Against the argument that we live in a sim...
Bruce Klein 04 Apr 2004
by Henry R. Sturman
In this article I argue against the argument that we are probably living in a computer simulation, because people with advanced technology will likely be able to simulate many more people in a computer than there are real people. Hence, the argument goes, the probability we are one of those simulated people is higher than the probability we are an unsimulated person. My critique is aimed at the argument as given in this article, a shorter version of which appears here.
I believe there are at least eight ways in which the argument (possibly) fails:
1. The assumption is that if people start simulating people, they will generally not tell the simulated people they are simulated people. But is that a valid assumption? If most people believe it is unethical to simulate people without telling them they are simulated, the argument fails. Hence, the fact that nobody told us that we are simulated is a case for thinking we might not be simulated.
2. Similarly, there is a lot of suffering in the world. If people simulating people were ethical they would not allow their simulated worlds to contain suffering. So again, the argument assumes that people simulating people are unethical and the validity of that assumption can be questioned.
3. It is striking that there is such a great deal of mathematical logic and consistency in the laws of nature. Such features are not necessary in a simulation. In a simulation there is no need for our heads to contain brains rather than green cheese, for example. And in a simulation we might as well have been given the option to magically move objects from A to B with the flash of a thought. Thus, the fact that no such magic or inconsistency exist is an argument for our world not being a simulation.
4. As the author admits, the argument requires acceptance of the assumption that the hardware doesn't matter for the arrisal of consciousness. I'm skeptical about that. If the biological structure of our brain is in fact a requirement for consciousness, then a computer which simulates the brain has no consciousness, and then the simulation argument fails. Except one could still argue that the space of the universe can contain more biological brains in vats (connected via wires to a computer simulating a world) than it has space for complete biological bodies. That would leave room for the argument that if people start putting brains in vats and simulating worlds for them, the probability is larger that you are a brain in a vat than a complete biological body in the real world.
5. As the author, in effect, admits there is doubt whether his calculations are correct. Maybe more rather than less calculating power is required to simulate a consciousness + environment than nature requires for a direct implementation of a conscious being. For example, suppose we build a very powerful computer, based on nanotechnology of very small detail. If we build such a computer within a simulated world, then for it to work properly all those small nanodetails would have to be simulated rather then that they are directly implemented physically. I would think that this only adds another layer of complexity, such that a computer simulating such a computer would actually have to be larger and more complex than the computer it's simulating. Similarly, if one emulates an Apple on a PC or vice versa, you also generally lose computer speed. This provides a case for turning the whole simulation argument on its head: because a simulation of consciousnessss + environment costs more calculation resources then a direct implementation, we can simulate fewer people than the universe can contain directly. Therefore, the probability we are a real person is larger than the probability we are a simulated person.
6. The validity of counter argument that if the simulation is no longer correct, the computer could simply change our memory content, is questionable. I believe that we can't reason anyway, unless we assume that our brains operate relatively correctly and there is no God in the background playing with our consciousness. However, if you do not make that assumption, then there is still no basis for accepting the simulation argument, for accepting any argument is only reasonable if we have faith in our ability to think straight. It's inconsistent to draw a conclusion based on our reasoning, while that very reasoning is based on the assumption that we can't trust our own reasoning.
7. But the fundamental error is that the whole argument is based on the application of a conclusion about our own world to another world about which we don't know anything. That is invalid. Even if all assumptions about computer power and motives about the people running simulations are correct, this only proves something about beings that we simulate ourselves. For the class of beings consisting of us plus the simulated beings it is correct to say that the probability one of them is simulated is greater than the probability that it is not. But, paradoxically, that's a conclusion only knowable to us, and not to the simulated beings. For it is only valid to apply this reasoning to our world and not to an imagined world above us. It's impossible for us to know or assume that the facts in our world, on which the whole simulation argument is based, are also true in a world above us. For example, any world above us might be a world in which all beings are already made with maximum efficiency, and so has more physical space for directly implemented beings than for simulated beings. In other worlds, the fatal flaw in the whole argument is that it hypothesizes a world above our world, while the very assumption that we are living in a simulation implies it is impossible for us to know anything about what such a world would be like and what would be the motives or actions of its inhabitants. The conclusion that we're probably living in a computer simulation immediately leads to the next conclusion that we can't trust the assumptions which led us to the first conclusion. Thus, the argument destroys itself.
8. The conclusion that we are living in a simulated world inside another world is a violation of Occam's razor.
Henry Sturman - Homepage
Henry Rudolf Sturman was born on February 8, 1966. He has a Masters degree in applied physics from the Technical University of Delft. He owns, Sturman Enterprises, which develops websites, software and database applications.
