and it proves that I'm not that organized.
Dismiss in the Interest of Justice The purpose of a motion to dismiss in the interest of justice is to allow justice to prevail over the strict letter of the law so as to prevent a miscarriage of justice. (See, People v Stern, 83 Misc.2d 935.) In entertaining such a motion, the court must scrutinize the merits of defendant's application and weigh the respective interests of the defendant, the complainant, and the community at large. (See, People v Clayton, 41 A.D.2d 204.)
We accordingly issue the writ and strike the challenged portion of City ordinance 97-4019. The order of the circuit court is quashed.
Case questions city noise ordinance In an unrelated ruling, a state Supreme Court justice finds the law unconstitutional. Court Justice John Brunetti noted that Syracuse's noise ordinance was just as unconstitutionally vague as a similar law in Poughkeepsie that was struck down for the same reason by the Court of Appeals 20 years ago New York State Constitution." James Johnson New York
BOROUGH ORDINANCE FOUND UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Penn State Changes Speech Policy
On February 11, 1999, Julian Heicklen and Diane Fornbacher were arrested for using a battery-powered bullhorn at the weekly Marijuana Smoke Out in downtown State College, PA. They were handcuffed and carried away for arraignment. On March 3, 1999, they were bound over for trial for violating the State College Borough Noise Ordinance and for disorderly conduct.
Through their respective attorneys, Simon Grill and Ron Rojas, Heicklen and Fornbacher filed writs of habeas corpus to have the cases dismissed. A hearing was held on May 21, 1999. On July 19, 1999, Judge
Thomas King Kistler found the municipal noise ordinance unconstitutional on its face and dismissed all charges.
In his order Judge Kistler stated: "The prohibition against the use of sound amplification devices found in Section 103(b)(2) is an absolute prohibition of such devices and does not contain reasonable manner, place, or time regulations. Presumably, the use of amplification is prohibited even if a person uses such a device to emit sounds in a mere 'whisper' level. Such an absolute prohibition is an impermissible restraint on free speech and is not a reasonable regulation according to Guess, supra, and
Saia, supra. Consequently, this Court holds the Borough of State College Noise Ordinance, Section 103(b)(2), unconstitutional on its face."
(Crockett Promotion v City of Charlotte, 706 F.2d 486, 493 [1983].)
content-based). Here, on the other hand, Section 2079-A contains no such exception and is clearly content neutral.
other hand, a statute that interferes with the right of free speech requires “a more stringent vagueness test.” Id. at 499.
~ The defendant also argued that the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague. That aspect of Kovacs is discussed in Section II, below.
Several cases from the Supreme Court and the Law Court illustrate the application of the standards discussed above to regulations restricting noise. In Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949), a city ordinance prohibited the use on public streets of sound trucks emitting “loud and raucous noises.” The Court found that while “loud and raucous” are “abstract words, they have through daily use acquired a content that conveys to any interested person a sufficiently accurate concept of what is forbidden.” Id. at 79. Thus, the Court held that the ordinance was not unconstitutionally vague.
Another illustrative case is Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972). There, an “antinoise ordinance” prohibited persons adjacent to any school from making, while the school is in session, ‘any noise or diversion which disturbs or tends to disturb the peace or good order” of the school session. Id. at 107-08. The Court concluded that the statute was not impennissibly vague. Id. at 109. The Court noted that “although the prohibited quantum of disturbance is not specified in the ordinance, it is apparent from the statute’s announced purpose that the measure is whether normal school activity has been or is about to be disrupted.” Id. at 112. Thus, the Court found that the ordinance gave “fair warning as to what is prohibited.” Id. at 114.
