86 replies to this topic

[Bruce Klein]

Message #24864
From: benbest@interlog.com
Subject: Re: Reply to Michael C. Price about Immortalism
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 2004 04:07:06 US/Eastern

Michael C. Price wrote:

> Ben Best wrote:

>>
>
>>> > You are confusing survival
>>> > strategies of species with survival strategies of individuals.
>
>>
>> No, I was not. Let me clarify:
>> The discounting is hard-wired in by evolution, but so are lots of
>> other *undesirable* things, ergo the fact that we are hard-wired
>> to discount the future doesn't mean that we *should* discount the
>> future. Just as we are hard-wired to invest in reproduction rather
>> than extend our lives greatly beyond the fertile period, yet as both
>> life-extensionists and immortalists we have chosen to value
>> extended lifespan / neural-information survival over genetic
>> survival through our descendants.


Discounting of future values is part of the way people rationally
allocate resources. You can call it hard-wired as a dismissive
way of calling it irrational, but I believe the opposite -- that it is
rational. Values are subjective, and you can reject (or imagine
that you reject) discounting of future values -- just as a person
who commits suicide is not behaving as "man qua man". We
may be hard-wired to not commit suicide, but many people
do it anyway. (See below)


>>>> >> An immortalist (such as myself) does not discount the
>>>> >> future in the way that a life-extensionist (like Ben) does.
>
>>
>> Do you agree with above statement?


I don't believe that you don't discount the future
(See below)


>>> > Even though a trillion
>>> > years is a million times longer than a million, by my values
>>> > the difference is not significant -- and I am skeptical that it
>>> > is even significant by yours -- skeptical that you are not
>>> > "discounting" future life.


I don't know how much I confused matters by doing so,
but I was not paying attention to the fact that in North America
and France, a "trillion" is a 1 followed by 12 zeros, whereas
in Great Britain and Germany a "trillion" is a 1 followed by
18 zeros. The British use "billion" to mean a "million million",
which in North America is described by the word "trillion".
I will stop using these terms in this discussion.


>> Scepticism is often a healthy attitude, but you are wrong.
>> My values rate any finite-length existence to be valueless,
>> and I am not alone in this view. I agree with Bruce Klein
>> when he says:
>
>>>> >> Limited lifespan, living 10 more years, or 10 million more
>>>> >> years, is irrelevant if death=oblivion. The pursuit of infinite
>>>> >> lifespan is the best way to overcome this problem.
>
>>
>> And I find your response to Bruce interesting:
>
>>> > I find this statement incredible. If you have certain knowledge
>>> > that you cannot live 10 million years you would consider living
>>> > another 10 years to be irrelevant. I know values are subjective,
>>> > but this seems so outrageous that I find it hard to believe you.
>
>>
>> You'll have not to believe me either, because that's my position
>> also, and has been since I was 11. This is the real source of our
>> disagreement -- you can't imagine that anyone could actually
>> have immortalist values. I, by contrast, have no problem imagining
>> that other people, even life-extensionists, don't share my
>> immortalist values.


(You have arrived at "below".) This seems more to me a matter
of irrational thinking than "immortalist values" -- and I say this
acknowledging that values are subjective. I do think I somewhat
misstated the matter when I said that the difference between
the prospect of living one million years compared to the prospect
of living one million million years is not significant. In order for a
person to not be discounting the future, the prospect of not living
one million million years would have to be one million times more
significant than the prospect of not living one million years.

Again, a googol is 10^100 and a googolplex is 10^googol.
I am skeptical that an "immortalist" really finds the prospect
of living a googolplex number of years nearly a googol order
of magnitude greater significance than the prospect of
living a googol number of years. And a lifespan of a googolplex
number of years is a drop in the ocean of Eternity. I don't
believe that the prospect of living Eternally is on the
same order of significance to anyone as an ocean is
to a drop of water when compared to the prospect of living
a googolplex number of years. But this is what the failure to
discount future value would require.

The fact that you would find it not worth living another
10 years if you knew for a certainty that there is no hope
that you could live a googolplex number of years -- or for
Eternity -- is a slightly different issue, an issue more
relevant to the subjectivity of value than the discounting
of future values. If this is truly the way that you feel, I am
somewhat amazed by it, but I can recognize that you
may genuinely feel this way or have these values. I was
similarly amazed when I first became interested in
cryonics and I discovered how indifferent most people
seem to be to the prospect of living less than 100 years.


