200 replies to this topic

[Mark Hamalainen]

Osiris, I will ask you the same question that I asked Justin. Can you please elaborate on your conception of FW?

FW -> choices are not wholly determined in either a deterministic or statistical sense. Consciousness makes choices independent of known physical processes.

In other words, at least some aspect of conscious decision making is directed by my conscious awareness and has the potential to make choices that would not have occured in the absense of awareness. Absolute/objective knowledge of the universe's state would not allow you to predict those choices absolutely.

What else could it be? Perhaps it sounds religous or spiritual or whatever. But I don't see how anything less is meaningful, and I have nothing to gain from assuming that life is meaningless and everything to gain by assuming that 'I' do have the ability to make choices.

[DJS]

osiris

FW -> choices are not wholly determined in either a deterministic or statistical sense.  Consciousness makes choices independent of known physical processes.

In other words, at least some aspect of conscious decision making is directed by my conscious awareness and has the potential to make choices that would not have occured in the absense of awareness.  Absolute/objective knowledge of the universe's state would not allow you to predict those choices absolutely.

What else could it be?  Perhaps it sounds religous or spiritual or whatever.  But I don't see how anything less is meaningful...

My personal position is that FW in the absolute or classical sense of the word is incomprehensible and stems from the very human desire to always arrive at a *first cause* (which is probably impossible in an infinite universe). You're right osiris, "consciousness making choices independent of known physical processes" sounds like mysticism to me (no offense). Honestly, I have never witnessed a respectable defense of classical FW and I am not sure that it is actually possible if one is to remain within a secular framework. Often participants in a FW discussion will end by simply agreeing to disagree...yes, its one of those kinds of topics. [sfty]

I have nothing to gain from assuming that life is meaningless and everything to gain by assuming that 'I' do have the ability to make choices.

Sounds like a Pascal's wager for the soul. From a personal, subjective perspective there is no doubt that we are in control of our actions, but should this control be classified as *free will* or simply *will*. Second, why would lacking *absolute* FW make life meaningless? I can understand why one would feel a certain amount of fatalism if predeterminism were true, but lacking absolute FW only implies that one is not the ultimate source (ie, first cause) of one's actions. It says nothing about whether one's fate is determined.

So I am a product of the universe and operate according to its physical laws...this only seems logical to me.

[DJS]

Cosmos

According to Dennett, it could be something else.

Since this exchange has now turned to Free will, I will introduce Dennett's definition of free will, albeit summarized by a book critic in a newspaper.

Hey are you trying to stealing my thunder or something? Hehe, just kidding Cos. It seems you read my mind on this one.

For some time now I have been a strong proponent of Dennett's concept of free will which is also known as *contemporary compatibilism*. Basically, compatibilism is the philosophical position that free will and determinism (or at least a strictly physical reality) can coexist together.

For Dennett, free will consists in the ability of a person to control her conduct on the basis of rational considerations through means that arise from, or are subject to, critical self-evaluation, self-adjusting and self-monitoring. That is, free will involves responsiveness to reason.

It is rationality then that is of paramount importance when trying to attain the greatest degree of freedom for one's actions. It logically follows that some individuals, based on their conceptual framework, have more "free will" than others. Dennett explains this in great detail in is latest book Freedom Evolves.

I thought it might be interesting to add that recently I began mixing Dennett's ideas on compatibilism with the possibilities presented by a post-human realm. You see, in actuality Dennett represents a more classical "humanistic" perspective in that he wants to improve the human condition through education and enlightenment (though he is also an advocate of AI, so he does have some foresight). Transhumanism agrees with this (humanistic) agenda but also identifies technological innovation as holding great promise in improving the human condition. Thus, while Dennett cites rationality as the prime determiner of an agent's level of freedom, I believe that the rationality that human's experience is paltry in comparison to what is physically possible. We may be able to achieve much greater levels of freedom by redesigning our cognitive architecture.

One of my highest order goals is to approach the logical limit of free will.

[Mark Hamalainen]

For some time now I have been a strong proponent of Dennett's concept of free will which is also known as *contemporary compatibilism*. Basically, compatibilism is the philosophical position that free will and determinism (or at least a strictly physical reality) can coexist together.