Another relevant - and arguably controlling - case is Town of Baldwin v. Carter, 2002 ME 52, 794 A.2d 62. There, a town ordinance prohibited allowing a dog to “unnecessarily annoy or disturb any person by continued or repeated barking, howling, or other loud or unusual noises anytime day or night.” Carter, 2002 ME at ¶ 2, 794 A.2d at 64. The defendant argued that the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague because “it did not provide objective standards for determining if a violation had occurred.” Carter, 2002 ME at ¶ 11, 794 A.2d at 67. The court rejected this argument. The court began by ,, “interpreting “any person as any reasonable person” and thus construing the statute as prohibiting only continuous or repeated dog barking that is unreasonable. Carter, 2002 ME at ¶ 12, 794 A.2d at 68. It then noted that “‘reasonableness’ is a well defined concept under the common law” and ‘is not an unconstitutionally vague concept.”’ Carter, 2002 ME at ¶ 13, 794 A.2d at 68 (quoting Tn -State Rubbish, Inc. v. Town of New Gloucester, 634 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Me. 1993)). After noting that the ordinance provided that the barking must also be “continued or repeated” and “unnecessary” to be actionable - and required the town to give a warning before taking legal action - the court held that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague. Carter, 2002 ME at ¶ 14, 794 A.2d at 68-69; see also State v. Singer, 945 P.2d 359 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997) (ordinance prohibiting keeping a dog “which is in the habit of barking or howling or disturbing the peace and quiet of any person” was not unconstitutionally vague); State v. Taylor, 495 S.E.2d 413 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998)(ordinance prohibiting keeping an animal that “habitually or repeatedly makes excessive noises that tend to annoy, disturb, or frighten” a person was not unconstitutionally vague).
A final noteworthy case - and one relied upon by the Carter court - is State v. Sylvain, 344 A.2d 407 (Me. 1975). There, a motor vehicle statute provided that “no signaling device shall be unnecessarily sounded nor any braking or acceleration unnecessarily made so as to cause a harsh, objectionable or unreasonable noise.” Id. at
408. Defendant, who was alleged to have “squealed” his tires while accelerating, argued that the statute was unconstitutionally vague. The court rejected this argument. The
13 court found that while the statute “does not set exact decibel limitations, its proscriptions are framed in words of common use and understanding.” Id. at 409. It noted that “only such noises harsh and loud enough to offend the sensibilities of the hearing public to an unreasonable degree are prohibited.” Id. The court concluded: “We have no doubt that the familiar language employed in the statute conveys a sufficiently accurate concept of what is forbidden.” IdP
Under the relevant standards, as illustrated by the cases discussed above, Section 2079-A is not unconstitutionally vague. The statute provides two separate objective standards by which one can determine whether the volume of a car stereo is excessive. First, it is excessive if it “is audible at a distance of greater than 25 feet” and “exceeds 85 decibels.” 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2079-A. Clearly, this standard is objective and can be readily determined. Alternatively, the volume is excessive if it “is greater than reasonable with due regard to the location of the vehicle and the effect on persons in proximity to the vehicle.”10 While this standard is less objective than the first, it is sufficiently definite to survive a vagueness challenge.11 Indeed, it survives attack for the same reason that the statutes in Carter and Sylvain survived - it adopts an objective reasonableness” standard. Thus, the volumes of car stereos are measured not by what an individual police officer or driver might consider an appropriate level, but what a Courts in other states have generally rejected vagueness challenges to regulations limiting muffler and other vehicle noise. See, e.g., St. Louis County v. McClune, 762 S.W.2d 91 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988)(ordinance prohibited vehicles from making “excessive and unnecessary noises”); People v. Byron, 215 N.E.2d 345 (N.Y. 1966)(statute prohibited excessive or unusual muffler noise); State v. Olsson, 895 P.2d 867 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995)(same); County of Jefferson v. Renz, 588 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998) (same), rev’d on other grounds, 603 N.W.2d 541 (1999). But see Meisner v. State, 907 S.W.2d 664 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995)(ordinance prohibiting “unnecessary noise” when accelerating was unconstitutionally vague).
The State notes that
The statue provides perhaps a third standard, stating that it is a “prima facie viola~on... if the vehicle is located near buildings and the buildings or windows in the buildings are shaken or rattled by the sound of the sound system.” Again, this is a readily-determined objective standard.
Broaderick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612-615 (1973); Town of Kittery v. Campbell, 455 A.2d 30, 31-32 (Me. 1983) (litigant may bring facial First Amendment challenge even when his or her own actions were not protected by First Amendment); Gabriel v. Town of Old Orchard Beach, 390 A.2d 1065, 1068 (Me. 1978)(same).
Speech and thought were enduring values, essential to the excavation of truth. And what sort of example was set by a government that resorted to criminality to enforce its laws?