Email: henry@sturman.net
evdaevb 04 Apr 2004
1. The assumption is that if people start simulating people, they will generally not tell the simulated people they are simulated people. But is that a valid assumption? If most people believe it is unethical to simulate people without telling them they are simulated, the argument fails. Hence, the fact that nobody told us that we are simulated is a case for thinking we might not be simulated.
Woudn't the purpose of simulating a universe as complex as ours be for the sake of knowledge? Observing how life evolves and how man advances won't be pointless if these same men knew they were simulated by a higher intelligence. Let's say for example that we found out today that we are a simulation. Would we continue living are everyday lives or would we instead be preoccupied with the fact that we aren't real? I think it's safe to say that the latter is more true.
2. Similarly, there is a lot of suffering in the world. If people simulating people were ethical they would not allow their simulated worlds to contain suffering. So again, the argument assumes that people simulating people are unethical and the validity of that assumption can be questioned.
Again, what would anyone learn from a highly regulated system? Some could argue that this higher intelligence (HI) may simply have started a process (say, the Big Bang or evolution on Earth) which led to humanity. It is also possible that the HI has no particularly strong feelings towards their creations. I mean, how much do you care about the little guys in THE SIMS?
3. It is striking that there is such a great deal of mathematical logic and consistency in the laws of nature. Such features are not necessary in a simulation. In a simulation there is no need for our heads to contain brains rather than green cheese, for example. And in a simulation we might as well have been given the option to magically move objects from A to B with the flash of a thought. Thus, the fact that no such magic or inconsistency exist is an argument for our world not being a simulation.
The less our world makes sense the possibility that we are in a random simulation increases. Maybe that opposes the intended purpose of running us?
4. As the author admits, the argument requires acceptance of the assumption that the hardware doesn't matter for the arrisal of consciousness. I'm skeptical about that. If the biological structure of our brain is in fact a requirement for consciousness, then a computer which simulates the brain has no consciousness, and then the simulation argument fails. Except one could still argue that the space of the universe can contain more biological brains in vats (connected via wires to a computer simulating a world) than it has space for complete biological bodies. That would leave room for the argument that if people start putting brains in vats and simulating worlds for them, the probability is larger that you are a brain in a vat than a complete biological body in the real world.
I'm unsure how the argument that the compter has no consciousness if our biological brain is a requirement for consciousness negates the simulation argument. Also, I completely agree with the last sentence.
5. As the author, in effect, admits there is doubt whether his calculations are correct. Maybe more rather than less calculating power is required to simulate a consciousness , environment than nature requires for a direct implementation of a conscious being. For example, suppose we build a very powerful computer, based on nanotechnology of very small detail. If we build such a computer within a simulated world, then for it to work properly all those small nanodetails would have to be simulated rather then that they are directly implemented physically. I would think that this only adds another layer of complexity, such that a computer simulating such a computer would actually have to be larger and more complex than the computer it's simulating. Similarly, if one emulates an Apple on a PC or vice versa, you also generally lose computer speed. This provides a case for turning the whole simulation argument on its head: because a simulation of consciousnessss + environment costs more calculation resources then a direct implementation, we can simulate fewer people than the universe can contain directly. Therefore, the probability we are a real person is larger than the probability we are a simulated person.<!--QuoteEnd]6. The validity of counter argument that if the simulation is no longer correct, the computer could simply change our memory content, is questionable. I believe that we can't reason anyway, unless we assume that our brains operate relatively correctly and there is no God in the background playing with our consciousness. However, if you do not make that assumption, then there is still no basis for accepting the simulation argument, for accepting any argument is only reasonable if we have faith in our ability to think straight. It's inconsistent to draw a conclusion based on our reasoning, while that very reasoning is based on the assumption that we can't trust our own reasoning.
I'm not sure I follow your argument here. Why can't we trust are reasoning? Is it because they may change are memory every time we see something revealing the simulation? If so, how does that affect our ability to reason?
I somewhat agree with the 7th argument and I totally agree with the 8th. The original simulation argument depended on assumptions and Mr. Sturman challenged those arguments with more assumptions, I then challenged Mr. Struman by making even more assumptions. In light of this, I consider the simulation question nothing more than something fun to ponder about because even if we are simulations it matters little until we find out. In the mean time we have to rely on all kinds of guesses which is in direct violation of Occam's Razor.
John Doe 05 Apr 2004
Objections 1 and 2 seem cogent to me. I do not yet understand objection 7. The other objections seem mistaken.
