92 replies to this topic

[valkyrie_ice]

So I guess I don't really understand your response then. I guess we should talk about it again in the ustream chat, because I don't really see how you've answered my question.

Alright, let me try it this way.

For the sake of discussion, I am going to assume that you believe that if you die, are cryonically preserved and revived that the "you" who is revived is still "you." If this is assumption is in error, then in all likelihood there is no point to this discussion as we are unlikely to ever be able to understand each other.

So, you "die" and are frozen.

To me, this state is no different than being stored digitally. Brain activity has ceased. No electrical activity is occuring, no data is being processed, no sensations being experienced, and as close to stasis as is physically possible is taking place. In this state, your consciousness has ceased. "You" have been put into storage. All of your data is merely being preserved for future activation.

At some point in the future, nanomachines invade your frozen corpse, analyse the total atomic makeup of your body, determine what damage has been done by ice crystals, and then restore full functionality. As a final step, they jumpstart your brain to cause a resumption of your electrical activity, and "You" wake up. "YOU" have come back from the dead.

To me, there is no essential difference between this situation, you being restored to life from a preserved body, and my being restored from preserved digital data. In fact, if I was stored entirely as data, in a multiply redundant and crosschecking system, my data preservation would be superior, as the nanomachines restoring me would not have to repair my data from a damaged (ice crystals) format. You have used analog storage, I have used digital.

In BOTH cases, there is no continuity of "consciousness" because in both cases all activity of the brain has ceased. Thus, what wakes up is dependent ENTIRELY on the preservation of the pattern, and it is the pattern which creates the "consciousness"

Thus, if instead I have a system which records my data, stores it and keeps it constantly up to the nanosecond accurate, then if my pattern, my body, is destroyed, lost, eaten by grey goo, falls into a black hole, gets to close to a supernova, etc, and is rebuilt to an accuracy of 99.9999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999% it is in no way shape or form ANY DIFFERENT, than if I died, was frozen, and revived.

Why? Because the pattern is preserved, and not lost. My consciousness is a RESULT of the pattern. It is not seperate, it does not exist independantly of my pattern, it is CREATED by my pattern. And that pattern is INSENSITIVE to replacement of individual elements. To my pattern, an atom is an atom is an atom. It doesn't matter WHICH atoms are used, just that they are arranged into the correct pattern neccessary for my Consciousness to be supported.

For the continuity of consciousness argument to make logical sense, than my consciousness would have to be uninterrupted at all times. Thus I would cease to exist every time I lose consciousness, and be destroyed any time I slept, went under anethesia, or suffered some mishap which resulted in unconsciousness. As my consciouness survives all of these interruptions, than it will survive transferral to a backup.

[valkyrie_ice]

*giggle* Funny, I just read the article in the Imminst book "The Scientific Conquest of Death" by Aubry De Grey, in which he makes almost the exact same case that I posted above, with almost the exact same examples.

[Vgamer1]

I don't really know what to think about cryonic preservation. I've often wondered whether the person when awoken would have the same consciousness as the original person who died. But putting that particular issue aside, I'm still on the side that a copy of you would not be you... and I still don't feel like my question was answered, sorry.

Would you agree that while you are alive you would not share consciousness with an exact copy of yourself?

Edit: Also, could you point me in the direction of the article you're referring to? I'd like to see how De Grey puts it.

Edited by Vgamer1, 05 March 2009 - 03:59 AM.

[valkyrie_ice]

I don't really know what to think about cryonic preservation. I've often wondered whether the person when awoken would have the same consciousness as the original person who died. But putting that particular issue aside, I'm still on the side that a copy of you would not be you... and I still don't feel like my question was answered, sorry.

Would you agree that while you are alive you would not share consciousness with an exact copy of yourself?

Edit: Also, could you point me in the direction of the article you're referring to? I'd like to see how De Grey puts it.

http://www.imminst.org/book

And why would my consciousness need to share nanosecond to nanosecond? With the proper technology, if my brain can be copied, I can also share memories and experiences with a simultainious copy, I could also utilize a connection to keep us both simultainously updating, rather than at intervals. In either case, the end result is the same, shared consciousness. one is simply time lagged, the other continious.

and I did answer. As your current arguement stands, you are claiming that consciousness is seperate and unique to the original, and that if anything happens to that original, then the separate and unique part is forever lost. I am argueing that the consciousness is an emergant property of the pattern and that any copy of the original will thus generate the exact same pattern. Thus, to me your arguement is dependant on the transferral of this vital property of "originalness" and that thus, you are uncopyable due to this "unique" property of "originalness". And to me, that is in essence no different than the arguement for "Souls" because this "originalness" is a property that cannot be proved, and in fact, due to the nature of the universe as we presently understand it, seems illogical. Thus it appears as a beleif which has no basis in logic, but much in the desire of the human race to be "special"

Sorry to put it so bluntly, but that is what the core of your arguement boils down to to me.