For Dennett, free will consists in the ability of a person to control her conduct on the basis of rational considerations through means that arise from, or are subject to, critical self-evaluation, self-adjusting and self-monitoring. That is, free will involves responsiveness to reason.

I don't understand how this is 'free will'. It sounds like simply 'will' to me, even if it subjectively appears to us to be free. By this definition, awareness does not influence choices and is an observer under the illusion of control.

If you are going to define 'free will' in this way, then is there a term that matches my definition?

[jaydfox]

Osiris, it's good to see that someone else here places high importance on the concept that we are not merely passive observers of that actions that our bodies would deterministically carry out in the absense of our observation. While I can't prove that I'm not merely "watching the movie of my life", as I've heard it said, it still seems silly to me. Am I only an observer watching my life evolve as it does? I can believe that I have little control, and perhaps even very little control, over a wide range of psychological aspects of my life. But to believe that I have no control whatsoever seems kind of silly.

Of course, and correct if I'm wrong Don, but doesn't Dennett even go so far as to argue that I'm not even an observer watching the movie of my life, that I in fact have no qualia, that I an fact do not experience my life, but that mental states exists which "correspond" is some metaphysical way to things that we delude ourselves into believing are qualia? I've seen debates in the past where the majority of people on this forum have sided with Dennett against Chalmers.

[knite]

osiris
QUOTE 

FW -> choices are not wholly determined in either a deterministic or statistical sense.  Consciousness makes choices independent of known physical processes.

In other words, at least some aspect of conscious decision making is directed by my conscious awareness and has the potential to make choices that would not have occured in the absense of awareness.  Absolute/objective knowledge of the universe's state would not allow you to predict those choices absolutely.

What else could it be?  Perhaps it sounds religous or spiritual or whatever.  But I don't see how anything less is meaningful... 


My personal position is that FW in the absolute or classical sense of the word is incomprehensible and stems from the very human desire to always arrive at a *first cause* (which is probably impossible in an infinite universe). You're right osiris, "consciousness making choices independent of known physical processes" sounds like mysticism to me (no offense). Honestly, I have never witnessed a respectable defense of classical FW and I am not sure that it is actually possible if one is to remain within a secular framework. Often participants in a FW discussion will end by simply agreeing to disagree...yes, its one of those kinds of topics. 

QUOTE 
I have nothing to gain from assuming that life is meaningless and everything to gain by assuming that 'I' do have the ability to make choices.


Sounds like a Pascal's wager for the soul.  From a personal, subjective perspective there is no doubt that we are in control of our actions, but should this control be classified as *free will* or simply *will*. Second, why would lacking *absolute* FW make life meaningless? I can understand why one would feel a certain amount of fatalism if predeterminism were true, but lacking absolute FW only implies that one is not the ultimate source (ie, first cause) of one's actions. It says nothing about whether one's fate is determined.

So I am a product of the universe and operate according to its physical laws...this only seems logical to me.

I dont think thats what hes saying here Osiris. I think his point is that with absolute free will comes absurdities, like I want to walk on the moon in my birthday suit, so I shall. Or, I want to travel back in time, so I shall. I can accept that we are goverened by reason and make choices within that reasonable set. Back to your dice analogy, though slightly different. We have a CHOICE this time of 6 sides of the die. We can choose {1,2,3,4,5,6}, however reason and physics prevents us from choosing 7. What I will not believe in, ever, is that I have a destiny.

[derekthano]

Without free will, aren't we little more than organic machines? Our mind, or conciousness, is just along for the ride on what our brains decide to do, all the while with the illusion that we chose that path. A lack of choice in what we do, even if it seems like we have a choice, seems rather bleak to me.

That having been said, where's the value in life if you're just a product of your environment?

Sorry, not trying to derail the thread here.

[Mark Hamalainen]

I dont think thats what hes saying here Osiris. I think his point is that with absolute free will comes absurdities, like I want to walk on the moon in my birthday suit, so I shall.

I think you are confusing free will with omnipotence. I thought free will referred to the ability to make choices, not to violate physical laws (i.e. roll a 7).

