Killing the Physically Immortal: the Ethics of Prohibiting Access to Life Extension Technology Mark Walker, PhD
Research Associate, Philosophy, Trinity College
University of Toronto
Abstract: Killing mortal humans is wrong primarily because it inflicts upon individuals one of the greatest losses they can experience: the loss of their future. It is argued that this same analysis applies to those who would deny access to life extension technology. To deny access to radical life extension technology—technology that would greatly extend longevity or permit physical immortality—is wrong primarily because it inflicts upon those who desire access one of the greatest losses they can experience: the loss of their future. Recognition of this loss makes a strong presumptive case for the moral impermissibility of prohibiting access to radical life extension technology.
1. Introductory
Through the use of emerging technologies the real prospect exists that some of us alive today (or at least our immediate descendents) may celebrate their one-thousandth birthday with the full vigor of youth, with many more to come. Clearly, circumventing the natural life cycle in humans raises enormous ethical questions. Indeed, the “immortality debate” may eventually result in more controversy than the ethical dispute at the “other end of life”, that is, the “abortion debate”. In addition to their controversial nature, there are several other parallels between these issues. One is the enabling role of modern medical technology to alter the “natural” life cycle: a greatly increased life span is not possible without the use of such technology, and modern technologies have made abortions a much less risky proposition, and thus a much more appealing option for many.
For our purposes, the relevance of the abortion debate is twofold. First, it provides an excellent illustration of the distinction between two sorts of ethical questions that might be asked:
Q1: Is it morally permissible to X?
Q2: Is it morally permissible to prevent X?
where ‘X’ refers to the act of an individual or a group. These questions are related, but distinct. That they are related is evident from the fact that often the answers to these questions will neatly dovetail. So, if X is ‘murdering an innocent child’ then it is not morally permissible to do X, and it is morally permissible to prevent X. It is permissible to prevent the murder of a child by whisking the youngster out of the path of a car driven by someone intent on murdering. If X is ‘reading the morning paper’ then X is morally permissible, and likewise, it would not be morally permissible to prevent someone from reading her morning paper. Sometimes answers to these questions do not dovetail so neatly, e.g., it has sometimes been argued that, while euthanasia is morally permissible, it is morally permissible to prevent euthanasia because we have no way of adjudicating between genuine cases of euthanasia and murder. The worry, in other words, is that by allowing euthanasia as a matter of public policy some might be killed against their will under the guise of “euthanasia”. To prevent this greater harm—the killing of those who do not want to end their life—we must (regrettably) prevent all cases of euthanasia. Abortion is another well known instance where the answers to these questions might point in opposing directions. Thus, a position held by some is that although abortion is morally impermissible, it is wrong to prevent those who want to have an abortion from obtaining one. According to this view, then, it would be wrong to barricade an abortion clinic to prevent women from gaining access, or to agitate for public policy that would prohibit abortion. Proponents of this position suggest that there are one or more harms that might be promoted by preventing women from seeking a legal abortion including: the harm of her loss of liberty, encouraging illegal and dangerous abortions, and the harm that an unwanted child might suffer. So one could consistently argue that abortion is morally impermissible, however, to prevent this morally impermissible act inflects greater harm.
The relevance of this for our purposes is that the argument I shall make claims that it is morally impermissible to prevent access to life extension technology. I do not consider the related question, whether it is morally permissible to use life extension technology. As our discussion above indicates, accepting the conclusion that it is morally impermissible to prevent access to life extension technology does not in itself entail believing that using life extension technology is morally permissible; just as one can consistently believe that abortion is morally impermissible, but deny that it is morally permissible to prevent women from obtaining an abortion. In other words, the argument I make is consistent with a positive or negative verdict with respect to the question of the moral permissibility of using life extension technology.
A second connection to the abortion debate is that to defend the conclusion that it is morally impermissible to prevent access to life extension technology I will employ a modified version of a well-known argument by Don Marquis (1989) against the moral permissibility of abortion. Marquis argues that abortion is wrong because it deprives a fetus of a future. I will argue that it is wrong to prevent access to life extension technology because it deprives those who seek such technology a future they would have otherwise had. First, however, we will consider (briefly) what is meant by ‘physical immortality’.
2. What is ‘Physical Immortality’?
Physical immortality means living indefinitely (supported by technology) as physically embodied beings. Exotic possibilities for continued physical existence involve the idea of having our minds “uploaded” to a computer and living in a virtual world; or perhaps having a robotic body as a home and instrument for our uploaded mind to interact with the physical world (Moravec, 1990). Clearly the idea of a person continuing to exist in this manner involves a number of assumptions about future technological developments; not to mention controversial metaphysical assumptions about the continuity of persons as they migrate from a biological existence to a computer upload. For present purposes it would be best to set these aside and concentrate on the idea of biological immortality. This too requires extrapolation from current technological capabilities, but perhaps not as much as one might think. One possibility is suggested by recent discoveries in the genetics of aging that have shown that it is possible to alter round worms to increase their life spans 2 to 6 times (Kenyon, 1996; Arantes-Oliveira, et al., 2003). The hope of some is to find human analogues of these genes and extend human life in a proportional manner. Thus, a human who is the beneficiary of such modifications would have a life span of between 160 and 500 years. Of course this is well short of immortality, but it is certainly a step in the right direction. In other words, these discoveries might lead to what is sometimes referred to as “superlongevity”—doubling or more the average lifespan of a human. Superlongevity itself may be a stepping-stone to physical immortality. If someone were the beneficiary of this technology today then technological advances during their lifetime will likely mean that the ravages of age might be overcome. How? One possibility is suggested by stem cell technology. Using stem cells it is conceivable that a person could live indefinitely through the replacement of organs and tissue. Imagine visiting your local immortality clinic to get a new heart, lungs, liver every 20 years, and new neurons every 30 years to replace dead or dying neurons, and so on. Presumably, the replacement procedures would not be done all at once; the stem cell regeneration of persons may well be piece meal and ongoing. Think of Thebes famous thought experiment: a ship has a few planks and other bits and pieces replaced as it ages and suffers damage, etc. If the repairs are done gradually, then every piece of the ship may eventually replaced; and yet it seems that we have one and the same ship, even though none of the original material remains. The same might be the case for our descendents as their worn bodies are repaired bit by bit. Every cell would be replaced sooner or later with youthful cells. Mature stem cell technology will make this a possibility in the near-term, almost certainly by the end of this century. For convenience sake, let us refer to any of the aforementioned technologies that would double or more a human life span as ‘radical life extension technology’.