~ The State is attempting to interpret Mr. O’Rights pro se motion as fairly as possible, but, at times, the motion makes little sense. For example, Mr. Q’Rights repeatedly argues that Section 2079-A prohibits “objectional” [sic] or “annoying” noises and that such standards are unconstitutional. Motion to Dismiss, 4-5. In fact, the statue makes no reference to “objectionable” or “annoying” noises and instead speaks only to volume levels without regard to content.
How such a group of privileged eighteenth-century aristo-crats, oligarchs, monarchists, lawyers and businessmen and bankers were led by reason and experience to understand that their lives and interests were best protected in a democracy-a democracy that the future would have to perfect-is the story of this book.
, the noise ordinance in no way allows for arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. (Crockett Promotion v City of Charlotte, 706 F.2d 486, 493 [1983].)
MARTIN v. STRUTHERS, 319 U.S. 141 (1943)
A municipal ordinance forbidding any person to knock on doors, ring doorbells, or otherwise summon to the door the occupants of any residence for the purpose of distributing to them handbills or circulars, held - as applied to a person distributing advertisements for a religious meeting - invalid under the Federal Constitution as a denial of freedom of speech and press. Pp. 142, 149.
The right of freedom of speech and press has broad scope. The authors of the First Amendment knew that novel and unconventional ideas might disturb the complacent, but they chose to encourage a freedom which they believed essential if vigorous enlightenment was ever to triumph over slothful ignorance.[fn3] This freedom embraces the right to distribute literature, Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452, and necessarily protects the right to receive it. The privilege may not be withdrawn even if it creates the minor nuisance for a community of cleaning litter from its streets. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162.
"The only security of all is in a free press. The force of public opinion cannot be resisted, when permitted freely to be expressed. The agitation it produces must be submitted to. It is necessary to keep the waters pure." Jefferson to Lafayette,
Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Washington ed., v. 7, p. 325.
Regulations like this simply pave the way for more repressive legislation; they are a harbinger for the future, a future where all "noise" is regulated, with those that are "offensive to local sensibilities" banned and the performers jailed. By excluding sporting events illuminates the selective enforcement of this law and shows the type of "noise" they are truly worried
about--music!
The case of Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989), in which the Supreme Court held that a regulation limiting the volume of outdoor concerts did not violate the First Amendment, illustrates the application of this test. In Ward, the City of New York regulated the volume at which music could be played at a bandshell in Central Park. Id. at 784. The sponsor of a rock concert brought a First Amendment challenge to the regulation, but the Supreme Court held that it was a reasonable regulation of the place and manner of protected speech and thus rejected the challenge. Id. at 803
Distinguish case
“The legislature apparently added this second standard in recognition of the fact that most police officers do not carry decibel meters. Legis. Rec. S-437 (Apr. 11, 2001); Legis. Rec. S-467 (Apr. 24, 2001). ‘LD 497, Page 1 - 120th Legislature, FIRST REGULAR Session Page 1 of2
“The legislature apparently added this second standard in recognition of the fact that most police officers do not carry decibel meters. Legis. Rec. S-437 (Apr. 11, 2001); Legis. Rec. S-467 (Apr. 24, 2001). ‘LD 497, Page 1 - 120th Legislature, FIRST REGULAR Session Page 1 of2
Divided Report
Majority Report of the Committee on TRANSPORTATION reporting Ought to Pass as Amended by Committee Amendment “A” (S-33) on Bill “An Act to Reduce Noise Pollution”
(S.P. 153) (L.D. 497)
Signed:
Senators:
SAVAGE of Knox
O’GARA of Cumberland
GAGNON of Kennebec
Representatives:
MARLEY of Portland
McNEIL of Rockland
COLLINS of Wells
WHEELER of Eliot
WHEELER of Bridgewater
FISHER of Brewer
BOUFFARD of Lewiston
McKENNEY of Cumberland
BUNKER of Kossuth Township
Minority Report of the same Committee
to Pass on same Bill.
Signed:
Representative:
PARADIS of Frenchville
Came from the Senate with the Majority OUGHT TO PASS
AS AMENDED Report READ and ACCEPTED and the Bill
PASSED TO BE ENGROSSED AS AMENDED BY COMMITTEE
AMENDMENT “A” (5-33). READ.
Representative FISHER of Brewer moved that the House ACCEPT the Majority Ought to Pass as Amended Report.
The SPEAKER: The Chair recognizes the Representative from Frenchville, Representative Paradis.
