86 replies to this topic

[Vgamer1]

But 'aware of' is exactly the same as 'conscious of'. Therefore, what you're actually saying is that you define your identity by the consciousness which you are conscious of.

Still, I understand what you're trying to convey because it is the other position in identity and duplication debates. What you're arguing is that point of view (POV) is what matters. This position has strong intuitive appeal because anyone of us can imagine a hypothetical scenario where we confront our duplicate and see that they are another individual.

The alternative to the POV intuition is a second, newer intuition which results from us utilizing our intellect and the expanding knowledge we're acquiring about our own nature. A book which I like recommending for an insightful and original look at the philosophical implications of functionalism is Being No One by Metzinger. If you don't feel like dropping the money for the book there are also a few Metzinger video presentations online.

Basically what I'm trying to claim is that, once you have a solid theoretical understanding of functionalism, you will understand that your point of view intuition is inferior, on intellectual grounds, to the patternist intuition. Whether you believe that overriding an intuition on intellectual grounds is a valid course of action is another issue entirely, and one which depends in part upon one's preexisting values. Although it should be noted that, if cognitive science has taught us anything, it's that our intuitions can often lead us far astray. But here I am appealing to the value of the intellect on intellectual grounds...

To restate my position in clearer terms; identity is the sum total of such things as personality, intellect, memories, etc - all of which are physically encoded in our brains. It is a static concept. Consciousness is not a component of identity, but it is vitally important for the existence of identity. (I'm having a difficult time coming up with analogy to convey this idea) The process of consciousness allows our intellect to interact with itself and it's environment, thereby evolving with time.

On a side note, I view identity combined with consciousness as being a dynamic concept which I refer to as 'Being' or 'Becoming'.

Despite what you may think, my point of view is not based solely on intuition - I'm majoring in Cognitive science . I actually have a Philosophy and a Psychology background and I have studied functionalism. I have no problem with creating new intuitions based on intellectual discovery - I've done it many times before, I'm a college student.

I have not closed my mind to your opinion, I'm just not convinced. Maybe you could try answering my questions instead of just telling me they are based on intuition I'm also open to hearing how your view of functionalism supports your point. I think it's the same argument I've already heard, but if you think there's something new that I'm missing let me know.

Don't think that because you have studied a particular Philosophy in depth, that you have come to the "correct" conclusion. I haven't closed my mind and I hope you have not either. I'm still waiting for science to (hopefully) reveal the answer.

Edited by Vgamer1, 14 October 2009 - 07:21 AM.

[DJS]

Hey vgamer,

What questions are you referring to?

I'm quite flexible in shifting my positions, but I believe I've become somewhat firmly entrenched on this issue. I haven't encountered an original argument on it in a long time. Apologies if I came off as condescending, it's just that most people who take your side of the debate have very little background in science or philosophy (so I was making certain inferences).

What is at issue is the concept of identity. In my last post I listed my definition of identity as concisely as possible:

To restate my position in clearer terms; identity is the sum total of such things as personality, intellect, memories, etc - all of which are physically encoded in our brains. It is a static concept. Consciousness is not a component of identity, but it is vitally important for the existence of identity. (I'm having a difficult time coming up with analogy to convey this idea) The process of consciousness allows our identity to interact with itself and it's environment, thereby evolving with time.

Based on this definition of identity, there is no logical reason why my identity couldn't exist in two places simultaneously. What is your definition of identity?

Oh, and here's a cool metzinger video. Lots of thought provoking stuff on it.

edit: intellect replaced with identity

Edited by DJS, 14 October 2009 - 07:15 AM.

[Vgamer1]

Sorry DJS, but I was getting a little irked by the assumptions you were making. I am in a way pretty new to this entire debate. I've thought about it for years, but haven't actually been able to discuss it with people in depth until coming to this forum. I will gladly watch the video you posted and respond to you, but I must be heading to bed. I'm waking up in 5 hours.

As a short answer to you question of "what is identity?" I would say that identity has multiple definitions, and yours fits at least one of them. Like I've said several times, I think this debate comes down to a confusion of terms more than anything else - similar to the way I view the free will / determinism debate. There are multiple definitions of identity depending on the context. For example, an exact copy of me living in an exact copy of my world in one sense could be said to have the same identity as me, but in another sense would not.

Like the Ship of Theseus thought experiment - which boat is the original? The one that is in the original location? The one with the original parts? Neither? Both? Depending on your perspective any of the above could be the "correct" answer.

I realize some people may not know of the thought experiment, so I'll explain it and then go to sleep.

So there is a complete ship at location A. Plank by plank, the ship is taken apart, and as each plank is taken away from the ship, it is replaced by a new plank. The planks from the ship are taken to location B and used to construct a "new" ship. Most would say that after only one plank has been removed and replaced, the original is still the original. But as more and more planks are taken away and replaced, the line blurs. At the end of the day there is a complete ship of entirely new planks at location A, and a complete ship made of the old planks at location B. Which is the original? The ship at location A? The ship at location B? Neither? Both?