[RighteousReason]

Would you agree that while you are alive you would not share consciousness with an exact copy of yourself?

This guy just cracks me up.

Vgamer1: Define consciousness. What scientific evidence do you have that a copy of yourself would not have it? I have done this for you, and you completely blew me off, with an offhand comment that you want only "coherent" responses. Well I have given you a perfectly coherent response, and now I'm asking you for the same.

Oh- and while you are at it, why don't you also explain why my response was "incoherent"

But Val, after you die, even if all that you contain is store there, the original is gone... Unless the brain's consciousness is being regenerated too

Exactly! Why wouldn't the brain's consciousness be regenerated?

You see? The brain's consciousness is a result of its physical processes.

There is no such thing as a zombie

Your "zombie", in the philosophical usage of the term, is putatively a being that is exactly like you in every respect - identical behavior, identical speech, identical brain; every atom and quark in exactly the same position, moving according to the same causal laws of motion - except that your zombie is not conscious.

http://www.overcomin...04/zombies.html

"You", and your "consciousness", are simply the labels we use to refer to the beautiful patterns of physical phenomena that are caused by the physical arrangement of matter that your body and brain are composed of.

"But I am not an object. I am not a noun, I am an adjective. I am the way matter behaves when it is organized in a John K Clark-ish way. At the present time only one chunk of matter in the universe behaves that way; someday that could change."
-- John K Clark

It definitely causes a "yuck" reaction for many of us, but this is the truth.

Believe me- there is nothing supernatural about that lump of carbon between your ears (although I can certainly understand calling it mystical, magical or spiritual in a purely romantic, non-literal sense).

If I were to copy you before your death, you would agree that you would not be conscious of the copy. Then if the original you died, how would you then become conscious of the copy? That seems to be what the "B" people are arguing for, yet I haven't seen any of you guys take on this argument directly. No sidestepping, just try to answer the question.

I am still waiting for a coherent response to this issue...

Edited by advancdaltruist, 05 March 2009 - 12:37 PM.

[Vgamer1]

Vgamer1: Define consciousness. What scientific evidence do you have that a copy of yourself would not have it? I have done this for you, and you completely blew me off, with an offhand comment that you want only "coherent" responses. Well I have given you a perfectly coherent response, and now I'm asking you for the same.

Oh- and while you are at it, why don't you also explain why my response was "incoherent"

You know, I don't have an exact definition of consciousness for you. I don't think anyone on Earth does. I can give a rough definition, which would be something like "the sum total of experiences and memories of a being who has them."

I never said a copy of myself would not have consciousness... I'm saying they would not have the same consciousness even if they were exactly the same in makeup. The mere fact that they are in different locations is enough to make the conscious entities separate. The brain states may be identical at the moment of creation, but they would not share any experiences or knowledge after the copy is created.

Like I said before, if you make a copy of yourself, would you be conscious of the copy's experiences? That's basically the core of my argument... To respond to Valkyrie, I believe it is completely logical that no you would not be conscious of the copy's experiences. I really don't think I'm trying to argue for a soul. If you'd like to look at it that way go ahead, but that doesn't make my argument intrinsically illogical... As far as I see it my argument is completely based in logic.

By the way, I was blowing you (advancdaltruist) off because your comments seemed to only be "wow you people are stupid." You did post that one quote about replacing neurons all at once, which I responded to. Then you decided to respond with "lol stupid people" again.

Edited by Vgamer1, 05 March 2009 - 09:03 PM.

[valkyrie_ice]

I never said a copy of myself would not have consciousness... I'm saying they would not have the same consciousness even if they were exactly the same in makeup. The mere fact that they are in different locations is enough to make the conscious entities separate. The brain states may be identical at the moment of creation, but they would not share any experiences or knowledge after the copy is created.

Like I said before, if you make a copy of yourself, would you be conscious of the copy's experiences? That's basically the core of my argument... To respond to Valkyrie, I believe it is completely logical that no you would not be conscious of the copy's experiences. I really don't think I'm trying to argue for a soul. If you'd like to look at it that way go ahead, but that doesn't make my argument intrinsically illogical... As far as I see it my argument is completely based in logic.