>>> > illustrated by listing goals:
>>> >
>>> > (A) live until next year
>>> > (B) live to age 100
>>> > © live to age 1000
>>> > (D) live to age one million
>>> > (E) live to age one trillion
>>> >
>>> > (A) may not be difficult. Going from (A) to (B) will
>>> > entail a monumental breakthrough in the history of
>>> > mankind.


This was a typo that totally mangled my argument.
I meant to type 200 rather than 100. A similar error
at the wrong time and place could cause me even to
fail to achieve (A) -- relieving me of the danger of
being destroyed in 25,000 years by an unexpected
explosion of a supernova. Whatever can go wrong
will go wrong -- especially when there is Eternity.
Things can go right a million million times, but things
only need go wrong once to obliterate you forever.

I will cut the irrelevant replies to my mistake.


>> Perfectly true and absolutely irrelevant. *Of course* an
>> immortalist has to worry about staying alive tomorrow
>> before worrying about the next day, year, century etc.
>> This has nothing to do with how much I *value* living
>> forever as opposed to just another 100 or googolplex
>> years -- both require that I live another year.


I think this IS relevant to the discounting of future
value, but I'm not sure how to explain it at this moment.


>>> > Worrying about how to become "immortal" is worse
>>> > than worrying about how to get from (Y) to (Z).
>
>>
>> My take is the complete opposite; worrying about how to
>> become immortal is what makes me take anti-aging
>> supplements *now*.


Again, this seems to be in the realm of your value
structure versus mine -- beyond argument.


>>>> >> Is the "death" of an hour old embryo more tragic
>>>> >> than that of a hundred year old? Obviously it depends
>>>> >> on your values.
>>
>>> >
>>> > Yes, but this is irrelevant to the points I have been
>>> > arguing concerning sentient beings.
>
>>
>> Not if you regard sentience as a phase along the continuum
>> of the complexity axis. No point arguing about this, simply
>> increase the timescales to whatever time-frame you
>> consider sentience to emerge in.


I see your point, am not entirely comfortable with it,
but don't have an interest in pursuing it.


>>> > Your supposition of "sour grapes" is wrong.
>
>>
>> Actually, what you've said sounds exactly like the
>> fox in the fable, who decided he didn't want the grapes
>> [immortality] once he realised he couldn't reach them.


I have cut some background text from this already
very-long message.

"Sour grapes" is regarding something as being
undesirable because it is unattainable. I don't regard
immortality as undesirable -- simpy unattainable. I
want to live as long as possible.

Unrelated to this fact, however, are other problems
I see with "immortalists" and their attitudes -- such
as the longing for a belief that immortality has been
attained -- a belief that I believe is unattainable almost
by definition -- and a belief which I believe can lead to
reduction of diligence and hastening of death.

-- Ben Best, speaking for himself

[jaydfox]

(You have arrived at "below".) This seems more to me a matter
of irrational thinking than "immortalist values" -- and I say this
acknowledging that values are subjective. I do think I somewhat
misstated the matter when I said that the difference between
the prospect of living one million years compared to the prospect
of living one million million years is not significant. In order for a
person to not be discounting the future, the prospect of not living
one million million years would have to be one million times more
significant than the prospect of not living one million years.

Again, a googol is 10^100 and a googolplex is 10^googol.
I am skeptical that an "immortalist" really finds the prospect
of living a googolplex number of years nearly a googol order
of magnitude greater significance than the prospect of
living a googol number of years. And a lifespan of a googolplex
number of years is a drop in the ocean of Eternity. I don't
believe that the prospect of living Eternally is on the
same order of significance to anyone as an ocean is
to a drop of water when compared to the prospect of living
a googolplex number of years. But this is what the failure to
discount future value would require.

The fact that you would find it not worth living another
10 years if you knew for a certainty that there is no hope
that you could live a googolplex number of years -- or for
Eternity -- is a slightly different issue, an issue more
relevant to the subjectivity of value than the discounting
of future values. If this is truly the way that you feel, I am
somewhat amazed by it, but I can recognize that you
may genuinely feel this way or have these values. I was
similarly amazed when I first became interested in
cryonics and I discovered how indifferent most people
seem to be to the prospect of living less than 100 years.