This is in some ways similar to my thought experiment with the consciousness transference - which could one day become a real science experiment. OK, I wrote way more than I thought I would. Good night for now.

Edited by Vgamer1, 14 October 2009 - 07:41 AM.

[DJS]

I would be very much interested in hearing about these multiple definitions of identity, however I must disagree that identity is in anyway contextual. I understand that you were tired and looking to go to bed when you wrote this, but I should point out that you still haven't provided a definition of identity.

Let me have a go at what I think your underlying definition of identity is. You state:

This is where the disagreement lies. I believe it is in essence the same consciousness, but what matters to me is which consciousness I am aware of.

As I stated earlier, "the process of consciousness allows our identity to interact with itself and it's environment, thereby evolving with time." You are taking a particular aspect of consciousness, as Metzinger would call it, the 'representational self system', and incorporating it into your definition of identity. I believe this is a confusion on your part.

Ah, I've thought of an analogy. It would be like claiming that the gasoline which allows you to operate your car is also part of your car's identity... not sure how good of an analogy that is, but I have to get going...

[Vgamer1]

I would be very much interested in hearing about these multiple definitions of identity, however I must disagree that identity is in anyway contextual. I understand that you were tired and looking to go to bed when you wrote this, but I should point out that you still haven't provided a definition of identity.

Like I said, your definition of identity fits. The thing is that there are other definitions that fit as well depending on what you're talking about. I was holding off on giving a single definition of identity for that very reason.

So one definition could be as you put, what seems to me to be the patternist view, that identity is simply the patterns of one's brain. This definition fits like I said. So with my example of the two "me's" living in identical worlds could be said to have identical identities. However are they the same identity?

Just like the thought experiment of the universe only existing as two point particles some distance from each other. For all intents and purposes they are identical particles. But the question remains if they can be considered the same particle or as individuals.

The same goes for identity. Although me and my copy in the copy of my world may have identical identities - indistinguishable identities - they may not be one and the same identity. I believe this is the heart of the debate. The patternist would say that the identities are one and the same while I would say that they are not.

Like I've said, I would have difficulty providing a one or two sentence definition of identity because this difficulty in terminology. The two identities can be considered as one and the same or as individual depending on one's perspective. It seems to me that each perspective has equal merit until one can be proven through empirical methods. Maybe one will be proven right or maybe there is some third hypothesis that we have not even considered.

So I'm sorry to not provide a concise definition of identity, but truly it is my belief that a definition will depend on a person's perspective and is often misleading because of ambiguity.

Do you at least see the confusion that arises from my thought experiment involving consciousness transference? If you need reminding I'll quote it here:

1) Link my brain up to a computer.

2) Have the computer copy my consciousness onto some kind of hardware/software keeping my biological body alive the whole time.

3) Somehow use the computer I am connected with to link my biological consciousness to the hardware/software consciousness so that I am experiencing both consciousnesses simultaneously via the computer interface.

4) Sever the link between the computer and my biological consciousness - but keep my biological body alive.

I'm not sure which consciousness (or "POV" as you put it) I would have at the end of the experiment. What do you think?

[Vgamer1]

DJS, I'm watching the Metzinger video you posted. I'm at the part where he's talking about symptoms of schizophrenic and manic patients. It's interesting to me intellectually and also because I've had my own experiences with these disorders.

I'm at 32:00 right now. I probably will have time to finish at work.

[DJS]

Like I said, your definition of identity fits. The thing is that there are other definitions that fit as well depending on what you're talking about. I was holding off on giving a single definition of identity for that very reason.

I should clarify something which I stated earlier. When I said my position on identity theory is 'firmly entrenched', I should say that it is approaching the level of 'firm entrenchment' which the theory of evolution has within my conceptual framework. It's not only that I have compelling reasons for believing in evolution, it's also that I do not view there as being a legitimate competing alternative. If evolutionary theory were to be falsified I would be baffled and utterly lost, conceptually speaking. Similarly, I have yet to encounter a coherent alternative to patternist identity theory, and your explanations are no exception in this regard (and I honestly mean no offense ). It just seems like you're struggling to find the right words to describe your intuitions. How is 'identical' any different from 'same'?

As eternaltraveler pointed out, we've arrived at a point in our empirical understanding of biology where we are highly confident that there is a rapid and constant turn over of the individual atoms of the body. Unless you deny outright the knowledge which we have attained in modern molecular biology (which has been confirmed and reconfirmed over the course of the past six or seven decades) you're unable to deny the logical necessity of patternism.

In the above statement, however, it could be argued that I have not stated the whole case. Certainly there are examples where one can recognize the logical necessity of one position while also recognizing that another conflicting position is undeniable. This would be identified as a paradox. How can paradoxes potentially be resolved? Empirical means, clarification of our terms, identification of initial suppositions/values?

