47 replies to this topic

[halneufmille]

Assume that scientists could create a perfect copy of my present body and bring it to life. Would this copy be me? Of course not, I can’t be in two places at the same time. That copy would claim to be me since it would have the exact same mind and memories, but it would just be a perfect clone, independent of me. If I was to die of a disease, my clone would go on living on his own, but I, myself, would be dead. Would that change anything if I died several years before my perfect clone is brought to life? Would my mind suddenly awaken in this clone as he is brought to life? No, since we already established that this clone is not me. Now, suppose that after I die, instead of using different atoms to create a clone of me, scientists just used my own cryogenically preserved dead body and bring it back to life, would that change anything? Hardly, since to our best knowledge, all atoms are the same and we constantly replace them throughout our life, even in our brain.

Thus even if cryonics works and can bring frozen people back to life, they will only be perfect copies of the originals. They will happily claim that they are the person who originally died, although, that original person will still be dead. Signing up for cryonics is thus useless. If you want to live forever, the best bet is on life extension research.

Ultimately, the core question is this: What keeps the continuity of the mind from moment to moment? My guess is that the mind is an ongoing process of neurons firing in patterns. If the process is interrupted, the mind dies. If the process resumes, the mind reappears, but this is just a copy. If the body is a computer, the mind is probably like a particular session. You can put the computer in standby (sleep) or even hibernation (coma), but if you turn it off, you die.

Note that for the rest of the society, there is no noticeable difference between the original and the copy. So we could choose to preserve a brilliant scientist or artist so that the next generations can enjoy this person's future achievements. It would be like preserving both the DNA and the living conditions that made this person a great mind.

Where is the flaw in this reasoning? I would love to have this question asked to the next cryonics guest of the Sunday Evening Update.

Nicolas

Edited by halneufmille, 04 December 2009 - 06:11 PM.

[maxwatt]

Well, no one has ever created a perfect copy of a mind, a brain or a body so we cannot say for sure what will happen. Consciousness, if it is a quantum phenomenon as John Horton Conway believes, would not be bound by ordinary common sense laws of how the universe operates. It is as likely as not that both individuals would be totally aware of each other regardless of the distance separating them, through some form of quantum entanglement. Telepathy across light years? Then both individuals would say "We are one and the same" for they would each experience each other simultaneously. Even if your "neural pattern" ceased to function, when restarted it would seem to be a continuation of your past experience. And if the pattern is all-important, it can be uploaded to some sort of computer, and you and the machine will be one, in unity, an instantiation of the singularity.

[David Styles]

Ultimately, the core question is this: What keeps the continuity of the mind from moment to moment? My guess is that the mind is an ongoing process of neurons firing in patterns. If the process is interrupted, the mind dies. If the process resumes, the mind reappears, but this is just a copy. If the body is a computer, the mind is probably like a particular session. You can put the computer in standby (sleep) or even hibernation (coma), but if you turn it off, you die.

This part is purely your assumption, of course.

It comes down to the fact that we don't know, and have a choice to make whether we bet that the result will be life, or death.

Since one can't collect on death, it makes sense to bet on life. It's an intelligent version of Pascal's Wager:

Either Cryonics will be reversible, or it won't. If it is, I gain life. If it isn't, I lose nothing that I wouldn't have lost anyway.

That's how I see it, anyway!

[halneufmille]

maxwatt, you're saying that two people with the exact same brain would be connected? By what mean? How exactly identical do they have to be? Can two identical twins be connected? You know that telepathy is still on James Randy's Encyclopedia of Claims, Frauds, and Hoaxes of the Occult and Supernatural.

And the issue of mind uploading you raised is equally interesting. Assume we just created a copy of your mind and put it into a computer. Now that you have a virtual self, you don't need your body, do you? But would you feel safe to destroy it? That's why when Kurzweil goes into the details of mind uploading, he always adds "progressive" mind uploading. You change a small part and make sure everything is ok, then another, then another... until you are 100% virtual. But continuity seems crucial to me.

Edited by halneufmille, 04 December 2009 - 07:20 PM.

[halneufmille]

Ultimately, the core question is this: What keeps the continuity of the mind from moment to moment? My guess is that the mind is an ongoing process of neurons firing in patterns. If the process is interrupted, the mind dies. If the process resumes, the mind reappears, but this is just a copy. If the body is a computer, the mind is probably like a particular session. You can put the computer in standby (sleep) or even hibernation (coma), but if you turn it off, you die.

This part is purely your assumption, of course.

It comes down to the fact that we don't know, and have a choice to make whether we bet that the result will be life, or death.