And my response has been, why does it matter? Two copies of me sharing memories at intervals or two copies of me sharing in real time is still going to result in two copies of me with shared experiences and shared "consciousness". Thus time is meaningless in the equation, and because the shared experiences are still part of both's long term experience. In the case of death and revival as a "copy" as the copy will have the exact same "everything" I had at the moment the final data is transmitted, then the consciousness that wakes up in this new body will be ME. As there is no inherent property that makes the original uncopyable, and no unique property that sets "primus" apart from "secondus", then I see no reason to make the assumption that the "me" that wakes up will suddenly go, "Oh, I'm only a copy, oh poor inferior me." instead of breathing a sigh of relief and going "Whew, close call there."

To be blunt, I do not currently have time to pursue the smallest fraction of all my interests. Being able to seperate into multiple parallel bodies, each capable of concentrating on a individual pursuit and then re-integrating, presumably during sleep, so that each of us continually has had the cumalative experience of all of us, makes perfect sense to me, as does the idea of multiple copies with various modifications as to gender, physical appearance, and so on.

Why? Simply to be able to enjoy all the experiences I will have. And why would I worry that any one of me would not feel like "me"? We will all share the same desire to experience and know that we will have the experience of all the other "me's" in short order. Any one of me, even if seperated for a extended period of time, would share the same desire to experience the whole.

Just as we would not be worried if we decide to resume a singular body and non parallel experience. We would simply decide which of my various bodies I wished to use, and reintegrate, then recycle the raw materials I had used to maintain multiplicity.

Thus, "dying" and "Waking up as the copy" are no different than "going to sleep" and "waking up from sleep" In both, my consciousness is dormant until it is reactivated. I have no more "continuity of consciousness" between falling asleep and awakening than I would dying and being revived, and can see no logical reason to assume I would.

[DJS]

I never said a copy of myself would not have consciousness... I'm saying they would not have the same consciousness even if they were exactly the same in makeup. The mere fact that they are in different locations is enough to make the conscious entities separate.

The standard of absolute space-time has been in disrepute for close to a hundred years now. So trying to incorporate it into an identity theory is not helpful.

The brain states may be identical at the moment of creation, but they would not share any experiences or knowledge after the copy is created.

How is this at all relevant to the topic being debated?

[DJS]

Sigh... debates on identity theory are always so value laden.

[DJS]

To witness the continued convergence of the dominant western theory of mind (functionalism) with the ancient philosophical traditions of eastern culture - the negation of self! To realize that, theoretically, one is not a unique and special snowflake. To sense the absurdity of one's situtation, one's existence. And to still go on. To still say Yes to life. Could there be a better example of the absurd hero?

[Vgamer1]

This is really getting tiresome. It seems like everyone is just going to stick to their guns and can't be convinced otherwise. To make one more point: I don't really think it's a matter of belief though. I think it is a matter of fact, but I can't convince you "B" people of it... Maybe one day we'll have the technology to find out who is right, but I don't even see that being a possibility. If someone could think of such a technology maybe that would help moving things along.

[DJS]

This is really getting tiresome. It seems like everyone is just going to stick to their guns and can't be convinced otherwise. To make one more point: I don't really think it's a matter of belief though. I think it is a matter of fact, but I can't convince you "B" people of it... Maybe one day we'll have the technology to find out who is right, but I don't even see that being a possibility. If someone could think of such a technology maybe that would help moving things along.

vgamer1

Just for the record I can, at least on some minimal level, relate to what you're saying. It's not as if I don't possess similar intuitions, and certainly I would be reluctant to "put my money where my mouth is" when it comes to philosphy B. I feel much more comfortable with the gradual replacement scenario - just in case there is something essential to continuity of consciousness after all. Hopefully (!!) I'll be able to achieve ultra-intelligence before having to deal with these deeply paradoxical philosophical issues.

However, when forced to take a position in this (classic) identity debate, I choose philosophy B. The reason I do this is almost exactly the same as why I am a compatabilist when it comes to free will. Intuitions are great, but sometimes intuitions can be deceiving (cog sci is overflowing with examples of "experience" not being veridical). I therefore allow my faculty of reason, and the conceptual framework which has been built by and assists it, to trump my raw intuitions when there is a conflict between the two.

However-however, it must also be acknowledged that the initial choice to value reason over perception is itself without ultimate justification, as are all pure value judgement. Even my supporting "evidence" in cog sci (and the many other branches of knowledge) are ancillary to this fact. Hence my critical rationalism.