It's interesting that you brought up the free will debate (I'm a compatibilist), because I also sense that there are similarities between that and this discussion (along with all topics which involve a mind-matter dichotomy). I suspect that the initial differences in values create the eventual differences in perspective (which begs the question of what creates values). If one's primary value is the subjective, one will probably subscribe to POV on identity theory and libertarianism on free will and dualism on matters of consciousness. Where as, someone whose primary value is the intellect/empiricism would side with patternism, determinism (or perhaps compatibilism) and monism.

Yet you do not seem to be arguing strongly in favor of the subjective (eg, not a dualist), but are instead trying to find logical means to support certain intuitions you are having. This leads me to believe that you will eventually override your conflicting intuitions if/when the logical necessity of patternism hits you. Or you could remain in a state of contradiction indefinitely, but I find that most individuals can rarely endure this for very long. BTW, there is no empirical means by which to solve this riddle...

Do you at least see the confusion that arises from my thought experiment involving consciousness transference? If you need reminding I'll quote it here:

1) Link my brain up to a computer.

2) Have the computer copy my consciousness onto some kind of hardware/software keeping my biological body alive the whole time.

3) Somehow use the computer I am connected with to link my biological consciousness to the hardware/software consciousness so that I am experiencing both consciousnesses simultaneously via the computer interface.

4) Sever the link between the computer and my biological consciousness - but keep my biological body alive.

I'm not sure which consciousness (or "POV" as you put it) I would have at the end of the experiment. What do you think?

The flaw in this thought experiment is (3). I don't understand why you would think that, in a scenario where we have two minds of identical capacities, either one could possess total awareness of both minds... If we changed the givens to having a mind-mind relational inequality, such as a human mind attached to an ultraintelligent mind, then perhaps the ultraintelligence could have global awareness of itself and the human mind. However this sort of set up would be inapplicable to your objective, which is to better illuminate your/our understanding of identity theory.

[DJS]

The same goes for identity. Although me and my copy in the copy of my world may have identical identities - indistinguishable identities - they may not be one and the same identity. I believe this is the heart of the debate. The patternist would say that the identities are one and the same while I would say that they are not.

Yes, patternists would argue that there can be multiple instantiation of an identity existing simulatenously. They would argue that this conclusion necessarily follows our current empirical knowledge of reality.

Again, if you are going to dispute that the two identities are identical or 'the same' then you need to give a definition for identity first. I feel like a broken record right now, but saying that "patternists say this, but I say the opposite" or trying to appeal to intuitions regarding the separate identity of two atoms alone in space (...which is not at all relevant to higher level abstractions involving identity... or are you trying to somehow make the argument that an object or entity's position in space is an element of its identity... if so, why?)

Like I've said, I would have difficulty providing a one or two sentence definition of identity because this difficulty in terminology. The two identities can be considered as one and the same or as individual depending on one's perspective. It seems to me that each perspective has equal merit until one can be proven through empirical methods. Maybe one will be proven right or maybe there is some third hypothesis that we have not even considered.

I don't see the equal merit because you have yet to give a definition. If you were to say that your definition of identity is subjective experience, then I would simply agree to disagree and bid you good day since there'd be no way to resolve the initial difference in values. But....again, what is your position on identity? Does identity involve personality? Memories? Yes, right? I'm sure your position on identity involves these things. If so, what are the nature of these things? Are they physical patterns encoded in your brain? Yes? Great, we're getting there...

[eternaltraveler]

This leads me to believe that you will eventually override your conflicting intuitions if/when the logical necessity of patternism hits you.

been there done that

hhttp://www.imminst.org/forum/index.php?s=&showtopic=3886&view=findpost&p=35344

i got better (that was 5 years ago)

Edited by eternaltraveler, 15 October 2009 - 12:13 AM.

[Vgamer1]

To DJS. You want me to give a definition of identity? No problem. Let's go with yours:

To restate my position in clearer terms; identity is the sum total of such things as personality, intellect, memories, etc - all of which are physically encoded in our brains.

Seriously, this is a fine definition that I agree with and we can use it to refer to.

This doesn't change my stance and I'm really not looking for logic to back up my intuitions. I'd like you to stop assuming so. I've actually had a moment when the patternist view sort of "hit me." I really do understand the patternist view, like I say, I'm just not convinced.

I'm also waiting for some answers from you. You seem to dismiss my arguments because "you've heard them before." Well, I have yet to hear a satisfying rebuttal.

I'm waiting for answers to a couple of my questions in particular. I'll repost them:

I'm still waiting for a response from patternists for my question about which entity you are aware of. If I replicate you, you will not be aware of the replica - you will only be aware of you the original. Then if I kill the original you, you will be dead along with your consciousness while the replica continues as a new consciousness. Which one are you aware of? The only answer in my eyes is the original.

The condition of killing the original "instantly" or "as soon as the copy is made" seems very arbitrary to me. And how is this going to be accomplished? Simultaneity is very hard to pull off if not impossible, especially when accounting for relativity which factors in even on small scales if you really do want "instant."

I'd really like an answer for this, but usually the issue I'm talking about seems to get sidestepped by patternists. I don't know why. Eternaltraveler likes to just say "nonsequitor" instead of giving an actual response.