Since one can't collect on death, it makes sense to bet on life. It's an intelligent version of Pascal's Wager:

Either Cryonics will be reversible, or it won't. If it is, I gain life. If it isn't, I lose nothing that I wouldn't have lost anyway.

That's how I see it, anyway!

The paragraph you quote is more of an educated guess, based on the reasoning of the first paragraph. But if there is no flaw the first paragraph, it means that cryonics is useless. If you accept that recreating a functioning brain do not replicate the original mind, even if you do it with the exact same molecules, then you must conclude that the continuity of the mind lies in the continuity of neural processes. I accept that the body could wake up, it would simply not be the original person.

And if there is 100% chance that cryonics will not work, just as there is 100% chance that God doesn't exist, then no, putting effort in it is not a good bet. Better invest in life extension for your children.

Edited by halneufmille, 04 December 2009 - 07:14 PM.

[David Styles]

maxwatt, you're saying that two people with the exact same brain would be connected? By what mean? How exactly identical do they have to be? Can two identical twins be connected? You know that telepathy is still on James Randy's Encyclopedia of Claims, Frauds, and Hoaxes of the Occult and Supernatural.

Be that as it may, James Randi is no scientist, by a long shot.

Many self-professed "skeptics" hold beliefs based on faith, such as "contemporary science is 100% correct and nothing new remains to be discovered". Yesterday's "magic" is today's science. What does tomorrow hold?

For my own part, while I hold no belief in any kind of supernatural thing, I at least acknowledge that there may be plenty of things just around the corner that will be like magic by today's standards.

Experimets testing Bell's Theorem have for example shown that either there can be faster-than-light communication between particles (in which case Einstein and Newton go out the window) or else time and space are not what we thought they were (in which case Einstein and Newton go out the window).

So perhaps people can really be connected like that - I don't know, but then unlike Randi I don't claim to.

[Vgamer1]

I'll address the first paragraph. Mind you, I'm not sure if cryonics will work either. I'm kinda in the same position as you.

Assume that scientists could create a perfect copy of my present body and bring it to life. Would this copy be me? Of course not, I can’t be in two places at the same time. That copy would claim to be me since it would have the exact same mind and memories, but it would just be a perfect clone, independent of me. If I was to die of a disease, my clone would go on living on his own, but I, myself, would be dead. Would that change anything if I died several years before my perfect clone is brought to life? Would my mind suddenly awaken in this clone as he is brought to life? No, since we already established that this clone is not me. Now, suppose that after I die, instead of using different atoms to create a clone of me, scientists just used my own cryogenically preserved dead body and bring it back to life, would that change anything? Hardly, since to our best knowledge, all atoms are the same and we constantly replace them throughout our life, even in our brain.

This is where the problem lies:

Now, suppose that after I die, instead of using different atoms to create a clone of me, scientists just used my own cryogenically preserved dead body and bring it back to life, would that change anything?

Using this logic, I think you would have to assume that a person dies and is reborn as a copy each and every moment they are alive. I have a few more things to say about this, but I'd like to hear some more of your thoughts first.

[David Styles]

If you accept that recreating a functioning brain do not replicate the original mind, even if you do it with the exact same molecules, then you must conclude that the continuity of the mind lies in the continuity of neural processes. I accept that the body could wake up, it would simply not be the original person.

I never accepted that premise, as it's not something I can claim to know.

Also, your conclusion infers the assumption that continuity is required. It may not be.

And if there is 100% chance that cryonics will not work, just as there is 100% chance that God doesn't exist, then no, putting effort in it is not a good bet.

That's a pretty big "if"

Better invest in life extension for your children.

I invest in life extension for myself and anyone else who wants it.

[halneufmille]

Using this logic, I think you would have to assume that a person dies and is reborn as a copy each and every moment they are alive. I have a few more things to say about this, but I'd like to hear some more of your thoughts first.

You're absolutely right. So my question is: Why is it still me that was "chosen" to live at each moment? It can't be luck. There must be another explanation. It could be because my mind is made of the same atoms, but I don't believe it because we constantly change them. It must be something else. My bet is that it lies in the continuity of the mind processes. If you have another idea, I am very interested in hearing it.

[Vgamer1]

You're absolutely right. So my question is: Why is it still me that was "chosen" to live at each moment? It can't be luck. There must be another explanation. It could be because my mind is made of the same atoms, but I don't believe it because we constantly change them. It must be something else. My bet is that it lies in the continuity of the mind processes. If you have another idea, I am very interested in hearing it.

I really don't have an answer and I don't think we can have one yet without the technology to test certain hypotheses.