Edited by DJS, 06 March 2009 - 01:33 AM.

[DJS]

Although at first blush this may sound derogatory, opinion A is actually rooted in the philosophy of Irrationalism.

Gaining a better understanding/awareness of each other's values is the only way to get anywhere in this debate. Rhetoric is worthless.

[RighteousReason]

I never said a copy of myself would not have consciousness... I'm saying they would not have the same consciousness even if they were exactly the same in makeup. The mere fact that they are in different locations is enough to make the conscious entities separate.

The standard of absolute space-time has been in disrepute for close to a hundred years now. So trying to incorporate it into an identity theory is not helpful.

Uh, I think you have it backward. I believe in absolute space time... “Outside our heads there is a freestanding reality. Only madmen and a scattering of constructivist philosophers doubt its existence.”

This guy is just so ridiculously confused on the nature of self and consciousness, he thinks they are on the level of supernatural, mystical, magical or otherwise non-physical (e.g. non-real) phenomena. If you want to demand to keep around some kind of concept of an imaginary, immortal "soul" you are going to find inconsistencies and paradoxes everywhere that make absolutely no sense, and your logic will lead you to all kinds of absurdities (like in the case of uploading Eliezer described, that I quoted earlier).

To use Eliezer's thought exercise... imagine replacing one neuron at a time (or if you are really picky, use a lower scale) with a totally functionally equivalent non-biological component (doing so with the understanding that you replace all the atoms and molecules in your body constantly, so nothing fundamentally different or special is occuring). If you imagine doing it over a long period of time, you would continue thinking, remembering, and behaving as your usual conscious self after any given neuron is replaced. Use the process of induction here- once you have replaced all of the neurons, you are still exactly the same, yet totally digital. Now compress the time component so that everything happens in one instant. There you have it- you have uploaded from a biological to a computational substrate, without losing anything whatsoever.

So taking your argument to the logical conclusion, you would be saying that anytime we lose a particular atom or molecule that we *totally die*, because to replace just one atom with a different one would be a "copy", and thus not technically 'you'. There is your absurdity my friend.

I feel much more comfortable with the gradual replacement scenario - just in case there is something essential to continuity of consciousness after all.

There is no paradox. There is no such "continuity of consciousness" in any way imaginable. "You" are merely the instantiation of a particular pattern of physics. If that pattern pops up in any other place with any other particles, it is "You" as much as any other.

However-however, it must also be acknowledged that the initial choice to value reason over perception is itself without ultimate justification, as are all pure value judgement

uh huh... sooo non-Bayesian... and I want to yell out this quote again for some reason “Outside our heads there is a freestanding reality. Only madmen and a scattering of constructivist philosophers doubt its existence.”

Although at first blush this may sound derogatory, opinion A is actually rooted in the philosophy of Irrationalism.

Perfect reference

Edited by advancdaltruist, 06 March 2009 - 03:16 AM.

[DJS]

Uh, I think you have it backward. I believe in absolute space time... “Outside our heads there is a freestanding reality. Only madmen and a scattering of constructivist philosophers doubt its existence.”

Uh, I think you're misunderstanding me. I wasn't referring to realism vs anti-realism (I am a realist). I was referring to the distinction between classic newtonian physics and einsteinian relativity. You see, there seems to be this under current of thought in those who argue for "Opinion A" (and this is just my perception, so I could be mistaken) that there are "absolute" coordinates in space-time that add an intrinsic component to one's identity. Contemporary physical theory leads us to the conclusion that this is not the case.

This guy is just so ridiculously confused on the nature of self and consciousness, he thinks they are on the level of supernatural, mystical, magical or otherwise non-physical (e.g. non-real) phenomena. If you want to demand to keep around some kind of concept of an imaginary, immortal "soul" you are going to find inconsistencies and paradoxes everywhere that make absolutely no sense, and your logic will lead you to all kinds of absurdities (like in the case of uploading Eliezer described, that I quoted earlier).

Hey dude, show some respect. The vibe which you consistently throw off in the forums is one of irrational over confidence. It's so glaringly obvious when someone lacks basic socratic wisdom (knowing that you know nothing). Identity theory contains a massive volume of philosophical literature and to think that your (or Yudkowsky's) scribblings are the final word on the matter is patently absurd. These issues ARE paradoxical, and very intelligent philosophers do disagree and do present diametrically opposed arguments. So please get over yourself. You're not impressing anyone.