I think this is a very strong point and one I'd like to see Michael answer. By Michael's logic, the fact that every person who lived before the 20th century (and the few still alive), and that most of the people living before the 21st century, will not have had even a remote chance of living forever, made those people's lives meaningless and not worth living, and in his value system, they should have obliterated themselves if for no other reason than to not have to deal with the pain and pointlessness of not having any worth left in their lives.

Clearly, the prospect of living 20 more years is worth about twice as much to me as living another 10 years. The prospect of living 10 million years is not worth a million times more than living 10 years! That's the point of discounting. As Ben pointed out, living for a googolplex years is worth well more than a googolplex orders of magnitude less than living for eternity. The value of human life, in Michael's value system, becomes completely meaningless. For that matter, under his value system, he could justify killing millions of people to save his life, indeed all of humanity to save his life, if there were a medical scenario in which that were possible.

For that matter, he wouldn't be here if everyone before him had realized how pointless their lives were. For that matter, laws relating to murder, rape, theft, and violence are meaningless unless they are framed in such a manner as to say that such crimes against Michael are forbidden!

No, there is no value system which makes any sense which does not discount the future, even if only the far future (beyond a googolplex years, if you like). Such a value system is inherently self-contradictory: such a system cannot be assured at one's own survival to even a googolplex years, which is a completely worthless period of time to exist: therefore self-termination is the only logical choice, since there is ZERO value in living.

On the other hand, if such a system can apply even the tiniest, even an almost infinitesimal value to living for the next 100 years, such that more time may be given to more fully evaluating the prospects of living forever, then such a system cannot be said not to be discounting the future.

Ben's right. And in my opinion, the fact that Michael hasn't self-terminated yet is proof that he either discounts the future, or he does not act in line with his purported values.

After all, when compared to the goal of living forever, there is no other goal whatsoever which has any value unless we allow ourselves to discount the future.

Now, I'll end this by stating that we're talking about discounts in terms of linear years. However, infinity is infinity. Even if we took a logarithmic scale of years, Eternity still is a more than a googolplex orders of magnitude longer than a googolplex years. So even with a logarithmic scale, which inherently discounts the future, one must still discount the goal of living for eternity in order to make any rational decisions towards trying to live for at least a googolplex years (which, by definition, you much reach before you can live for eternity).

Postscript: I'm not saying that immortalist views are not worthy ones. But one cannot make the only worthwhile goal that of living forever. Otherwise, why leave your house? In fact, freeze yourself now before you get in an accident that might destroy your brain! Clearly, even if we accept that living for a million years is worth far less than living for a googolplex years, and that living for a googolplex years is worth far less than living for eternity, we must accept that both a million years and a googolplex years have non-zero worth!

[bacopa]

For my value system the answer is YES, it more tragic to die
the older you are, because more memories are lost the older
you are when die. (I am assuming that we develop the means
to stop the "slow death" of creeping memory loss / overwriting).
If you have a problem with this answer, try dividing the numbers
by a million! Is the "death" of an hour old embryo more tragic
than that of a hundred year old? Obviously it depends on
your values.

Well if you have more cumulative experiences and precious memories stored in our brain than yes I suppose an argument could be made that it is more tragic to die the older one is. However what about an athlete who is in top shape at 22 and dies? An argument could be made that it is just as tragic because he/she was in the peak of their career at that point in linear time. It does boil down to values and the values one holds true at that period in their life. Someone ten years old could think they are the best most important thing since swiss cheese but who is to determine whether this is so? Most people tend to try and not judge other people's inherant self worth as individuals because that would reek of gross prejiduce, personal opinion, and even fascism. But if one day we somehow do find a need to judge people on their importance or worthiness as people hopefully we will use some kind of moral standard and not the systems of 'like' 'dislike' we have used for so long. I know this is off the point of gauging the tragedy of the death of a person, but it is closely related.

I personally agree that if I happen to be lucky enough to be in pretty good shape at 77 or 150, or 300 and I'm making steady progress in a positive direction than I think it would be a greater tragedy to die, greater than if I hadn't had the chance to gain those experiences and knowledge in the first place. But can I really say that because I'm a superman at 150, assuming I'm cognitively together and helping the world out in many ways etc. that my life is more inherently worthwhile and important, and therefore worse to die, than that 10 year old child who thinks he's a superhero and also vehemently doesn't want to die? Probably justifiably not, but by some value systems who knows? [tung] Certainly a troubling idea that brings about a 'Logan's Run' scenario where humans have to make these kind of judgements. The prospect of immortality, or at least living indefinitely, ideally will allow us all to never have to make that decision and we can decide on our own barometer of self worth.