For example, with mind uploading. Instead of the traditional method let's say that I interface with a computer that copies my consciousness onto software. Then the computer creates a link between myself and the computer version of myself so that I am aware of both consciousnesses. Not sure if this is possible, but we're well into the realm of the theoretical here anyway.

So now I'm aware of the 2 consciousnesses. So let's say we do one of three things:

1) Kill the original

or

2) Delete the computer copy

or

3) Sever the link

Kinda interesting to think about what would happen, but there's no way of knowing without actually trying it.

[halneufmille]

I really don't have an answer and I don't think we can have one yet without the technology to test certain hypotheses.

For example, with mind uploading. Instead of the traditional method let's say that I interface with a computer that copies my consciousness onto software. Then the computer creates a link between myself and the computer version of myself so that I am aware of both consciousnesses. Not sure if this is possible, but we're well into the realm of the theoretical here anyway.

So now I'm aware of the 2 consciousnesses. So let's say we do one of three things:

1) Kill the original

or

2) Delete the computer copy

or

3) Sever the link

Kinda interesting to think about what would happen, but there's no way of knowing without actually trying it.

Yes. I'm not sure I would be the first volunteer to try it though.. Meanwhile, note that in your example, there is a link between the original and the copy. For cryogenics, that's Kill the original, freeze it, unfreeze it, repair it and reboot the original.

[xlifex]

http://www.depressed...something-else/

Cryonics as something else

At EconLog economist Bryan Caplan has posted a number of blog entries that perfectly illustrate what happens when cryonics is not presented as a form of experimental long term critical care medicine but linked to other ideas such as transhumanism, mind uploading, and immortalism. One post is titled “What’s Really Wrong With Cryonics” but a close reading of the post and subsequent exchanges between Caplan and cryonics advocate Robin Hanson leave little doubt that this exchange is really about the technical feasibility of mind uploading and the nature of identity.

These topics are of great philosophical and practical interest to some but have little relevance to the technical feasibility of cryonics. When a person goes in for surgery it is not common to engage medical personnel in abstract arguments about the nature of identity prior to induction of anesthesia. Similarly, when hypothermia is used to allow complete circulatory arrest in complex surgical brain procedures it is not common to object that this procedure puts the soul at risk. Even people who do not subscribe to the empiricist premise that underpins modern medicine have come to accept the procedures that are associated with it. Cryonics, as conceived and practiced by organizations like Alcor, is just an extension of the idea that metabolism can be reduced or stopped without inevitable irreversible death.

It is therefore surprising how many discussions about cryonics actually deal with “something else”: overpopulation, transhumanism, the Singularity, egoism, religion etc. It would be convenient to put most of the blame on people who do not want to seriously engage with the technical and bio-ethical arguments involving cryonics but there is an undeniable tendency of some cryonics advocates to dwell excessively on the issues that triggered their own interest in cryonics or alternative methods to preserve one’s identity. There is nothing forbidding cryonics to be linked to such topics but in light of the fact that cryonics as understood by the average person faces formidable obstacles of its own, it is not good public relations to link what is essentially a logical development within medicine to speculative futurism.

Bryan observes that he’d like to think “that Robin’s an outlier among cryonics advocates, but in my experience, he’s perfectly typical. Fascination with technology crowds out not just philosophy of mind, but common sense.” We have made similar claims on this website but with the purpose to advance the cause of cryonics. Bryan is dead-on regarding the issue of common sense, but it is the same common sense that compels one to conclude that philosophy of mind has little practical relevance to biomedical research and practice. Unless Bryan can make a persuasive case that lowering the temperature of a patient to ~ 20 degrees C raises no philosophical issues but lowering the temperature to ~ -196 degrees C does raise philosophical issues there is no reason to introduce such issues into debates about the technical feasibility of cryonics.

[Vgamer1]

Yea I know. Basically the case can't be settled until a later date (if at all). I think there is still legitimate reason to sign up for cryonics since we're not sure. Besides, we don't even know if we can unfreeze people or cure every disease that killed them.

If we do end up being able to revive people, what happens if they wake up in a world that completely sucks? Like they are immediately put into slave labor or something. There's going to be a lot of legal issues around cryonics to be sure. The people who are frozen are legally dead, what happens legally when they're not anymore? The person may be worse off than if they had died in the first place.