To use Eliezer's thought exercise... imagine replacing one neuron at a time (or if you are really picky, use a lower scale) with a totally functionally equivalent non-biological component (doing so with the understanding that you replace all the atoms and molecules in your body constantly, so nothing fundamentally different or special is occuring). If you imagine doing it over a long period of time, you would continue thinking, remembering, and behaving as your usual conscious self after any given neuron is replaced. Use the process of induction here- once you have replaced all of the neurons, you are still exactly the same, yet totally digital. Now compress the time component so that everything happens in one instant. There you have it- you have uploaded from a biological to a computational substrate, without losing anything whatsoever.

So taking your argument to the logical conclusion, you would be saying that anytime we lose a particular atom or molecule that we *totally die*, because to replace just one atom with a different one would be a "copy", and thus not technically 'you'. There is your absurdity my friend.

If I were going to take the opposition position, I'd say that you're knocking down a straw man here. Do you understand that continuity arguments are grounded in process philosophy?

DJS: I feel much more comfortable with the gradual replacement scenario - just in case there is something essential to continuity of consciousness after all.

AA: There is no paradox. There is no such "continuity of consciousness" in any way imaginable. "You" are merely the instantiation of a particular pattern of physics. If that pattern pops up in any other place with any other particles, it is "You" as much as any other.

Just because you keep repeating your position doesn't make it so. Again, I am more or less on your side of the debate, but I find it in poor taste to state things so emphatically one way or the other. And again, there certainly is a paradox. Rationally, as a patternist, I can believe that my pattern determines my identity. Yet, if I were in a room staring my duplicate in the eye and I was told by him that in ten second he was going to shoot a bullet through my forehead... Well, I can't help but think that this would concern me. As I was saying earlier, the intuition and the (advanced) reasoning conflict.

DJS:However-however, it must also be acknowledged that the initial choice to value reason over perception is itself without ultimate justification, as are all pure value judgement

uh huh... sooo non-Bayesian... and I want to yell out this quote again for some reason “Outside our heads there is a freestanding reality. Only madmen and a scattering of constructivist philosophers doubt its existence.”

First, anyone who believes that they can legitimately practice "Bayesian reasoning" and have a % confidence level in a proposition is an over confident fool. Bayes theorem is great for formal scientific reasoning, but it is of very little practical use for most activities which human level cognitions must deal with.

Second, claiming that my statement is "sooo non-Bayesian" demonstrates that you don't have a firm grasp on just what Bayesianism is. See the branches of philosophy:

Metaphysics investigates the nature of being and the world. Traditional branches are cosmology and ontology.
Epistemology is concerned with the nature and scope of knowledge, and whether knowledge is possible. Among its central concerns has been the challenge posed by skepticism and the relationships between truth, belief, and justification.
Ethics, or 'moral philosophy', is concerned with questions of how persons ought to act or if such questions are answerable. The main branches of ethics are meta-ethics, normative ethics, and applied ethics. Meta-ethics concerns the nature of ethical thought, comparison of various ethical systems, whether there are absolute ethical truths, and how such truths could be known. Ethics is also associated with the idea of morality. Plato's early dialogues include a search for definitions of virtue.
Political philosophy is the study of government and the relationship of individuals and communities to the state. It includes questions about justice, the good, law, property, and the rights and obligations of the citizen.
Aesthetics deals with beauty, art, enjoyment, sensory-emotional values, perception, and matters of taste and sentiment.
Logic deals with patterns of thinking that lead from true premises to true conclusions, originally developed in Ancient Greece. Beginning in the late 19th century, mathematicians such as Frege focused on a mathematical treatment of logic, and today the subject of logic has two broad divisions: mathematical logic (formal symbolic logic) and what is now called philosophical logic.
Philosophy of mind deals with the nature of the mind and its relationship to the body, and is typified by disputes between dualism and materialism. In recent years there has been increasing similarity between this branch of philosophy and cognitive science.
Philosophy of language is the reasoned inquiry into the nature, origins, and usage of language.

Can you tell me which of these branches Bayes theorem is relevant in?

Can you tell me which of these branches my comment fits into?

[RighteousReason]

those who argue for "Opinion A" (and this is just my perception, so I could be mistaken) that there are "absolute" coordinates in space-time that add an intrinsic component to one's identity.

Cool, that makes sense, in the same way as if the atoms one is composed of were intrinsic components to one's identity. They are both so completely absurd its annoying as hell.