Again, if I am misrepresenting the patternist view please let me know. Otherwise, I'd love to hear a rebuttal to this argument instead of "you're just appealing to your intuitions."

[eternaltraveler]

I really do understand the patternist view

I'm still waiting for a response from patternists for my question about which entity you are aware of. If I replicate you, you will not be aware of the replica - you will only be aware of you the original. Then if I kill the original you, you will be dead along with your consciousness while the replica continues as a new consciousness. Which one are you aware of? The only answer in my eyes is the original.

these two statements are incompatible.

You are the replica. You are the original. Each is not "aware" of the other. But both are equally a continuation of the you right now (ie a continuation of your present awareness). Your awareness bifurcates.

This is apparently so strongly against your intuition that you don't realize it is an intuition. Understandable. As i said. Been there. You might want to review some of what I was saying in that 5 year old thread I linked too.

[Vgamer1]

Before this gets too heated, let me restate my main point.

My true belief is that we can't know whether or not the patternist view is correct. Therefore, it would be unwise in my eyes to attempt such procedures like uploading or teleporting until more scientific evidence is collected. Basically, I'm staying on the safe side unless science or logic proves to me that I can go over to what appears to me to be the risky side. And it's only risky because we lack scientific evidence to prove or disprove it IMHO. So, I will remain safe until such evidence is presented to me.

[Vgamer1]

You are the replica. You are the original. Each is not "aware" of the other. But both are equally a continuation of the you right now (ie a continuation of your present awareness). Your awareness bifurcates.

This is apparently so strongly against your intuition that you don't realize it is an intuition. Understandable. As i said. Been there. You might want to review some of what I was saying in that 5 year old thread I linked too.

Yes, I understand this reasoning. The replica and the non-replica or both continuations of the original. PLEASE stop assuming that I'm only being intuitive. It is really getting annoying.

Read my last post above also.

Edit: Also, eternaltraveler, you are being very condescending. Just because you once thought about things my way and now have a different opinion does not make your opinion automatically right.

Edited by Vgamer1, 15 October 2009 - 12:19 AM.

[Vgamer1]

I'm still waiting for a response from patternists for my question about which entity you are aware of. If I replicate you, you will not be aware of the replica - you will only be aware of you the original. Then if I kill the original you, you will be dead along with your consciousness while the replica continues as a new consciousness. Which one are you aware of? The only answer in my eyes is the original.

....Each is not "aware" of the other....

Thank you, this answers my question. Now we are still in disagreement about something, but at least we've reached common ground here.

I think you understand my point of view. We may have to just agree to disagree, but I urge you to wait for more empirical evidence before making a final decision. This is your very existence we are talking about.

Edited by Vgamer1, 15 October 2009 - 12:27 AM.

[eternaltraveler]

Before this gets too heated

its getting heated?

eternaltraveler, you are being very condescending. Just because you once thought about things my way and now have a different opinion does not make your opinion automatically right

I was giving you a link to a lot of discussion on this subject that the others involved already have in their armamentarium (which also will save us from having to restate a lot, which is annoying). I made no statements, or implications that I was automatically right.

[eternaltraveler]

I think you understand my point of view. We may have to just agree to disagree, but I urge you to wait for more empirical evidence before making a final decision. This is your very existence we are talking about

ha, outside of a thought experiment i don't plan on having myself copied and the original destroyed any time soon

[eternaltraveler]

also I have a tendency of optimizing my posts for information. Not for being nice. Sort of a crocker-lite. You are free to use crockers rules when speaking to me insofar as other moderators don't decide it looks bad for imminst's image or something like that and stop you

[DJS]

I'm waiting for answers to a couple of my questions in particular. I'll repost them:

I'm still waiting for a response from patternists for my question about which entity you are aware of. If I replicate you, you will not be aware of the replica - you will only be aware of you the original. Then if I kill the original you, you will be dead along with your consciousness while the replica continues as a new consciousness. Which one are you aware of? The only answer in my eyes is the original.

Sure, my answer is as follows: There is a presupposition in your use of the term 'you' and what 'you' will 'be aware of' - it revolves around the fact that you believe that your consciousness can only be in one place at one time, and that 'POV' is an important component of identity. This is implicit in your statement.

The way I would put it is that 'your consciousness' is simply a conscious process which is defined as 'yours' by its being 'attached' to 'your identity'. If there are two identical duplicates of 'your identity' (let's say at the exact moment of duplication), then there will also exist two of 'your cognitions' simultaneously. Obviously, each one of 'your cognitions' would not be aware of the other's internal state. At the moment of duplication, 'you' have one identity but are two Beings. This is, admittedly, a counter intuitive way of looking at things, but it does logically follow from the implications of patternism.

I believe, as Metzinger mentions in his video, that the evolution of POV has taken place on a vast evolutionary time scale, and that its sophisticated human form is the result of a 'cognitive arms race' amongst organisms in a hyper-social species. It seems plausible that part of our evolutionary psychology is to attach our sense of identity to our POV because, up until very recently in our history, the level of abstraction we are currently engaged in did not exist.