Perhaps we should all put on a better performance?
quadclops 05 Apr 2004
If only it were. If only we could find the God Mode, or the button that would allow us to reload ourselves after death. Maybe by finding all the secret areas and saving up enough game icons, we can get extra lives![lol]
Sorry, but this just sounds like fuzzy thinking to me.
Thomas 05 Apr 2004
I don't buy simulation either.
xlifex 05 Apr 2004
John Schloendorn 05 Apr 2004
Inconsistent? Yah, maybe...
xlifex 05 Apr 2004
Edited by xlifex, 05 April 2004 - 10:10 PM.
Mind 05 Apr 2004
If there is a finite number of nested simulations then we come to a similar question. What is outside the last simulation? "What is 'outside' the last simulation?", would seem to be the same inquiry we are involved in today...looking deep into the universe.
Omnido 06 Apr 2004
Well, I do actually hold the affirmation that the entirety of the universe, or perhaps even the "Multiverse" is a mere simulation. It makes sense mathematically, but as Mind stated, infinite layers of simulation would be moot.
However, I am still open to the idea that Infinite Regress, while facing immediate rejection and seeming incomprehension, might still be the truth, regardless of whether or not we accept the idea.
"Because its the way nature works. If you wanna know the way nature works; We looked at it, carefully, thats the way it looks. You dont like it? Go somewhere else! To another Universe where the rules are simpler...philosophically more pleasing, more psychologically easy. I cant help it! Ok? If Im going to tell you honestly what the world looks like to Human beings who have struggled as hard as they can to understand it, I can only tell you what it looks like...so Im gonna tell you what it really is like, and if you dont like it, thats too bad, Ok?" - Richard P. Feynman - The Sir Douglas Robb Lectures, 1979
ocsrazor 14 Apr 2004
1. & 2. Assuming you know what the ethics and motivations of a superintelligence are is highly dubious
3. Mathematical logic and symmetry are absolutely necessary for any GOOD simulation. That the universe has these properties indicates that it is an energy and information efficient system, this is true of any such system though.
4. From a neuroscientists perspective, the idea that consciousness is somehow special to the biological brain is just moronic. Consciousness emerges out of physical processes, but is in no way tied to one specific substrate. Brains in vats? You must be kidding me.
5. The author does not understand the concept of complexity. Complexity is about unique connection density, it is not about size or material cost. The human brain is the most complex object in the universe we know of, turning this around - the pre-life universe is likely less complex than a single human brain. Sheer size or number of objects does not make something complex (or expensive to simulate).
6. Is just circular logic and is semantically meaningless.
7. & 8. A simulation argument is not a violation of Occam's Razor, because there is no evidence for either option, but it is a moot question. If we are or are not being simulated there is no possible method for us to be aware of it, we live inside the system (this is what I believe the author was trying to say in points 6 & 7) Arguing for or against simulation is without merit for this reason. We can speculate all we want, but all supernatural arguments are also moot for this same reason, we cannot access any information outside the system of our universe.
7000 08 May 2004
But the irony of it is that, human which is create knowledge is NO knowledge because human eventually loose something to become nothing.When this happen, there is NO knowledge that make up human again.
However, human simulate everything because human eventually end up to have NO knowledge.This is a complex issue and it's very dynamic probably because of its nature of existence.It's like fire is looking for something to hold it.When fire see something to hold it, it will burn, but fire see nothing to hold it.So it is not burning and if it is still burning, it will soon stop burning.
Something that don't simulate have knowledge and will not loose something.When human acheive immortality, human will have knowledge, human will not loose something and human will not simulate till infinity.
Edited by 7000, 13 May 2004 - 09:33 PM.
adering 20 Jun 2004
2. As I do not possess the capacity to freely travel through time either with or against the entropy gradient, this "situation" I'm in is real.
3. Perhaps there's some logical flaws in the reasoning involved, but seeing as how all logical arguments of this sort end up beginning with an axiom which is accepted because "well, ya gotta start somewhere," I don't see how my logic flaws are any worse than the rest.
4. If this is a simulation, I'd like to be filthy rich please. And I'd like long wavy red hair and a washboard stomach. And eidetic memory.
Mind 04 Jan 2005
Of course, back to the infinite regress, if the entire universe is just layers and layers of simulation with no end or beginning, then the simulation is "all that is real", and not really a simulation (by our current english definition).
cosmicv 19 Feb 2005
With the hundreds of billions of galaxies, one might expect that a fraction of these might contain a civilization that was at one point at a phase of using radio waves and that these radio waves would have reached us.