It may help to further our understanding of physical immortality by saying something about what it is not. As is well known, there is a long history of speculation about the possibility of non-physical immortality, often invoking the idea of an “after life” enjoyed by the disembodied soul. In part the term ‘physical immortality’ is meant to stand in contrast to this long tradition of concern and hope for the non-physical immortality of the soul. This is not to suggest that these terms are mutually exclusive: it is not necessary to deny the existence of the immortal soul to be concerned with physical immortality. For one could consistently believe in the immortal soul, yet prefer to continue living in a physically embodied state. Not surprisingly, many who are interested in physical immortality believe that there is no such thing as a soul or an “after life”; or at least the evidence is lacking. However, this is merely a sociological observation, for, as we have said, physical immortality does not logically preclude a belief in the immortal soul.
Sometimes the idea of physical immortality is criticized in terms of the “prolonged disability” argument (Moody, 2000). The idea is that physical immortality will mean simply extending the time period in which we suffer the ravages of age. This calls to mind the image of spending thousands upon thousands of years in a nursing home, physically and mentally incapacitated. Surely no one (or almost no one) would be tempted by the idea of physical immortality if this were what it entails. Champions of physical immortality conjecture that the same biomedical technology that will allow us to live indefinitely will also allow us to do so with the health and vigor we associate with youth. If against all evidence this is not possible then physical immortality will likely have few advocates. For what would be the point of living indefinitely with a ruined body and an incapacitated mind? So we should think of ‘physical immortality’ as referring to both the idea of individuals living indefinitely in the physical world, and the idea that they will do so with their mental and physical abilities intact.
Naturally, even if we can perfect radical life extension technology, this in itself does not guarantee that we won’t be murdered or die in an accident. From this observation some might object that this means that even with advanced biomedical technology in hand we would not be immortal, since we could still perish. Whether we should insist that “true immortality” requires that it is not possible to die, rather than accept a more relaxed understanding of ‘immortality’ as meaning “not dying from disease or old age” is something we need not consider for our purposes. Clearly, it seems that we are far from being immortal in the sense of being impossible to kill, after all, even if we possessed mature stem cell technology or the ability to upload to a computer there is no guarantee that the earth won’t be wiped out by an undetected asteroid in five minutes. So, I will continue to speak about ‘physical immortality’ while acknowledging that we cannot rule out all possible hazards that might end our life, even if we can avoid aging. If one objects to this use of ‘physical immortality’ then one can substitute the term ‘agelessness’ understood as ‘not dying as a result of disease or old-age’ everywhere I use the word ‘immortality’. To think we can achieve more than this in the near-term is pure science fiction. (Of course other technological advances may help us reduce the probability of dying in some hazard but; at least in the short-term, we cannot completely eliminate these hazards).
3. Values and Rights
Should we prevent access to radical life extension technology? An argument frequently adduced against the moral permissibility of physical immortality is that it will lead to over population. The thought is that new persons will be born while older generations will no longer die-off, and so the earth’s population will swell beyond its carrying capacity. Another prevalent objection is that physical immortality would lead to widespread boredom, and so is morally impermissible.
How might radical life extension supporters respond to these objections? One possibility is to argue that these objections are factually mistaken: life extension will not lead to overpopulation and boredom. The idea that we might be dealing strictly with uncontroversial “facts” can be quite misleading. First, the objections of overpopulation and boredom are predictions, and it is not entirely clear we have the relevant data to assess what is or is not likely to happen. After all, no one has ever been physically immortal, indeed no has lived much past 120, so we are entering uncharted waters. Secondly, the idea of disputing the “facts” here ought not to distract us from the truth that there are normative notions at play: ‘overpopulation’ according to what criterion? In the sense that we cannot feed everyone? Or against the standard that if we feed everyone it will require us to destroy additional ecosystems? Some believe that ideally the world’s population should shrink drastically—the world human population should number in the millions not the billions—so that we can return the earth to a more natural balance. Similar remarks apply about boredom. Everyone has been bored at one time or another. How much boredom makes for an unsatisfactory life? The point here is that even disputing these predictions of overpopulation and boredom require us to make a number of ethical judgments.
Even conceding these objections is not sufficient to adjudicate the issue, at most it demonstrates that allowing life extension technology will create some harms. To reach a conclusion concerning the moral permissibility of preventing access to radical life extension technology we must consider “the other side of the equation”, namely, the harm that individuals will suffer if they are prevented from using this technology. One way to think about this harm is in terms of rights, and the attractiveness of the appeal to rights is perhaps obvious, for it seems to allow us to take the short-line here: others should not prevent access to physical immortality technology because it violates our “right to life”. We would never (or almost never) think of sacrificing individuals for some abstract goal like a sustainable population. It is a horrific thought to imagine executing people, or dropping bombs on villages or cities in the name of “population control”. Similarly, killing those who presently are bored in the name of reducing boredom is also an unimaginable evil. The argument then is that given the right to life a parallel line of reasoning leads to the conclusion that one should not prevent physical immortality.
