158 replies to this topic

[irichc]

As simple as this:

What is the difference between my body and the other bodies which I could call "my body"?

Imagine that, in a Christlike style, I take some bread and say: "This is my body". But obviously it wouldn't be my body, because it isn't a part of my organism. The same goes if I point to the body of my fellow and I state that it is mine. My question, then, is: how can I distinguish between my body and all the other bodies which I could call "my body", although they wouldn't turn immediately into a part of it for that reason?

If you answer that there is a different arrangement of cells, I would reply that the different parts of your body are quite unlike from each other, so it wouldn't solve the problem. Otherwise, I would have infinite bodies and not just one.

If you state that my body, taken as a whole, has specific properties that make it different from another one, I will object that, despite of this, our body changes at every second, and nevertheless we don't get constantly a new body, but we keep the same one.

Thus, which might be the correct answer?

I can have a functioning brain but, if I don't want to move myself, I won't. The brain doesn't determine any self-movement, my soul does. Even if I decide not to move, I'll be doing another activity instead of that. And, as far as nothing exists without an activity, the soul can't stop thinking.

Everything needs a sufficient reason to move or to be moved. The sufficient reason of a moved thing is its mover. But, what's the sufficient reason of a self-moving thing? If we say it is in its own body, we should state that there is an infinite succession of causes in every self-movement or that it is uncaused. However, both choices are wrong, since if self-movement is uncaused, it would be also involuntary; and, if it requires an infinite amount of causes, it would never start. Thus, my answer (and Leibniz's one) is that every self-moving individual has a sufficient reason to move, which isn't in his body, but in his soul. The soul is the active principle or force that matter needs to leave its inertial passivity.

Greetings.

Daniel.

[John Doe]

Some comments:

1. There is no self. The sooner you recognize this, the sooner will stop searching for something that does not exist.
2. The brain never stops moving. Even when you think to yourself "I am not moving now", that thought itself correlates with movement in your brain.

Prometheus, I am adding the verse in your signature to my list of favorite quotations.

[eres]

Study a little genetics and you soon realize that we are all nothing more than complex chemical reactions. Come to terms with it, and then you can pursue scientific means to continue you, the reaction.

[Clifford Greenblatt]

Study a little genetics and you soon realize that we are all nothing more than complex chemical reactions.  Come to terms with it, and then you can pursue scientific means to continue you, the reaction.

This comment is based on a materialist philosophy. It assumes that nothing but physical processes are real.

[lightowl]

I have another perspective on this 'believing in a soul' thing. I think I don't believe in a soul simply because I don't have a reason to. I tend to believe in things that have been proven, if I don't have a specific reason to make up my own mind as to what to believe.

If there is some scientific proof that there is a 'soul' in every human being ( or any living being ) then I am certain I would begin to consider the possibility. Until then, I don't really care about that 'soul' stuff.

Also, the definition of the word 'soul' is vague to say the least. If we cant even come to an agreement on what the meaning for the word 'soul' should be, then lets stop discussing it and continue with something that shows a little promise.

http://dictionary.re...m/search?q=soul

[Clifford Greenblatt]

I have another perspective on this 'believing in a soul' thing. I think I don't believe in a soul simply because I don't have a reason to. I tend to believe in things that have been proven, if I don't have a specific reason to make up my own mind as to what to believe.

If there is some scientific proof that there is a 'soul' in every human being ( or any living being ) then I am certain I would begin to consider the possibility. Until then, I don't really care about that 'soul' stuff.

Also, the definition of the word 'soul' is vague to say the least. If we cant even come to an agreement on what the meaning for the word 'soul' should be, then lets stop discussing it and continue with something that shows a little promise.

http://dictionary.re...m/search?q=soul

Here is a proposed test for the presence of a soul that may practical implications. This test does not deal at all with the issue of whether a soul is material, supernatural, or otherwise.
If there is only one thing about yourself that you would temporarily not want to be present in a time of severe personal suffering, what would it be? Suppose noone outside of you would be able to tell the difference. What would that one thing be?

[lightowl]

Hmmm... only one thing you say.

I would say my consciousness if you can define that as a thing. I would rather call it a state of mind. But if no one would notice. Then please remove all my pain receptors Although I think that would confuse my immune system. I don't really se how that test could make any impact in my belief in a 'soul', and to be honest, I don't know that much about the biomechanical systems in my body to know exactly what part of me to remove.

