101 replies to this topic

[Clifford Greenblatt]

You have a choice of running into a burning building and saving a ten-year-old orphan child crying for help, or you could shut the child behind a fire door, enabling you to prevent the loss of 100 cryonic patients. Do you save one person, or 100 "people"?

[eternaltraveler]

what a loaded question. There is no right answer.

[123456]

I would likely try to save the child first, second priority would be the cryonic patients. Why? because those cryonic patients are relatively closer to death. I placed null vote.

[Kalepha]

First I would try to think of ways to save both the girl and the 100 cryonic patients. If I genuinely couldn’t do both, but just one or the other, I would save the girl. It wouldn’t make a difference whether she’s 10 and an orphan. What’s considered is that being burned while conscious is terribly unpleasant and being burned alive while conscious is probably one of the worst ways to die. The number of people dying as partially a consequence of my decision wouldn’t take precedence over the total amount of death accompanied with the acute suffering that would be experienced. However, during the hypothetical event, I would override this principle if I was certain that the implication of my decision to save the girl rather than the cryonic patients would be greater overall constraints, deployed by other strategists with collectively more power than my group of strategists, upon my living conditions. I would be just as an important constituent in this event as anything else, exactly up to the point its transparency becomes self-defeating as a result of stirring up the human evolutionary orchestra.

[caliban]

1) The Cryonauts are more probably my peers, sharing my dreams and aspirations

2) By saving the cryonauts I support the enterprise of cryonics (given the miniscule number of people in suspension, such a fire would potentially tear down the entire cryonics movement)

3) By saving the cryonauts, I set a moral precedent. As a potential cryonaut myself, I would rather live in a society where large numbers of cryonauts where given preference over a single child.

4) Considering its age, the child is likely not even a full moral agent.

Or was it a trick question?

[Clifford Greenblatt]

What’s considered is that being burned while conscious is terribly unpleasant and being burned alive while conscious is probably one of the worst ways to die.

How many immortalists would be willing to suffer an hour of severe pain if this were the cost of gaining immortality?

[Clifford Greenblatt]

Clifford, as part of this hypothetical scenario are we to assume that these individuals are very well preserved and that their reanimation is quite likely once the technology facilitates?

All I meant for you to assume is what you think at this time regarding likelihood of reanimation. If preservation is mediocre the inferiority of preservation quality may only delay reanimation rather than reduce its likelihood or quality. The most serious threat to reanimation may be loss of financial resources to keep the cryonic process going long enough for sufficient reanimation technology to arrive. In this case, cryonics patients would be lost to economic considerations rather than to a decision to save a child in a burning building. I saw a newspaper article decades ago about a cryonic couple who’s funds had run out and a legal decision was that they would have to be removed for burial in a traditional cemetery. Would you be willing to invest a large proportion of you personal funds to save a cryonics patient who’s funds are in danger?

[Kalepha]

Clifford, I think most of them. But I'm not sure I see the connection between this answer and my inference that being burned alive while conscious is probably one of the worst ways to die.

[Clifford Greenblatt]

Clifford, I think most of them. But I'm not sure I see the connection between this answer and my inference that being burned alive while conscious is probably one of the worst ways to die.

The connection here is that the suffering of a person being burned whilst conscious would last no more than an hour and likely no more than a quarter of an hour. If the 100 cryonics patients are spared to become immortal and the child would likely never have opted for cryonics, then the gain on the part of the cryonics patients would dwarf the very short term suffering of the child into insignificance.

I actually voted for the child in the poll but I did this for transcendent reasons, not for natural reasons.

[Clifford Greenblatt]

Cryonics companies should work out a strategy for financially supporting cryonics patients indefinitely, or at least into the very long term future. One would hope that current cryonics companies have learned from past mistakes.

The economic challenge in this appears when the earliest cryonic patients get extremely old. If the number of new cryonic patients increases with time then this would be no problem. However, if the number of new cryonic patients fails to increase at a sufficient rate then the cryonic patient population would grow faster than revenue to maintain them because old cryonic patients are an immortal maintenance expense until reanimated.

