• Log in with Facebook Log in with Twitter Log In with Google      Sign In    
  • Create Account
  LongeCity
              Advocacy & Research for Unlimited Lifespans


Adverts help to support the work of this non-profit organisation. To go ad-free join as a Member.


Photo
- - - - -

Super Free Will: Metaprogramming & QM


  • Please log in to reply
64 replies to this topic

#1 PaulH

  • Guest
  • 116 posts
  • 0
  • Location:Global

Posted 20 April 2004 - 06:33 AM


This is a re-post from my original article over at Future Hi.

Contrary to popular belief among most brain scientists today, I will argue that free-will not only exists, but ultimately is all that remains in an ever changing uncertain universe. In order to understand the body of my argument, we’ll need to delve into quantum physics, Skinnerian behaviorism, neurological imprinting, brainwashing and metaprogramming.

Here is Robert Anton Wilson’s definition of Von Neumann's Catastrophe of the infinite regress.

A demonstration by Dr.Von Neumann that quantum mechanics entails an infinite regress of measurements before the quantum uncertainty can be removed. That is, any measuring device is itself a quantum system containing uncertainty; a second measuring device, used to monitor the first, contains its own quantum uncertainty; and so on, to infinity. Wigner and others have pointed out that this uncertainty is only terminated by the decision of the observer.


What this means, and has been proven time and again in experiment after experiment, is that without a conscious observer, quantum states remain uncertain and in a state of indeterminacy. It is the conscious observer that makes the uncertainty wave function collapse out of an either/or “maybe” into something "real". No experiment has yet been able to remove this observer from the results. Therefore without consciousness, there is no wave function collapse, and no "reality". Scientists, including Einstein have been fighting this conclusion for more than 70 years, when he said, “God does not play dice”, but experiment after experiment has proven this to be the case. The Aspect Experiment in 1982 and its dozen follow up experiments have reproduced this non-local consciousness dependent result. This is most troubling to determinist materialist as it goes against their training and almost every other working scientific theory. Yet the power of quantum mechanics has made itself known in almost every field of technology and industry.

So why hasn’t this shattering revelation made greater waves through the scientific community? I honestly don’t have the answer to that, other than history is full of old paradigms dying slow hard deaths. So rigid in their thinking are people and therefore scientists, that as Thomas Kuhn, the author of the book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), said, "The triumph of a new paradigm may therefore depend as much on this generation’s dying off as it does on decisive confirmation or refutation, as more traditional philosophies of science understand such things." This is an important point, which I’ll get back to in a bit.

Meanwhile, as our understanding of the brain has increased, we have been able to isolate and tie numerous psychological functions to deterministic brain chemistry. Tweak a molecule here; get a psychological effect there. Apply an electrode there; get a psychological effect here. This has led most neuroscientists and cognitive researchers, including the likes of Francis Crick, to conclude that any conception of having free-will is an illusion. Francis Crick says,

All your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions, your sense of personal identity and free-will, are in fact no more than the behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules.


He is only partially correct, as we shall soon see.

Eastern yogi philosophers and psychedelic aficionados have said similar things as Crick. Either through advanced meditative techniques or psychedelic ingestion, these people have temporarily transcended their neural conditioning and brain programming, and from this higher, more self-aware perspective, have correctly concluded that most of what makes up "them" is arbitrary programming, robotic behavioral patterns inserted either through conditioning or imprinting at certain stages of their life.

So what are imprints? Imprinting was first demonstrated by Konrad Lorenz in the 1930’s when he was able to imprint himself as the mother to hatched ducklings. He discovered that there are moments of imprint vulnerability where an electrochemical bond is formed in neural circuitry that precedes any further conditioning. Another way of looking at this is imprints are hardwired neurological patterns, whereas conditioning is composed of looser, more easily reprogrammed softwired patterns. Conditioning can be changed by positive or negative re-enforcement, but imprints require something altogether more traumatic. We could say that imprints form the basis of our personality and remain unchanged throughout our life, except under the most traumatic of experiences. It is here that the science of brainwashing comes in.

The most notable case of brainwashing is the story of Patti Hearst, who having been kidnapped a "rich daddy’s girl", came back six weeks later as a different person, robbing banks, and proclaiming the birth of a new "peoples liberation". This brainwashing was accomplished through a combination of drugs and extreme trauma. Kept in a locked closet for weeks, taunted by her captors, and fed only the smallest amount of food, Patti went into extreme shock, and in turn become imprint vulnerable. Unbeknownst to her, and after weeks of torment, these same captors befriended her as if they were the ones rescuing her. As they opened the closet door, they immediately started calling her a new name. Loving, comforting, feeding and taking care of her, they gave her a whole new identity and mythos. Claiming that her abductors were working for her father, she immediately came to love and accept these people, her saviors, completely forgetting her old life, and accepting this new reality imprint without question. In short, she was brainwashed.

Ok, so where does free-will come in? So far it seems like I’ve decimated every last shred of free-will and human dignity. Yes, and for good reason! Unless we understand the full extent of just how brainwashed and programmed we are, we will never have anything close to a free-will. To be free it first helps to intimately understand just how imprisoned we are by our own nervous system. Freedom comes from knowledge, not ignorance. To know thyself is the pathway to liberation and freedom, as I will now explain.

Lets start with simple conditioning. An addiction to something would be a good example of strong mental conditioning. Most people who are seriously addicted think they can’t stop their addiction, feeling they are slaves to their nervous system programming, compelling them to get more of whatever it is they are addicted to. We know that addictions can happen at both the psychological level like gambling, or in the physical (central nervous system level), like crack-cocaine. If the person has a strong enough desire to seek adequate help, they can with assistance overcome their addiction. Some people are strong enough to be able to do this without help, but the majority look for others support to get them through the thick of it. Is this desire to overcome their mental conditioning the same as free-will, or just another higher level of programming? Some would argue that there were other programs, super-programs that eventually re-wrote these lower subroutines of addiction. Or what some AI researchers like to call super-goals. Ok, this has some computational basis, but I think it’s a bit of a stretch to describe in adequate neurological terms precisely how overcoming ones programming is not the beginnings of something more uncertain and indeterministic. Remember the indeterminate conscious observer in quantum mechanical systems? We’ll get back to that.

So what are these supergoals then? I think there are many. The next layer beyond conditioning as I mentioned earlier is neurological imprinting; hard-wired electro-chemical bonds that program behavior and our subsequent perception of reality and self. Almost everyone you’ll ever meet has never re-imprinted their nervous systems. However for those lucky or not so lucky individuals who have taken a large quantity of a psychedelics, what John Lilly calls metaprogramming agents in his groundbreaking book, Programming and Metaprogramming in The Human Biocomputer, these electro-chemical imprints can be re-programmed, or re-imprinted too. John Lilly described this ability to re-program our programs, meta-programs. He then goes into considerable scientific and rigorous detail describing all the ways we can metaprogram our own brain, changing our brains programming as we see fit.

The question now needs to be asked, if we are nothing more than our programs, imprints and conditioned reflexes, then who is the "we" who is doing the programming? Who is the metaprogrammer? Some might remain steadfast and say that this new higher you is also just a collection of programs, or metaprograms. In either case, for those of us lucky enough to have metaprogammed ourselves and not been metaprogrammed against our will (brainwashing), it sure feels like we are a lot more free than we are ordinarily. Any so-called free-will we have in an ordinary state of consciousness feels contrived and robotic compared to being in a metaprogramming state. So if nothing else, this thing called free-will is relative. There are states where we are more "free" than others.

John Lilly has gone further in exploring the depths of the mind and the limits of metaprogramming, and said that after a while of metaprogramming, you eventually realize there are limits to certain metaprograms, or what he also likes to call beliefs about beliefs. Robert Anton Wilson is fond of calling them catmas... with dogmas being absolute beliefs, and catmas being relativistic metabeliefs. And as you play around with metaprograms, then there is a new "self", the self that is meta-meta-programming! Programming ones own metabeliefs. Or what John Lilly also liked to call supra-meta-beliefs. John Lilly quickly realized there is no limit to this self-recursion when he uttered his most famous quote,

In the province of the mind, what the mind believes to be true, either is true or becomes true within certain limits to be found experientially and experimentally. These limits are further beliefs to be transcended. In the mind there are no limits.


