Let's be clear here, I don't think we die at every moment or every time we go to sleep, and I don't think it is only an abstract philosophical statement. Let's shape the problem in the simplest way possible.
Let's say I'm standing at point A and I want to move to point B. I have two means to do it.
Mean 1: I walk from point A to point B.
Mean 2: Scientists create a clone of myself in point B and kill me at point A.
In both instances, to an exterior observer, I have been effectively transfered from A to B. But for me, if you allow me to choose which mean I prefer, I prefer mean 1. I don't think it is just a philosophical matter.
Mean 1: I think I am me when I leave point A and I am still me when I arrive to point B.
Mean 2: I think when scientists create a clone of me (unconnected by anything, assuming telepathy is still impossible), then this is a whole new person, however identical, that is not me. And when they kill me, I cease to exist from my own perspective. The existence of any number of clones or virtual copies of my mind stored anywhere do not change anything to that.
This is what I feel sure of. Now, imagine a scale of human experiences ranging from 1 (being alive from my own perspective) to 2 (death from my own perspective). Here is how I would intuitively classify them (I don't have any proof of that obviously)
Day to day awake moments: 1
Day dreaming: 1
Going to sleep: 1
Being uploaded progressively (Moravec transfer (http://www.accelerat...t-is-uploading/)): 1
Going into coma: Unsure
Going into full anaesthesia: Unsure
Having my brain cool down for a neural surgery: Unsure
Dying: 2
Dying while having an identical twin: 2
Dying while having an identical clone: 2
Dying, but having an identical clone made of me in the future: 2
Dying, but having my body cryogenically preserved, then unfrozen and brought back to life: 2
Sadly, since this is highly subjective, I don't think science will ever be able to tackle with this issue. All we can use is thought experiments. And if I was myself a clone, I would have no mean to know it anyway.
Saying that you're dead, as in informational theoretical dead (opposed to the other sorts of dead which medicine brings people back from all the time), when you go into cryonics is BEGGING THE QUESTION then, as assuming they can revive you, it's no different than any other case where consciousness is temporarily halted and then resumed. Consciousness is not merely a function of the volatile, electrical activity in the brain because that's been stopped in multiple people and all that's missing is the couple of minutes around when it was stopped. I think that if there is any case of temporary halting in brain function that you accept as still the same person, then you have to accept cryonics. If there isn't such a case, you're not worth arguing with because there's a lot of people out there living after having experienced that, and believing that they're not the same person implies you believe in a duality of brain and mind, which I think is an empty position that isn't even worth trying to refute.
I doubt that there is any guy who lost his neuro-electrical activity and is still alive. Note: we are not just talking about plain brain waives used to declare the death of a guy or measure sleep phases. We are talking about the inter-neuronal acitivty - if you loose the electric potentials of the axons of your neurons and the ongoing electrochemical potential at your synapsis you are simply dead as your braincells no longer can interact. Whether consciousness goes beyond your neural acitivty can be surely argued about - but certainly it is a major part of it.