There are several reasons why the proponents of physical immortality should consider resisting taking the short-line here. First, this line of reasoning involves what opponents may see as an unwarranted extension of the “right to life” to a “right to a physically immortal life”. This may be seen as part of a general concern about how traditional conceptions of rights are to be extended to new cases opened up by technology. For example, the right to “reproductive freedom” has found no uncontroversial extension to the right to use cloning technology to “reproduce” (Brock 1998, Kass 1998, Pence 1998, Annas 1998). Thus, it might be thought that it is not clear that the traditional right to life extends to a right to an immortal life, that is, an opponent of immortality may claim that our original understanding of the idea of a “right to life” was never intended to extend to the right to a physically immortal life. Whether this is the case or not is clearly open to question. Perhaps proponents of physical immortality are on solid ground in claming that the right to life does extend to immortal lives, but this should emerge as a conclusion of an argument rather than be assumed as a premise. Otherwise, it seems, the main question has been begged. Second, one has not really even begun to think seriously about rights until one has considered cases where rights conflict. What are we to say if my right to life conflicts with your right to free speech? Imagine that I am precariously situated at the bottom of a potential avalanche. The slightest exercise of your right to free speech (or any other sound) may trigger an avalanche that will destroy me. Presumably in this case my right to life ought to take precedence over your right to free speech. But why? The answer seems to depend on the values that underlie these particular rights. The right to life typically ought to take precedence over the right to free speech precisely because the right to life covers something more valuable than free speech, namely, life. Similarly, even if opponents of life extension technology concede “a right to an immortal life” this in itself will not settle the issue. It would still be open to the objection that this conflicts with the rights of others, specifically the right of others not to be harmed, e.g., to be harmed by overpopulation. So, settling this issue may require an examination of the values underlying various rights.
This brief discussion is meant merely to indicate some potential problems that a rights based defense of physical immortality might face. I am not claiming that it would be impossible to defend physical immortality in this way, however, I don’t see how a rights based defense will be able to avoid discussing the values that rights are intended to preserve. What follows is a discussion of some aspects of these values. And so in this way what I want to argue here may be consistent with, or perhaps even underwrite, a rights based defense. However, the argument I develop is intended to stand on its own.
4. Killing Mortals and the Value of Having a Future-like-ours
To understand the harm individuals might suffer if they are prevented from accessing life extension technology it will be useful to consider first the harm of killing mortal individuals. Our argument will be that the harm done in killing mortals is the same as the harm done if access is denied to radical life extension technology. So let us begin by considering this question: Why is it wrong to kill a perfectly healthy person for no reason? In asking this, we are putting aside cases of self-defense, wartime killing, capital punishment and the like. Let us use the locution ‘presumptively wrong’ to exclude such cases of killing. So what is wrong with the sort of example that Johnny Cash sings about in “Folsom Prison Blues?”
I shot a man in Reno
Just to watch him die
Obviously this is an illegal act, but it is more than an illegal act, it is an immoral act. But why is it immoral to randomly kill someone? One possible answer is that it will inflict pain on the victim. But this cannot be the primary reason that killing is wrong, since then it would be permissible to kill where no pain is inflicted; for example, where one instantly and painlessly kills the victim in his sleep. Even shooting someone at your local mall would not be morally impermissible on this understanding, if you could sneak up behind him and end his life instantly. Another possible answer is that it will cause a great deal of suffering and harm to those left behind. While this may be true, it does not seem to get to the heart of the matter, since it would be permissible to kill a hermit who has no others around to grieve his loss, or where the individual would not be missed by others (Marquis, 49). Furthermore, if the trouble is that others will grieve, then the problem would resolve to killing all those that know the victim, and all those that know them and so on. Thus, on this account it would be wrong to kill a member of an isolated tribe because others in the tribe might grieve his death. But if one could arrange for the whole tribe to be killed then this would alleviate the difficulty: since the tribe is isolated there would be no others left to grieve their departure from this world. Of course, it is wrong to conclude from this that the pain that a victim might suffer during his death is irrelevant, or that the pain experienced by those left behind is irrelevant. However, neither answer seems to provide a satisfactory analysis of what is primarily wrong with killing.
A more promising suggestion, developed by several thinkers (Glover, 1978; Young, 1979; Marquis, 1989) is that what is key here is the loss of the victim’s future. As Marquis states it:
What primarily makes killing wrong is neither its effect on the murderer nor its effects on the victim’s friends and relatives, but its effect on the victim. The loss of one’s life is one of the greatest losses one can suffer. The loss of one’s life deprives one of all the experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyment that would otherwise have constituted one’s future. Therefore, killing someone is wrong, primarily because the killing inflicts (one of) the greatest possible losses on the victim. (49)
This analysis of why killing is wrong is supported by two further considerations. It explains why we consider killing to be one of the worse crimes: killing deprives the victim of more than just about any other crime. Second, it explains why those dying of a terminal illness consider their premature death such a bad thing: the loss of their future is primarily what makes premature death through disease so tragic for the victim (Marquis, 50).