In other words, as you become more aware of your supra-metabeliefs, you can continue upwards to meta-meta-meta-beliefs, ad infinitum… the neurological equivalent of the Von Neumann Catastrophe. If this relative scale of increasing neurological metaprogramming freedom is not some kind of free will, then I think the meaning itself has been destroyed, and for no damn good reason, other than dogmatic stubbornness on the part of people unwilling to let go of an old dying deterministic paradigm, against the new empirically verifiable new paradigm of quantum mechanics. All physical systems are subject to quantum mechanical principles, which are in turn subject to a conscious observer. So no matter how you slice it, the conscious observer is both separate and a part of the physical world. Consciousness it would seem is a fundamental in the universe, possibly the one and only fundamental, preceding all other observed physical properties, which are determined by consciousness.

Quoting Robert Anton Wilson again,

Since all human knowledge is neurological in this sense, every science may be considered a neuro-science; e.g., we have no physics but neurophysics, no psychology but neuropsychology and ultimately, no neurology but neuroneurology. But neuroneurology would itself be known by the nervous system, leading to neuroneuroneurology etc., in an infinite regress.


But as John Lilly humbly admitted, even though in the mind there are no limits, the body on the planetside trip has definite limits locked in by biology. So as long as we return to and operate within it, we are subject to its limits. However each day we are becoming more aware of how these genetic limits work, and soon will figure out how to overcome those limits, first with genetic engineering, then nanoengineering.

So here we are altering our own molecular DNA, and soon the entire physical world down to the atomic level. Another way of looking at this, is DNA having evolved out of the slime, is now becoming recursive enough to begin altering itself with internationality and purpose towards something stronger, smarter and more versatile. Going further, the atomic world is now becoming aware of itself, and as it becomes aware of these limits, just like we becoming aware of our own programming, will begin to re-program this matter to become more expressive to this internationality, to the logos, the memeplex that is our noosphere. Will this self-recursion ever end? Probably not. Do we have free will? As I have shown, free-will is a matter of degree. It is easily demonstrated that we can increase the levels and degrees of freedom as we become aware of our own limits. I would say, not only is there free-will, but eventually everything in the universe, including the very essence of ourselves will become re-defined by it. In the end, everything will change, but one thing will remain and increase, the level of our free will, our consciousness, the fundamental that is and comprises everything.

Edited by planetp, 20 April 2004 - 08:18 AM.


#2 John Doe

  • Guest
  • 291 posts
  • 0

Posted 20 April 2004 - 09:30 AM

PlanetP, I have a bit of an obsession with free will, which I why I inject the topic into most conversations (such as the Dennett and supernaturalism thread). Indeed I recently received an email from Richard Double, the author of the Non-Reality of Free Will and Metaphilosophy and Free Will, who wrote that he was "VERY" impressed with my essay and suggested that I submit the essay to one of several prominent academic journals. This is the most thrilling thing to happen to me in several years considering that I am an engineering, not philosophy, major and I do not have a Ph.d.

That essay (which you can read at my website: www.ece.utexas.edu/~werking) criticizes the view of Robert Kane (who teaches at my school). Kane is perhaps the world's authority on "naturalistic libertarianism" -- by that I mean a view that asserts that (i) free will is incompatible with determinism, (ii) determinism is false, (iii) free will exists, and (iv) all of this is true within the natural order and without need for spirits/souls/immutable Selves/agent-Causes etc.

Your own view seems similar to him but I am not sure how all of the pieces of your presention (QM, conscious observation, metaprogramming, etc) fit together. For example, metaprogramming is entirely compatible with determinism. So what need is there for indeterminate QM? Are you a compatibilist living in an indeterministic world?

You identify a regress during your discussion -- this is a familiar idea in philosophy of free will. You admit, however, that FW is quantitative rather than qualitative. Moreover, you admit that the "end" of this regress is rather arbitrary. This is precisely what incompatibilists or "pessimists" such as myself do not like. Our ideas of how the world actually is are probably type identical -- but we call two different things free will.

Incompatibilists such as Kane, myself and others want this regress to end with the agent in control. Our objection can be captured in the reply that "self-modifying programs are still programs". Whoever sets the initial conditions determines the future modifications in a way that the person does not. Note that there is no coherent way in which human beings could ever "set their own initial conditions". We can rewrite our genome. We can rewrite our environment. But we cannot write our original genome and environment (and whatever else might be relevant at the start of an agent's life) -- but these determine how they will be revised. In this way, incompatibilists do not find the idea of self-modifations impressive at all. Compatibilists such as Daniel Dennett do.

#3 PaulH

  • Topic Starter
  • Guest
  • 116 posts
  • 0
  • Location:Global

Posted 22 April 2004 - 08:06 AM

John,

I have no doubt you are erudite in this obsession of yours. I finished reading your essay, and responded to it on the other thread.

Your own view seems similar to him but I am not sure how all of the pieces of your presention (QM, conscious observation, metaprogramming, etc) fit together. For example, metaprogramming is entirely compatible with determinism. So what need is there for indeterminate QM? Are you a compatibilist living in an indeterministic world?

You identify a regress during your discussion -- this is a familiar idea in philosophy of free will. You admit, however, that FW is quantitative rather than qualitative. Moreover, you admit that the "end" of this regress is rather arbitrary. This is precisely what incompatibilists or "pessimists" such as myself do not like. Our ideas of how the world actually is are probably type identical -- but we call two different things free will.


You seem to be speaking such a different language here, as I am unclear what you are saying and what you are claiming I'm saying. Perhaps from your perspective metaprogramming fits within determinism, but as I have argued, this binary, either/or, determinism vs. indeterminism, free will (1) vs. no free will (0), Aristotelian logical framework is simply not equipped to address these issues.

Incompatibilists such as Kane, myself and others want this regress to end with the agent in control. Our objection can be captured in the reply that "self-modifying programs are still programs".


This is incorrect. Metaprograms are not programs. Metaprograms are metaprograms. I understand your need to see it in determinist semantic terms, but this faulty semantic-logical framework is what's actually leading you to all the wrong conclusions. To imply that these metaprograms already exist is incompatible with how emergent self-awareness actually works. As awareness increases, so does awareness of ones programming, and in turn ones ability to change that programming. This is an infinite regress, and I don't argue that it ends at some arbitrary point; it never ends, until all that is left is free-will, total quantum indeterminacy. That is the discomforting reality that most scientists, even quantum theorists have such a hard time coping with, but it is an inescapable fact of scientific empiricism. It is fraught with paradox. I would say that it's your discomfort with paradox, and that of most people that is the real fourth conceit. And it is that conceit, a world without paradox, that will succumb to greater intelligence. In a post-singularity hyper-intelligent universe, paradox will reign supreme.

Edited by planetp, 22 April 2004 - 08:41 AM.


sponsored ad

  • Advert

#4 Bruce Klein

  • Guardian Founder
  • 8,794 posts
  • 242
  • Location:United States

Posted 22 April 2004 - 08:15 AM

I would say that it's your discomfort with paradox, and that of most people who think about these things deeply enough to confront it that is real fourth conceit.

Yes, humans find it hard to wrap their minds around the concept of infinity. I look forward to thinking about infinity as a posthuman soon, but until that time rely upon Paul to give me the skinny.

#5 John Doe

  • Guest
  • 291 posts
  • 0

Posted 22 April 2004 - 06:53 PM

You seem to be speaking such a different language here, as I am unclear what you are saying and what you are claiming I'm saying. Perhaps from your perspective metaprogramming fits within determinism, but as I have argued, this binary, either/or, determinism vs. indeterminism, free will (1) vs. no free will (0), Aristotelian logical framework is simply not equipped to address these issues.