I must say that I really do view this as a case where we must override our 'default programming' or 'instinctive' intuitions with a correctly modified understanding of our identity.

Edited by DJS, 15 October 2009 - 01:43 AM.

[DJS]

I think you understand my point of view. We may have to just agree to disagree, but I urge you to wait for more empirical evidence before making a final decision. This is your very existence we are talking about

ha, outside of a thought experiment i don't plan on having myself copied and the original destroyed any time soon

This is how I feel as well.

I am arguing for a particular intellectual position and, although I've stated previously that my confidence level on this issue is fairly high, when it comes to my existence I acknowledge that my confidence level would need to be approaching the limit of absolute certainty for me to take the plunge. But again, as I mentioned on the first page of this topic, I believe there are existential risk factors which come from things other than duplication or transfer scenarios which may increase my risk tolerance if push came to shove.

[exapted]

The thing about the brain is that it references itself, but it's reference is not a complete engineering diagram of the brain. What does it mean that something exists? You have a set of criteria achieved. How can the brain most efficiently perceive things? As being directly perceived, or perceived in the most useful configuration. The self is perceived to be nestled inside the body, with sound coming into the ears, and vision coming in via the eyes; my fingers actually seem to "directly" feel my keyboard. But actually vision comes from the vision system, and the sense of touch involves the brain.

The self seems to be inside the body, because the body is perceived to encase the mind. That's more efficient, because it incorporates your senses together seamlessly. That includes the sense of having made a decision, the sense of free will. Ben Goertzel proposed that free will is when a virtual multiverse collapses in the mind. That means there is a module that understands a web of possibilities. When it collapses it sets off various processes. I think I agree with that, but I also think the most efficient means of embedding purpose into a mind is to make it believe it decided something. So it is a function for the power of facilitating a change of course, and believing in it. This is probably an emergent property, but it is a part of what I have heard called the "user illusion", meaning that the deeper patterns in your mental processes are not inherently recognizable to you the user.

So, the question I think is common is something like this: "But why is there experience and feelings at all?"
Here is where you should use Occam's Razor. We are pretty sure that a computer with the raw capacity of the human brain could be really smart, if we programmed it right. And if we are confident in technology, then we should agree that it should be possible to build a machine that is convinced it has a soul. If you believe that the mind is a system of some sort, then it would be quite drastic to assign a high prior probability to the proposition that the mind is not physical. You could be just like the machine that is convinced it has a non-physical self. Remember that there are very good reasons to believe that a computer with the raw computational power of the brain could be very smart if it had the right programs. But I'm not saying that the "user illusion" self-reference experience is just a trick - it is an efficient methodology.

And if you believe I glossed over some things, maybe I did. The patterns of consciousness seem too rich to arise from simple matter - doesn't that seem true sometimes? But if you believe that you are a system, then it doesn't really matter which computing paradigm you use, as long as it can be emulated in a Turing machine. Your experience, in my view, is a set of emergent patterns, a "landscape of geometric and evolutionary Good Tricks".

You could wonder, "what if it is non-physical?"

But if you admit that the mind is a system, then it can run on a suitable computer. So imagine if a bird didn't understand how it could fly (obviously), and it was convinced that there was some non-physical element helping it to fly. Maybe that's sort of what they think, who knows. We are like birds and thinking/feeling is like flying.

Edited by exapted, 15 October 2009 - 12:21 PM.

[Vgamer1]

Sure, my answer is as follows: There is a presupposition in your use of the term 'you' and what 'you' will 'be aware of' - it revolves around the fact that you believe that your consciousness can only be in one place at one time, and that 'POV' is an important component of identity. This is implicit in your statement.

This is where we have a confusion of terms. I believe a conscious identical to mine can exist at another location, that does not mean that is is my consciousness or identity. Two identities can be identical and still be individual. This is probably where we will agree to disagree.

The way I would put it is that 'your consciousness' is simply a conscious process which is defined as 'yours' by its being 'attached' to 'your identity'. If there are two identical duplicates of 'your identity' (let's say at the exact moment of duplication), then there will also exist two of 'your cognitions' simultaneously. Obviously, each one of 'your cognitions' would not be aware of the other's internal state. At the moment of duplication, 'you' have one identity but are two Beings. This is, admittedly, a counter intuitive way of looking at things, but it does logically follow from the implications of patternism.

I believe, as Metzinger mentions in his video, that the evolution of POV has taken place on a vast evolutionary time scale, and that its sophisticated human form is the result of a 'cognitive arms race' amongst organisms in a hyper-social species. It seems plausible that part of our evolutionary psychology is to attach our sense of identity to our POV because, up until very recently in our history, the level of abstraction we are currently engaged in did not exist.

I must say that I really do view this as a case where we must override our 'default programming' or 'instinctive' intuitions with a correctly modified understanding of our identity.

I have no problem with these statements, except the part about me being "two beings." I see that that "at the moment of duplication" we would have the exact same identity, but yet we would still be unique individuals even at that moment - if only for the mere fact that we exist in two distinct spatial locations.