[bacopa]

Now as for the difficulty in fathoming, existing as a being of infinite life span, I will acknowledge one thing, the human condition is generally not compatible with immortality. That is part of the reason so many people have trouble fathoming it, even considering it as a possibility. What people need to take into account, even if they can't understand it at the moment, is that the way we live, our cognitive faculties, and our environment will likely change.

Yes and IMAO this must change or we will go on hating one another for our intelligence, lack of intelligence, physical appearance, social status, wealth etc. In other words like you are basically describing evolution has not allowed for the 'best of all possible worlds,' to quote Candid. I wish more people would realize the gross imperfections in the human brain and work harder towards a post human condition.

[jaydfox]

To those in that newsgroup who argue against immortality or it's possibility, bear mind that you can't make a logical argument that asserts zero probability of immortality. You cannot apply absolute certainty to such statements, and therefore even if the chance of living forever is negligible (which I do not think it is), the chance still exists and therefore should be pursued as a extended goal of current LE and radical LE.

I agree. But we should be careful to avoid either extreme. Although I believe he is mistakenly painted as completely discounting immortality, I think Ben merely remains a very healthy skeptic (if it were to be proven to him reasonably possible, he might come around). On the other hand, while Michael claims that he is completely discounting anything less than immortality, he is probably just being healthily overoptimistic. Truly, as should be obvious, we cannot know with absolute certainty that immortality is even possible, let alone probable for people alive today. That said, if Michael truly discounted any scenario other than complete, infinite and eternal immortality, I think he'd have self-terminated by now. Clearly, regardless of however much he might deny it, he puts at least some non-negative value on a finite existence.

I think they both have healthy viewpoints, and each is probably taking a harder stance than he really believes in order to defend his point of view. And I don't see the disagreement as bad, at least not yet.

After all, even for true materialist immortalists, we can find the time to take care of ourselves and enjoy life to the fullest within bounds of safety and health: if immortalists don't take care of themselves as any good life extensionist would, then it won't matter if the immortality problem is eventually solved; and if immortalists don't take at least a little time to enjoy life and not just the act of being alive, then does it really matter that their neural patterns live on to eternity? Is life merely about existence to materialist immortalists, or is there an element of enjoyment involved as well? I'd hope the latter.

For a life extensionist, we can worry about getting to 200, and as long as we don't actively stand in the way of people trying to get to eternity, we should be all right: if we make it to 200, odds are that our views will be much more immortalist in nature, and we'll all have more common ground.

Random ramblings from one new to the community (4.5 months and counting!)

[Bruce Klein]

Dear Ben Best,

What do you think happens after death?

Bruce

[Bruce Klein]

I believe that after death, existence ceases. I love existing
and I hate the thought of non-existence. Some people say
that after death it won't matter because in non-existence
there is no possibility of caring. But I don't care that I won't
care (won't be able to care) after death. What matters to
me is *now*. Valuation happens in the *present*. I want to
live as long as possible -- and I hate death and the idea
of death.

Aging and death are my "mortal enemies". This being
the case, you may think I would be an "immortalist",
but wanting to avoid death and believing that immortality
is possible are two different things. To leap immediately
from the former to the latter is *wishful thinking*, something
I try to avoid. I believe death is inevitable, but in my case
I hope that I can avoid it for many thousands of years,
at least.

-- Ben Best

[Bruce Klein]

Message #24874
From: benbest@interlog.com
Subject: Wrap-up comments about Death and Immortalism
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 2004 04:41:56 US/Eastern

I think I am about done with this topic and can stay
out of CryoNet for a while -- after a few brief comments

Thomas Donaldson wrote:


>> no one will actually know EVER that they'll live forever.


Yes, Thomas, the results of the clinical trial will not
be done until death occurs. Prior to that time definitive
conclusions are premature.

Michael C. Price wrote:


>> Rather than try to compare the value of
>> different, finite length lifespans, I would rather say that *all*
>> finite lifespans have the same value to me, namely zero.
>>
>> [......]
>> That all finite lifespans are valueless.


It seems to me that our dialog has boiled down to this, which
seems to simply be a statement of your values which I cannot
personally relate to. I love life -- I love being alive -- and I want
to live as long as possible. Thus, life to me at every moment
has value that cannot be nullified upon my death. I place value
on the the values of the moment -- I am now an alive and
valuing creature. When that ceases to be the case, my valuing
will become "history", but will still have existed. I care about
the present in the present.