You claim that I should not use either/or language when describing free will. This, however, is how philosophers have described FW for millennia. No one says "do I have more free will than a chimpanzee has?" People say "do I have free will?" Likewise, you claim that thought experiments entertaining the existence of deterministic worlds are irrelevant. But I think they are relevant, however, for just this reason: I do not think QM helps your case for free will at all. I think you tacitly assume that QM helps because you, like most everyone, have incompatibilist intuitions about this subject. However, if you inspect the details of your position, I think it is plain that metaprogramming can exist entirely within deterministic worlds. I could write a self-modifying program on my laptop, right now, just to demonstrate this point.

This is incorrect.  Metaprograms are not programs. Metaprograms are metaprograms.  I understand your need to see it in determinist semantic terms, but this faulty semantic-logical framework is what's actually leading you to all the wrong conclusions. To imply that these metaprograms already exist is incompatible with how emergent self-awareness actually works.  As awareness increases, so does awareness of ones programming, and in turn ones ability to change that programming.  This is an infinite regress, and I don't argue that it ends at some arbitrary point; it never ends, until all that is left is free-will, total quantum indeterminacy. That is the discomforting reality that most scientists, even quantum theorists have such a hard time coping with, but it is an inescapable fact of scientific empiricism.  It is fraught with paradox.  I would say that it's your discomfort with paradox, and that of most people that is the real fourth conceit.  And it is that conceit, a world without paradox, that will succumb to greater intelligence.  In a post-singularity hyper-intelligent universe, paradox will reign supreme.


Would you also say that red cars are not cars -- they are red cars? Of course metaprograms are metaprograms. No one is denying the Law of Identity. But metaprograms can also be programs in the same way that red cars are also cars. They are not mutually exclusive. Red cars are a subset, a certain type, of cars. Likewise, metaprograms are a certain type of program. This much is obvious.

Next, you claim that the regress would never end "until all that is left is free-will, total quantum indeterminacy." But what does "total" quantum indeterminacy look like? Unless the indeterminism is bound by some higher-order classical approximations -- unless the stability of Newton's laws emerges from the swarms of quantum flux -- "total" quantum indeterminacy looks a lot like total randomness. Wouldn't you agree?

This image of total chaos introduces important objections to arguments that invoke QM to defend FW. These are the "randomness" and "luck" objections. Thought experiments about two identical agents who "freely choose" to do different things (according to QM) would differ only according to randomness. Whether or not one is a saint or sinner would seem to be a matter of luck. Luck, however, is not like anything we imagine free will to be. Free will implies a control that is incompatible with indeterminism.

Finally, you charge that those who deny the existence of FW do so because we are unwilling to appreciate paradox. This might be the case if I thought the world was perfectly deterministic and without paradox. But I maintain that the world may very well be paradoxical at the micro scale. This indeterminism, however, cannot help the defender of fw (and you have yet to show how it can). FW cannot exist in either a classical Newtonian world or a quantum mechanical world.

#6 PaulH

  • Topic Starter
  • Guest
  • 116 posts
  • 0
  • Location:Global

Posted 23 April 2004 - 06:37 AM

John, your use of non-equivalent analogies, unwillingness to step out of Artistotelian logic, and a lack of understanding of Quantum Mechanics is substantial enough, I don't see anyway to move this conversation forward. I'm going to agree to disagree.

Cheers.

#7 John Doe

  • Guest
  • 291 posts
  • 0

Posted 23 April 2004 - 08:38 AM

John, your use of non-equivalent analogies, unwillingness to step out of Artistotelian logic, and a lack of understanding of Quantum Mechanics is substantial enough, I don't see anyway to move this conversation forward.  I'm going to agree to disagree.

Cheers.


Agreeing to disagree is not very satisfying.

You say that you do not see any way to move forward in this conversation. I suggest these ways:

1. Show how QM helps your case for free will.
2. Answer this question: Does FW require indeterminism?
3. Show how the analogies I use are inappropriate ("non-equivalent").
4. Show why free will should admit of degrees even though few philosophers have defined it that way. If you appeal to the non-absolute nature of QM, you still need to show (1) how QM helps your case for free will.

Your view on FW seems to rely upon an indeterministic interpretation of QM. The interpretation of QM, however, is very controversial, and there competing interpretations, such as those of Everett or Bohm, which are entirely deterministic. So, on your view, whether or not human beings possess FW is contingent upon which interpretation of QM is correct. Would you agree?

One final note. You question my understanding of QM. I do not pretend to be an expert on QM but on this point I am with the majority. If you refuse to defend your view against anyone whose understanding of QM -- a notoriously difficult subject -- does not satisfy yourself, your view would never reach a tremendous number of philosophers. Descartes, Spinoza, and Hume, for example, knew nothing about QM. Were their contibutions on the subject meaningless? Likewise, most academic philosophers who work on the subject today have an understanding of QM that is comparable to my own. That so many experts could not even discuss the subject with you suggests a weakness in your position. Does QM strengthen your idea of FW, or just protect it from scrutiny?

#8 DJS

  • Guest
  • 5,798 posts
  • 11
  • Location:Taipei
  • NO

Posted 23 April 2004 - 01:21 PM

Paul,

I have to agree with JD on this one. His argument was well made and worthy of a response. Most people have a limited understanding of QM (including myself), but why should this prevent debate? Personally, I was enjoying the interplay between the two of you and if for nothing else, was hoping that the conversation would continue for educational purposes.

DS

#9 bgwowk

  • Guest
  • 1,715 posts
  • 125

Posted 23 April 2004 - 08:13 PM

What this means, and has been proven time and again in experiment after experiment, is that without a conscious observer, quantum states remain uncertain and in a state of indeterminacy. It is the conscious observer that makes the uncertainty wave function collapse out of an either/or “maybe” into something "real". No experiment has yet been able to remove this observer from the results. Therefore without consciousness, there is no wave function collapse, and no "reality". Scientists, including Einstein have been fighting this conclusion for more than 70 years, when he said, “God does not play dice”, but experiment after experiment has proven this to be the case. The Aspect Experiment in 1982 and its dozen follow up experiments have reproduced this non-local consciousness dependent result.


Well I *do* understand QM better than most (being a physicist), and the above is plain and simply not true. It is a philosophical preference, not statement of fact. There is no instrinsic need for an observer in quantum mechanics. All the angst and fuss over "consciousness" and QM are simply the death throes of the collapse postulate. Once the collapse postulate is acknowledged as the arbitrary baggage that it is, QM becomes completely local, deterministic, and free of ill-defined distinctions between observer and observered.

See

http://www.hedweb.co...ett/everett.htm

---BrianW

#10 PaulH

  • Topic Starter
  • Guest
  • 116 posts
  • 0
  • Location:Global

Posted 24 April 2004 - 12:56 AM

Brian,

As an ex-physicist myself and with due respect for your opinion, I have to adamantly disagree with you. ;) I have read Michael's lovely piece when it first appeared on the net. MWI is just one of many interpretations. Therefore, the most I'll settle for is the jury is still out on hidden variables. If QM is decisively deterministic, local and observer independent, then you might want to inform the rest of the physics community that disagrees with you, and there a A LOT of them.

Don,

If you have noticed I have spent a lot of time on these boards the last month or so, and my time is about up. I'm now doing work related activities over 12 hours per day, and traveling away from home at least 3 of those days each week. I simply no longer have the time to respond, especially if the divide is so wide, that it would take too much time for me to adequately address the detractors weaknessness in their argument. I have made several rebuttals of John Doe's position, which he almost off-handedly dismissed with nothing more than either "I don't see the connection", or "you are wrong". It's fine to disagree, but if we are speaking a different language, or one is arguing, as it appear to me John is doing, from ideological grounds, there is little choice but to agree to disagree. I think that is the gentlemanly thing to do. Please, don't stop on my account... continue the conversation amongst yourselves. [thumb]

Speaking of which, this lack of time is going to effect the frequency in which new material appears on Future Hi, so if there are any of you out there who would like to contribute, please let me know. Future Hi has quite a readership now, with somewhere between 300 and 500 regular readers coming to the site each day.

