First we make a list of all the things a conscious person can do which he can't when he is not conscious, as when he is in deep dreamless sleep.
Next we work out computer systems which can do all those things which a conscious person can do when conscious.
Now, do we have a conscious computer system?
I submit: yes!
At this point, if we put into the computer system all our memory data and all our emotional data, and all the knowledge of science and technology, and human learning of all kinds and fields, then we will have a replicate of my consciousness, which is quintessentially me, superior to my original me.
So, we have now two me: the biologically based me and the computerized me.
We can monitor the computerized me (cm), and we can enable the computerized me to monitor the biological me (bm).
Wherefore, the biological me and the computerized me are monitoring each other.
Who or which is in charge?
Of course the biological me (bm) or the original me is in charge of the computerized me (cm); but we can enable and allow the cm to gradually more and more be in charge of the bm, in an exchange of 'in charge' roles.
Which is better in acting the in charge role, the bm or the cm?
The cm. Why, because the cm knows more about what is good for the bm to keep the bm biologically alive, functioning, and in top shape, and lasting longer.
Think about this possibility now: the cm is in charge, monitoring the bm, to keep it in biological life; and the bm is still retaining the radical control over the cm; but they are both shifting from one consciousness to another, i.e., from the biological consciousness to the computerized consciousness, like you have a robotized eye and you switch from the robot eye to your biological eye and back.
You both the bm and the cm might reach the conclusion that you both might as well settle on the cm and exist on electricity indefinitely.
No need for any kind of biological existence of man, man is by his computerized consciousness a self-developed and self-induced computerized consciousness, a computerized self. This computerized self has no need at all for all the purely physiological functions of the biological me.
But it can perform all the purely intelligential and intellectual functions of the biological me. And these functions are the quintessential features making a man a human person.
In effect, from a biological entity we shift to a computerized entity, and be thus enabled to exist indefinitely as a computerized human entity, on electricity.
Pachomius2000