[DJS]

Jay

Osiris, it's good to see that someone else here places high importance on the concept that we are not merely passive observers of that actions that our bodies would deterministically carry out in the absense of our observation. While I can't prove that I'm not merely "watching the movie of my life", as I've heard it said, it still seems silly to me. Am I only an observer watching my life evolve as it does? I can believe that I have little control, and perhaps even very little control, over a wide range of psychological aspects of my life. But to believe that I have no control whatsoever seems kind of silly.

I would like to stress this again. YOU are in complete control of your Will. You are also a product of the universe which you inhabit. Somehow it seems to me that both of you are painting this picture of a meat puppet being moved about by hooks. This is simply not the case. The sources that converged to form the nexus that is your consciousness are probably infinite in scope(a mixture of determined and stochastic processes) -- and more over, there is no evidence that the ultimate source of all of these influences is directional in nature. Thus there is no controller over you other than yourself. (More than likely you are simply one product of an infinite number of possible realities). Again I should make clear that from my perspective I see no point in assessing a "first cause".

Of course, and correct if I'm wrong Don, but doesn't Dennett even go so far as to argue that I'm not even an observer watching the movie of my life, that I in fact have no qualia, that I an fact do not experience my life, but that mental states exists which "correspond" is some metaphysical way to things that we delude ourselves into believing are qualia? I've seen debates in the past where the majority of people on this forum have sided with Dennett against Chalmers.

Well who am I to speak for Dennett , but I would have to say no to all of the above. Dennett takes what is known as the intentional stance when considering the idea of FW (I'll give you a good link for compatibilism at the end of my post). Dennett does not "believe in" qualia, just as he does not believe in God, because there is no need for it. However, I get the sense that you are mixing up the concept fo qualia with the concept of consciousness itself. Qualia specifically deals with potential quatum uncertainty in neural processing, as well as raw experience such as the "greeness of green". However, like Dennett I fail to see how quatum uncertainty can create free will, but I digress.

What else...Yes, Dennett believes that you experience your life, he also believes that you are an active controller of your will.

As for the issue of consciousness itself, I believe that Dennett has been greatly misinterpreted by a number of his critics. I would not be doing his work justice by trying to summarize him (I would recommend reading Consciousness Explained) but instead I will give you my own rather simplistic view on the matter. Consciousness is an epiphenomenon of physical processes taking place inside of the brain. This is what I believe because this is what there is evidence to support.

Please understand, I am aware that there is always the possibility that individual consciousness is tied into a *universal consciousness* or perhaps another plain of existence. After all, my best friend is a Jew who would be more properly classified as a Buddist. Trust me, I have thought about there issues. It is just that, as one who attempts to remain entirely rational, I must respond to such challenges as Laplace responded to Napoleon, "Sir, I have no need for that hypothesis." )

Edited by DonSpanton, 15 June 2005 - 05:36 AM.

[DJS]

Here's the link. I find it to be a rather balanced presentation.

plato.stanford.edu

[DJS]

I'm not sure if all of you are familiar with Kip's paper on FW and determinism. It is a good paper, although I disagree with some of his comments regarding Nietzsche and have come to disagree with his specific conclusions on FW. Hopefully some day when I find some time, I will be able to construct a refutation.

The Posthuman Condition

[jaydfox]

Don, perhaps I confused you by using the nebulous terms "I". "I" is something that I tried debating with Brian Wowk, Marc Geddes, Cosmos, and others when I first joined ImmInst. (Actually, in that debate, we used "me", but that's purely a grammatical difference.) It's a very difficult subject. It goes to the core of the Duplicates problem, and of the problem with making copies in general. In many respects, it affects the foundations of cryonics, because even if ones accepts that the technology will be available to completely rebuild the brain to the state it was in prior to being frozen, whether the person revived is "me" affects the definition of "success" in saying that someone was successfully reanimated.

Part of the problem with "I" is that it is, for most intents and purposes, purely subjective. From a purely objective standpoint, it almost doesn't matter, though I won't rule out entirely that it matters.

[Mark Hamalainen]

I would like to stress this again. YOU are in complete control of your consciousness. You are also a product of the universe which you inhabit.

The sources that converged to form the nexus that is your consciousness are probably infinite in scope(a mixture of determined and stochastic processes) -- and more over, there is no evidence that the ultimate source of all of these influences is directional in nature.

Thus there is no controller over you other than yourself.