[Clifford Greenblatt]

Hmmm... only one thing you say.

I would say my consciousness if you can define that as a thing. I would rather call it a state of mind. But if no one would notice. Then please remove all my pain receptors Although I think that would confuse my immune system. I don't really se how that test could make any impact in my belief in a 'soul', and to be honest, I don't know that much about the biomechanical systems in my body to know exactly what part of me to remove.

Your belief in a "soul" would be impacted by the way it is defined. If a "soul" is defined as consciousness, then I think you would believe in a "soul."

Suppose none of your pain receptors are receiving signals but your imagination is making you feel pain? Suppose your pain receptors are sending intense signals to your brain and your brain is responding to them subconsciously but not consciously?

Here is another idea about the soul as applied to AI. What would a machine need for you to be concerned about the possibility that it could suffer? Could it have a pseudoconsciouness that is so advanced that it gives all the external appearances of suffereing and yet be incapable of suffering internally?

Finally, if you were to be duplicated, what about you would need to be included for you to truly be satisified that the duplicate is really you?

[lightowl]

I think we are biological machines. What makes our consciousness is the complexity of our brain. What makes what we call us, is our experiences. This is my conviction, a 'soul' is irrelevant to me.

[jaydfox]

I think an interesting way to help clarify this issue for those who don't believe in a soul is the concept of duplication.

Let's say that an exact duplicate of you is made. Not just down to the structural level, or the cellular, or the cellular mechanics level, or even the molecular level. If the highest level of fidelity physically possible were used (quantum states if possible), would that new physical creation be you? What if the "old" you were simultaneously destroyed in the making of the "new" you, so that you can't point to the old you and say, "No, I'm still over here!"?. Would it still be you? The new you would certainly think so. The new "you" would have a steady stream of consciousness of your whole life experience, to whatever degree you currently possess such a steady stream. And then, poof, "you" suddenly go from here to there. Ignore the consequences of the disorientation of a sudden jump; that could be resolved through trivial means (being destroyed and recreated in identical rooms, with identical lighting and atmospheric conditions, etc.)

That new "you" can't possibly be you. (If you think so, consider the flipside of this case; the old you wasn't destroyed. There can't be two of "you".) Actions, thoughts, emotions, etc., will all be the same. But it's not you. Some intrinsic property makes you, well, you. It's not structures, or atoms. It's you.

I apologize for using the Star Trek transporter as an analogy. But in all seriousness...

This could be viewed as idle speculation, a logic game which is an end unto itself. Does this analogy even matter if we're never posed with this possibility in real life? But this line of reasoning has very real applications.

Cryonics lays questions like this at our feet. If you were to be vitrified by Alcor or another such institution, what measures would you want them to perform to ensure that the physical body that comes out of the process in 100 years from now is really "you"? After all, if it's not you, what's the point? Let's assume that you opt for neurosuspension, because the brain is the seat of the mind, of your consiousness. Let's further assume that you preserve not just you brain, but the first several inches of the spinal cord, perhaps as far down as the nerves that go to the heart, or the liver (or heck, why not the whole thing down to the base of the spine?). This way you preserve some of your physical reflexes that help define your responses to stress, fear, anxiety, love, etc.

So they'll have to build you a new body. No big deal. But they'll also have to repair quite a bit of damage in your brain. What if this entails using nanobots to completely rebuild each neuron, each interneural connection, and indeed the exact configuration of each connection, with the exact number of transmitter and receptor sites and their alignment relative to the sites on other cells, chemical concentrations, etc.?

This repair work could be done in situ, or they could just create a whole new brain, atom by atom, using the frozen one as a template.

The newly formed person would have all your memories, all your personality traits, your phobias, dreams, and aspirations. The new person will have your style of thinking, your methods of analyzing, of internalizing what you learn, and synthesizing that with what you have already learned. To that new person, your "death" will simply be like an extended sleep session or a short coma (short in the sense that from a biochemical perspective, only a few hours would have passed).

But is that new person really you? What critically defines that? Is it a requirement that the repairs be made in situ, even if the outcome is physically identical to the outcome had they made a copy, and kept your old brain vitrified?