[Vgamer1]

Cryonics as something else

At EconLog economist Bryan Caplan has posted a number of blog entries that perfectly illustrate what happens when cryonics is not presented as a form of experimental long term critical care medicine but linked to other ideas such as transhumanism, mind uploading, and immortalism. One post is titled “What’s Really Wrong With Cryonics” but a close reading of the post and subsequent exchanges between Caplan and cryonics advocate Robin Hanson leave little doubt that this exchange is really about the technical feasibility of mind uploading and the nature of identity.

These topics are of great philosophical and practical interest to some but have little relevance to the technical feasibility of cryonics. When a person goes in for surgery it is not common to engage medical personnel in abstract arguments about the nature of identity prior to induction of anesthesia. Similarly, when hypothermia is used to allow complete circulatory arrest in complex surgical brain procedures it is not common to object that this procedure puts the soul at risk. Even people who do not subscribe to the empiricist premise that underpins modern medicine have come to accept the procedures that are associated with it. Cryonics, as conceived and practiced by organizations like Alcor, is just an extension of the idea that metabolism can be reduced or stopped without inevitable irreversible death.

It is therefore surprising how many discussions about cryonics actually deal with “something else”: overpopulation, transhumanism, the Singularity, egoism, religion etc. It would be convenient to put most of the blame on people who do not want to seriously engage with the technical and bio-ethical arguments involving cryonics but there is an undeniable tendency of some cryonics advocates to dwell excessively on the issues that triggered their own interest in cryonics or alternative methods to preserve one’s identity. There is nothing forbidding cryonics to be linked to such topics but in light of the fact that cryonics as understood by the average person faces formidable obstacles of its own, it is not good public relations to link what is essentially a logical development within medicine to speculative futurism.

Bryan observes that he’d like to think “that Robin’s an outlier among cryonics advocates, but in my experience, he’s perfectly typical. Fascination with technology crowds out not just philosophy of mind, but common sense.” We have made similar claims on this website but with the purpose to advance the cause of cryonics. Bryan is dead-on regarding the issue of common sense, but it is the same common sense that compels one to conclude that philosophy of mind has little practical relevance to biomedical research and practice. Unless Bryan can make a persuasive case that lowering the temperature of a patient to ~ 20 degrees C raises no philosophical issues but lowering the temperature to ~ -196 degrees C does raise philosophical issues there is no reason to introduce such issues into debates about the technical feasibility of cryonics.

Who says that patients who go under anesthesia survive the procedure? I would sure like to believe it (I've been under anesthesia), but that doesn't make it so. Same goes for hypothermia, circulatory arrest, and cryonics.

[halneufmille]

These topics are of great philosophical and practical interest to some but have little relevance to the technical feasibility of cryonics. When a person goes in for surgery it is not common to engage medical personnel in abstract arguments about the nature of identity prior to induction of anesthesia. Similarly, when hypothermia is used to allow complete circulatory arrest in complex surgical brain procedures it is not common to object that this procedure puts the soul at risk.

Who says that patients who go under anesthesia survive the procedure? I would sure like to believe it (I've been under anesthesia), but that doesn't make it so. Same goes for hypothermia, circulatory arrest, and cryonics.

Dead on, there's just a difference of scale between cooling the brain for a surgery or vitrification. I too have been under anesthesia twice. All I can say is that I am the person who came out of it the second time. But there's no way to tell that it is the same person that went into it. I feel like it but I can't assure it. It's kind of creepy. Now that I think about it, I think next time I'm going for local anesthesia if possible.

[Vgamer1]

Technically that applies to every waking moment as well. It sure feels like I'm a continuous consciousness, but I could literally be 'dying' every second. There's really no way to answer the question without a better understanding of the brain/identity. I sure hope we get there one day.

[AgeVivo]

so far it seems that I have the same reasoning (or rather feeling or intuition) than vgamer. I think we can narrow the search for answers a little:

a) "to be or not to be, that is the question" :
Are we the same person after each moment? We want to think so because we feel that we *are*, and that we can define ourselves through this continuity. Are we the same person after each night? Less sure... but (if we don't think too hard at least) we don't want to imagine that we are a new person every day. After anesthesia? After a traumatic memory loss? After cryonics? etc etc. Do we have to accept that we can't know?

b) We can't find the frontier in terms of 'atomic' views: existence is defined at a macro level, and not defined at micro levels
When thinking at an atomic micro level (in time or space) the notion of existence doesn't make sense. E.g. after all 'our body' is just an bunch of atoms; at the macro level the body dies if i cut the body in 2 parts; but at a micro level the body is already cut in 2 parts, or even trillions of trillions of parts. Huh, well...there were better examples in the previous posts.

c) So i'd rather look for the answer using a continuous micro/macro assumption. But, hey, sorry guys, here stops my 2 cents: for example, i then don't see why there couldn't be multiple coexisting versions of me that are also one me, all death and alive at the same time, the real definition of "me" being a sort of aggregated artefact that sort-of forms in my brain while i type those lines.