[Kalepha]

The connection here is that the suffering of a person being burned whilst conscious would last no more than an hour and likely no more than a quarter of an hour. If the 100 cryonics patients are spared to become immortal and the child would likely never have opted for cryonics, then the gain on the part of the cryonics patients would dwarf the very short term suffering of the child into insignificance.

Other than I don’t think that’s a workable argument since the plausibility of future reanimation is just as much of a guess as what the child’s future attitude might be toward extreme longevity, I can also operate on just empirical data alone.

It’s verifiable that it’s currently impossible to reanimate the cryonic patients. It’s verifiable that no one can accurately extrapolate that the cryonic patients will be reanimated. It’s verifiable that the child’s life can be saved. Given all available and reliable information during this hypothetical event that presumably occurs in the present state of conditions, my logical options are to either save one person or save none.

I save one.

[jaydfox]

For all my support of cryonics, my conscience at this time must decide for the child.

In my mind, the cryonauts are just static data snapshots, and if "successfully reanimated", they would be new "subjective agents" operating with the database of now forever-gone subjective agents. In my mind, they have as much moral right to live as a future as-yet-unconceived child, so this question amounts to asking if I would save one child at the expense of preventing 100 couples from conceiving a child (perhaps by perniciously administering a "morning after" pill after being informed of successful conceptions).

This is my current opinion, based on all my limited knowledge of philosophy, cryonics, and consciousness. I'd like to believe that my opinion is wrong, and I work towards learning new things that might convince me that I'm wrong, but I so far no luck... However, I acknowledge that it may turn out that in 50 years, I'd know enough to "regret" the decision if it had actually been made in the context described by Clifford.

[Clifford Greenblatt]

Emotional attachment has an enormous impact on how a person values the lives of others. The abduction of a single child in the U.S. can trigger a great deal of media coverage out of which millions become emotionally attached to the one abducted child. A million children overseas can be slaughtered or kidnaped from their families to be sold into slavery or forced prostitution with little notice being given in either the media or in the emotions of the general public. In Caliban’s case, I see an emotional bond to fellow immortalists that is much stronger than his emotional bond to children. Parents will generally have a very strong emotional bond with children. Yet, many of those who would anxiously hope for the return of an abducted child in their own country may give much less thought to the plight of many children in other countries. Suffering adults in other countries get the worst of the deal. A person’s first responsibility is to his own family and his own country. Still, there needs to be more compassion remaining after that for those who are suffering far away.

My emotional attachment to the orphan child would be vastly greater than my emotional attachment to any number of cryonic patients. I also see myself as being far more morally responsible for the orphan child. I would have a moral responsibility to protect the cryonic patients but my responsibility to the child would be far greater. However, I can understand Caliban’s position as he views cryonic patients as living humans who have a great deal in common with him and who are awaiting the day that they will be restored to good health.

[John Schloendorn]

I'd save the child. I guess that's like the actual/potential thing again. If I was one of the cryonauts, and you saved the child rather than us -- Well, I would't blame you.

Im not sure, perhaps a cryonics provider whose contract specified this scenario in advance and who pledged to save the cryonauts might be morally obliged to save the cryonauts. (Practically, however, they couldn't because they'd be charged with failure to render assistance to the girl or worse and shut down and the patients would end up dying, too.)

If I was a prospective cryo patient I'd just accept that placing my last hope this incredibly unlikely adventure does not leave me in a position to make any demands to random actual persons. It's for a reason that they say it's "the second worst thing that can happen to you".

[Trias]

I am a father, I am an Immortalist and I am a scientist, but above all I am a human being.

The statement resonates in me...


good reply;
convinced me


-Daniel S.

[caliban]

How did the "child" become a "girl" ?

How did being "human above all" become a virtue?

How many girlsavers are signed up for cryonics?

[Kalepha]

How did the "child" become a "girl" ?

That’s probably my fault, Caliban. It’s weird, though, because, to memory, I specifically asked myself whether I was correctly referring. Evidently that never happened.

[Infernity]

Wow that's a very hard question. I think the right thing to do is to save the 100 cryonic patients; although I believe I'd go and save the child because of pressure.

Hence I would save the child. I think it is wrong though, but I know myself.

100 lives of around 90 years of experience each, or a child that "have all his life ahead". Well, this statement applies also to them, after all, I stick to once you dead nothing matters, so also for the child and also for the patients, it's death or possible life without limits.