Marquis notes four implications (50-1) of this view that are relevant for our purposes. One of which is that the theory makes no mention of a particular biological species, Homo sapiens. So, the theory is incompatible with speciesism. If there are aliens on other planets who have a future like ours then it is wrong to kill them for precisely the same reason that it is wrong to kill us: because it would deprive them of a future like ours. A similar point may apply to other nonhuman animals, e.g., other primates, dolphins, whales, etc. Whether the same analysis in fact applies to such animals will depend on whether their future is relevantly similar to ours. To answer this question we would need an account of what it is about our future that gives it value and makes killing wrong; and then to see if the future of some nonhuman animals is relevantly similar. Marquis does not provide such an account and neither shall we, so the question of whether it is wrong to kill some nonhuman animals must remain indeterminate so long as such an account is lacking. This lack of a detailed account of what it is about our future that gives it value in the way that the future of a virus does not have value will not affect our argument, since we are not considering the future of nonhuman animals. A third implication is that the theory does not entail that euthanasia is wrong. People who are suffering terribly through a fatal disease and who have no wish to live do not have a future like ours. The point is not that their future is much shorter, but that their future may little or no value for them. In such cases it is a future of pain, incapacity and death. A future such as this has no value for some. There may be other reasons why euthanasia ought not be practiced, but it does not follow from the future-like-ours account. A fourth consequence of this theory is that it implies that infanticide and abortion are prima facie wrong because such actions deprive the child or the fetus of the same thing that we are deprived of when we are killed, namely a future-like-ours. Our topic of course is not abortion or infanticide, but noting this implication is a means to underscore the point that this analysis of the wrongness of killing is essentially “forward looking”. Killing is wrong because it deprives individuals of a future, it does not matter that a child or a fetus does not have a past like ours—a past full of adult type activities, experiences, projects and enjoyments. It is sufficient to show that it is wrong to kill fetuses, infants, aliens, and non-human primates, if it can be shown that they have a future like ours.
It is worth emphasizing here that what is not being claimed is that this is a necessary condition. Imagine you see someone being pushed from a very tall building. The victim here does not have a future like ours. In part because they do not have much of a future at all, and what little they have is probably filled with fear and pain and so not very valuable to them. However, it does not follow that because they do not have a future like ours it would be permissible to shoot them with a gun as they are falling. To make this inference would be to understand the idea that having a future-like-ours is a necessary condition for the wrongness of killing, rather than a sufficient condition.
Another point worth emphasizing is that this is a (rudimentary) analysis of the wrongness of killing, not a justification of why killing is wrong. The thought process, in other words, is this: given that killing is presumptively wrong, why is it wrong? What we have not shown is that killing is wrong. The rest of the argument will not persuade someone who does not accept that killing is presumptively wrong, since it relies on the premise that it is indeed wrong to kill us (mortals). For those that do not accept this, it might be best to stop reading right here.
5. Kill Immortals and the Value of having a Future-like-ours.
The next step of our argument shows that this analysis of the wrongness of killing includes individuals who have an immortal future. A thought experiment might help secure this conclusion. Imagine a spaceship from Alpha Centauri lands on earth tomorrow. The galactic travelers have mastered a variety of our languages by picking up television traveling from earth. The aliens, with their wry sense of humor, say: “Greetings Earthlings, we come in peace”. It is apparent to both parties that there is an uncanny similarity between the aliens and us. It is quickly discovered that the visitors are in fact descendents from a small group of humans who were kidnapped 30,000 years ago and transported to Alpha Centauri. Not surprisingly, then, the visitors are genetically virtually indistinguishable from humans on earth. Culturally they are similar to us in almost every way with the important exception that they are technologically more advanced. It turns out that they achieved physical immortality through a process of stem cell regeneration several thousand years ago, and so, many on board the craft are several thousand years old. The question arises whether it would be wrong to kill the visitors. Surely the answer is “yes”. But why? One answer is that they should not be killed because allowing them to live might help us advance our scientific and technological knowledge. While this may be a reason, it does not seem to be the primary reason. Rather, it seems that our analysis of why it is wrong to kill us ought to apply to them as well: to kill them would be to inflict upon them one of the greatest losses anyone can suffer, the loss of their future. After all, they are very similar to us, and so it seems that to deprive them of their future would be to inflict upon them one of the greatest losses they could experience. The fact that they have a different past from us is irrelevant, that is, that they have had a much longer life span does not affect the value of their future. As we noted above, the value of a future-like-ours account is essentially “forward looking”. Just as the fact that the fetuses have a different past from us—they have almost no past to speak of—is irrelevant, so too the fact that the aliens have a different past—a much longer past—is also irrelevant to the value of their future. Therefore, it seems that the same primary reason it is wrong to kill us applies to the visitors as well.
A feature of this example that requires comment is that it assumes that the extra-solar guests will value their future just as we do. It must be admitted that we cannot be certain that people will continue to value their future in extreme advanced age. There may be some universal law of ‘diminishing marginal utility of having a future’ where everyone over (say) the age of 125 no longer finds their futures to be of any value. For example, there is the common thought that people would become completely jaded with life after a certain amount of time, and so no longer value having a future. While this seems possible, it hardly seems probable given our present evidence. It is true that some of the elderly agree with the dying words of Winston Churchill: “I’m so bored of it all”, but again many of the elderly are not bored and value their future just as much as the young, sometimes more so. Even the fact that some of the elderly do not find that their future has much value for them is complicated by the fact that sometimes their futures are sometimes quite different from ours, e.g., they may be suffering from debilitating diseases that seriously compromises the value they place on their future.