You might say "what does space have to do with it"? I would simply say that being in two distinct spatial location automatically makes two objects unique. Have you heard of the identity of indiscernibles? It's simply that two objects are identical if they cannot be differentiated, but two objects are distinct if they can be differentiated. One way of differentiating objects is their spatial location - or their relative distance to other objects.

Here's another question to the patternists here: If an identity is defined by a specific, unique brain pattern then how can you hold that we do survive from second to second or from year to year? We both agree that our brain patterns change over time and the atoms in our brains are gradually replaced. It would seem to me that the patternist would have to hold that at each moment we perish and are replaced by a similar, but different (and therefore not the original) pattern.

To me at least the nonpatternist view holds the possibility for us to survive changes over time. I'm going to work on formulating a better argument, but do you see my point?

Edited by Vgamer1, 15 October 2009 - 02:18 PM.

[exapted]

Here's another question to the patternists here: If an identity is defined by a specific, unique brain pattern then how can you hold that we do survive from second to second or from year to year? We both agree that our brain patterns change over time and the atoms in our brains are gradually replaced. It would seem to me that the patternist would have to hold that at each moment we perish and are replaced by a similar, but different (and therefore not the original) pattern.

To me at least the nonpatternist view holds the possibility for us to survive changes over time. I'm going to work on formulating a better argument, but do you see my point?

I see your point. But the patternist view is at no disadvantage in that regard.

When someone says "an identity is defined by a specific, unique brain pattern", it means that some parts of the pattern are removed, some added, or you could say that some are transformed. There could still be some invariant core pattern that essentially does not change. Even if you are not a patternist, your philosophy of mind probably needs to consider what it means to 'persist'. Patternism simply claims that the mind is something that is accessible to observation and mathematical definition. If something is accessible, it can be defined as a pattern.

There are the assumptions that:
1) there are some invariant properties of self, and
2) there can only be one of a self

Patternism doesn't say that those assumptions are incorrect, but it makes it easier to imagine a set of criteria for the correctness of those two assumptions:
1) if there are some invariant properties of self, it should be possible to find mathematical definitions for those properties
2) if there can only be one of a self, then minds should not be multiply realizable
I think at least assumption 2 is incorrect. Assumption 1 is sort of open to interpretation, but we could develop a set of criteria.
Vgamer, in your view, what should be the criteria for those two assumptions?

Edited by exapted, 15 October 2009 - 08:43 PM.

[Vgamer1]

There are the assumptions that:
1) there are some invariant properties of self, and
2) there can only be one of a self

...

Vgamer, in your view, what should be the criteria for those two assumptions?

I'm not really sure what you mean by "criteria for the assumptions." The second assumption for me needs to be more clearly stated before I can accept it. In a way I agree that there is only one self, but that doesn't prevent identical, yet unique selves from existing, which seems to be an argument of patternists.

I see your point. But the patternist view is at no disadvantage in that regard.

When someone says "an identity is defined by a specific, unique brain pattern", it means that some parts of the pattern are removed, some added, or you could say that some are transformed. There could still be some invariant core pattern that essentially does not change. Even if you are not a patternist, your philosophy of mind probably needs to consider what it means to 'persist'. Patternism simply claims that the mind is something that is accessible to observation and mathematical definition. If something is accessible, it can be defined as a pattern.

Yes, I would like to ask the patternist what it means to persist in this case. If there is some invariant core pattern that must persist in order to preserve a consciousness, then I would ask what guarantees that pattern to still be around one year from now, or after sleeping, or after anesthesia.

I have more to say, but I'm about to head home. Peace.

[exapted]

There are the assumptions that:
1) there are some invariant properties of self, and
2) there can only be one of a self

...

Vgamer, in your view, what should be the criteria for those two assumptions?

I'm not really sure what you mean by "criteria for the assumptions." The second assumption for me needs to be more clearly stated before I can accept it. In a way I agree that there is only one self, but that doesn't prevent identical, yet unique selves from existing, which seems to be an argument of patternists.

Well in order for you to make a proposition, in my opinion you need to make a falsifiable definition about what is a 'self'. Patternists have a criteria of "some pattern" which could be mathematically defined, yet is not discovered.

I see your point. But the patternist view is at no disadvantage in that regard.

When someone says "an identity is defined by a specific, unique brain pattern", it means that some parts of the pattern are removed, some added, or you could say that some are transformed. There could still be some invariant core pattern that essentially does not change. Even if you are not a patternist, your philosophy of mind probably needs to consider what it means to 'persist'. Patternism simply claims that the mind is something that is accessible to observation and mathematical definition. If something is accessible, it can be defined as a pattern.

Yes, I would like to ask the patternist what it means to persist in this case. If there is some invariant core pattern that must persist in order to preserve a consciousness, then I would ask what guarantees that pattern to still be around one year from now, or after sleeping, or after anesthesia.

I have more to say, but I'm about to head home. Peace.

I agree. Patternists should have some criteria for how a mind-pattern could persist.