I don't understand your logic. I'm not trying to convince you that free will exists or not. I'm trying to understand how you are defining it. I don't understand how any of your proposed scenarios are in any way 'free'.

To put it simply, is free will not (by definition) the ability of awareness to influence choices in a way that would not occur in the absense of awareness?

In the scenarios you've described its seems that the presence or absense of awareness is irrelevant. That is why I contend that what you describe is not free will. Which scenario is true to reality is not known and I am not trying to convince you to share my beliefs in the nature of reality.

[DJS]

Which scenario is true to reality is not known and I am not trying to convince you to share my beliefs in the nature of reality.

Nor am I trying to convince you Mark. It may be as Pinker says, that we are not capable of solving the hard problems of our existence (such as FW) with our currently -(my addition, not his) limited capacities.

I will get back to the rest of your query later tonight, but I wanted to add one thing. I firmly believe that one should never cling to an idea because of any positive effect it may have on one's self worth or the "meaninfulness" of their existence. *Happiness* is not necessarily a path toward truth or away from it; it is simply a distraction.

If I wanted the fuzzy bunny answers I would have been a Christian.

I'll be back later,

Don

[knite]

My personal position is that FW in the absolute or classical sense of the word is incomprehensible and stems from the very human desire to always arrive at a *first cause* (which is probably impossible in an infinite universe).

I think I lost you here. Could you elaborate on this sentence? I think others here may have had this debate alot and know what your talking about, but I do not.

[DJS]

Osiris

I don't understand your logic.  I'm not trying to convince you that free will exists or not.  I'm trying to understand how you are defining it.  I don't understand how any of your proposed scenarios are in any way 'free'.  To put it simply, is free will not (by definition) the ability of awareness to influence choices in a way that would not occur in the absense of awareness?

Well this is my fault for not being clear enough.

There are two prevailing connotations for FW. The first type of FW is what is known as classical FW or indeterminate Free Will. This is probably what you have in mind.

The second type of FW is known as volitional Free Will and rests on the premise that human choice is determined internally rather than externally.

Volitional FW is compatible with determinism, indeterminate FW is not.

Jay

Don, perhaps I confused you by using the nebulous terms "I".

Yes, a loaded term is it not? There was recently a discussion on another thread that briefly touched on this issue of the "self" and an interesting philosopher named Thomas Metzinger. Being No One: By Thomas Metzinger

Also, links to the discussion:

Other

Abortion thread

Dennett's Take on Agency

Ooo, and I just found this really awesome website that I'm sure you would all appreciate. [thumb]

Conscious Entities




12 dots, yet we all perceive it as a walking person. What does this say about our consciousness?

[Edit Note: I change this post a little bit by taking out my statements about Libet after realizing that it was intellectually inconsistent.]

Edited by DonSpanton, 15 June 2005 - 05:22 AM.

[DJS]

Knite

My personal position is that FW in the absolute or classical sense of the word is incomprehensible and stems from the very human desire to always arrive at a *first cause* (which is probably impossible in an infinite universe).

I think I lost you here. Could you elaborate on this sentence? I think others here may have had this debate alot and know what your talking about, but I do not.

Sure. Many people find determinism distasteful because they view it as encroaching on an agent's ultimate will to make decisions. In this sense, determinism can also be seen as undermining many ethical systems which are founded on the notion of moral responsibility. IOW, "Its not my fault, its was society that made me do it." This idea of being absolved from moral responsibility can best be highlighted by the Leopold and Leob Trial of 1924.

In the strictest sense of having complete/*absolute*/total control over one's will I would have to concede that we do not have this magical power. As I've stated previously, I have never had anyone demonstrate to me this type of FW. We are all products of this physical universe so it would logically follow that -- ultimately -- our very "being" or "will" is also a correlate. However, at the same time, I believe that we can increase our *freedom of action* by embracing a rational mindset and eventually, by altering the fundamental nature of our minds.

The real difference between Kip's perspective and mine is that, while Kip views our essentially deterministic nature (and lack of Indeterminate Free Will) as a kind of curse, I view it as a challenge. For me, The Post Human Condition is a wonderful journey without a destination. [!]