Or would you go so far as to say that "you" has no meaning? Would you contend that "we" do not really exist, that our consiousness is just a figment of our imaginations? Oh wait, a figment of the chemical processes that drive our brains?

I am totally cool with having it both ways. I think, therefore I am. And yet, I do not deny the physical underpinnings of my consiousness. We can alter our minds with chemical and physical changes. I'm not saying I don't think we'll have the ability to conquer the mysteries of the mind, and to alter ourselves as we see fit. In doing so, we have the power to destroy our "selves" (or, more appropriately, change beyond recognition), those parts of us that determine how we react to the world around us, and remember the past.

But at some fundamental level, there is a part of me which is not defined physically. I don't see the value of making a copy of myself, because it's not me. That copy would be a new person.

As for cryonics, I'm still debating where I stand on this. One thing I know for sure; if the repair work isn't made in situ, then my "soul" will be lost. Whether repairs made in situ will preserve my soul or not, I haven't decided. But I don't want a copy made. If it comes to that, then don't bother. You may as well just create a new person from birth, and let him live his own life. Why stick him with my baggage?

Jay Fox

[chubtoad]

This concept of "you" is now in my brains catcher category with the term "free will". They are both words that are can only be roughly defined, invented because it is difficult to take a truly materialistic world view. The only way this "you" can be defined seems to be by saying the thing that continues from ... to ... . There is consciousness observing it self at various instants in time. This whole continuing identity/"you" idea seems to be just an illusion. Can someone put a clear definition to this "you" idea that doesen't involve the thing that is still there from ... to ...?

[shedon666]

What is the difference between my body and the other bodies which I could call "my body"?......I take some bread and say: "This is my body". But obviously it wouldn't be my body, because it isn't a part of my organism.

it is known that each seperate cell and each seperate organ inside our own internal body has an individual consciousness and/or will, so to speak, even be it small. given that, imagine your the liver inside a human body, thinking to yourself, "eh, it does not matter if i commit suicide, for it only hurts me, and no other." obviously, without a liver, we as full bodies are dead. any partial substance missing from a whole is detriment to the whole when gone. so, referring to the bread and "this is my body", statement, the more intise question would be, "what part of my body is this? what does this substance include?". most humans, because of their homosapien-superiority-complex, forget that they are in the middle of things. there is indeed an external body, as the liver in the supplied analogy-story forgot.

A Question for Those Who Don't Believe in the Soul

i know that -i am- a soul, rather than -i have- a soul. the difference in the rhetoric supplies an extremely different science of the mind. the difference effects everything from perception to truth and all the quarks between.

Prometheus, I am adding the verse in your signature to my list of favorite quotations.

me too.

Study a little genetics and you soon realize that we are all nothing more than complex chemical reactions.

i have read or heard somewhere that it is also, at times, the other way around; every emotion has a chemical that represents it. is this a matter of the origin of the chicken or the egg? is it possible it could be a two-way street?

...................................................

i myself support both spiritual and hardcore science as an engine to this path of defiling Death as inevitable, simply because both have failed and succeeded to this date since the dawn of Life itself.

[bgwowk]

I don't know why people always get upset about personal duplication scenarios. It is a trivial issue. If you draw a "world line" for a human being in space time, it is a wavy line that has a beginning at some point in time. Every point on that line is a distinct copy of you. Every copy is equally you (by virtue of a shared past), even though you only perceive yourself as existing at one instant in time. The fact that you cannot simultaneous experience all past instances of yourself does not mean those past instances are not you, or that those past instances of you did not "survive".

Now consider that Einstein showed that space and time are the same "stuff", and are freely interchangeable depending on circumstances. Therefore, if the physical pattern of your mind is ever duplicated so that multiple copies of you exist at different points in space at the same time, the philosophical relationship between those different instances of you across space will be the same as the philosophical relationship between different instances of you across time. The fact that you cannot simulateneously experience all instances of yourself across space does not mean those instances are not you, or that any instances of you did not "survive".

Beliefs that only one duplicate can be the "real" you are pure mysticism. Such mysticism is a result of the failure to distinguish between the subjective and objective. Subjectively you can only experience one instance of you at a time, but that is eqally true across space or time. The fact that existance can only be *subjectively* experienced at a single point in space and time does not invalidate the *objective* existence of your personal identity across multiple points of space and time.