I have a plane to catch, and writing this using Atlanta airport's convenient wi-fi system.. so I need to go.

Cheers.

Edited by planetp, 24 April 2004 - 01:14 AM.


#11 PaulH

  • Topic Starter
  • Guest
  • 116 posts
  • 0
  • Location:Global

Posted 25 April 2004 - 07:02 PM

My client cancelled his appointment this afternoon, giving me some free time to try and respond to Brian and John's objections. I can't promise any follow-ups though.

Brian,

Quick breakdown of QM interpretations.

1) Local Hidden Variables: Impossible

2) Non-Local Hidden Variables: Possible (Bohm)

3) Locality without Hidden Variables: Possible (Consistent Histories, Many Worlds)

4) No Locality nor Hidden Variables: Possible (Copenhagen)

Despite the advancements in Quantum Computing, Aspects Experiment has been repeated many times providing strength to non-locality and the necessity of the conscious observer. As of yet, Bell's theorem has not been disproved. The double-slit experiment provides strength to no hidden variables. Combined they provide strength to the Copenhagen Interpretation.

David Chalmers and Ben Goetzel have both given, as yet unrefuted logical frameworks to consciousness being a fundamental in the universe. Almost, but not all attempts to deny this, have comes almost exclusively from dogmatic materialist grounds, and not sound reasoning. Some are so unconfortable with this, that they have gone so far as to deny there is even a hard problem at all! A real scientist would not be arguing from ideological grounds, but would look at ALL the evidence and do their best to hypothesize a comprehensive theory. The majority of experimental evidence has conscious receptors as an integral and necessary 'cause' to any quantum event. In order to prevent the infinite regress that bothers John so much, we have conscious receptors as the bottom end of that chain. If we can accept consciousness as a fundamental, then the chain of causation is broken, and we have consciousness as the primary force. This is so against the dogma of the day, that almost every scientist and person arguing against it does so with inquisitorial zeal and dogmatic assertions. Materialism is the New Inquisition of our age. I see no differences between their behavior and the protectors of old-time religion.

When science began to embrace materialism it did so for some very good reasons. As a budding intellectual institution, science had to divest itself of the liabilities of its roots in alchemy, astrology, and numerology and establish an assailable power base by applying itself to easily provable propositions. There was a whole world of useful knowledge just waiting to be discovered through simple, straightforward research, and it gained science nothing to have its practitioners burned at the stake as witches. Unfortunately this swing to materialism has been so severe that it’s the proverbial case of throwing the baby out with the bathwater. Now most anyone questioning it are labeled as heretics by the New Inquisition of materialism. Character asasanination is rampant, and nowadays, it's not burning at the stake that has scientists worried, but loosing their hard-won reputations, tenure and funding. Why is it so hard to acknowledge conscious receptors as fundamental any more than highly abstract m-branes or leptons? Leptons of course behave with all the high weirdness of QM, including indeterminacy and non-locality. Hmmm.

Ok, now to John.

1. Show how QM helps your case for free will.


Uhh, I think my article does that.

2. Answer this question: Does FW require indeterminism?


Probably. Does your argument require hard determinism? Yes. Is the universe deterministically hard? Most probably not. Does this shoot holes in your argument? Most probably yes. Sorry for the lack of certainties, but QM is anything but certain. ;)

3. Show how the analogies I use are inappropriate ("non-equivalent").


Example:

Would you also say that red cars are not cars -- they are red cars? Of course metaprograms are metaprograms. No one is denying the Law of Identity. But metaprograms can also be programs in the same way that red cars are also cars. They are not mutually exclusive. Red cars are a subset, a certain type, of cars. Likewise, metaprograms are a certain type of program. This much is obvious.


This is false and apparently not obvious to you, and it means you don't understand the nature of metaprogramming as I am using the term. So, I will do my best to explain how your analogy is non-equivalent.

Is a set of cars also a car? No, it is a fleet. Is a set of people, also a person? No, they are a community. Is a set of house also a house? No, it is a neighborhood. Is a way of manipulating numbers, also a number? No, it is an equation.

So what are we getting at here? Emergence. Emergent properties cannot be defined by their individual parts. So is a set of brain programs also a program? No, they are a set of programs. Not only is the analogy of the brain to computer programs a poor analogy, but has John Lilly has demonstrated by multpile, repeated experiments, metaprograms are not programs, they are meta-programs with entirely different, emergent properties not defined by any one program. Is there still programming aspects to metaprogramming? Sure, just like there are still "person" aspects to a group of people, or a structural aspect to a neighborhood. But we are also talking about a whole new phenomena that transcends those limited properties. Just as a metaprogram transcends certain aspects of programming. So does meta-meta-programs transcend it even further. It's a matter of degree, ultimately terminating at whatever is fundamental in the universe. So far that fundamental appears to be consciousnes and indeterminancy. Is indeterminancy random? No, it's indeterminant. The conscious observer as demonstrated by the aspect and double-slit experiments is anything but random. So if all we have left is indeterminancy and conscious observation that collapses that indeterminancy. And since consciousness is the end of the causation chain, then this means that all we have left is concious choice. If that isn't free will, I don't know what it is. In fact, it's a level of free will that is almost impossible for me to comprehend, being that most of what I am is not free and prone to deterministic brain patterns. Which is why I called my piece, Super Free Will. ;)

All of this nicely ties in with your next question:

4. Show why free will should admit of degrees even though few philosophers have defined it that way. If you appeal to the non-absolute nature of QM, you still need to show (1) how QM helps your case for free will.


Why do you insist on sticking with outdated binary Aristotelian logic, especially considering that complexity theory is anything but? The universe of emergent complexity is anything but black and white, yes or no. The world of complexity, and therefore of brain complexity and consciousness is gray. Even the primitive study of neural networks by today’s current AI researchers depends on weighted connections (fuzzy logic) in order to work. So no appeal to QM is necessary. I throw in QM because it implies both the action of conscious receptors, and of indeterminacy, both of which challenge hard determinism and consciousness as a subset of a physically determinist universe, of which your side of this argument continues to depend on.

Descartes, Spinoza, and Hume, for example, knew nothing about QM. Were their contributions on the subject meaningless?


There contribution were exemplary and consistent in a deterministically hard "clockwork" universe. Since most evidence is strongly in favor or an indeterministic QM universe, their contribution must be weighed and judged accordingly. I'm finding your reliance on past philosophers to be somewhat odd. Can't your own arguments make the case for you?

Likewise, most academic philosophers who work on the subject today have an understanding of QM that is comparable to my own. That so many experts could not even discuss the subject with you suggests a weakness in your position. Does QM strengthen your idea of FW, or just protect it from scrutiny?


This is definitely not true. Have you done a sampling of all the philosophers to say this with any degree of certainty? I know of lots of philosophers and thinkers on the subject who agree with me. Again, are you going to stand on the weight of your own arguments, or do you insist on having your friends behind you? Does your insistence on using Aristotelian logic and a denial of the indeterminacy of QM strengthen your idea of no free will, or just protect it from scrutiny?

Cheers.

P.S. I can't promise any more follow ups. If you still think that my argument is weak, please feel free to continue to deconstruct it.




Trying to understand how consciousness works in the brain while limiting our study entirely to the physical aspects of the brain, is like trying to taste a peach through a microscope. - Edward Close, Ph.D.

Edited by planetp, 25 April 2004 - 07:59 PM.