[DJS]

I was reading another web site and I realized that one of the big distinction that I wasn't making up to now was the difference between perceptual and conceptual awareness. When we are discussing qualia, we are referring to perceptual awareness (feeling, sensation). When we are discussing intentionality we are referring to conceptual awareness (comprehending, learning).

[Mark Hamalainen]

Libet has demonstrated that decisions precede our "perception" of them (see below) so I am inclined to view the contention that perception is essential to decision making as unsupported by experimental evidence (although obviously his results are open to interpetation). From an evolutionary perspective, the purpose of "perception" is to generate primary sensory data that can be sent back and recorded in our memory (a data base). "Perception" or "Experience" is evolutionarily the most effective way for an organism to record and recall vital information about its surrounding environment. Of course, I am sure that this POV is rather distasteful to you.

I am aware of that work, and it does not disprove classical free will. It takes time for the conscious mind to process data so it is not very suprising that our brains are capable of initiating actions prior to conscious decisions. As it says in your quote (which was edited out):

the data remain consistent with the idea that conscious processes could still exert some effect over actions by modifying the brain processes already under way. The fact that conscious awareness of intention precedes movement by a few hundred milliseconds means that a person could still inhibit certain actions from being made

Animals were performing actions in responsed to sensory stimulus before their brains evolved to be capable of hosting consciousness. The role of consciousness is not to perform split second reactions to sensory stimulus, but to process data and effect the course of current and future actions. But I think we're digressing here, however interesting this subject may be, it will not reveal the existence or absense of classical free will. Although it may help us narrow our definition of the possible limits of free will's influence.

The real difference between Kip's perspective and mine is that, while Kip views our essentially deterministic nature (and lack of Indeterminate Free Will) as a kind of curse, I view it as a challenge

I believe that we can increase our *freedom of action* by embracing a rational mindset and eventually, by altering the fundamental nature of our minds

Now it sounds as if you do believe that conscious awareness can influence reality.

Either awareness is merely an observer or it is something more. Does not the ability to 'increase our freedom of action' imply at leasted a limited amount of classical free will?

The second type of FW is known as volitional Free Will and rests on the premise that human choice is determined internally rather than externally

I'm not really sure what the distinction between internal and external. Is internal the body, the nervous system, the cortex...? And I still don't understand how it is 'free'. I realize you didn't coin these terms so I'm not blaming you for that, but since you are more familiar with them I thought you could explain what 'free' refers to in these context.

We are all products of this physical universe so it would logically follow that -- ultimately -- our very "being" or "will" is also a correlate.

I agree that free will is constrained by the physical universe. In the very least we our constrained to move from one instant of time to a subsequent one (by instant of time I mean a configuration of the universe, and the subsequent instants being configurations of the minimal possible change and of greater entropy. This is assuming time is composed of discrete instants), and not jump around time and space.

[DJS]

I am aware of that work, and it does not disprove classical free will.  It takes time for the conscious mind to process data so it is not very suprising that our brains are capable of initiating actions prior to conscious decisions.  As it says in your quote (which was edited out):

No you're right and I realized that I was actually not being consistent in what I was saying anyway (which is why I quickly scratched it). You should understand that from my perspective I see the *logic* of determinism, but I also have the desire ("will") to free myself from its shackles. I think that the best way to approach this problem is not to deny that it exists, but to take it head on and somehow over come it (or at least minimize it).

Now it sounds as if you do believe that conscious awareness can influence reality. 

Either awareness is merely an observer or it is something more.  Does not the ability to 'increase our freedom of action' imply at leasted a limited amount of classical free will?

All right, let me take another crack at this. By my *Will in the present* I can increase my freedom of action for my Diachronic Self (or will) in the future. For example, currently I can not communicate in Korean. If today I decided to spontaneously pack my bags and visit South Korea, my range of actions there would be greatly limited by my language deficiency. However, if over the next few months I took the time to learn the rudimentaries of Korean, and then I went to South Korea, well, then I just increase my freedom of action by strategically planning out how I could maximize my freedom of action in South Korea.

This ability to plan things out in advance, to conceptualize both ourselves and the world around us is at the heart of what "intentionality" means. Combined with the *functional* relationship between our selves and the external world and I believe that I see a path to attain at least a limited form of FW in a universe that MUST operate according to the logic of causality.