Edited by AgeVivo, 04 December 2009 - 09:43 PM.

[Vgamer1]

c) So i'd rather look for the answer using a continuous micro/macro assumption. But, hey, sorry guys, here stops my 2 cents: for example, i then don't see why there couldn't be multiple coexisting versions of me that are also one me, all death and alive at the same time, the real definition of "me" being a sort of aggregated artefact that sort-of forms in my brain while i type those lines.

I'm sorry, I don't understand this part. What do you mean by 'multiple coexisting versions of me that are also one me'? Do you mean multiple copies of you? Or do you mean being aware of multiple entities?

[sinkpoint]

Assume that scientists could create a perfect copy of my present body and bring it to life. Would this copy be me? Of course not, I can’t be in two places at the same time. That copy would claim to be me since it would have the exact same mind and memories, but it would just be a perfect clone, independent of me. If I was to die of a disease, my clone would go on living on his own, but I, myself, would be dead. Would that change anything if I died several years before my perfect clone is brought to life? Would my mind suddenly awaken in this clone as he is brought to life? No, since we already established that this clone is not me. Now, suppose that after I die, instead of using different atoms to create a clone of me, scientists just used my own cryogenically preserved dead body and bring it back to life, would that change anything? Hardly, since to our best knowledge, all atoms are the same and we constantly replace them throughout our life, even in our brain.

Thus even if cryonics works and can bring frozen people back to life, they will only be perfect copies of the originals. They will happily claim that they are the person who originally died, although, that original person will still be dead. Signing up for cryonics is thus useless. If you want to live forever, the best bet is on life extension research.

Ultimately, the core question is this: What keeps the continuity of the mind from moment to moment? My guess is that the mind is an ongoing process of neurons firing in patterns. If the process is interrupted, the mind dies. If the process resumes, the mind reappears, but this is just a copy. If the body is a computer, the mind is probably like a particular session. You can put the computer in standby (sleep) or even hibernation (coma), but if you turn it off, you die.

Note that for the rest of the society, there is no noticeable difference between the original and the copy. So we could choose to preserve a brilliant scientist or artist so that the next generations can enjoy this person's future achievements. It would be like preserving both the DNA and the living conditions that made this person a great mind.

Where is the flaw in this reasoning? I would love to have this question asked to the next cryonics guest of the Sunday Evening Update.

Nicolas

This is actually a question I have pondered a lot on. Here are my thoughts.

Here's a thought experiment. Think about you waking up today, how is it that you KNOW that you have continued to live as yourself? It's simply because you "remember" that you have existed. Now what if you have lost that memory? How would you know that you've existed then?

The answer is you can't. Essentially, all our "knowledge" of our existence is based on our memory, which can be flawed to begin with. So every morning that you wake up, it's no different than if you are born, only with a continuous stream of memory to supply you your sense of continuity. So every night that we go to sleep, it's really fundamentally no different than if we have died. Of course, this is true only from the viewpoint of that particular person/conscious.

So the paradox of a cloned person, that exist at the exactly the same time can be explained. See, each consciousness would be unique. You are only AWARE that you are not your clone, because you have OBSERVED and REMEMBERED him/her. If you have no such knowledge, and still retain a continuous stream of memory, then you will think that you have continued to exist. At very least, to that particular consciousness this is true.

So you see, all continued existence is an illusion. We have all died over and over again, and reborn over and over again. Death then is nothing to be feared of, it's simply that blank space between you sleeping and awaking ( memory of dreams excepted ). So if you want to go for cryogenics, it's fine. It'll just be like you sleeping for a very very long time. Just make sure to destroy your original body to save you the anguish of observing it.

[Vgamer1]

So the paradox of a cloned person, that exist at the exactly the same time can be explained. See, each consciousness would be unique. You are only AWARE that you are not your clone, because you have OBSERVED and REMEMBERED him/her. If you have no such knowledge, and still retain a continuous stream of memory, then you will think that you have continued to exist. At very least, to that particular consciousness this is true.

I'm not quite sure what you're saying here. It sounds like you are saying that regardless of you knowledge of the copy, you will still remain the same consciousness as the original. But that seems trivial, so I think you're saying something else. Correct me if I'm wrong.

So you see, all continued existence is an illusion. We have all died over and over again, and reborn over and over again. Death then is nothing to be feared of, it's simply that blank space between you sleeping and awaking ( memory of dreams excepted ). So if you want to go for cryogenics, it's fine. It'll just be like you sleeping for a very very long time. Just make sure to destroy your original body to save you the anguish of observing it.