I think the criteria are pretty simple, however: A physical copy is made, and all patterns are preserved. The assumption is that physics (as it is currently defined) is of a high enough order to embody a mind-pattern, and it is not necessary for natural selection to have used some other higher-order patterns.

[Vgamer1]

Well in order for you to make a proposition, in my opinion you need to make a falsifiable definition about what is a 'self'. Patternists have a criteria of "some pattern" which could be mathematically defined, yet is not discovered.

I guess I would then define a 'self' as a specific brain pattern at a unique location in space. This is just an initial thought though that seems to fit.

I agree. Patternists should have some criteria for how a mind-pattern could persist.
I think the criteria are pretty simple, however: A physical copy is made, and all patterns are preserved. The assumption is that physics (as it is currently defined) is of a high enough order to embody a mind-pattern, and it is not necessary for natural selection to have used some other higher-order patterns.

So then we've missed the issue entirely, because I would agree that if an exact replica is made, then the pattern is preserved. However, once again, just because it is the same pattern does not make the two patterns non-unique.

An argument that I've posed a couple times in this thread, which has basically been ignored is one about making an exact copy. It seems to be a condition of patternist that in order to preserve an identity, the original must be killed at the same instant that the copy is created. To me this is problematic because simultaneity is basically impossible to pull off when accounting for relativity.

If the "instantaneous" thing is not a condition, then I don't know where patternists stand.

Edited by Vgamer1, 15 October 2009 - 11:51 PM.

[exapted]

It seems to be a condition of patternist that in order to preserve an identity, the original must be killed at the same instant that the copy is created. To me this is problematic because simultaneity is basically impossible to pull off when accounting for relativity.

It only needs to be simultaneous on the level of mental patterns. I am assuming there is a scale separation between physical events and mental information, so that we just need to make the replication process last shorter than, say, a few milliseconds. There are many who resist this argument by insisting that mental events happen on the level of quantum events.

However, I'm not sure it really matters if some information is lost and there is a bit of discontinuity. I don't think patternists insist on perfect continuity.

So then we've missed the issue entirely, because I would agree that if an exact replica is made, then the pattern is preserved. However, once again, just because it is the same pattern does not make the two patterns non-unique.

Right, there are two instances of "i used to be my past self, and I'm gonna have a future!", both in different locations. In the patternist view, they both claim the same past from two different locations.

Part of this voice that says "i used to be my past self, and I'm gonna have a future!", is reluctant to accept that there is another voice which satisfies the same criteria. But if you destroy one and replace it with another one which satisfies the same criteria, without explaining what is happening to the mind, no one will ever know the difference, not even the original which is destroyed or the new one. That's what patternists mean by "identical". It means "it satisfies all of the same criteria". Only in the fictional "self" are the criteria of identity not maintained by replication.

But if we consider identity to be a belief, then identity can indeed be lost in a mind-replication process. If the mind believes that replication leads to loss of identity, then the new mind will think, after replication, that it has somehow lost the original identity. That is a belief based on fictional entities. But the beliefs are real, so identity is real in a sense.

Edited by exapted, 16 October 2009 - 01:19 AM.

[Vgamer1]

Part of this voice that says "i used to be my past self, and I'm gonna have a future!", is reluctant to accept that there is another voice which satisfies the same criteria. But if you destroy one and replace it with another one which satisfies the same criteria, without explaining what is happening to the mind, no one will ever know the difference, not even the original which is destroyed or the new one. That's what patternists mean by "identical". It means "it satisfies all of the same criteria". Only in the fictional "self" are the criteria of identity not maintained by replication.

I'm not reluctant to accept that another being could have the same past memories as me or the same identity as me. What I'm reluctant to accept is that you could kill me and I would "go on living" as the copy. I understand that the pattern would also be a continuity of my original self just like if I were to keep living, I would also be a continuity of my original self.

Let me put it this way. Let's imagine there is an afterlife of some kind. I think everyone here is assuming that after death there is only oblivion, but let's forget that assumption for a minute. If you're having difficulty accepting the possibility of an afterlife, let me spell out in the following scenario. There is some omnipotent being watching over us and knows the future, meaning he knows the moment of each of our deaths. Luckily this being is benevolent and does something nice for the soon-to-be-dead. A millisecond before a person's death, the omnipotent being grabs the person from their world and brings them to the afterlife, replacing them with an already dead dummy copy of the person. To me, this is just as likely as any proposed afterlife if not more. And because not one of us knows what comes after death, it is, in my opinion, just as likely as oblivion after death. You may not agree with me there, but the point is to assume that some form of afterlife exists besides sheer oblivion.

Now let's go back to the original scenario of exact replication. I am me. My entire self is then copied and recreated at another location. He is him. Then lets say eternaltraveler shoots me in the neck with a rifle. Luckily, I live in the universe of Mr. Benevolent and he pulls me away from my fate and brings me safely to the afterlife. Now, I am in the afterlife and my copy is still in my old world. We still have distinct POV's and now even distinct identities. I am not my copy. I am me in the afterlife.

Does patternism assume no afterlife?

