitrification. Vitrification uses low temperatures and cryoprotectants to turn tissue into a glass like state where decay is extremely slow. Therefore it may be possible to develop hybrid procedures involving elements of both cryonics and chemical brain preservation.

It may seem obvious to some, but we need ask the question of why would anyone pursue brain preservation? Assuming it works, the obvious answer it that the person wishes to continue living. Many bioethicists argue it is wrong to "unnaturally" extend life and that we need to accept death. This may be good advice if there is nothing we can do about death, but it rings hollow when something can be done. After all, no one argued about refusing public health measures beginning in the late nineteenth century which was arguably the first case of significant life extension.

If the world continues its accelerated pace there is every reason to expect that in a few hundred years we will have a complete science of how the brain gives rise to mind, and the technological prowess to routinely upload memories and minds. Citizens of that future world will have conquered disease and death and overcome countless other biological limitations. And they will viscerally understand what today's neuroscience textbooks try to convey: The mind is computational, and a person's unique memories and personality are encoded in the pattern of physical connections between neurons. From that vantage point, future generations will ask: "Why didn't humanity preserve its most priceless possession -the human brain?"

Link: http://ieet.org/inde...cerullo20150908


View the full article at FightAging
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#2 albedo

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Posted 20 September 2015 - 09:46 PM

Thank you. Reading through the nice Cerullo's article reminded me an equally nice article (also cited by Cerullo) by Ken Hayworth ("Killed by Bad Philosophy") of the Brain Preservation Foundation clarifying in particular the issue of the continuity of the "self" in the mind uplodading process. In Hayworh's personal rebuttal of MIT Technology Review article by Michael Hendricks he again, in particular, emphasizes and puts to rest the "philosophical trap" of loosing the continuity of the "self" argumentation. I feel the 3 articles are a good basis to understand the scientific status as well as the philosophical and ethical issues related to these technology. I also equally feel a parallel progress and serious dialog in these 3 areas is a prerequisite for a more general societal endorsement and funding.


Edited by albedo, 20 September 2015 - 09:54 PM.


#3 Antonio2014

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Posted 22 September 2015 - 02:14 PM

Thank you. Reading through the nice Cerullo's article reminded me an equally nice article (also cited by Cerullo) by Ken Hayworth ("Killed by Bad Philosophy") of the Brain Preservation Foundation clarifying in particular the issue of the continuity of the "self" in the mind uplodading process.

 

 

The reasoning in that article is circular. Here:

 

For expositional purposes, let’s call the self that we experience on a moment‐by‐moment basis our “point of view” self (POVself), and let’s call the self that comprises our set of declarative, procedural, and perceptual memories our “memory” self (MEMself). Of course, to make a whole person you need both – the POVself experiencing the world on a moment‐by‐moment basis, and the MEMself guiding our internal and external actions based in part on the current contents of the POVself and in turn modifying the state of this POVself. You can roughly think of the POVself as the currently active representational state of the brain, and the MEMself as the hardwired circuitry of the brain. However, it is important to think of the POVself and MEMself in information terms only. It does not matter which particular neurons are firing to represent that a bus just pulled out in front of you or which particular axonal connections cause you to swerve the steering wheel – what matters is the informational content of these neural representations and circuits.

 

The bold text is using what the article is supposed to prove. If you say that only the connections pattern matters, and not the actual brain that implements it, then you are saying that POVself and MEMself are the same, wich is what you are supposed to demonstrate.



#4 albedo

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Posted 13 February 2016 - 04:30 PM

Antonio2014 I might miss you point completely but reading your critic let me to think that the article wishes to demonstrate POVself and MEMself are the same. It does not look so. It rather looks the article indicates that, while emphasizing MEMself is highly more important, both "selves" are needed, i.e. "..POVself experiencing the world on a moment‐by‐moment basis, and the MEMself guiding our internal and external actions based in part on the current contents of the POVself and in turn modifying the state of this POVself.."



#5 Mind

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Posted 14 February 2016 - 01:55 PM

A copy of me is not me.


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#6 John Schloendorn

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Posted 17 February 2016 - 08:42 PM

A copy of me is not me.

 

Do you speak of a copy in space or in time?  How could that make a difference? 



#7 Danail Bulgaria

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Posted 22 February 2016 - 07:17 AM

I personally don't see it even as a copy of me. I see this as a model of me. 



#8 Mind

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Posted 23 February 2016 - 09:18 PM

 

A copy of me is not me.

 

Do you speak of a copy in space or in time?  How could that make a difference? 

 

 

I don't understand the question.

 

I am speaking from my subjective viewpoint of the universe and life.


Edited by Mind, 23 February 2016 - 09:18 PM.


#9 A941

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Posted 02 March 2016 - 04:07 AM

Plastination will not save you, just enable other people to build a copy of you.

This may be interesting for biologists and so on who want to learn about, by then, century old "biological artifacts" but not for us.

Personally I dont understand why people think this may be a good Idea, just like i think uploading is just the creation of a copy and nothing else.

 

I once (2002) had an extensive discussion about this whith M. Anissimow, I would really like to know what he thinks now about it.

 

 

btw.: If we ever use repair and recosntruction, freezing and unfreezing of preserved brains, or even the replacement of single molecules and atoms during life, I think we should find a way, a test, to determine if the upgraded, remodeled or partially replaced brain still is the same person or if it died during the process.

 


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