Your freedom of action stems from the depth of your intellect and the flexibility (plasticity) of your cognition.

Saying that it was determined that your present self would make choice "A" and couldn't possibly make any other choice quite honestly frustates my mind. I think that a more appropriate question to ask is -- Did you have the external freedom to make a variety of choices, or were coerced to do so? If your freedom of action was not impeded from an external source than you had (theoretically) the freedom to choose in any way you desired. The reason that you chose the way you did is because YOU ARE YOU. You have tastes, preferences, capabilities, etc. The only way that you could have chosen other wise is if YOU WEREN'T YOU.

I don't know about you, but I like ME [lol] and I'm glad that I made the choices that I made (otherwise I would not be me, but someone else right now ).

I believe that underneath the fancy lexicon of terms used by many contemporary compatibilists is the rather simple notion of *self improvement*. For most traditional philosophers this self improvement comes from traditional sources such as the adoption of various heuristics or embracing the life style of an autodidact. As I have alluded to earlier, us Transhumanists have much more amibitious aspirations.

The main point though is using the external world to improve oneself. Do you remember that very popular song by Metallica called "One" where a veteran was blown up by a land mine and lost all of his senses. "Land mine has taken my sight, taken my speech, taken my hearing..." The veterans existence was portrayed as the ultimate hell, and I think I would have to agree with this perspective. Being trapped in a perceptual vacuum with nothing to do but focus in upon yourself... for the rest of your life. In such a situation there is really no chance for growth, no chance for discovery -- you are worse than dead.

[DJS]

I was also thinking about the distinction I was making between perception and conception, and I thought I should add that the conception is often interwoven with perception. This might actually make it easier to distinguish between qualia and other mental phenomenon (though I have heard qualia used in all sorts of contexts).

As an example, complex patterns of sound are intepreted effortlessly by the mind as data. In fact, the mind can not help but interpret language into meaning. If my native tongue is english and I hear someone speaking in english I can't help but understand what their saying. IOW, I can't make myself hear an english conversation as gibberish. Yet, if I heard a conversation in a language I was not fluent in, I would perceive nothing other than "noise" or "sound". This noise, or pure sound, is qualia -- just as the redness of red on a rose is qualia. Qualia then is the purest, core component of perception. What I should have said previously was that, from my perspective, qualia (if it is even appropriate to use such terminology) is an epiphenomenon of physical processes in the brain. However, many proponents of qualia would counter back that the very intentionality that I mention, the *understanding* of language or the *meaning* of a rose, is also tied up in this mysterious, fundamentally elusive mental phenomenon.

In all truthfullness I have no idea, but I do find interesting the functionalist interpretation of meaning at more abstract levels of thought which can not be traced back to an empirical reality (such as conceptualizing the fictitious world of Babar the Elephant). This higher form of intentionality may resolve some of the mysteries our consciousness.

[DJS]

Also, just to let any readers of this thread know, at some point I will be split this conversation off into its own separate topic.

[knite]

Alright, let me think.
Humans make mistakes. Mistakes require some will, because it means that there is bad(or not as good) choice and a good choice.
We do this because...
A.)We do not have the ability to predict everything that will happen.
B.)We approximate, ALOT.
C.)We do not have perfect logic, stemming from our inability to predict everything, as well as often the inability to focus on many things at once while still holding the details. (Mentally I mean. But an analogy would be the stars, we can see the whole universe above our heads at night, but its quite impossible (at least as of now) to see the whole universe, AND still be able to see individual planets and whatnot around stars, or even thier colors. This leads to our approximating.)
This means that in order for a human being to have absolutely no free will, they would need to be able to predict everything perfectly, hold even the most minute detail as well as look at the big picture. And with this, they could theoretically make perfect choices (which would logically be the only ones to make.)
So...that would mean that a completely predictable universe necessitates no free will, and an unpredictable universe necessitates at least SOME?
Sorry if this looks funky, I just had to organize my thoughts to show you how I came to this, correct me where Im wrong, please.

Edit-Let me clarify predictable and unpredictable.
Predictable is obvious,
Unpredictable however, does NOT mean absolute randomness. It simply means that you will never be able to absolutely know for certain every detail at any one moment.

Edited by knite, 16 June 2005 - 05:17 AM.