#12 John Doe

  • Guest
  • 291 posts
  • 0

Posted 25 April 2004 - 10:10 PM

PlanetP,

[quote]Why do you insist on sticking with outdated binary Aristotelian logic, especially considering that complexity theory is anything but?  The universe of emergent complexity is anything but black and white, yes or no.  The world of complexity, and therefore of brain complexity and consciousness is gray.  Even the primitive study of neural networks by today’s current AI researchers depends on weighted connections (fuzzy logic) in order to work.  So no appeal to QM is necessary.  I throw in QM because it implies both the action of conscious receptors, and of indeterminacy, both of which challenge hard determinism and consciousness as a subset of a physically determinist universe, of which your side of this argument continues to depend on.[/quote]

First I want to say something about "Aristotelian logic." Aristotle founded, in a sense, logic. But he was not perfect. Some of his mistakes persisted throughout history and were only corrected recently by people such as Bertrand Russell. This, however, is not the difficulty you seem to have with Aristotelian logic. Instead, you do not like logic because it is absolute. In particular, you seem attracted to the idea of breaking the Law of Non-Contradition, that p ^ !p cannot be true simultaneously.

Particles may very well break this law at the quantum scale. I think, however, that you appeal to this "weirdness" when working in inappropriate domains. For example, I hope we can I agree that I am either typing at the computer now, or I am not doing so. In other words, it could not be the case that I am both sitting here typing and also NOT sitting here typing simultaneously. Do we agree? If we do, is this not "Aristotelian" logic? Consider another example. Can we agree that men went to the moon in the twentieth century or they did not? Could it be the case that men both went to the moon and men did NOT go to the moon in the twentieth century simultaneouslY? Of course, that cannot be true. Men did go to the moon.

So, Aristotle's logic is quite useful in some domains. If we were discussing quarks and protons, I might disagree. But you have yet to show me why "Aristotelian" logic does not apply to statements such as "free will and determinism are incompatible" or "free will admits of degrees". Note that the vast majority of philosophers working today and throughout history who considered this question both found it coherent and answered either yes or no.

[quote]1. Show how QM helps your case for free will.
[quote]Uhh, I think my article does that.[/quote][/quote]

I did not remember that part of your article so I went back and reread it. This is the closest I found:

[quote]If this relative scale of increasing neurological metaprogramming freedom is not some kind of free will, then I think the meaning itself has been destroyed, and for no damn good reason, other than dogmatic stubbornness on the part of people unwilling to let go of an old dying deterministic paradigm, against the new empirically verifiable new paradigm of quantum mechanics. All physical systems are subject to quantum mechanical principles, which are in turn subject to a conscious observer. So no matter how you slice it, the conscious observer is both separate and a part of the physical world. [/quote]

So you define free will as "this relative scale of increasing neurological metaprogramming freedom." Earlier you defined metaprogramming as the "ability to re-program our programs." Of course, re-programming programs does not require indeterminism. Programs reprogram themselves all of the time without indeterminism. I could write a program to do so on my laptop just to demonstrate this point. So when, after you define free will as "this relative scale of increasing neurological metaprogramming freedom", you add that there is no reason to deny your definition of FW except a dogmatic resistance to QM, you have switched domains. Considering everything you have written, the former statement is simly not relevant to the latter. This is why I say that you have yet to show why QM helps your case for free will. Metaprogramming, or re-programming programs, can be done without QM at all.

In your most recent reply to me you write in bold: "So no appeal to QM is necessary." But your original essay claimed that the only reason to deny your definition of FW would be a dogmatic resistance to QM. I am confused. On your view, FW does or does not entail QM or indeterminism?

[quote][quote]2. Answer this question: Does FW require indeterminism?[/quote]

Probably. Does your argument require hard determinism? Yes. Is the universe deterministically hard? Most probably not. Does this shoot holes in your argument? Most probably yes. Sorry for the lack of certainties, but QM is anything but certain. ;) [/quote]

Did you read this in my reply:

[quote]Finally, you charge that those who deny the existence of FW do so because we are unwilling to appreciate paradox. This might be the case if I thought the world was perfectly deterministic and without paradox. But I maintain that the world may very well be paradoxical at the micro scale. This indeterminism, however, cannot help the defender of fw (and you have yet to show how it can). FW cannot exist in either a classical Newtonian world or a quantum mechanical world. [/quote]

I do not subsribe to hard determinism -- not in the sense that determinism must be true. I think FW is incompatible with determinism but also with indeterminism. So the indeterminate nature of the universe does not "shoot holes in my argument".

You write "probably" to the question of whether or not FW requires indeterminism. Can you elaborate? For example, what might FW without indeterminism look like? Would a perfectly deterministic self-modifying program have free will? Or how does indeterminism help your case for FW? Earlier you defined FW as the ability to re-program programs and this is possible within a fully deterministic world.

[quote]This is false and apparently not obvious to you, and it means you don't understand the nature of metaprogramming as I am using the term. So, I will do my best to explain how your analogy is non-equivalent.[/quote]

I too think that we are using the term "metaprogram" differently. I thought that you used the term to mean something "re-programming programs", which you wrote in your essay. This is also suggested by the combination of "meta" and "program". On this definition, metaprograms would be programs, such as self-modifying programs. But later you refer to a "set of a brain programs."

[quote]So is a set of brain programs also a program?  No, they are a set of programs.[/quote]

I think I understand the problem. In my original post I wrote:

[quote]Our objection can be captured in the reply that "self-modifying programs are still programs."[/quote]

My point was that metaprograms could not "set their own initial conditions" and were perfectly compatible with determinism. I did not understand, however, that metaprograms are sets of programs rather than a single program. So I can revise my sentence to say "self-modifying sets of programs are still sets of programs." I hope this ends the confusion.

[quote][quote]Descartes, Spinoza, and Hume, for example, knew nothing about QM. Were their contibutions on the subject meaningless? Likewise, most academic philosophers who work on the subject today have an understanding of QM that is comparable to my own. That so many experts could not even discuss the subject with you suggests a weakness in your position. Does QM strengthen your idea of FW, or just protect it from scrutiny? [/quote]

There contribution were exemplary and consistent in a deterministically hard "clockwork" universe. Since most evidence is strongly in favor or an indeterministic QM universe, their contribution must be weighed and judged accordingly. [/quote]

This is simply not true. Descates, amongst many other philosophers, did not think that, on the subject of free will, the universe was "clockwork." He claimed that a gland in the brain was an unmoved moved -- not that different from the uncaused causes you think exist in the brain and give people free will. Epicurus is another famous example.

[quote]I'm finding your reliance on past philosophers to be somewhat odd.  Can't your own arguments make the case for you?[/quote]

I have given original arguments for my case, which is only that your view of FW does not require QM (which you admit) and does not require determinism (here you "probably" disagree). I have also suggested that your account of FW does not deserve the name "free will", and I have suggested alternative definitions, but I am not going to press this case because we would only be arguing semantics.

[quote][quote]Likewise, most academic philosophers who work on the subject today have an understanding of QM that is comparable to my own. That so many experts could not even discuss the subject with you suggests a weakness in your position. Does QM strengthen your idea of FW, or just protect it from scrutiny? [/quote]

This is definitely not true. Have you done a sampling of all the philosophers to say this with any degree of certainty? I know of lots of philosophers and thinkers on the subject who agree with me. Again, are you going to stand on the weight of your own arguments, or do you insist on having your friends behind you? Does your insistence on using Aristotelian logic and a denial of the indeterminacy of QM strengthen your idea of no free will, or just protect it from scrutiny?[/quote]

This was a very curious paragraph. Who are these philosophers and thinkers who agree with you? Of course I have not sampled the opinions of philosophers directly but I am familiar with most of them, especially those who appeal to QM to defend free will. Am I protected by my "friends" behind me? Philosopher who work on the subject of free will, today and historically, are not my friends and my arguments do not depend upon their views. I was only drawing attention to how peculiar your ideas are. My insistence on using Aristotelian logic helps me think -- logic *is* thinking -- I do not know how anyone could do philosophy without logic. Finally, I do not deny that QM is indeterminate. I never have. This should be irrelevant, however, because you admit that your idea of FW does not depend upon QM. So we can stop talking about QM and focus on metaprograms.

#13 PaulH

  • Topic Starter
  • Guest
  • 116 posts
  • 0
  • Location:Global

Posted 25 April 2004 - 10:54 PM

I have only a short time to respond, so this will have to do. Sorry if it's not an adequate response for you. If not, then we will have to agree to disagree for now, as I simply do not have the time.