Representative PARADIS: Mr. Speaker, Men and Women of the House. This is highly reminiscent of Twelve Angry Men standing alone. The reason I am opposing this is that I would like to see a comprehensive bill on noise pollution. If that had been included in such a bill, I would have joined the majority. We have many sources of noise pollution. There are some that are supported by very strong lobbyists. The laws are not enforced adequately. I think this is singling out one group, the young people, maybe it is the teacher in me. I don’t like to see that, but somewhere along the line I hope there is a bill introduced that would call for a study of noise pollution and more stringent enforcement of the laws. Anybody who wishes to join me in the red column, I would appreciate it. Thank you.
The SPEAKER: The Chair recognizes the Representative
from Wells, Representative Collins.
Representative COLLINS: Mr. Speaker, Ladies and Gentlemen of the House. I seldom rise to speak to you, but this morning I feel obligated to speak to you. I think we have all heard the cars with the deep base on the radios. They are noise polluters. You wonder sometimes how the operator of that vehicle can hear emergency sirens coming up behind him to move out of the way. You question where the motive is to interfere with our constituents when they are trying to sleep at night during the summer months. I have had a vehicle come by my house and it seems as though I could hear it a quarter of a mile before it even got to my house with this deep base tone to the radio. I have constituents on a number of occasions say to me, Ron, there ought to be a law. This is a nuisance. I was reluctant to even present legislation, but fortunately a member of
the other body did. I am a member of the Transportation Committee and we supported this, not unanimously, however, a majority supported this legislation. I ask that you would also. Thank you.
The SPEAKER: The Chair recognizes the Representative from Brewer, Representative Fisher.
Representative FISHER: Mr. Speaker, Men and Women of the House. I saw Twelve Angry Men also and as my good friend from Aroostook, he was right like Henry Fonda. This bill is considerably narrower than the gentleman from Aroostook would like it to be. It specifically aims itself at the boom box heavy base songs emanating from vehicles today. It gives us a tool to kind of tone things down in the neighborhoods. The Representative from Wells mentioned our former colleague who is down at the other end of the building now, the good Senator from York. He did a great presentation. We are going to name him an honorary choirboy for his rendition of the noises that come from cars. If you see him in the halls, I would ask to request to hear him do his song again.
The Chair ordered a division on the motion to ACCEPT the Majority Ought to Pass as Amended Report.
A vote of the House was taken. 80 voted in favor of the same and 32 against, and accordingly the Majority Ought to Pass as Amended Report was ACCEPTED.
The Bill was READ ONCE. Committee Amendment “A” (S-33) was READ by the Clerk and ADOPTED. The Bill was assigned for SECOND READING Wednesday, April 4, 2001.
Majority Report of the Committee on STATE AND LOCAL
.
An Act to Reduce Noise Pollution
S.P. 153 L.D. 497
(C “A” S-33)
THE PRESIDENT PRO TEM: The Chair recognizes the Senator from Aroostook, Senator Martin.
Senator MARTIN: Mr. President, members of the Senate. The
title sort of intrigued me and I would ask you to take L.D. 497 with the amendment and take a look at the bill. “An Act to Reduce Noise Pollution.” I was involved with a similar idea a number of years ago dealing with a problem we had in Aroostook County on agricultural noise. When we got through it, we realized that in order to enforce anything dealing with noise, someone needed to have a noise meter. What this bill does is to say that you can’t be riding a vehicle, and the amendment is amended to say “on a public way at a volume that is audible at a distance of greater than 25 feet and exceeds 85 decibels.” So as you’re riding your vehicle, or someone is but it won’t be me as I don’t like to hear the sound that loud to begin with but some of the teenagers that we all know do, someone is going to stop them and say it’s too loud. Now someone’s going to need a decibel meter. State Police do not carry those. Are they then going to cease the car at the noise level that it’s at and then go find a decibel meter and then test it? I think we’re asking for trouble. The fine sponsor is a member of this body, the Senator from York, and I’d like him or members of the Transportation Committee to explain how we’re going to be able to enforce it, what the cost will be of the decibel meters that we’re going to have to provide to Municipal and State Police, and whether or not this potentially becomes a method of harassment for Maine’s young people. So I hate to pose those
S-437
LEGISLATIVE RECORD - SENATE, WEDNESDAY, APRIL 11,2001