I don't understand this either. What do you mean 'destroy your original body'? The cryogenicly frozen body is the original body.

[halneufmille]

So the paradox of a cloned person, that exist at the exactly the same time can be explained. See, each consciousness would be unique. You are only AWARE that you are not your clone, because you have OBSERVED and REMEMBERED him/her. If you have no such knowledge, and still retain a continuous stream of memory, then you will think that you have continued to exist. At very least, to that particular consciousness this is true.

So you see, all continued existence is an illusion. We have all died over and over again, and reborn over and over again. Death then is nothing to be feared of, it's simply that blank space between you sleeping and awaking ( memory of dreams excepted ). So if you want to go for cryogenics, it's fine. It'll just be like you sleeping for a very very long time. Just make sure to destroy your original body to save you the anguish of observing it.

I don't follow you either. The paradox of the clone and cryonics is this:

Assume that before dying, scientists scan my whole body to know exactly how each molecule is arranged so it's easier to repair the freezing damage afterwards.

A century later, they unfreeze me. Cryonics assumes that it should feel for me like waking up from a long coma or something similar. But my body was damaged and they need to use nanobots and new flesh to rebuild me. Is it still me? That's what Alcor says. Say they need to rebuild my body 90% from scratch. Is it still me? Why couldn't they rebuild me at 100%? If so, why couldn't they rebuild two copies of me? Then who would I be? Both? How about ten copies?

How about I had a bad temper and they think they could improve my brain by changing one or two neurons? Would I still awake in this body? How about changing one thousand of them? Would I still awake, feeling a bit different, or would I stay dead? How about they rebuild me, but like I was when I was 30 years old instead of 90 years old. It's better, isn't it? And it's still me, right? So I still wake up, or not?

Edited by halneufmille, 04 December 2009 - 11:40 PM.

[Traclo]

I think that what he was saying is that since our molecules are being replaced every minute of every day, continuation of a single 'self' is simply an illusion stemming from when we didn't really understand our own bodies. I think what he was saying was, since identity isn't defined by the matter which makes up a person, memories would be the chief component of an identity.

So if there was a clone made of you which was identical in all ways (including memories), it would in fact be you, but only in the limited sense of having all the same memories. The same way the body you currently reside in is only you in a limited sense.

Identity may just be the conceit of a primitive mind grasping for some continuity.

At least this is what I understood (and expanded on) from the previous post. Thus his conclusion that it doesn't matter that a person will not have their exact identity upon waking from cryonics, because it is the same kind of event which happens to us every single day anyway.

But! our desire to be at least highly similar to our current personality (in the same way we are highly similar to our personality of a minute ago) could be respected and acted upon, thus giving a reason for cryonics.

Edited by Traclo, 05 December 2009 - 02:41 AM.

[j0lt_c0la]

He's Dead, Jim: The Irreversibility of Death as a Circular Argument

If you really think we die every time we go to sleep or go under anesthesia, then there's no point arguing with you because that's such an unfalsifiable position that if you hold it, no argument is going to make you change your mind. It's more philosophy than anything, it's up there with p-zombies in implicit dualism and lack of evidence for its possibility. If you don't actually think that, then the above link is very relevant.

[sinkpoint]

Yes, Traclo has summarized what I said the best.

When I speak of death, I'm talking about from a consciousness point of view. If you think about it, all our notions of ourselves being alive are solely advantages from OUR point of view. When we observe someone else has died, it is OUR observation and definition of it. The person that actually died, his consciousness is not there to observe and make a note of his state. So if we revive him, HE will think he just woke up, from SOMETHING. WE think he has died, but he will either A. think he has continued to exist if he has his memory intact, or B. have no idea who he was if he lost all his memory, or C. some shades of grey in between.

We already have examples of people with great physical similarities but completely different consciousness --- twins. Why do they differ? It's because they have developed independent memories that differentiates their sense of self-identity. If you have a clone at this very moment, the original you and the new you will immediately start differentiating because your memory will become divergent. But at the moment of creation, the two of you are identical in terms of self-identity, and are both you. Get it? It has to do with perspective. If you do not observe the other person, or have no previous knowledge, then such divergence of identity won't occur, and you will still be you, as far as your consciousness is concerned. An independent observer might disagreed, but it's only YOUR consciousness' sense of self that matters to YOU.