Hey dude, show some respect. The vibe which you consistently throw off in the forums is one of irrational over confidence. It's so glaringly obvious when someone lacks basic socratic wisdom (knowing that you know nothing). Identity theory contains a massive volume of philosophical literature and to think that your (or Yudkowsky's) scribblings are the final word on the matter is patently absurd. These issues ARE paradoxical, and very intelligent philosophers do disagree and do present diametrically opposed arguments. So please get over yourself. You're not impressing anyone.

That's kind of a random rant.

"Indeed, the PhD physicist technically has a Doctorate of Philosophy. However, generally people who call themselves "philosophers" nowadays are essentially proponents of failed schools of philosophical thought which science left by the wayside a long time ago and who now spend their time railing against the victors." - Mike Wong, stardestroyer.net

The vast majority of this stuff is complete bullshit and a waste of time. I apologize for throwing that which science has left by the wayside into a raging fire. "That which can be destroyed by the truth should be." - P.C. Hodgell

So if these issues are paradoxical, show me a paradox. This stuff is obvious, and I don't care if I *sound* overconfident. Put me in my place if you can. I'll thank you for it.

If I were going to take the opposition position, I'd say that you're knocking down a straw man here. Do you understand that continuity arguments are grounded in process philosophy?

The whole premis of the concept of continuity of consciousness is non-sensical on so many levels. It all goes back to the concept of:

This guy is just so ridiculously confused on the nature of self and consciousness, he thinks they are on the level of supernatural, mystical, magical or otherwise non-physical (e.g. non-real) phenomena. If you want to demand to keep around some kind of concept of an imaginary, immortal "soul" you are going to find inconsistencies and paradoxes everywhere that make absolutely no sense, and your logic will lead you to all kinds of absurdities (like in the case of uploading Eliezer described, that I quoted earlier).

Yet, if I were in a room staring my duplicate in the eye and I was told by him that in ten second he was going to shoot a bullet through my forehead... Well, I can't help but think that this would concern me. As I was saying earlier, the intuition and the (advanced) reasoning conflict.

You are creating a hypothetical here without much context. Frankly, any time any full fledged sentient human physical process is going to "deleted", I find it hard to believe that a real world moral justification from a human-Friendly goal system would exist, so this situation would where your duplicate is shooting you in the head would suggest either you are insane in this hypothetical, or irrational.

The intuition and the reason do not conflict. After all, crazy/irrational people kill themselves all the time.

However-however, it must also be acknowledged that the initial choice to value reason over perception is itself without ultimate justification, as are all pure value judgement

uh huh... sooo non-Bayesian... and I want to yell out this quote again for some reason "Outside our heads there is a freestanding reality. Only madmen and a scattering of constructivist philosophers doubt its existence."

First, anyone who believes that they can legitimately practice "Bayesian reasoning" and have a % confidence level in a proposition is an over confident fool. Bayes theorem is great for formal scientific reasoning, but it is of very little practical use for most activities which human level cognitions must deal with.

I think you do not See the Way

The whole point of Bayesian reasoning is that you *determine* your beliefs based on *real-world evidence* and of course by applying reason and logic. It isn't strictly about using the mathematical formula in a controlled setting. It is by principles of reality that perception could never violate reason, so how could you value one over the other? If you mean in the sense that, this one time I saw my cat outside, and then I walked inside and he was there, for reasons seemingly inexplicable by known physics, then its not because I "value reason over perception" that I believe the cat did not violate known laws of physics, its because using Bayesian reasoning, my belief that my cat did violate the known laws of physics is exceedingly improbable (pretty much 0).

I see Bayesian reasoning as a simple, elegant, and correct solution- much like scientific reasoning. And much like scientific reasoning, which pissed off all the philosophers who watched their non-scientific systems go up in flames, Bayesian reasoning pisses off all the philosophers who watch their non-Bayesian systems go up in flames.

Edited by advancdaltruist, 06 March 2009 - 05:33 AM.

[DJS]

Scientism

[RighteousReason]

Scientism

I apologize for throwing that which science has left by the wayside into a raging fire.

Oops, I meant I don't apologize.

[Vgamer1]

DJS, thanks for defending me, although I really must firmly disagree that my argument based on intuition (irrationalism). I've been using logical arguments the whole way through as far as I can tell.