---BrianW

[Anne]

I would argue that the brain creates the functioning illusion of something we call "self" or "soul": that is, the sense of being a discrete consciousness with sole access to certain memories and emotions and inner states and interpretations. In fact, a sense of self might simply be the natural consequence of requiring "processing" of various events internally so that an appropriate reaction can be established. Sometime back in our evolution, humans developed the capacity to delay gratification, which I suspect is responsible for giving us a sense of time. We also sacrificed a large number of instinctive behaviors still in use by many other animals, for the sake of allowing greater customization of our actions to our environment.

There are plenty of good, practical reasons to have a sense of self that do not necessitate invoking of the supernatural.

I do not think that we currently have the means to determine whether uploading / copying / cloning / replacement of various bodily and neurological structures will or will not result in maintenance of the "original" sense of continuity of consciousness. I do note that people with replaced limbs / organs claim to be the same individuals as before the loss of the "original" parts, and I would be inclined to believe them. Nevertheless, I think that there is much to be learned from individuals with brain injuries and those who will eventually receive "replacement" neural circuitry for such things as motor control (in cases of paralysis) and vision. I have encountered individuals whose personalities have changed drastically after, for instance, an automobile accident.

The experience of self is highly subjective and malleable. Humans are vulnerable to delusions regarding their own identities. Therefore, I do not see the value or validity of positing something like a soul, that represents an individual independent of their brain states and structures. The health or existence of these structures drastically influences who we think we are.

I plan to go on existing as what I think is "me" for as long as possible. I am certainly going to sign up for cryonics as a means of "insurance" - after all, it is better than nothing! I suspect that someday frozen people will be able to be revived by means of nanotechnology. And I also suspect that this nanotech will need to take advantage of pattern-restoration algorithms in order to restore the "self" that was contained in a brain being thawed. I think that this would reliably produce a sense of continutity of consciousness. For every thought we have and every emotion we feel, there is a physical change in the universe. I imagine that at some point in the future the technology will exist to determine the chain of changes that led to a person's sense of identity.

[DJS]

Actually, Bgwowk's post really hit home for me and (from my perspective at least) made perfect sense. I'm not exaggerating when I say that it has given me a better understanding of the issues of consciousness and duplication. [thumb]

However to maintain that claim, the duplicate would need to be an exact copy in all possible aspects except position in space.

To be more specific, at the exact point of duplication the duplicate and original would have to be exact images of each other. Jaydfox raised the issue in the other thread that perhaps this is not possible, there may be physical restraints (I believe he referred to quantum physics) that would not allow for an exact copy to be made. If this is in fact the case then there will be immediate differences at the point of duplication between the duplicate and original. As a result this faulty copy would not be an extension of one's self in space.

This differs from Cryonics where one person's timeline continues past clinical death, even as some changes occur over time to the physical body in imperfect suspension. The key here being that the changes occur over time, rather than at the exact point of duplication as a result of duplication "errors".

If we acknowledge that, then perhaps the uniqueness of each being arises from the fact that they cannot be duplicated exactly. There is nothing very profound about that assertion, mystics would not be satisfied with that answer either, but if true it is sufficient reason not to use duplication as a process for extending lifespan (through generational duplicates).

Okay, I don't mean to be a jerk here but this entire argument is a Red Herring. The debate that was taking place was assuming that perfect duplication was possible... [mellow]

[DJS]

This concept of "you" is now in my brains catcher category with the term "free will".  They are both words that are can only be roughly defined, invented because it is difficult to take a truly materialistic world view.  The only way this "you" can be defined seems to be by saying the thing that continues from ...  to ... .  There is consciousness observing it self at various instants in time.  This whole continuing identity/"you" idea seems to be just an illusion.  Can someone put a clear definition to this "you" idea that doesen't involve the thing that is still there from ... to ...?

hhhmm, well Chubtoad I do not believe that I have an eternal soul (which I associate closely with the mystical concept of free will), but I most certainly do believe that "I" exist.

Self = Database

[eternaltraveler]

Here is a proposed test for the presence of a soul that may practical implications. This test does not deal at all with the issue of whether a soul is material, supernatural, or otherwise.
If there is only one thing about yourself that you would temporarily not want to be present in a time of severe personal suffering, what would it be? Suppose noone outside of you would be able to tell the difference. What would that one thing be?