Every day that goes by without detecting alien signals lends credence towards sim theory.
enigma 14 Jun 2005
7. But the fundamental error is that the whole argument is based on the application of a conclusion about our own world to another world about which we don't know anything. That is invalid. Even if all assumptions about computer power and motives about the people running simulations are correct, this only proves something about beings that we simulate ourselves. For the class of beings consisting of us plus the simulated beings it is correct to say that the probability one of them is simulated is greater than the probability that it is not. But, paradoxically, that's a conclusion only knowable to us, and not to the simulated beings. For it is only valid to apply this reasoning to our world and not to an imagined world above us. It's impossible for us to know or assume that the facts in our world, on which the whole simulation argument is based, are also true in a world above us. For example, any world above us might be a world in which all beings are already made with maximum efficiency, and so has more physical space for directly implemented beings than for simulated beings. In other worlds, the fatal flaw in the whole argument is that it hypothesizes a world above our world, while the very assumption that we are living in a simulation implies it is impossible for us to know anything about what such a world would be like and what would be the motives or actions of its inhabitants. The conclusion that we're probably living in a computer simulation immediately leads to the next conclusion that we can't trust the assumptions which led us to the first conclusion. Thus, the argument destroys itself.
It is not true that we would know nothing of the "world above our world", for if we were living in a computer simulation , we would know that we were a product of the world above us. Aswell, we could make rational inferences about the world above us. Because, if we created a simulation for research, and if then the people in that simulation created a simulation below them for research and so on... we would know that
1. The simulations below us tend to reflect their designers.
2. The simulations were created for research.
Now lets say the people in the simulation below us began to suspect that they were living in a simulation, and made the correct inference that their simulation reflected their designer. Lets say that the people in the simulation below that made the same connections.
We would know that, in all simulations that we knew of, the people in those simulations correctly assume that they resemble their designer, they assume this despite KNOWING nothing of their designer. It could then be assumed that because of this we could also make the same correct inference about our designers and also be correct.
hmmm...
Maybe the people in the simulation above us gained a perfect understanding of the origins of the universe and replicated it exactly in a computer, this would mean that our simulation would be exactly the same as theirs and that because of that, this exact simulation would be replicated for eternity.
Maybe the people in the simulation above us wanted to increase the chances of their being a god. So, all they did was created a simulation with a god and a heaven that simulated people goto after they die. If i die and goto heaven I would be pretty suspicious that I was in a simulation for this reason.
elevatenz 12 Apr 2006
As for the whole "watching too much of the Matrix" arguement. The Matrix was written by gnostics with the whole idea of waking people up to the idea of the simulation. Hence the last two words of the movie "Wake Up". So its fine to use the matrix as an example as its what it was intended for.
apocalypse 30 Apr 2006
simulations all the way up kinda like, with the turtles.Who simulates the simulators then? How far back does it go?
I don't buy simulation either.-Thomas
If the simulators are simulated themselves etc. will this make the simulation argument incoherent? I mean, if it's probable we're living in a simulation, there cannot be individuals who do *not* live in a simulation. Or is this reasoning invalid? But if it's invalid how do know whether "we" are being simulated or at the "top level"?-xlifex
Maybe, the top level is an abstract limit at infinity, maybe there is no real or true world [:o] Or maybe reality is just a relative concept, a concept of denial, related to whether one knows or not of the possibility of being simulated and embracing such as possibly the truth.
xanadu 09 Nov 2006
"2. Similarly, there is a lot of suffering in the world. If people simulating people were ethical they would not allow their simulated worlds to contain suffering. So again, the argument assumes that people simulating people are unethical and the validity of that assumption can be questioned."
Perhaps suffering serves a purpose? Pain seems to serve a purpose and those who are unable to feel it not only do not learn but tend to get hurt and die.
jackinbox 10 Nov 2006
Who simulates the simulators then? How far back does it go?
I don't buy simulation either.
"It's turtles all the way down."
jdgauchat 28 Aug 2009
Edited by jdkasinsky, 28 August 2009 - 02:33 AM.
treonsverdery 28 Aug 2009
actually during 1999 a person tied me to a chair while feeding me drugs They said that "it" was kind of like a (human activity of racing organic creatures running after a mechanical creature on a track) only with "people" the mechanical creature was an actual being (I) n the racers were the mechanisms
If I were to believe that person then that suggests "people" are motivatable quasimechanistic structures with a radically different form of being than what I am
There I've told
We may actually be different
I actually think people are authentic though Perhaps that will cheer the readers
I am urging the mechanism to feel kind happiness yet I can sense the structuralism
This video reminds me of that description
Edited by treonsverdery, 28 August 2009 - 02:53 AM.