100 people are worth to save, more than 1, so I believe.

BUT, I would possibly save the child because of seeing and hearing a living man burning up is terrifying, especially a kid, and also, what comes after, seeing the parents sorry for you didn't save the child, or interchange- thanking you, and all around... I can say I should give a damn about this, fame and stuff are nonsense, but it is what my brain at the moment would calculate as better chances to survive myself. Sad but True, I know myself.

The patient are patient, and no one will act like being too sorry for it. My heart though will be heavy after this. But many so they think "moral" people will say, they are already 'dead' and they had their lives before them, and they felt nothing.

But they:
1st- could not be dead forever.
2nd - as dead people they had no lives, but nothing- EXATCLY as they child would have (um, wouldn't have), if he would stay to burn instead.
3rd - no one ever felt anything after dying- not even the living child.

I didn't go through the thread yet, let me see.

-Infernity

[jaydfox]

cryonauts are just static data snapshots, and if "successfully reanimated", they would be new "subjective agents" operating with the database of now forever-gone subjective agents

I like that term - static data snapshots. However this is also much the same as what one experiences when one wakes up from a deep sleep (not meaning to cover old ground but I thought I should mention it) due to the break in the consiousness continuum.

I don't think deep sleep quite fits the bill. There is still a lot going on in the brain, even if one is not consciously aware, to compare it to a cryonics patient. I suspect Brian Wowk's favorite example of someone in a coma, or perhaps even a person undergoing surgery, where their brain has been cooled and essentially shut off. This is probably a better analogy, and I'm actually not even convinced that this is comparable to the state a cryonics patient is in (aside from the obvious temperature and metabolism differences), but it's certainly much better than mere deep sleep.

[Clifford Greenblatt]

How did being "human above all" become a virtue?

Although I cannot speak for Prometheus, I think he may have had the virtue of compassion in mind when he wrote, "but above all I am a human being." As desperately as he would want to save the cryonauts, his sense of compassion would not permit him to let the child perish in terror and torment when he could have prevented this. This is not to say that you would not be compassionate in such a circumstance but your compassion would be for the cryonauts rather than for the child.

I suppose this sort of reasoning is what distinguishes us from the psychopaths but does such reasoning give us a disadvantage over more moderate civilized psychopaths I wonder?

What is more disturbing is the destruction of compassion through violent forms of entertainment. Those who enjoy violent forms of entertainment often get a thrill from watching people suffer and die. Why should the public lose interest in stories of compassion? A trend toward immoral interests could destroy compassion in a society.

[signifier]

From a utilitarian standpoint, and my belief that cryonics patients can be resuscitated, I would save the 100 cryonics patients. In my obviously nonempirical judgment, P(at least 2 cryonics patients can be successfully brought back) > 0.05, therefore the girl will have to burn to death.

Of course, I am not a utilitarian and I am happy to know that the world, for all its misery, rarely comes down to either-or choices where both decisions are immoral. So, unfortunately, I do not have an answer to the question, because no answer is right. (0 * x) = 5. What is x?

I do not think cryonics patients are living people. I do not think they are dead, either. They aren't living, because they aren't moving, breathing, thinking or feeling, yet they're not dead, because they are not dissolving away. Their cells are molecular statues, and they are in some strange realm between life and death. They're much closer to death than the living child - but I can't use that to make a decision, because my grandmother is also much closer to death than the child. If I had to chose between saving a 10-year old or saving one hundred 80-year olds, it would once again be just as impossible to give a correct answer. For that matter, I could ask: "Would you save one 10-year old child from death, or a hundred 11-year old children from death?" Or: "Would you save one 10-year old child from death, or two 11-year old children from death?" Going from everything I can go on, the situation is the same for all these questions. All the answers involve death, and so all are equally wrong.

Culture tells me to save the child, but we all know how useless a guide culture is.

[bgwowk]

jaydfox wrote:

In my mind, the cryonauts are just static data snapshots, and if "successfully reanimated", they would be new "subjective agents" operating with the database of now forever-gone subjective agents. In my mind, they have as much moral right to live as a future as-yet-unconceived child, so this question amounts to asking if I would save one child at the expense of preventing 100 couples from conceiving a child (perhaps by perniciously administering a "morning after" pill after being informed of successful conceptions).