Also, thank you for pointing out how unproductive advancdaltruist has been with his comments

Once again, I'm not trying to appeal to anything supernatural or mystical or intuitive. I don't really know where you guys get that idea. I'm trying to appeal to logic. I can state my basic argument again if I need to. Maybe this example will help:

Let's say a copy of you is made and transported to a sort of simulation that exactly copies whatever experiences you have. The copy would basically be placed in a copy of your world. So your copy and you experience the same stuff at the same time. Now, let's say we change the simulation slightly so that your copy experiences a bit of a different reality and therefore has a different conscious state than you. I think we would all agree that you would not be aware of the changes that occur to your copy in the simulation. Your consciousness and the copy's consciousness would no longer match. Now, if the copy is then killed I think we could also agree that the copy's consciousness would cease, leaving only you left. So if that initial change in fact was the copy's death I argue that the same result would happen. The copy's consciousness would cease and you would continue. Now if we reverse the situation, where you are the one to die and your copy continues then I'd argue that the same result would happen. Your consciousness would cease with the copy's consciousness continuing on.

I'm not really sure how to word what I mean any better. I hope it makes sense. It's basically what I was saying before.

Also, I have another comment about what DJS was saying about "absolute" coordinates in space. That isn't necessary at all for my argument. What I said was the the two consciousnesses are in different places (a relative notion), therefore making them different consciousnesses.

[RighteousReason]

Scientism

The fact that there is a serious philosophical concept out there such that calling someone a "scientist" is pejorative is hilariously absurd.

More seriously though, it is kind of sad.

Edited by advancdaltruist, 06 March 2009 - 05:59 AM.

[RighteousReason]

btw, DJS, do I remember correctly that you once claimed to believe in dualism?

Edited by advancdaltruist, 06 March 2009 - 06:15 AM.

[Infernity]

But Val, after you die, even if all that you contain is store there, the original is gone... Unless the brain's consciousness is being regenerated too

Perhaps it will explain my views if I discuss the process I envision.

As I see this process, my brain will contain a device that is capable of interfacing with a onboard computer with massive capacity. This computer will be interfaced transparently with the hardware in my head, and be massively redundant. My consciousness will be the controlling program. In addition, a pure memory backup will be happening in a seperate location, keeping a up to the nanosecond record of my thoughts, synaptic maps, and current operating conditions, i.e. limbic system analogs, hormone levels, etc.

Due to the fact that my sensor cluster is centralized in my head, my Point of View, appears centered there as well, but the process of cognition and consciouness will in fact be shared between my possibly no longer organic brain, the computer system I possess onboard, and an external system. In this example, say it is a space vessel.

My thoughts and thus my consciousness is residing on all of these systems at once, but my POV is still centered in my head, because this is where my interface with the external world is. If my head is lost, by say a rock falling and crushing my head, my consciousness is preseved becasue it simply runs on the other hardware uninterrupted while my body regenerates my head. If my entire body is destroyed, my consciousness is preserved in the spaceship, where I simply make a new body. If the spaceship is destroyed, I would have the neccessary programs and nanomachines to rebuild it.

In this same manner, prior to this eventuality, say I have still have an organic body, and I have that same nanosecond to nanosecond backup, so that in the event of my body's destruction, that completely accurate, up to the nanosecond clone, which has been maintained digitally, is activated. To my consciousness, which is an emergant phenomina created by the energy pattern maintained by my physical structure, all that would occur is that my Point of View, i.e. my center of consciousness, will have shifted to the new sensor cluster.

Consciousness is an inherent property of the Pattern. So long as the Pattern is maintained, by which I speak not only of my memories, but the sum total of data needed to produce my consciousness, i.e. the neural structure of my brain, the hormonal effects of my emotions, and the physical support structure which maintains it, then my consciousness is also maintained.

Thus, my perfect copy is also me. Everything else is argueing semantics and philosophical belief systems. As a Scientific Materialist, I can see no other logical conclusion than that if A=B then B=A

I understand now what you mean. I think we first gave the question different meanings because it wasn't too clear, the entire process.
If that's so, I tend to agree. I'm not sure yet, I have to think on it.

[DJS]

btw, DJS, do I remember correctly that you once claimed to believe in dualism?

No, never. I've always resided on the monist side of the spectrum, and generally tend to view dualist inquiries as unproductive scholasticism (in the pejorative Popperian sense of the word). If you look back at some of the old imminst debates on consciousness you'll see what I mean.

Perhaps what you're recalling is my assertion that functionalism actually represents a merger of monism with certain aspects of dualism, and hence could be consider a quasi form of dualism. Here I can not claim originality as I came across this line of reasoning while reading Paul Churchland, who was arguing against functionalism and in favor of elimitivism.