I had a problem with this realization for a while, because it implies that I will simply cease to exist. A cloned me will not be me physically no matter how much I wish it. But then I realized that I experience this kind of "death of consciousness" every time I sleep. Physical discontinuity is meaningless, because our body is replaced all the time. The important continuity is in the realm of consciousness.

[sinkpoint]

Think of it from a computer perspective.
If you shut a computer down and reboot it. If you didn't save the previous session, then it's a whole new state the computer is in.
If you do a hibernation, then your state is all saved, so a new boot up really is no different from if you put the computer to sleep.

However if you do a bit by bit copy of the hard drive during a hibernation, and up the new drive into a new computer with exactly the same hardware, and boot that up, then you will have 2 computers with identical sessions.
Are they different computers or the same computer? As an independent observer, you say 2. From each computer's perspective, there is no difference from just waking up from a hibernation, no?
If I start using the 2 computers differently, then will they become 2 different computers?
What if I destroy the original computer, once I finished copying the hard drive? Assuming from the perspective of the computers, and assume the computers have no knowledge of each other, there is NO difference.

[halneufmille]

Let's be clear here, I don't think we die at every moment or every time we go to sleep, and I don't think it is only an abstract philosophical statement. Let's shape the problem in the simplest way possible.

Let's say I'm standing at point A and I want to move to point B. I have two means to do it.

Mean 1: I walk from point A to point B.

Mean 2: Scientists create a clone of myself in point B and kill me at point A.

In both instances, to an exterior observer, I have been effectively transfered from A to B. But for me, if you allow me to choose which mean I prefer, I prefer mean 1. I don't think it is just a philosophical matter.

Mean 1: I think I am me when I leave point A and I am still me when I arrive to point B.

Mean 2: I think when scientists create a clone of me (unconnected by anything, assuming telepathy is still impossible), then this is a whole new person, however identical, that is not me. And when they kill me, I cease to exist from my own perspective. The existence of any number of clones or virtual copies of my mind stored anywhere do not change anything to that.

This is what I feel sure of. Now, imagine a scale of human experiences ranging from 1 (being alive from my own perspective) to 2 (death from my own perspective). Here is how I would intuitively classify them (I don't have any proof of that obviously)

Day to day awake moments: 1
Day dreaming: 1
Going to sleep: 1
Being uploaded progressively (Moravec transfer (http://www.accelerat...t-is-uploading/)): 1

Going into coma: Unsure
Going into full anaesthesia: Unsure
Having my brain cool down for a neural surgery: Unsure

Dying: 2
Dying while having an identical twin: 2
Dying while having an identical clone: 2
Dying, but having an identical clone made of me in the future: 2
Dying, but having my body cryogenically preserved, then unfrozen and brought back to life: 2

Sadly, since this is highly subjective, I don't think science will ever be able to tackle with this issue. All we can use is thought experiments. And if I was myself a clone, I would have no mean to know it anyway.

Edited by halneufmille, 05 December 2009 - 01:42 PM.

[Medical Time Travel]

I would like to reply to all posts by halneufmille and other post in this discussion.

Cryonic suspension is not about human reproductive regeneration (reproductive cloning). Alcor, CI or other cryonics organization is not involved in reproductive cloning and are not tending to do so. No serious cryonics advocate are thinking about making a clone of the actual critically-ill patient. It's about restoring health to the critically-ill patient. Repair what's already there. Not make a copy of what's already there or a living clone of the actual person before s/he was cryopreserved.

Your opinion is ill-informed.

[Guest]

hmm... maybe I should correct/extend some of the statements done:

1. quantum entanglement is unlikely to do anything on macroscopic scales or connection to someone (be it a clone or a computer), as the entangelement is easily lost anyway in interacting systems (that's why it is so difficult to build a quantum computer)

2. the question whether we die every moment depends IMO on the quantum nature of time. While there is the Planck time, it is not established whether time itself goes "in steps" or continously. If the few models quantising time should be correct we could indeed argue about the brain changing in steps, giving rise to the question of step-wise identity. However, this is not yet established.

3. IMO we are not just memories but also our character. Memories of course contribute to a good part to our identity but our character - so whether we are polite, selfish, sense of humor, interrogative mind etc - does not rely on memories, albeit being a result of experiences we made in our life. This can be easily observed in people with certain brain damages after accidents, who retain their memory, but have completely change social behaviour. The same is true for abilities as playing the piano.

4. IMO the neuroelectric activity of our brain can't be negelected when talking about death. Given a continous flow of time all our brain cells are connected by the electric signals at 100% of the time when we are alive. This is also true in sleep and anasthesia, although higher brain functions can be largely supressed (but the electric potential between the neurons would still be measurable if you put an E-Meter in the brain!).