Aristotelian logic is not logic, it is only one type of logic, just as the human mind is only one type of mind in the general set of minds. Arguing exclusively from an Aristotelian point of view is completely quaint. For example, if I say I am not a dogmatic communist, does this mean I must automatically be a dogmatic capitalist? If I don't believe dogmatically in X, does this mean I have to believe dogmatically in not-X or the reverse of X? From an Aristotelian point of view it certainly does! So dude, your failure to either grasp or acknoweldge other more useful logical frameworks is growing thin. Not to mention that without multivariate "fuzzy" logical systems, there wouldn't exist the growing science of neural networks. That fact alone should be most telling!

If we look at FW as either something we absolutely have or don't have, as you continue to insist on then yes, absolute FW is incompatible with determism. I've said this a couple of times, so I'm still confused why you think I'm dodging the issue. As I have been arguing from the very beginning, I define FW as something that is not black and white, but rather fuzzy along a continuum of 0 to 1. Although absolute FW requires something like indetermism, what's most important is empirically demonstrated requirment of a conscious receptor to collapse that indeterminism, which in turn means that consciousness is a primary fundamental. Indeterminacy helps, because it means that without conscious choice there is no deterministic outcome.

Then again, perhaps we are talking about two different things when we discuss free will. I don't think it's nearly as simple as we either have it or don't have it. I think it is plainly obvious that there are just way too many things in our immediate enviorment that prohibits absolute free will... especially in an enviromentally responsive way. We are only human afterall, with limited genetics and survival imperatives. For example, I can't choose not to eat without dying at some point.

In the mind however, there is increasing levels of free will, as I think I have demonstrated. And this increased level of freedom slowly creeps out into the real world by our actions, first in our immediate environment, under very limited conditions, then altering our genes, then matter-energy-space-time itself. Until the quantum observer regress is completly self-recursive, existing simulataneously in a state of indeterminancy and a chosen collapsed wave function. I would call this quantum conciousness, and I believe we can tap into it inside the domain of our minds, and eventually this may become completely externalized, with some sort of "quantum" or "onto-technology".

Paul


Trying to understand how consciousness works in the brain while limiting our study entirely to the physical aspects of the brain, is like trying to taste a peach through a microscope. - Edward Close, Ph.D.

Edited by planetp, 25 April 2004 - 11:46 PM.


#14 John Doe

  • Guest
  • 291 posts
  • 0

Posted 26 April 2004 - 01:09 AM

Aristotelian logic is not logic, it is only one type of logic, just as the human mind is only one type of mind in the general set of minds.  Arguing exclusively from an Aristotelian point of view is completely quaint. For example, if I say I am not a dogmatic communist, does this mean I must automatically be a dogmatic capitalist?  If I don't believe dogmatically in X, does this mean I have to believe dogmatically in not-X or the reverse of X?  From an Aristotelian point of view it certainly does!  So dude, your failure to either grasp or acknoweldge other more useful logical frameworks is growing thin.  Not to mention that without multivariate "fuzzy" logical systems, there wouldn't exist the growing science of neural networks. That fact alone should be most telling!


This is what you meant by "Aristotelian logic?" I am not an expert in ancient philosophy but I am fairly sure that Aristotle did not mean this. In any case, why do you think that I am using logic in this fallacious way?

Of course !dogmatic communist does not imply dogmatic capitalist. It simply implies !dogmatic communist. Whatever you are, you are not a dogmatic communist. You could be passionate but not quite dogmatic. You could be apathetic. You could be fascist. There a countless number of things you could be. This is one of the first things we learn in an introduction to logic course.

But why do you think that I am committing this fallacy? How so?

If we look at FW as either something we absolutely have or don't have, as you continue to insist on then yes, absolute FW is incompatible with determism. I've said this a couple of times, so I'm still confused why you think I'm dodging the issue.  As I have been arguing from the very beginning, I define FW as something that is not black and white, but rather fuzzy along a continuum of 0 to 1. Although absolute FW requires something like indetermism, what's most important is empirically demonstrated requirment of a conscious receptor to collapse that indeterminism, which in turn means that consciousness is a primary fundamental.  Indeterminacy helps, because it means that without conscious choice there is no deterministic outcome.


So if FWA signifies "free will does admit of degrees" your argument is:

!FWA -> incompatibilism
!FWA -> "something like indeterminism"

and

!conscious choice -> !deterministic outcome
deterministic outcome -> conscious choice


Of course, you assert FWA, so if we take the contrapositive:

!incompatibilism -> FWA
!"something like indeterminism" -> FWA

And if you negate incompatibilism:

compatibilism -> FWA
"something like determinism" -> FWA

You say that your argument in blue "helps". Why? I think this is the heart of the disagreement between you and I. How does the premise "deterministic outcome -> conscious choice" help your case for free will?

Furthermore, your arguments in blue depend upon one interpretation of QM. If this interpretation turns out to be wrong, these arguments fail. Do you agree?

Of course, we disagree about the premise FWA. This is a disagreement on definition. The only way to decide what the term "free will" ought to mean is to examine its common usage. Against FWA, most philosophers and theologians (who have always been very concerned with free will) define the term in a more absolute sense than you do. What arguments can you use to support FWA?

If we examine what you wrote above, you argue that FWA follows from compatibilism or something like determinism. Why? Likewise, I agree with you that "it is plainly obvious that there are just way too many things in our immediate enviorment that prohibits absolute free will" but from this premise the conclusion does not follow that free will is something that admits of degrees.

But whether or not we call two different things the same name is trivial. I am more interested to know why you think indeterminism, or the premise "deterministic outcome -> conscious choice" helps your case for FW. I still suspect that the sort of FW you describe (metaprogramming) is perfectly compatible with a fully deterministic universe. The view you describe is an awkward mix between one interpretation of QM and the idea of self-modifying programs, but it is not at all clear how the former relates to the latter, or if the former is even necessary. This is something you seem reluctant to admit. It might help if you gave a precise definition of what free will is and requires.

#15 bgwowk

  • Guest
  • 1,715 posts
  • 125

Posted 26 April 2004 - 08:56 PM

Paul wrote:

Quick breakdown of QM interpretations.

1) Local Hidden Variables: Impossible

2) Non-Local Hidden Variables: Possible (Bohm)

3) Locality without Hidden Variables: Possible (Consistent Histories, Many Worlds)

4) No Locality nor Hidden Variables: Possible (Copenhagen)

Despite the advancements in Quantum Computing, Aspects Experiment has been repeated many times providing strength to non-locality and the necessity of the conscious observer. As of yet, Bell's theorem has not been disproved. The double-slit experiment provides strength to no hidden variables. Combined they provide strength to the Copenhagen Interpretation.


Absolutely not. Bell's theorem simply shows that results predicted by quantum mechanics cannot be generated by any local hidden variable theory. Aspect's experiment simply shows that the results predicted by quantum mechanics pertinent to Bell's theorem are correct. Therefore the combination of Bell's theorem and Aspect's experiment simply proves your point #1 (i.e. that local hidden variables are impossible). That's all.

Bell's theorem, Aspect's experiment, and the double-slit experiment are all neutral with respect to 2, 3 and 4 above. All observational facts are equally compatible with 2, 3 or 4. However, if we impose the requirement of consistency with Einstein's theory of relativity, then only 3 survives. Another stunning feature of 3 is that its axiom set is smaller than any other interpretation. MWI is the smallest set of assumptions that explains all observational data.

Of course, besides arbitrary axioms and violation of relativity, another problem with 4 is that it doesn't really "explain" anything. The Copenhagen Interpretation, as formulated by Bohr, simply tells you that it's wrong to try to explain QM. It is an "explanation" that is defined as non-explanation. That was why Einstein hated it. Grafting "consciousness" onto the Copenhagen Interpretation, as was done by New Agers in the 1970s, doesn't really make it any more explanatory.