I would want to be most present at a time of severe personal suffering. Such is life and I wouldn't give up one glorious moment of it.

[eternaltraveler]

lets look at this duplication scenerio in an entirely different way shall we. Forget this perfect quantum duplication stuff. Think of it this way.

Binary fission. When a bacteria splits which one is the original? Is either? Are both?

What if binary fission was possible for us. What if I could just split right down the middle to form two identical copies (even assume every one of my cells split with one half migrating one way and one half migrating the other)

Coming to the point. Are these two copies the same entity? NO. They very cleary are not the same entity anymore than two bacteria that came out of one are the same bacteria. And this idea extends to quatum level copies with 100% precision too. Whether or not you can tell which one is the original "you" it is quite clear that they are not the same entity. Whether or not you can treat time as a dimension just like space mathmatically it doesn't matter. The very definition of separate objects means they are separated by space.

Time is very very different than space practically. I can move in 3 dimensions of space no problem, but I can't do a damned thing about this damned dimension of time (which way do I point the thruster?). Sure accelerate me near the speed of light and my rate through time slows down, but I wouldn't even notice. The rest of the universe just sped up on me is all.

A super duper 100% quatum copy of me would not be me, it would be a child of my mind. Even if the two of us couldn't figure out which one was the original we would still know that we weren't the same guy anymore.

[DJS]

Ah, I got you Cosmos. I read the post as you trying to refute the claim -- my bad (can you see why I thought it was a Red Herring?)

[bgwowk]

cosmos wrote:

bgwowk, I wouldn't call the claim of self or unique identity pure mysticism.

I didn't say (or mean to say) that a belief in self was mysticism. I said that believing selfhood can survive multiple disparate instances across time, but not across space, is arbitrary and mystic.

By your standards, we exist in space and time, and a duplicate would simply be an extension of "you" in space where "you" are an extension of yourself in time.

However to maintain that claim, the duplicate would need to be an exact copy in all possible aspects except position in space.

To be more specific, at the exact point of duplication the duplicate and original would have to be exact images of each other.

No. That's a double standard. The physical state of your brain is changing constantly over time, and often punctuated by intervals of unconsciousness during which large changes take place (e.g. sleep, anesthesia, long comas). If you think that preservation of selfhood requires exact duplication, then you are still missing the point. YOU ALREADY REFUTE THIS DOCTRINE BY BELIEVING YOU ARE THE SAME PERSON IN THE MORNING THAT WENT TO SLEEP THE PREVIOUS NIGHT! If a Nov. 14 instance of you believes it is the same person as a Nov. 13 instance of you, then two Nov. 14 instances of you created in different points in space while you slept (each no different from the Nov. 13 instance than, say, the differences created by a good night's sleep) must also each believe they are the same person as the Nov. 13 instance of you. Of course, from Nov. 14 onward, the experience of both copies would diverge. So the copies would not believe that they were the same person as each other anymore. But they would both always believe and experience themselves as the same person as the Nov. 13 and prior instances of you by virtue of shared past memory.

Again, if you believe that all the multiple instances of you that exist across time-- despite their differences --are still you, then you must also believe that multiple instances of you can also exist across space. The standards you apply for exactness of spatial duplication must not be any more stringent that those you apply for preservation of selfhood by temporal duplication.

For copies across either space or time, it is shared past memory that creates a consistent sense of self. That is your "soul." As long as there is a person somewhere in space or time (at single or multiple points of either) that shares with some degree of fidelity the memories that you now have, that person will be you beyond any doubt. Indeed, that person (and all such persons) will insist on it.

Look at this another way. If we accept as an axiom that the activity and subjective experience of a mind depends exclusively on the brain that supports it, and if a brain is duplicated with the same fidelity of a good night's sleep, then both persons must awake and subjectively experience themself as the same person that went to sleep the night before. For they will both have the same brain that would naturally result from a good night's sleep of a single person. The conclusion of equivalent identity preservation follows directly and unvoidably from the axiom that mind has a physical basis. There is no avoiding it.

I humbly suggest, cosmos, that there is some unarticulated concern that is deeply bothering you about this. Could it simply be that there is no Judeo-Christian precedent for the concept of soul duplication?