I'm not going to touch this poll with a ten foot pole, but I do take issue with the above statement. Let's stipulate for the sake of argument that you have demonstrated a successful suspended animation procedure. Are you actually saying that killing someone in suspended animation is no different than preventing a pregnancy?!?!? What if you went into an operating room today, and killed a patient undergoing neurosurgery during profound hypothermic circ arrest (a procedure that stores a person as a static "image" for revival up to an hour later)? Would that be murder? It would certainly be prosecuted as murder.

In general, whenever medicine learns to induce a condition (be it general anesthesia or suspended animation) that is shown to be reversible, people in such conditions are regarded as living people the same as any other medical patient. Suspended animation can now be done for hours. If we extend that time to days, months, years, when does the patient cease to be a viable person with rights? And what objective basis could there ever be for setting a time limit on personhood? A revivable person is a revivable person. Period.

Of course cryonics today is speculative because it is unproven. This (sometimes highly) speculative prognosis is the only thing that should give one pause for thought about whether cryonics patients are people. The mean vibrational energy of molecules (temperature) of a patient is by itself completely irrelevant.

---BrianW

[manowater989]

I guess I just look at this differently from most people, perhaps I am less mature, as others have mentioned, I would of course choose to save both, but if that were an offered choice, it wouldn't be much of a moral dilemma, now would it. I chose the 100 not out of any great emotional attachment to them over the child, or visa versa, instead, simply because of the (perhaps misplaced) trust I place in technology. I didn't see that article that someone mentioned about people being buried because their funding ran out, but to the best of my knowledge, in the about 3 decades since the advent of cryonics, no one has been "lost" once preserved.

Since I believe with very little uncertainty that within another 2 maybe 3 or 4 at the very most times that length of time nanotechnology will have reached a level that all of those people will be able to be revived, I would say the probability is that at least 90 of them will make it, it's simply a numbers issue. I don't want someone to burn to death, but I'd rather save 90 people, or maybe even up to a 100, than 1.

The cryonics patients are also even more helpless than the child. I don't know exactly what you mean by a "fire door", but the child can at least move around and maybe get out a window or something. The cryonics have no means by which to protect themselves at all, they are going to sleep, maybe forever (dying) with the desperate and very sympathetic hope that maybe they will wake up again someday. It's terrible, but to me, the moral choice is clear. But this is a really complicated and thorny issue, like abortion, like all those, a final conclusion on what is truly "right" in these cases may never be widely agreed upon. I think the main issue here is how much faith one places in the tech. What if the 100 cryo patients were people in cardiac arrest, who, if, theoretically, there were enough doctors on-hand to defibrillate all of them, there was a good chance that most would live? Would you still choose the one over the many? Was someone who was technically "dead" for a thousand years and then revived perfectly ever really any more dead than someone who was technically "dead" for a minute? These are the kinds of complex philosophical issues I think the poster of this poll was meaning to raise, I'm surprised I haven't seem them discussed here more already.

[bgwowk]

I didn't see that article that someone mentioned about people being buried because their funding ran out, but to the best of my knowledge, in the about 3 decades since the advent of cryonics, no one has been "lost" once preserved.

Cryonics is actually now four decades old (beginning with the publication of The Prospect of Immortality in 1964). With the exception of the "first man frozen" (James Bedford, now at Alcor) *all* people cryopreserved during the first decade were lost. This was due in large part to the practice of billing families for storage on a perpetual basis, rather than requiring all necessary funds up-front. No organization operates like that anymore.

From:

http://www.alcor.org...onfailures.html

Of seventeen documented freezings through 1973, all but one ended in failure, while maybe five or six later cases, some of them privately maintained, were later terminated (or were continued under questionable circumstances, such as attempted permafrost interment). In most of these cases, finances were a factor. One notable exception involved a woman frozen in 1990 at Alcor (name withheld), whose will, it was later discovered, stated she did not want to be frozen. Her cryonicist husband fought the case through the (California) courts, arguing that the will, which survived only in photocopy, had been revoked, but the decision went against him, and her body was committed to burial under court order in 1994 [23].

---BrianW