This is relevant to my comment to Thomas. Because you
can never know that you are immortal, you will forever be in
question about whether life has value or not -- until you die,
at which time the question will disappear. I find this not
only sad, but unbelievable. I can remember your broad
smile as you stuck your spoon into a huge container of
ice-cream, chocolate syrup and whipped cream.
The moment has passed, but was not valueless to you.

[Bruce Klein]

Message #24870
From: "Michael C Price"
References: <20041019090001.56189.qmail@rho.pair.com>
Subject: Immortalism vs. Life Extensionism
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 2004 00:58:58 +0100

Like Ben, I have snipped bits here and there to reduce the
length of the message -- without distortion, I hope.


>> Discounting of future values is part of the way people
>> rationally allocate resources. You can call it hard-wired as
>> a dismissive way of calling it irrational, but I believe the
>> opposite -- that it is rational.


Some discounting -- due the real rate of return on capital -- is
rational by a purely economic analysis, but the rest is subjective
and value driven.

[......]

>> In order for a person to not be discounting the future, the
>> prospect of not living one million million years would have
>> to be one million times more significant than the prospect
>> of not living one million years.


I have an erratum which I hope clarifies your point:
I misstated my views earlier when I compared the values of
living to different spans and then dying, which I fear has lead
to some misunderstanding of "the" -- or at least "my" --
immortalist position. Rather than try to compare the value of
different, finite length lifespans, I would rather say that *all*
finite lifespans have the same value to me, namely zero.

[.......]

>> The fact that you would find it not worth living another
>> 10 years if you knew for a certainty that there is no hope
>> that you could live a googolplex number of years -- or for
>> Eternity -- is [....] an issue more relevant to the subjectivity
>> of value than the discounting of future values. If this is truly
>> the way that you feel,


That all finite lifespans are valueless.


>> I am
>> somewhat amazed by it, but I can recognize that you
>> may genuinely feel this way or have these values.


Thank you.


>> I was
>> similarly amazed when I first became interested in
>> cryonics and I discovered how indifferent most people
>> seem to be to the prospect of living less than 100 years.


Exactly. I remain equally amazed that any cryonaut or
other life-extensionist, can find solace in thinking that
they are merely going to live a long time, but not forever.

[......]

>> Whatever can go wrong
>> will go wrong -- especially when there is Eternity.
>> Things can go right a million million times, but things
>> only need go wrong once to obliterate you forever.


Not if you're distributively and continuously backed up
in real-time across multiple basement universes. Or if
you believe that your identity at an earlier time can be
shared, to some extent, amongst backups/ duplicates
at a later time.

[....]

>>>>>> Worrying about how to become "immortal" is worse
>>>>>> than worrying about how to get from (Y) to (Z).
>>
>>>>
>>>> My take is the complete opposite; worrying about how
>>>> to become immortal is what makes me take anti-aging
>>>> supplements *now*.
>
>>
>> Again, this seems to be in the realm of your value
>> structure versus mine -- beyond argument.


No, pursuing an anti-aging strategy *now* is a logical
consequence of *both* immortalist and life-extensionist
values. Behaviourally they are the same (or at least very
similar, I should say, to be exact).

[......]

>> I don't regard immortality as undesirable -- simply
>> unattainable. I want to live as long as possible.


And I want to live forever, irrespective of its perceived
attainability. That's the difference in values again.


>> Unrelated to this fact, however, are other problems
>> I see with "immortalists" and their attitudes -- such
>> as the longing for a belief that immortality has been
>> attained -- a belief that I believe is unattainable almost
>> by definition -- and a belief which I believe can lead to
>> reduction of diligence and hastening of death.


You're right, this is an unrelated problem. See my
last but one comment.

Cheers,
Michael C Price

[Bruce Klein]

essage #24888
From: "Michael C Price"
References: <20041021090001.43190.qmail@rho.pair.com>
Subject: living forever: comparison of lifespans?
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 2004 20:02:57 +0100

Hi John,
rather than try to compare the value of a finite lifespan with
an infinite lifespan, I prefer to think of them as different classes
of objects: one has an endpoint and the other doesn't, so it
doesn't really make much sense to compare them together. It's
like trying to compare finite numbers with transfinites: there's
not much you can say about such comparisons, except that
every transfinite number is bigger than any finite number.