KalaBeth 29 Aug 2009
Whether more modern discoveries of the granular nature of space and even time, some apparently mathematically based physical forms (to say nothing of out experience of music), the presence of older gnostic, akashic, and what all other ideas, and even how some modern mental illnesses manifest ... it quite frankly disturbs me that the more I think on it, the more plausible it sounds as an explanatory force.
I don't buy it as written.... but it bugs me that it's just plausible enough I can't reject it out of hand either. Purely an emotional argument I know... but there you go.
Then again, it's basically a form of gnosticism in modern language, and that idea has been around in one form or another for millennial.... so no surprise it at least sounds plausible to human wetware.
Luna 29 Aug 2009
Another argument is computer power.. which also fails, as who knows what kind of computing power is achievable.
But arguing it's possible does not mean it's true, which leaves a 50-50 chance.
Mind 11 Sep 2012
http://www.vice.com/...w-0000329-v19n9
platypus 11 Sep 2012
DAMABO 11 Sep 2012
hathor 30 Dec 2013
The assumption is that if people start simulating people, they will generally not tell the simulated people they are simulated people.
So when I play "the sims" how do I go about informing my sims that they're simulated?
If people simulating people were ethical they would not allow their simulated worlds to contain suffering.
Grand Theft Auto V made how many sales when it came out?
the fact that no such magic or inconsistency exist
must be nice to live in a world without inconsistency or magic.
If the biological structure of our brain is in fact a requirement for consciousness, then a computer which simulates the brain has no consciousness
you're assuming that the brain is being simulated by a computer, instead of itself actually being a computer.
Maybe more rather than less calculating power is required to simulate a consciousness + environment than nature requires for a direct implementation of a conscious being.
Again this assumption that quantum physics is being simulated by other means, instead of quantum physics itself being the means by which the simulation is being generated.
The conclusion that we're probably living in a computer simulation immediately leads to the next conclusion that we can't trust the assumptions which led us to the first conclusion. Thus, the argument destroys itself.
Circular logic. It's not hard to prove that the reality around us is a simulation. The only reason more don't bother to do so is that it ruins the immersion. Most here are happy enough to be here that they don't want to reduce the immersion by noticing the many obvious things that prove that this place isn't that objective.
The conclusion that we are living in a simulated world inside another world is a violation of Occam's razor.
Occam's razor is just a particular bias toward preferring simpler explanations. It is not a scientific law; it doesn't prove anything. And I beg to differ; simulism seems like the simplest and most likely conclusion, it makes a lot more sense than many of the other explanations. It's also rather self~evident given how many simulations we are running as a society right now on our computers and video game consoles. I'd love to hear a simpler explaination for why humans evolved here than: 1. this simulation was an attempt to re-create the original conditions of our ancestors as similarly as possible, to try to discover where to draw the line between simulating intelligent life and creating new intelligent life. or 2. this simulation is simply a training program/educational tool to teach about simulations and life creation.
Edited by katimaya, 30 December 2013 - 04:19 AM.
Soma 09 Jun 2014
This reminds me of descartes' everlasting "cogito ergo sum". It is generally misunderstood and butchered though. Jacob Needleman, professor of philosophy at San Francisco State University, has described it best. What Descartes was saying here was essentially that the we can be absolutely certain of the existence of only thing, and that is awareness, which he likened to "thinking" or mind. This all may be a dream, a simulation, etc. None of the outside world and this whole play of life may exist, but whatever it is, there is an awareness of it. That is undeniable and therefore constitutes incontrovertible truth. Once again, what existence is will always be debatable (and likely never provable), but whatever it is, there is awareness of it (whether it is real or illusion). Thus, the only thing that can be self-evidently known to exist is awareness. Everything else is debatable.How is the "simulation argument" different from the argument "this could all be just a dream"?
If this is a simulation, then this universe and everything in it (including our bodies) are likewise a simulation and therefore have no physical reality and are therefore unreal. This means that the our bodies and their deaths are unreal. Consciousness would only be interacting with your simulated body the same way your consciousness would interact in a highly developed virtual reality video game. Who would expect to actually die if their video game character gets killed?
Basically, if this is a simulation, then consciousness would ultimately be interacting with our bodies, but fundamentally separate from them. Thus, death of the simulated body would not translate into the cessation of consciousness.
Edited by Soma, 09 June 2014 - 10:13 PM.