Therefore I also have doubts, whether cryonics can be really seen as a kind of suspended state of life as the continous connection of our neurons is lost.

Edited by TFC, 05 December 2009 - 03:28 PM.

[Medical Time Travel]

Thanks for criticising me. I'm discussing this topic from the view of biomedical science not physics. And the title: "Cryonics, bringing you back to life while still dead" is a good one because it addresses a flaw in the argumentation as you mentioned. What I had problems with was the assumption that a revival should constitute a reproductive clone of you and that the information in a way should be transmitted from brain-brain via quantum entanglement. If you are neuropreserved then a potential future revivial will include "cloning" a new body around the neuropreserved head. Not make a whole-body reproductive clone. That I criticised. If an exact copy of your brain is you or not I can't answer. But unlike most other in this discussion from a pure biomedical view it's my opinion that a cryopreserved person who are cryopreserved under excellent conditions with non-toxic cryoprotectants will still be the same person. I think that you can always discuss quantum physics in this case. However as addressed by the last post under sleep and anesthesia there are still neuro-electro firing between the neurons. Your argument is that since all neuro-electro activity are completely arrested under cryonic suspension the revived person are not the same as the cryopreserved. My argument here is that the basis of the personality are still concerved in the brain as an organ. As long as the neurons are at the same place the basis for consciousness is still there. I don't think that if or not your personality are preserved after revival depends on how much neuro-electro activity are shut down. As long as the brain tissue functions the personality is preserved. When it comes to the analogy with the computer I will try to come up with another analogy. It might not be good. When some of the first computers existed you had to give it new input every time you turned it on. Then John von Neumann came up with the idea that it might be possible in the future to create a hard drive and store the memories. All PC's today had a hard drive and it's functions. If it's the "same" information that is stored there after you turns it in/off due to some quantum physics can be discussed. I don't know. For me this debate is abstract and reminds me of the debate if a sould actually exist.

It's my opinion that cryonic suspension is the suspension of life.

[j0lt_c0la]

Let's be clear here, I don't think we die at every moment or every time we go to sleep, and I don't think it is only an abstract philosophical statement. Let's shape the problem in the simplest way possible.

Let's say I'm standing at point A and I want to move to point B. I have two means to do it.

Mean 1: I walk from point A to point B.

Mean 2: Scientists create a clone of myself in point B and kill me at point A.

In both instances, to an exterior observer, I have been effectively transfered from A to B. But for me, if you allow me to choose which mean I prefer, I prefer mean 1. I don't think it is just a philosophical matter.

Mean 1: I think I am me when I leave point A and I am still me when I arrive to point B.

Mean 2: I think when scientists create a clone of me (unconnected by anything, assuming telepathy is still impossible), then this is a whole new person, however identical, that is not me. And when they kill me, I cease to exist from my own perspective. The existence of any number of clones or virtual copies of my mind stored anywhere do not change anything to that.

This is what I feel sure of. Now, imagine a scale of human experiences ranging from 1 (being alive from my own perspective) to 2 (death from my own perspective). Here is how I would intuitively classify them (I don't have any proof of that obviously)

Day to day awake moments: 1
Day dreaming: 1
Going to sleep: 1
Being uploaded progressively (Moravec transfer (http://www.accelerat...t-is-uploading/)): 1

Going into coma: Unsure
Going into full anaesthesia: Unsure
Having my brain cool down for a neural surgery: Unsure

Dying: 2
Dying while having an identical twin: 2
Dying while having an identical clone: 2
Dying, but having an identical clone made of me in the future: 2
Dying, but having my body cryogenically preserved, then unfrozen and brought back to life: 2

Sadly, since this is highly subjective, I don't think science will ever be able to tackle with this issue. All we can use is thought experiments. And if I was myself a clone, I would have no mean to know it anyway.

Saying that you're dead, as in informational theoretical dead (opposed to the other sorts of dead which medicine brings people back from all the time), when you go into cryonics is BEGGING THE QUESTION then, as assuming they can revive you, it's no different than any other case where consciousness is temporarily halted and then resumed. Consciousness is not merely a function of the volatile, electrical activity in the brain because that's been stopped in multiple people and all that's missing is the couple of minutes around when it was stopped. I think that if there is any case of temporary halting in brain function that you accept as still the same person, then you have to accept cryonics. If there isn't such a case, you're not worth arguing with because there's a lot of people out there living after having experienced that, and believing that they're not the same person implies you believe in a duality of brain and mind, which I think is an empty position that isn't even worth trying to refute.