The majority of experimental evidence has conscious receptors as an integral and necessary 'cause' to any quantum event.



You keep saying this, but there is no experimental basis for it. What appears as wavefunction collapse to macroscopic beings can be explained perfectly well by decoherence effects in macroscopic measurement systems without invoking any collapse at all. Adding a collapse axiom when none is necessary to explain observation is a violation of Occam's Razor. Now *that's* dogma.

---BrianW

#16 PaulH

  • Topic Starter
  • Guest
  • 116 posts
  • 0
  • Location:Global

Posted 27 April 2004 - 12:44 AM

BrianW said:

The majority of experimental evidence has conscious receptors as an integral and necessary 'cause' to any quantum event.


You keep saying this, but there is no experimental basis for it. What appears as wavefunction collapse to macroscopic beings can be explained perfectly well by decoherence effects in macroscopic measurement systems without invoking any collapse at all. Adding a collapse axiom when none is necessary to explain observation is a violation of Occam's Razor. Now *that's* dogma.


Quoting that certain experiments supports a certain hypothesis is not dogma. Dogma is when someone asserts that there position is THE ONE and ONLY correct interpretation. The best we can do is say the jury is still out, which is exactly what I've said twice so far in this debate. I have never claimed my position is THE correct one, only that super-free will is a compelling possibility with conciousness-collapsiing-the-wave-function. I love the various "esemble" theories too, esepcially Tegmark's sublime descriptions. However there is no supporting evidence for it either. Interesting, Dr Cramer gave a brilliant talk at Texas A*M University today where he says MWI has been invalidated.. Here is more information:

http://mist.npl.wash...iqm/TI_toc.html

Another shot at MWI is that Non-locality has indeed been demonstrated - see "Experimental test of quantum nonlocality in three-photon Greenberger–Horne–Zeilinger entanglement", Pan et al, Nature 403, 515 - 519 (2000).

So using Occams Razor, #3 can be thrown out just as easily as #1 or #4.

Grafting "consciousness" onto the Copenhagen Interpretation, as was done by New Agers in the 1970s, doesn't really make it any more explanatory.


Now that's funny! [lol] The concept of consciousness collapsing the wave function was first proposed by Darwin (1929), then von Neumann (1932) and Wigner (1962). If you read your physics history books, Bohr, Wigner, Von Neuman, Schrodinger and DeBroglie all invoked consciousness to some degree when discussing QM. "New Agers" had nothing to do with it!

Edited by planetp, 27 April 2004 - 01:01 AM.


#17 bgwowk

  • Guest
  • 1,715 posts
  • 125

Posted 27 April 2004 - 06:29 PM

Interesting, Dr Cramer gave a brilliant talk at Texas A*M University today where he says MWI has been invalidated.. Here is more information:

http://mist.npl.wash...iqm/TI_toc.html


There is nothing at this URL that invalidates MWI. In fact, this URL contains serious misunderstandings of MWI.

With each splitting of the universe, spatial regions megaparsecs distant from an event locus are instantaneously split into alternate realities due to the distant quantum event. It would seem that both the propagation speed of the splitting and its simultaneity are manifestly inconsistent with relativistic invariance.


All MWI says is that state vectors never collapse. Light and matter continue to move at their normal speeds. There is no "instantaneous" splitting of space across megaparsecs (a relativistically meaningness notion). This paper also misrepresents the "arrow of time" issue in MWI, but I won't bother going there.

Another shot at MWI is that Non-locality has indeed been demonstrated - see "Experimental test of quantum nonlocality in three-photon Greenberger–Horne–Zeilinger entanglement", Pan et al, Nature 403, 515 - 519 (2000).


Again, misunderstanding of MWI. The "non-locality" of GHZ is the same "non-locality" as EPR, and both experiments can be explained locally by MWI. Non-locality only appears by assuming state vector collapse, which is an unnecessary assumption because you can still get the experimentally observed results by assuming that the state vector never collapses. If you assume state vector collapse, and then conclude QM is non-local, that's a circular argument.

Now that's funny!  The concept of consciousness collapsing the wave function was first proposed by Darwin (1929), then von Neumann (1932) and Wigner (1962). If you read your physics history books, Bohr, Wigner, Von Neuman, Schrodinger and DeBroglie all invoked consciousness to some degree when discussing QM. "New Agers" had nothing to do with it!


I stand corrected.

I do not assert that MWI must be correct. In fact, it is falsifiable. (If gravity turns out to be a non-quantum phenomenon, that will blow MWI out of the water.) But I do assert that it is presently the philosophically "cleanest" theory that requires the fewest assumptions to explain all observed phenomena. In fact, it explains phenomena that other quantum theories can't even touch, such as why physical constants are so finely tuned to support life.

The Copenhagen interpretation (or variants that replace "observer" with "consciousness") has never been a clean, or even complete theory. The incompleteness is the absense of a clear definition of the "Heisenberg cut" between observer and observed. Until this interpretation is cleaned up into something unambiguous, it barely qualifies as an interpretation in my books. I personally believe it only has the status it does because it was the first thing cooked up, and carries on by force of intertia and even (to some extent) religious bias. Religious bias was clearly evident a couple of years ago when Martin Gardner trashed MWI in Skeptical Inquirer by saying, "God created only one universe." Perhaps this should be called Doe's "fifth conceit" (to the extent it isn't already subsumed by his fourth).

---BrianW

#18 John Doe

  • Guest
  • 291 posts
  • 0

Posted 27 April 2004 - 08:49 PM

Again, I am no expert, but I always found this quote telling:

"Oxford's Deutsch, the man who is recognized for starting the revolution, reminds us that quantum theory requires the existence of multiple universes. He believes instruments built using the principles of quantum computers might let us probe the multidimensional fabric of reality, just as telescopes and microscopes grant us entry to the realms beyond our planets and the worlds within our cells."

http://www.popularme...rs/index3.phtml

#19 bgwowk

  • Guest
  • 1,715 posts
  • 125

Posted 27 April 2004 - 09:55 PM

"Oxford's Deutsch, the man who is recognized for starting the revolution, reminds us that quantum theory requires the existence of multiple universes.


Hawking has also called MWI "trivially true." And consider this from the MW FAQ:

"Political scientist" L David Raub reports a poll of 72 of the "leading
cosmologists and other quantum field theorists" about the "Many-Worlds
Interpretation" and gives the following response breakdown [T].
       
1) "Yes, I think MWI is true"                    58%
2) "No, I don't accept MWI"                      18%
3) "Maybe it's true but I'm not yet convinced"  13%
4) "I have no opinion one way or the other"      11%

Amongst the "Yes, I think MWI is true" crowd listed are Stephen Hawking
and Nobel Laureates Murray Gell-Mann and Richard Feynman.  Gell-Mann and
Hawking recorded reservations with the name "many-worlds", but not with
the theory's content.  Nobel Laureate Steven Weinberg is also mentioned
as a many-worlder, although the suggestion is not when the poll was
conducted, presumably before 1988 (when Feynman died).  The only "No,
I don't accept MWI" named is Penrose.

The findings of this poll are in accord with other polls, that many-
worlds is most popular amongst scientists who may rather loosely be
described as string theorists or quantum gravitists/cosmologists.  It
is less popular amongst the wider scientific community who mostly remain
in ignorance of it.


Let me explain why MWI is integral to quantum cosmology, and why even Paul believes in Many Worlds, but just doesn't realize it. ;)

Among other things, the large scale structure of galaxy clusters in the universe can be shown to result from quantum fluctuations during the earliest moments of the Big Bang. But obviously there were no "conscious beings" to collapse the Big Bang state vector into particular components that would later become galaxy clusters. So the consciousness-collapses-the-wavefunction interpretation forces us to conclude that many different universes with different galaxy cluster patterns continued to coexist in quantum superposition until that magical moment when the first conscious being (whatever that means) appeared and suddenly caused all universes with a layout different from ours to collapse and disappear.