It is worth noting too that the assumption that the galactic travelers value their future does not require that the entire alien population values their future after a certain age. For instance, it is consistent with our example that the crew on the visiting spaceship represents a rarity on their home planet. Imagine that 98 % of their population does not value having a future after they reach 120 years of age, and so they do not use radical life extension technology; whereas, the crew (who are thousands of years old) is part of the 2% of the population that does value having a future well past their 125th year. Similarly, in our society many may find that once they reach a certain age they agree with Churchill’s ennui and forego using radical life extension technology, while others (perhaps a minority) indefinitely find value in having a future.
In any event, if the assumption that at least some will value having a future after a traditional lifespan (say less than 125 years) is found to be false, there should be little controversy over access to radical life extension technology. For once it is discovered that there is little or no value in having a future after a certain age then presumably there will be little demand for access to the technology. So, it is only on the assumption that people will find having a future like ours valuable even when they are hundreds or thousands of years old that the issue takes on much practical significance.
Perhaps it might be thought that the question of whether it is wrong to kill the aliens begs the question in the same way that insisting that the ‘right to life’ extends to cover the ‘right to an immortal life’. Recall that we noted that opponents of physical immortality might resist the inference from ‘we have a right to life’ to ‘we have a right to a physically immortal life’; and thus, the right to an immortal life seems to be in need of argumentative support. Similarly, it seems that the value of a future-like-ours argument is open to exactly the same sort of objection, namely, that the galactic travelers do not have a future-like-ours, their future is quite different, for they have an indefinite future ahead of them, whereas we (unaltered) humans have a finite future ahead of us.
There are two independent arguments that demonstrate that this objection is not correct. The first argument is simply that, if the value of a future-like-ours argument does not apply to the physically immortal it must be because their future is not valuable in the way that ours is. After all, we have said that the galactic travelers we are considering are otherwise genetically and culturally very similar to us. The question then is why their future does not have value. However, it is not clear why having a larger future should mean that their future does not have the same value as ours. Indeed, it seems that other things being equal, having a more expansive future makes that future more valuable. Suppose you were faced with the awful and tragic position of being capable of helping only one of two ten year olds from a burning hospital. One child has a terminal illness and has been given two weeks to live; the other is perfectly healthy except for a broken leg. The fact that one has a more expansive future to look forward to than the other hardly counts against saving his life. If anything, as tragic as it would be, it would seem to make sense to save the life of the child with the broken leg precisely because he has a much longer future in front of him. Similarly, the same reasoning seems to apply if we change the example slightly. Imagine if the child with a broken leg were the recipient of genetic engineering that made him physically immortal. In this case, it would also make sense to save this child rather than the child with a mere two weeks to live.
It would be wrong to conclude from this that we should always prefer to save the life of an individual with a longer future. Imagine having to decide between saving a child with a full life ahead of him; and an elderly scientist who has just discovered a cure for cancer and if she dies the cure will die with her. Some might conclude that the elderly scientist is the one to save given the good that will flow to so many from the cure for cancer. Other values too might come into play here. Consider a 20 year old with 10 years left to live, and a 70 year old with 15 years to live. Considerations of equality might force us to choose (if we must) to save the 20 year old. The idea being that the 70 year old has already had a greater slice of life than the 20 year old, and even though the 70 year old has a greater future, considerations of equality require preserving the 20 year old. What the example of saving the physically immortal child over the terminally ill child does demonstrate is that having a physically immortal future does not preclude the future having value. This explains why it would be better to save the physically immortal child over the terminally ill child.
To make our second argument let us concede the objection that appealing to the idea of a value of a future-like-ours does not support the claim that physically immortal futures have value. If we grant this then indeed it is a case of begging the question to say that killing of a physically immortal person is wrong because it deprives them of an immortal future. However, the question we should ask is whether it is necessary to defend physical immortality on the basis that a physically immortal person has a valuable immortal future. I believe that it is sufficient to show the wrongness of killing a physically immortal person on the basis of the overlap between the future of immortals and our own futures.
Let me illustrate what I have in mind here first with an example of the value of a future-like-ours of a mortal person. John is 20 years old and will in all likelihood live to be 80. One reason not to kill him is that it will deprive him of the next 60 years of his activities, projects, and enjoyments that would have constituted that future. Question: do we need to appeal to all 60 years to support the judgment that it is wrong to kill John? It seems sufficient to say that it is wrong to kill him because it would deprive him of the next 10 years of his future. It might be a stronger reason not to kill him that he has 60 years ahead of him, but this does not change the fact that killing him would deprive him of the next 10 years. So, it would be wrong to kill him because it would be wrong to deprive John of the value of the next 10 years of his life. Obviously it does not follow that it would be right to kill John in 10 years, because if we killed him then we will have deprived him of his future. Plainly, we can repeat the argument here. It would be wrong to kill John in 10 years because it would deprive him of the next ten years of his future, and it would be wrong to kill John in 20 years because it will deprive him of the next ten years and so on.
The applicability of this argument to physical immortality is perhaps obvious. If it is wrong to kill John because we will deprive him of the next 10 years of his future then it is also sufficient to explain why it is wrong to kill one of the galactic visitors, namely that it will deprive the visitor of the next 10 years of her future. And as we said with John, the argument can be iterated: in 10 years it will still be wrong to kill John and the galactic visitor because this will deprive them of the next ten years of their future. Obviously after six iterations John will no longer be around, but this does not thereby show that the galactic visitor’s future is no longer valuable. After all, if it is wrong in 100 years to kill John’s grandson because it will deprive his grandson of the next ten years that would have constituted his future, then it is wrong to kill the galactic visitor for the same reason. These two arguments, then, show that the future-like-ours analysis does support the judgment that it is primarily wrong to kill physically immortal individuals because it will deprive them of a future like ours.