I further suggest that your approach of concluding that there may be physical obstacles to duplication because of your (axiomatic?) belief that souls can't be duplicated is the wrong approach. The proper scientific approach to this question should be to first ask based on laws of physics whether physical duplication with reasonably fidelity (as defined above) is possible. Conclusions about whether souls can be duplicated should then follow from the outcome of that inquiry, not the other way around.

---BrianW

[eternaltraveler]

lets take a look at the life of a photon.

a photon is traveling at the speed of light (well duh, it is light). At the speed of light the dimension of time does not exist. A photon exists everywhere it will ever go in one moment.

Is a photon generated from my light bulb the same photon when it is 1 billion light years away? Remember, these two are only separated by space, they are not separated by time (relative to the photon).

I would argue that, yes, they are one and the same. Dimensional separation, either through space or time is not enough of a criteria for saying two things are separate. Therefore, all the serial me's that exist back through time are the same me despite a few changes along the way. (the photon is getting streched out by the expanding universe after all.)

disregard the part where I slightly contradict my previous post [wis]

[eternaltraveler]

Now the argument that I think you're making, and one I similarly made earlier in another thread, was that regardless of what the observer thinks, each copy knows that their thought processes are seperate from each other and if one of them were to be killed that would be the end for him. Both elronds, both divergent after the point of duplication, both do not want to die and would consider it a hollow victory to know their copy (a seperate but equally "elrond" person) was to continue the legacy of elrond. So even if 100% accurate copies are possible, even without the existance of unique self, each individual, each conscious sentient being is not of less value simply because it is duplicable.

you got it here.

[bgwowk]

cosmos wrote:

Even with slight duplication errors the copy probably would not know it was a copy, but if the copy is not 100% accurate of the true original at the point of duplication then it is not strictly the same person. I know that after the point of duplication both individuals diverge with their on their own timelines, but do you understand my contention here?

I believe I do understand your contention. But such a definition of "same personhood" (one requiring 100% copy accuracy) is contrary to all popular conceptions of personhood. If "sameness" requires 100% copy accuracy, then we are not the same person from moment to moment for our entire life. Anyone who *really* believed that would have no instinct for self-preservation at all.

You may not believe it, but *I* believe and regard myself as the same person over multiple decades of my life, and enormous changes (including complete atomic turnover) in my brain. Why? Because of shared past memory with past instances of "myself".

Now the argument that I think you're making, and one I similarly made earlier in another thread, was that regardless of what the observer thinks, each copy knows that their thought processes are seperate from each other and if one of them were to be killed that would be the end for him. Both elronds, both divergent after the point of duplication, both do not want to die and would consider it a hollow victory to know their copy (a seperate but equally "elrond" person) was to continue the legacy of elrond. So even if 100% accurate copies are possible, even without the existance of unique self, each individual, each conscious sentient being is not of less value simply because it is duplicable.

I also agree with you and elrond about this, subject to the proviso that both copies spend some time awake after copying. On the other hand, if two copies of me are made, and one copy (any copy) remains TOTALLY UNCONSCIOUS, then I have absolutely no problem at all destroying the copy that never regained consciousness. I have no doubt that I would survive in the copy that awoke. The laws of physics demand it.

I predict that people will one day travel between stars in this manner. They will have themself placed in biostasis, and the entire information content of their body and brain encoded in a laser light beam and sent to a receiver that will reconstruct them in another star system. They'll travel home in a similar manner, and if they deem the whole process successful (in terms of retention of life memories prior to transports), they may well order their original copy still in biostasis destroyed. It may seem incredible today, but people (in whatever form "people" will be in such a far flung future) will get quite used to it.

---BrianW

[eternaltraveler]

The laws of physics demand it.

I don't think you use the same theories I use

Would you argue that two hydrogen atoms are one and the same atom? If one hydrogen atom is destroyed does it still exist in every other hydrogen atom in the universe? They may be the same but they are also different.

I think that in the end it comes down to a matter of belief on both sides of this story. You can believe that all hydrogen atoms are the same atom because they have the same properties (all of the same isotope), and I can argue that they are a different. The fact that you can put one in one container, and one in another and I can then hold these two containers in separate hands seems to indicate to me that they are indeed different particles even if they share all the same characteristics.

I would not partake of this laser beaming system you speak of because it would kill me and I do not want to die. Such is my belief. You hold a different belief.