So even consciousness-collapses-the-wavefunction advocates necessarily believe in multiple universes, except that they all went poof when the first life appeared. My point is why believe in "poof" when it can be shown mathematically that all the different universes would be quantum mechanically incoherent, and unable to see each other anyway?

---BrianW

#20 PaulH

  • Topic Starter
  • Guest
  • 116 posts
  • 0
  • Location:Global

Posted 28 April 2004 - 06:56 AM

Interesting point Brian, but my supposition is that consciousness (qualia) is a primary fundamental. Not self-reflexive consciousness like you and I enjoy, as that is obviously the result of emergent complexity, and thus descriptively the "easy problem". Rather, consciousness as it's own quanta. Have you read David Chalmers?

The irony of this position is that despite it's hypothetical non-materialist nature, it does not contradict computationalism (uploading), materialism, or ANY QM interpretation. Whatever turns out to be the most accurate physical theory would in turn shape the properties/limits of what that consciousness is within that framework.

So IF conciousness-collapses-the-wavefunction is correct (and it may not be), then it does not require (using Chalmer's hypothesis) the rise of a certain complexity minimum (easy problem), as that primary consciousness (hard problem, qualia) is pre-existent in the fabric of the universe itself. So consciousness-collapsing-the-wavefunction exists from the very beginning.

Please keep in mind I am only describing this from a strictly philosophical point of view, not what is actually true.

#21 bgwowk

  • Guest
  • 1,715 posts
  • 125

Posted 30 April 2004 - 01:21 AM

Whatever turns out to be the most accurate physical theory would in turn shape the properties/limits of what that consciousness is within that framework.


Agreed. Having said that, it must be remembered that the contact point of consciousness with science is neurobiology. The physical phenomena that correlate with consciousness will ultimately be determined by neurobiologists, not physicists. There is no a priori reason to believe that these phenomena are intrinsically quantum mechanical. The operation of our mind may well be entirely deterministic in the classical sense.

None of this detracts from the sublime importance of consciousness in the universe, or the subjective reality of free will. Since subjective reality is ultimately what we all deal with, and it is through subjective free will that intelligent life may ultimately reshape the universe (in a Tiplerian sense), I actually agree with your premise that "free will" is a very fundamental parameter in the universe. However I believe it is very important to properly distinguish between subjective parameters and objective parameters so that we can develop the best possible theories of objective reality to better model and control our subjective experience.

---BrianW

#22 PaulH

  • Topic Starter
  • Guest
  • 116 posts
  • 0
  • Location:Global

Posted 30 April 2004 - 06:56 AM

Brian,

Well said. :)

I mostly agree and wanted to add that my only other conjecture, is the possibility that certain visionary states of consciousness might be explained by quantum mechanical means. Even if that turns out not to be the case, there should come a point when it will, when nanotechnology outstrips neurobiology as the defining factor of intellegence and conscious experience. There is no reason to think this process will not continue until the most basic building blocks of the physical universe are being manipulated by consciousness and intellience - contelligence - for its own enhancement and experience. Hans Moravec and Kurzweil have suggested logical elements using exotic (super-dense) matter or some other technology past nano- as potential future "computronium".

#23 micah

  • Guest
  • 24 posts
  • 0

Posted 01 May 2004 - 05:16 AM

The historical FW vs Determinism debate is irrelevent.

In order for FW to exist, the MWI of QM MUST be true. Unless someone actually makes all the choices available to him, it is meaningless to suggest that those choices were actually available to him.

The only other possible meaning of FW (as opposed to determinism) would be randomness. I have no problem with that definition.

-micah

#24 PaulH

  • Topic Starter
  • Guest
  • 116 posts
  • 0
  • Location:Global

Posted 01 May 2004 - 07:49 PM

Actaully Micah, if Brian is correct then MWI is not incompatible with a lack of FW. As I have argued, and I suspect you will agree, absolute free will would need something like QM indeterminancy or randomness to exist. However, indeterminancy and randomness are not necessarily the same thing. For example, not all randomness is indeterminant, and not all indeterminancy is random, especially IF concious choice is the thing collapsing the wave function.

My argument ultimately rests on the supposition that consciousness is the primary "stuff" of the universe. There is compelling evidence as well as a logical framework (See David Chalmers) this is the case, but in all fairness the jury is still way out on this one. :)

#25 MichaelAnissimov

  • Guest
  • 905 posts
  • 1
  • Location:San Francisco, CA

Posted 04 May 2004 - 04:16 AM

Wow, a very fascinating discussion. I agree with Brian W. about everything. Another easy way to test MWI is to take a conscious measurement (of a photon or electron), make another observation that shares mutual information with the first, then reverse it, then make the first observation again and check your answer. MWI predicts that the worlds merge back into each other. Copenhagen doesn't.

Copenhagen disallows the existence of anything without an observer. How did the multiverse get started, then? It would require a conscious observer popping into existence randomly as a First Cause. This seems harder to explain than individual particles popping into existence randomly, although explaining the latter is clearly not easy.

#26 PaulH

  • Topic Starter
  • Guest
  • 116 posts
  • 0
  • Location:Global

Posted 04 May 2004 - 05:35 AM

Michael Wrote,

How did the multiverse get started, then? It would require a conscious observer popping into existence randomly as a First Cause. This seems harder to explain than individual particles popping into existence randomly, although explaining the latter is clearly not easy.


Actually Michael, no matter what you prefer to think of as the first cause - a particle, a singularity, a string, brane, or a conscious singelton, they are ALL equally hard to explain, because no matter what it is, it's completely arbitrary, especially since it was something that popped from nothing. And from a philosphical perspective of nothingness, anything at all, existence itself is just plain weird. I've actually written a lot on this very topic, but I don't want to pollute this otherwise focused conversation. :)

#27 hughbristic

  • Guest Hugh Bristic
  • 137 posts
  • 0

Posted 04 May 2004 - 10:37 PM

I just wanted to throw in my 2 cents and say, as best I can follow, I agree with John and Brian, and I appreciate the patience they have shown in responding to Paul's article and posts. As Paul so frequently points out, it is hard to find the time to engage in such online debates. However, I appreciate that there are intelligent people who do not let such stuff go unchallenged and do so with more courtesy and intelligence than I could muster.

Hugh

#28 John Doe

  • Guest
  • 291 posts
  • 0

Posted 05 May 2004 - 08:11 AM

My argument ultimately rests on the supposition that consciousness is the primary "stuff" of the universe.  There is compelling evidence as well as a logical framework (See David Chalmers) this is the case, but in all fairness the jury is still way out on this one. :)


PlanetP, I still challenge you to show how this premise, that consciousness is the "primary 'stuff' of the universe", helps your case for free will. Please how this interpretation of QM is integrated with your account of metaprogramming, and how the combination of these two produce free will.

#29 PaulH

  • Topic Starter
  • Guest
  • 116 posts
  • 0
  • Location:Global

Posted 06 May 2004 - 03:07 AM

John,

Thanks for the challenge, but that is what I thought I've been doing since the beginning. Actually, I've grown quite weary of these boards, especially in light of comments like Hugh Bristic's, with their veiled disparaging undertones.

My time is VERY limited and it's comments like those that motivated me to distance myself from the Extropian community a few years ago. Increasingly I feel the only reason I'm tolerated here at Imminst (with a few exceptions), is for those people who need a good "whipping boy" to further cement their pre-existing beliefs, and I'm just not going to play along anymore.

So I'm going to make this very easy.


You win. You're right.


Hopefully this will make everyone whose beliefs I've challenged feel better. I know I do. :)

Edited by planetp, 06 May 2004 - 05:59 AM.


#30 Bruce Klein

  • Guardian Founder
  • 8,794 posts
  • 242
  • Location:United States

Posted 06 May 2004 - 06:41 AM

Paul,

You bring a wealth of knowledge to the table, and I appreciate your time and thoughtful discussion. As you know, we're really all just whipping boys to the cruel hand of aging and death.

Bruce




1 user(s) are reading this topic

0 members, 1 guests, 0 anonymous users