6. Killing and Letting Die
Thus far we have developed an argument that says that it is presumptively wrong to kill physically immortal beings for the same primary reason that it is wrong to kill mortal humans. Noticeably, we still have distance to cover to connect this to the debate over whether individuals ought to be prohibited from gaining access to life extension technology. The obvious gap in the argument is that opponents of life extension are not suggesting that we should go around indiscriminately killing physically immortal beings should any appear, what they are proposing instead, is that we ought not to use technology to extend the normal longevity of persons. To make their case, suppose that opponents of physical immortality invoke the following sort of example. Imagine it is discovered that you have the only heart that is a close enough match to save Bill—Bill’s heart is failing and he will die without a replacement. Obviously it is morally permissible for you to deny access to Bill (and others) from taking your heart and using it to save him. In denying access to your heart, you will no doubt rob Bill of the value of a future-like-ours, but it would not be morally impermissible for you to refuse to have your heart removed. Sometimes the distinction between killing and letting die is invoked to explain the difference here. It would be wrong for you to kill Bill by stabbing him, but it is not wrong to let him die by denying him your heart. So, adversaries of physical immortality might defend their position by claiming that denying access to radical life extension technology is merely letting-die those who seek physical immortality, in the same way that denying Bill your heart is letting Bill die. Therefore, denying access to radical life extension technology is not morally impermissible.
What should we make of this objection? At least this much seems clear: if the example shows that it is morally permissible to let those seeking physical immortality die by denying access to radical life extension technology this conclusion cannot rely on the general premise that letting die is always morally permissible. Suppose from the safety of a security control room you are observing on video camera several hundred children trapped in a burning museum. If saving them meant almost certain death for you, then one may or may not believe that it is morally permissible for you to let the children die. However, if you could save all the children simply by pressing a button in the control room that would open a large door that would allow them to escape very rapidly, then it is morally impermissible for you to let them die. Indeed, there would seem little difference here between this case and the case where you killed the children by starting the fire (Cf. Rachels, 1975). After all, what is required of you here is simply moving just one of your fingers several centimeters to save the children. So, if we are to accept the claim that denying access to life extension technology is morally permissible because it is a matter of letting-die rather than killing, then this claim must be grounded in something other than the general principle that letting others die is always morally permissible.
Thus, we need to examine features of the analogy other than merely the fact that it is a case of letting-die to see whether it is persuasive. Immediately we should be struck by one glaring difference: The various potential radical life extension technologies noted above, genetic engineering, stem cell technology, and computer uploading, do not require taking organs from others to sustain those who seek life extension technology. Surely if physical immortality required taking organs from some of the living then it would be morally permissible to let those that seek physical immortality die in just the same way that it is morally permissible to let Bill die. Since physical immortality does not require something as ghoulish and immoral as taking organs from the living, this in itself seems sufficient reason to reject the analogy of refusing Bill access to your heart. A more apt analogy is one where mortal individuals are denied access to life saving technology. Imagine a not-for-profit agency sets up the first blood distribution center in Etiddul, a (fictional) technologically less advanced country. Having access to such blood supplies is considered by some to be a boon for the population. However, imagine a group of citizens believes that blood transfusions are immoral; and so destroys a large number of blood banks or gains political control and outlaws blood transfusions. As a result of either course of action a number of people will die, for example, accident victims that might otherwise be saved by a blood transfusion will die. Should we consider the actions of those who would deny access to blood transfusions a matter of killing or merely letting die? Given their active participation in the process of denying access to blood transfusions, I think the most plausible understanding is that they have at least (indirectly) killed the victims who might otherwise be saved by blood transfusions. Clearly it would be wrong to attribute to them responsibility for victims needing a blood transfusion in the first place, but their actions have contributed to the death of the victims—a simple blood transfusion would have saved the individuals in question. If we were to blame anyone for letting the victims die it would seem most appropriate to consider those that stood idly by while the blood banks were destroyed, or not voting against those that campaigned on the election platform of closing blood banks.
Even if one wanted to dig in one’s heels here and insist that denying access to blood is not killing but merely letting die, this would not significantly change the moral assessment here. Letting accident victims die by destroying blood supplies or legislating against their use does not change the assessment of moral culpability. Suppose the tour bus that you and your spouse are traveling on rolls off a mountain road in Etiddul. You escape with minor injuries, but your loved one has lost a massive amount of blood. At the local hospital the doctor says that your spouse has very little chance of living without a blood transfusion, but with a transfusion your spouse would in all likelihood make a rapid and complete recovery. Even if you were convinced that those who have prevented access to blood are not guilty of killing, only of letting-die, nevertheless, as your spouse dies in your arms surely you would be right to hold morally responsible for the death of your spouse those that have destroyed or legislated against blood transfusion.
Similarly, we can imagine a possible future where radical life extension technology is made available by a not-for-profit agency working in Etiddul. The same conclusion applies. On the one hand, if one is persuaded in the previous case that preventing access to blood reserves is a form of killing then those that destroy radical life extension clinics and technology, or politically maneuver to prohibit radical life extension, should also be seen as culpable of killing. As we argued above, it is wrong to kill the physically immortal for the same reason that it is wrong to kill mortal humans, and so, it follows that denying access to radical life extension technology is presumptively wrong, for this would deprive those that seek physical immortality the value of a future-like-ours. On the other hand, if it is thought that denying access to blood reserves is an instance of morally impermissible letting-die, then denying access to radical life extension technology is also an instance of morally impermissible letting-die. In either case, we have good grounds for saying that the denial of access to radical life extension technology is presumptively wrong.
