Like Syria, Iran has certainly lended aid to militant groups, but in the case of Iran, the support has come more in the form of weaponry, improvised explosive devices of considerable sophistication, and funding for both military and political activities. But whether this is a policy approved by the ruling government, or an independent venture of the Revolutionary Guards, remains an open question. Iran has made no effort to conceal its support for the Mahdi Army and the Badr Corps, but its alleged relationship with other insurgent groups is less certain, and I think there is a general tendency to overstate the role of foreign governments in what appears to be a largely indigenous insurgency.
There has yet to be precedent for a country sharing sensitive nuclear technology with a non-state actor, but there is the worrying case of a non-state actor---led by nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan---selling nuclear starter kits to other nation-states. However, there is no evidence that this network had the intention of providing similar support to non-state actors like Al-Qaeda, since their political goal was to strengthen Muslim states, and not to create conditions for nuclear war. For nation-states, nuclear proliferation is driven almost without exception by the rational desire to upgrade their defenses, and to gain greater freedom in foreign policymaking. And although some groups fantasize about the prospect of acquiring nuclear material, a regard for self-interest disinclines governments from transferring such technology, or creating conditions for theft. This is because every state understands the costs of erring, and the likelihood of massive retaliation if stolen or transferred material is used against a major target. In post-Soviet Russia, there were indeed instances of nuclear material going missing, but such only involved a very trivial quantity, and in any case, much of the missing material was later recovered. And in Pakistan, which is considered more vulnerable to cases of theft or collaboration, critical components like the nuclear trigger, have been separated, and kept under safe guard, which makes the chances of transfer by a rogue element within the military exceedingly remote. North Korea has been more audacious with its sharing of unconventional weapons, but again, they have predictably limited their clients and partners to nation-states. In the post 9/11 world, the fear of terrorist groups getting a hold of nuclear material is understandable, but to date, there is no evidence that there have been any significant failures in the safety protocols of nuclear weapons states, or reason to believe that there might be a future failure. If anything, there is evidence of a strong causal relationship between the spread of nuclear weapons and the reduced incidence of interstate war, so we shouldn't hyperventilate about the prospect of new members in the nuclear weapons club. Rather, we should simply try to contain the proliferation of such weapons, because the costs of development are significant for many of the underdeveloped aspirants, and because proliferation may give rise to a destabilizing arms race that leads to devastating miscalculations.
Finally, I can appreciate concerns over corporate influence in foreign policymaking, but there is little proof that recent acts of war were driven largely by the interests of the private sector, who has not fared especially well in postwar Iraq. Rather, it seems that the originally modest foreign policy of the Bush administration underwent a radical change after September 11th, which greatly altered assumptions about security, and because of undiminished feelings of triumphalism after the Cold War, there was a terrible failure to understand the limits of unipolarity---which led to a predictable case of overstretch in Iraq and the broader war against terrorism.
Edited by Rol82, 30 October 2010 - 11:02 PM.