Edited by Vgamer1, 16 October 2009 - 01:42 AM.

[exapted]

Does patternism assume no afterlife?

I can't speak for others, but I reason that there is no afterlife, I don't just assume it. Because I have an explanation for what death is, I don't need any more explanations. Secondly, I have an explanation for the assumption that there is an afterlife - the historical development of religion, proto-religion, shamanism, etc. I am agnostic, and I am an atheist because I reason that there is no afterlife (and no god). Of course I am not 100% sure of it, but there are several additional arguments I could make (that should be another topic).

Of course you could be right, but you are talking about "another world", which has no consequences in this world. If my mind pattern continues after being copied to afterlife-world, then more power to it. Then there will be two of me. But the version of "me" on earth won't be any poorer for it, unless it knows that the other version of itself is suffering in afterlife-world.

I guess after living for a few thousand years, the copy of "me" in the real world would have the disadvantage of having no ticket to the afterlife. And the "me" in afterlife-world could feel pretty jipped out of the rest of it's life on Earth.

But remember there is no reason for there to be an afterlife, and it explains nothing unexplained. You could come up with all sorts of claims like that, but it would be poor risk management to take all of them seriously. The *claim* of an afterlife is explained by an historical analysis of religion.

Edited by exapted, 16 October 2009 - 02:58 AM.

[Vgamer1]

But remember there is no reason for there to be an afterlife, and it explains nothing unexplained. You could come up with all sorts of claims like that, but it would be poor risk management to take all of them seriously. The *claim* of an afterlife is explained by an historical analysis of religion.

I wasn't necessarily arguing for an afterlife, but to say there is no reason for it seems presumptuous. Like you say, you are not 100% sure that there isn't one. There are many avenues to be an "afterlife" and not even in a religious sense. Saying that one would be taken to "another world" may have been misleading. Let's imagine instead that the person would be taken to a remote location beyond the boundaries of our current observable universe. Or even somewhere in our observable universe that we have not fully explored. It doesn't really matter. But for patternism to assume that there is no afterlife... that doesn't fly with me. I too am inclined to believe in oblivion after death, but that does not exclude the possibility of alternatives. My point was that if there is anything remotely like an afterlife or an existence after death, then patternism is bunk. And since this is at least a possibility, I don't see how patternism holds.

Edit: Also, I'm not requiring for there to be an afterlife in order for patternism to be false. I'm just illustrating a point. Even if oblivion were somehow guaranteed, I would still be inclined against patternism.

Edit2: Basically for the assumption of no afterlife to be a requirement for patternism falsifies it because there is no way to prove that there is no afterlife.

Edited by Vgamer1, 16 October 2009 - 03:43 AM.

[exapted]

I wasn't necessarily arguing for an afterlife, but to say there is no reason for it seems presumptuous.

I am an agnostic atheist, or more accurately a bayesian atheist. There is nothing presumptuous. I agree it is possible that there is an afterlife. My patternist view has alternative explanations for the scenario where there is an afterlife, as is illustrated above.

Like you say, you are not 100% sure that there isn't one. There are many avenues to be an "afterlife" and not even in a religious sense. Saying that one would be taken to "another world" may have been misleading. Let's imagine instead that the person would be taken to a remote location beyond the boundaries of our current observable universe. Or even somewhere in our observable universe that we have not fully explored. It doesn't really matter.

Sure, but there are perhaps an infinite number of possible scenarios. The afterlife scenario seems very low in priority, despite how consequential it would be if true. Claims for an afterlife are contrived. This is how I think of it:

Historical refutation as the definitive refutation.-- In former times, one sought to prove that there is no God - today one indicates how the belief that there is a God arose and how this belief acquired its weight and importance: a counter-proof that there is no God thereby becomes superfluous.- When in former times one had refuted the 'proofs of the existence of God' put forward, there always remained the doubt whether better proofs might not be adduced than those just refuted: in those days atheists did not know how to make a clean sweep.

from Nietzsche's Daybreak,s. 95, R.J. Hollingdale transl.

In other words, religion is so contrived that, when considering 'truth', the scenario where the ideas of religion are true is assigned a negligible probability. (At worst, it can be considered a trap, but that's another issue.)

But for patternism to assume that there is no afterlife... that doesn't fly with me.

I am not assuming there is no afterlife. I am reasoning that there is no afterlife, and assigning a very low likelihood to the possibility and thus very little attention to that scenario.

I too am inclined to believe in oblivion after death, but that does not exclude the possibility of alternatives. My point was that if there is anything remotely like an afterlife or an existence after death, then patternism is bunk. And since this is at least a possibility, I don't see how patternism holds.

Patternism could hold, even if there is an afterlife. In fact, lots of things hold, because they are just interpretations and our probability assignments of interpretations never reach 100% or 0%.

But really you should realize that I explained how the patternist view of mind would work if there were an afterlife. There would be one mind in afterlife-world, and one mind on Earth, two patterns - patternism robustly handles the case of an afterlife. Of course you are right that if there is an afterlife it is important.