7. Global Triage
What we have established, then, is that it is presumptively wrong to deny access to radical life extension technology. To complete the argument, we should look then to see if there are good mitigating reasons to override the presumptive wrongness. Let us begin with two easier cases—one where it is clearly permissible to kill and one where it is clearly impermissible to kill—and work our way to two harder cases.
As we noted above, to say that it is presumptively wrong to kill us does not include cases of self-defense. This is not to say that in killing someone in self-defense you are not depriving them of a future-like-ours, only that it is not morally impermissible in cases of self-defense to deprive someone of their future. The presumptive wrongness of killing then allows for self-defense, and this justification for killing seems to apply equally to mortal and immortal attackers. So, if a mortal human or a physically immortal galactic visitor attacked you, then it would make little difference. In either case, it is permissible for you to defend yourself even if it means depriving your attacker of his future. Obviously the self-defense defense has little plausible applicability to denying access to life extension technology, just as denying access to blood transfusions is not likely to have much applicability in cases of self-defense.
What about boredom as a mitigating reason against the presumptive wrongness of denying access to life extension technology? The argument, it will be recalled, is that physical immortality will harm individuals since it will lead to a life of boredom. So, is it permissible to withhold radical life extension technology on the basis that individuals will be bored? Surely we must return a negative verdict here. Our analogy of refusing blood transfusions may help us see this. Imagine refusing blood to patients who are bored, but have a strong desire to live. Surely the answer here is that this is morally impermissible. It would be one thing to not perform blood transfusions for those that wish to die because they are bored, but to withhold treatment against their wishes simply because they are bored is a thought that should make us recoil in horror. By the same token then, to deny access to radical life extension simply on the basis that the physically immortal are (or will be) bored is morally reprehensible.
A more challenging sort of case is suggested by the overpopulation argument we briefly considered above: the population of the world is near or already past its carrying capacity, and physical immortality will only exacerbate this problem. Here adversaries of physical immortality might suggest that we are forced into a position of “global triage”. As an analogy, consider a doctor who has access to only 20 liters of blood to operate on eleven victims of a serious multi-vehicle collision. Ten victims will require 2 liters of blood each to save them, while, Bill, the eleventh victim has serious injuries that will require 20 liters of blood if his life is to be saved. Here we might believe that it is morally permissible to let Bill die in order to save the other ten victims; it seems grossly unfair to save Bill and let the other ten victims die.
There are several ways one might reject this analogy. As noted above, some might deny that the earth is near its carrying capacity, and so, overpopulation is not a concern at the moment. Another possibility is to deny the view (or class of views) of distributive justice that seems to underlie this idea of global triage. For example, if a just distribution of resources is dictated exclusively the market rather than the needs of individuals then it does not follow, necessarily, that it is unfair to save Bill at the expense of the other ten. If Bill has the financial resources to pay for the blood, while the other ten do not then, according to this view of distributive justice, it would indeed be fair to save Bill and not the other ten. Likewise, if those that are successful in the market can afford radical life extension technology then it is not just to deny them access to it, even if it means that their continued existence will mean the demise of others. Yet another possibility is suggested by “life boat ethics” (Hardin, 1977). Overpopulation is not a global problem, but a problem endemic to certain nations of the world and not others. On this view, then, overpopulation is not a responsibility of the rich nations, so there is no reason based on population considerations why citizens of the rich nations should not have access to radical life extension technology. Rather than explore any of these possibilities let us grant, for the sake of the argument, (1) that the world is at or near its carrying capacity, and (2) that overpopulation is indeed a global responsibility, not one that is endemic to only some nations, and (3) the assumption that distributive justice issues can not be resolved to market considerations, but must account for the needs of the worst off in the world. Granting these assumptions, does it follow that it is morally permissible to deny access to radical life extension technology?
If the answer to this question is yes then it must be the case that physical immortality inevitably will lead to overpopulation. However, this implication is patently false. One means to see this is to envision, as a condition for physical immortality, recipients agree to a “non-proliferation pact”: a moratorium on having offspring until we have adequate resources to increase the total number of humans. One way to implement a non-proliferation pact would be to have everyone at age eighteen decide whether they want to opt for physical immortality. If they do then they agree to either a vasectomy or a tubal ligation. Perhaps even a moratorium of a few thousand years ought not to seem too burdensome for those who are physically immortal—they have all the time in the world to start a family. The moratorium on having children could be lifted when the world has an increased carrying capacity, perhaps through the implementation of new environmentally friendly technologies. Another possibility is that space colonization may allow us to expand the human population. The “nonproliferation pact” would adequately address population concerns. Indeed, given as we have said that the physically immortal can still die for non-aging reasons, e.g., accidents, murder, wars and suicide, the global population would actually decrease if everyone adopted this policy.
Now I am not claiming that it would be fair to insist that all those that seek physical immortality ought to agree to such a nonproliferation pact; rather, I want to make the more modest claim that it would be unfair to not, at the very minimum, allow individuals access to radical life extension technology on the condition of signing the nonproliferation agreement. In terms of public policy, enforcement of nonproliferation might be managed in part by making it illegal to allow medical practitioners to treat individuals with radical life extension technology, unless the patients have had a vasectomy or a tubal ligation, and their records show that they have not had children. Given what is at stake for such individuals—the possibility of suffering one of the greatest losses that they can suffer, the loss of their future—it is wrong not to permit them at least this choice since it adequately addresses the population concern population. That is, any policy that does not allow individuals at least this option is unfair.