[DJS]

Let's say a copy of you is made and transported to a sort of simulation that exactly copies whatever experiences you have. The copy would basically be placed in a copy of your world. So your copy and you experience the same stuff at the same time. Now, let's say we change the simulation slightly so that your copy experiences a bit of a different reality and therefore has a different conscious state than you. I think we would all agree that you would not be aware of the changes that occur to your copy in the simulation. Your consciousness and the copy's consciousness would no longer match. Now, if the copy is then killed I think we could also agree that the copy's consciousness would cease, leaving only you left. So if that initial change in fact was the copy's death I argue that the same result would happen. The copy's consciousness would cease and you would continue. Now if we reverse the situation, where you are the one to die and your copy continues then I'd argue that the same result would happen. Your consciousness would cease with the copy's consciousness continuing on.

I think that using an example where you add *experiential change* to the original and duplicate after duplication confuses the issue. But I'll answer it anyway. I believe that identity can be partially shared between entities, such as between myself and myself of 1 year ago. So if at point z in time, the duplicate is x+y and I am x+w, then the x part of me survives and the w part of my identity does not. Note that at point z we are actually referring to two seperate identities which share a percentage of their identities with one another.

[DJS]

btw, DJS, do I remember correctly that you once claimed to believe in dualism?

No, never. I've always resided on the monist side of the spectrum, and generally tend to view dualist inquiries as unproductive scholasticism (in the pejorative Popperian sense of the word). If you look back at some of the old imminst debates on consciousness you'll see what I mean.

Perhaps what you're recalling is my assertion that functionalism actually represents a merger of monism with certain aspects of dualism, and hence could be consider a quasi form of dualism. Here I can not claim originality as I came across this line of reasoning while reading Paul Churchland, who was arguing against functionalism and in favor of elimitivism.

A small add-on.

I subscribe to functionalism because I find it to be the best framework currently available in philosophy of mind. It also fits in well with my broader naturalistic interpretation of reality, especially in regards to evolutionary psychology. That being said, there are some fundamental questions in the "qualia debate" which leave me feeling unsettled, yet at the same time I do not believe there is an approach available which can provide satisfactory answers. So basically I am a functionalist with reservations, which fits in with my more general attitude that there is still a great deal of reality which I find to be mysterious.

[Vgamer1]

I think that using an example where you add *experiential change* to the original and duplicate after duplication confuses the issue. But I'll answer it anyway. I believe that identity can be partially shared between entities, such as between myself and myself of 1 year ago. So if at point z in time, the duplicate is x+y and I am x+w, then the x part of me survives and the w part of my identity does not. Note that at point z we are actually referring to two seperate identities which share a percentage of their identities with one another.

I see that the identical X part would still exist, but my point is that they aren't really identically. I guess the strongest evidence of that is that they exist in different locations. They may have the same exact makeup, but since they are in different locations they are different consciousnesses. Like, for example two hydrogen atoms are exactly identical, but they are distinguishable and different because they exist in different locations.

[100YearsToGo]

The A people are totally right. Why? Because a human is aware of himself. The code that is running in the human brain has awareness. It is a running code that believes that he is. He is unique. He exists. If you threaten the code it will defend itself or run. This is why you don't want your copy to shoot you.

The other code running on the other platform is the same as yours but you two do not share the same awareness. They are separate.
This is why you die when you copy yourself and kill the original. Death is the permanent suspension of awareness of a code. The particular instance of the code has stopped running.

The confusion arises because B people think of the human code as windows XP or Microsoft Office or something like that. A code that is not aware. A code that is aware knows that his instance of the code is him. The other instance of the code is not him.

Conclusion: B people are obviously missing the awareness sub routine. Thats why they don't give up their position.

[abolitionist]

Can two objects inhabit the same space/time?

No.

Does a twin carry on the memories and genes of his/her dead sibling?

Not exactly.

Will a backup or copy prevent your subjective death?

No.

[pulsar]

I believe in A but if it in no way harms my original body/brain then i would make a backup just in case

[A941]

Its A, you are dead and thats it, therefor i dont like anything that has to do with minduploading cause i will not benefit from that in any way.

I had a long discussion about that with M. Anissimov over 8 years ago, he thought B was right.
Yes for the rest of the world the copy would be the same, and the copy would think that he/she is the original, but this wouldnt save the original from dieing, from vanishing, because there is no continuity between the original and the copy.

I think that it would be possible to change parts of the brain, in small steps and that that would be the same person (like it happens to us through the exchange of old cells etc.) because in this case continuity would not be disrupted.