Abstract
Dr. Evil learns that a duplicate of Dr. Evil has been created. Upon
learning this, how seriously should he take the hypothesis that he
himself is that duplicate? I answer: very seriously. I defend a principle
of indifference for self-locating belief which entails that after
Dr. Evil learns that a duplicate has been created, he ought to have
exactly the same degree of belief that he is Dr. Evil as that he is the
duplicate. More generally, the principle shows that there is a sharp
distinction between ordinary skeptical hypotheses, and self-locating
skeptical hypotheses.
more from the paper:
Dear Sir,
(Forgive the impersonal nature of this communication—our purpose
prevents us from addressing you by name.) We have just created a
duplicate of Dr. Evil. The duplicate—call him “Dup”—is inhabiting
a replica of Dr. Evil’s battlestation that we have installed in our skepticism
lab. At each moment Dup has experiences indistinguishable
from those of Dr. Evil. For example, at this moment both Dr. Evil
and Dup are reading this message.
We are in control of Dup’s environment. If in the next ten
minutes Dup performs actions that correspond to deactivating the
battlestation and surrendering, we will treat him well. Otherwise
we will torture him.
Best regards,
The PDF
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so don't let duplicates fall into the wrong hands