A variant on the global triage objection is to suggest that physical immortality is unfair because millions lack access to the basic requirements of health such as food, clean water, and minimal medical attention. In other words, it seems grossly unfair to allow some to use resources to obtain physical immortality while others suffer in abject poverty. Once again we could reject the view of distributive justice that underlies this objection. Certainly this view of justice seems inconsistent with our actual practice: presently we spend enormous amounts of money to extend the life of a single rich individual by a few months, while this same money could be used to save hundreds of children in other parts of the world. It is pretty clear that this view of distributive justice is not operative in much of the world, e.g., Antarctica is probably the only continent on our earth where the affluent don’t drive Mercedes Benzes down the same street as the homeless and the hungry. However, let us once again grant the underlying assumptions.
As with the first global triage objection, the opposition here is successful only if it is the case that physical immortality will inevitably lead to more persons being denied basic necessities. This does not seem likely for two reasons. First, it is quite likely that the technology that permits physical immortality will drive down medical costs. The reason is that, in general, radical life extension technology addresses the underlying cause of illness rather than merely treating the symptoms. Not long ago we were only able to treat (in a partial way) the symptoms of polio with expensive devices like the iron lung. Now with an inexpensive vaccine we have beaten polio. Diabetes is another example. Presently we treat diabetes symptoms with diet, drugs and insulin, but this only partially treats the symptoms; and treating diabetes in this manner is enormously expensive. However, there are phase two clinical trials ongoing that involve injecting a protein (ingap) into patients that stimulates their body to rejuvenate the beta cells (the insulin producing cells of the body) in the pancreas with stem cells (Taylor-Fishwick, et al., 2003; Clinical Trials, 2003). This may prove to be the first widespread use of stem cell technology to save lives. The treatment promises a very inexpensive (especially once the patent runs out) cure for diabetes. Second, it cannot be the case that physical immortality will necessarily lead to further inequality, since as a condition of physical immortality one might insist that recipients sign an “equality proliferation pact”. This would require a signatory to become a “knight of equality” by donating a large portion of their earnings to the less fortunate, and perhaps in addition to perform volunteer work to end world poverty. In terms of public policy, there are a number of ways that one could ensure the fidelity of the knights of equality to their oath, for example, as before this might be managed in part by making it illegal to allow medical practitioners to treat individuals with radical life extension technology, unless the patients can demonstrate the they have donated the required amount to the less fortunate, and (or) that they have done so many hours of community service. Another possibility is to simply tax the recipients of radical life extension technology at a much higher rate and redistribute the wealth in an equitable way. Again, I am not claiming that it would be fair to impose this as a condition of access to radical life extension technology. Rather, I am making the more modest claim that it would be unfair to not, at the bare minimum, make this an option for those seeking physical immortality. So, it is implausible to say that physical immortality is unfair because it means taking away resources from the goal of equality: the army of the knights of equality could do much to relieve this problem, certainly much more could be done in the name of equality than would be had simply by denying access to life extension technology.
Let me emphasize once again that these pacts are hypothetical and are presented in response to a fairly radical conception of distributive justice. They are offered only to demonstrate that considerations of “global triage” cannot offer a principled reason to deny access to radical life extension technology. What conditions, if any, should be attached to having access to life extension technology is beyond the scope of this paper. However, I will record my hope that the physically immortal will subscribe at least to the spirit of these pacts. I should add too, although I cannot argue the point here, that laws that would completely bar citizens from radical life extension technology, that is, laws that do not allow citizens to agree to non-proliferation and equality, may prove to be good grounds for civil disobedience. For such laws would unjustly inflicts upon individuals one of the greatest losses they can experience: the loss of their future.
8. Conclusion
To summarize: the argument is that it is morally impermissible, either through individual actions or through public policy, to deny access to radical life extension technologies. Individuals or groups who do so are as guilty of killing or letting-die as those in Etiddul who are guilty of killing or letting-die for denying access to life preserving blood transfusions. As we have said this is compatible with the view that physical immortality might come with some “strings attached” such as the “population nonproliferation pack” and the “equality proliferation pact”.
As noted above, the argument here does not address the independent issue of the moral permissibility of using radical life extension. Let me underscore this by noting that in theory one could agree with Leon Kass’ argument (Kass, 2001) that physical immortality is morally impermissible, and yet agree that it is impermissible to kill or let-die those that seek physical immortality (by denying access to radical life extension technology). In saying this I do not mean to suggest that the question of the moral permissibility of physical immortality is irrelevant or not worthy of exploration. Indeed, I believe it is. My own take on the issue is that it might be best to ask first whether it is morally obligatory to become physically immortal. If so then it follows that it is permissible. (Here is a parallel: If it is obligatory to save the children in the burning museum then it is morally permissible to save them). This may seem an unusual tactic; after all, the question of whether to opt for physical immortality seems a very personal decision. But consider that ethical theories typically enjoin us to promote virtue, the right and (or) the good. Other things being equal, it is pretty hard to see how one can do this if one is incapacitated, e.g., if one is always drunk, or if one is always dead. Developing this line of reasoning may yield an argument that it is morally obligatory to seek physical immortality. This is clearly a topic for another occasion so let me just say this. Even if it is morally obligatory to seek physical immortality, as we have seen, it does not necessarily follow that it is permissible for others to force you to live up to your obligations. At one time Inuit elders, in order not to be a burden on the limited resources available to their families and communities, sometimes set themselves adrift on ice flows as a means to exit this world. Even assuming that they had a moral duty to not burden their families and communities, there is still a huge difference between stepping on an ice flow of one’s own volition and being pushed. We should keep this difference in mind—whether one believes that it is morally obligatory, permissible or impermissible to use life extension technology.
Acknowledgements
Thanks to Nick Bostrom and Robert J. Bradbury for helpful comments.
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