[Mark Hamalainen]

So...that would mean that a completely predictable universe necessitates no free will, and an unpredictable universe necessitates at least SOME?

Which sort of free will are you talking about? Volitional or classical?

Complete preditability is the same as complete determinism and it outlaws classical free will.
Unpredictability does not prove any amount of classical free will, it just doesn't outlaw it.

[DJS]

knite

B.)We approximate, ALOT.

Edit-Let me clarify predictable and unpredictable.
Predictable is obvious,
Unpredictable however, does NOT mean absolute randomness. It simply means that you will never be able to absolutely know for certain every detail at any one moment.

I isolated B here because this is really the idea you fixated on in this post. Indeed, approximation can lead to a level of unpredictability, but either way, this unpredictability stems from one of two sources; random or deterined events. This you see Knite, is the delimma.

All of us live in a universe where logic dictates *causality*. There are two types of causation, random or determined, but no matter how you cut it, every event in time has a previous cause (or causes). The creation of you, as a conscious, Willing, human being is also an event which had causes. Unfortunately this makes the classical notion of FW difficult to maintain. If I have a given internal state, then there is no *choice* but for me to make the decision I am about to make, such as typing 8902u3489q289ghw97rh a9svgr5273. This action may seem unpredictable to you, and I *feel* as if I made this decision to type gibberish of my own FW, but was this action not actually dictated by the composition of my internal state?

I believe that internality and externality are important however, and something which I am still pondering. One philosophical school of thought which I believe might offer some insights into the relationship betweent the two is the functionalist camp.

[Mark Hamalainen]

I think its important to point out that there is no scientific explanation for self-awareness, nor any way of measuring or detecting it. I know that I am aware, but I can't know for sure if anybody else actually is or not. Given the similarities between me and other people I can only infer that other people are probably self-aware as well.

If I didn't know that I was self-aware, the idea of self awareness would suffer the same skepticism that classical free will does. However I do know that self awareness exists despite there being no reason for it from a purely physical level.

So just as I assume without being able to prove it that other people are self-aware, I assume that I have classical free will.

[knite]

I think its important to point out that there is no scientific explanation for self-awareness, nor any way of measuring or detecting it. I know that I am aware, but I can't know for sure if anybody else actually is or not. Given the similarities between me and other people I can only infer that other people are probably self-aware as well.

If I didn't know that I was self-aware, the idea of self awareness would suffer the same skepticism that classical free will does. However I do know that self awareness exists despite there being no reason for it from a purely physical level.

So just as I assume without being able to prove it that other people are self-aware, I assume that I have classical free will.

I think this is where Im losing the predeterminism. If I am the product of nothing but a chain of reactions, and all my actions are the same product, then there is absolutely no reason for awareness at all. I may as well be a rock.

as a side note-does the "go back in time" for predeterminism seem unreasonable to anyone else? It does make sense that if you rewound time that a person would take the same action as they had before, and the person proving predeterminism would never realize they had rewound time before and would do it again. BUT if the person proving predeterminism were to actually go back and SEE if you took the same action, then its very likely that you will make a different one. I suppose theres a huge difference between this rewinding time and actually going back in time.

Edited by knite, 16 June 2005 - 07:58 PM.

[DJS]

I think its important to point out that there is no scientific explanation for self-awareness, nor any way of measuring or detecting it. I know that I am aware, but I can't know for sure if anybody else actually is or not. Given the similarities between me and other people I can only infer that other people are probably self-aware as well.

If I didn't know that I was self-aware, the idea of self awareness would suffer the same skepticism that classical free will does. However I do know that self awareness exists despite there being no reason for it from a purely physical level.

So just as I assume without being able to prove it that other people are self-aware, I assume that I have classical free will.

A friend of mine refers to this as the "Free Will fills in the gaps" perspective. [lol] I'll type a more thorough response later as it is a legitimate position that deserves analysis.

Oh and Knite,

I think this is where Im losing the predeterminism

Our conversation has moved away from predeterminism and should not be mixed into this debate. As I've stated earlier, the topic of predeterminism and Free Will are not directly related.

[jaydfox]

As I've stated earlier, the topic of predeterminism and Free Will are not directly related.

That depends on your definition of Free Will. [hmm] )