The situation becomes more complicated once we start
copying ourselves. Instead of world-lines or life-lines we have
life-trees. Some branches will terminate and some proliferate
endlessly; trying to compare their subjective value becomes
even more difficult and perhaps impossible. Some branches
may not care about what happens to other branches;
other branches may feel an affinity for the whole tree.

Cheers,
Michael C Price

[Bruce Klein]

Message #24875
From: "John de Rivaz"
Subject: living forever
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 2004 12:02:46 +0100

The difficulty with the concept of the value of finite life and living
forever seems to be in the matter of

10 more years has some value, therefore 10^6 more years has 10^5 more value
and so on.

If an infinite number of years has a value x, then a lifespan of n years has
a value of nx/(infinity) which is zero. This gives rise to the suggestion
that a finite lifespan is of zero value regardless of duration. If an
infinite number of years has infinite value, n years has
n(infinity)/(infinity) which is indeterminate. However it is possible to
write:

value of n years of life= limit(t approaches infinity)(nx/t), where x is the
value of an infinite lifespan.

If more is known about the nature of the variables there are various
mathematical tricks to work it out. Mike Price may know them off the top of
his head, and I would have to look them up.

The goal must be to exist forever, but it must also be understood that
forever never comes. The fact that there is this philosophical dilemma is
convenient because it gives us a way for saying that we do upstage religions
who do seem quite happy to makes claims about people living forever.

--

[Bruce Klein]

Message #24877
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 2004 08:04:14 -0400
From: Thomas Donaldson <73647.1215@compuserve.com>
Subject: CryoNet #24865 - #24874

For Ben Best:

First of all, just where did I say that living a finite lifespan is
valueless? It's not that I personally think that a finite lifespan
is without value, but that the value of a lifespan of N years is
less than that of exp(N) years.

Basically I was trying to understand your own position and why you
hold it. We find ourselves in the midst of cosmological questions
(as I said, currently unanswered) if we ask whether or not an
infinite lifespan will be possible. And I would certainly agree that
the best way to prolong our lifespans is not to cease, ever, to work
on the problem of increasing them. (For that matter, if we lived in
a civilization in which lifespans of 10,000 years is entirely accepted,
then everyone would have a time perspective that takes in 10,000
years, and consider it a very deep injury if their own lifespan turns
out to be only 8000 years). AS for the problem of increasing our
lifespans, again the best strategy is to work on more immediate
problems. Presently aging constitutes the most immediate problem
to increasing our lifespan (yes, I'm prepared to argue that with
anyone who says it's cancer, heart disease, etc etc etc). As for
cryonics, it will not alone do anything to increase our lifespans,
but as individuals it may bring us to a time in which the problems
which caused our "death" today will have become totally fixable...
due, of course, to the work of others on the problem of aging.

I will also add here that it's a consequence of my viewpoint that
cryonics, or some more advanced technology with replaces it, will
never be discontinued. When everyone comes to live for 200 years,
then they will think of 500 years as desirable, and want some
form of suspension to take them to such a time if their own lives
ever need it. And the same if we live for 1000 years, and want to
live for 2000 years.

Best wishes and long long life for all,

Thomas Donaldson

[Bruce Klein]

Message #24879
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 2004 09:48:55 -0700 (PDT)
From: Scott Badger
Subject: Re: Discussion on immortality

>>The recent discussion on the value and desirability of physical immortality
>> has brought to my mind some questions. Why is it that so many people
>> denigrate the idea of physical immortality in this reality, citing all sorts
>> of problems like boredom, lack of meaning,selfishness, etc, etc, while they
>> are quite happy with the notion of immortality in an afterlife?

I'm not a christian but I imagine they would respond
with something like,

"God has taken care of that problem by arranging
things in heaven so that we won't have to worry about
any of those issues."

Or how about...

"How could anyone be bored or selfish or need more
meaning in their life if they're with god in heaven?"

Or how about ...

"We will be higher beings in that realm and won't be
beset by the same problems that afflict our mortal
selves here on Earth."

People can be quite creative in explaining away the
holes in (incoherence of) their belief system in order
to reduce the discomfort of any cognitive dissonance
they might experience from the rational observations
of skeptics.

Cheers,

Scott

=====
Wm Scott Badger, PhD

[Bruce Klein]

Message #24884
From: "Michael C Price"
References: <20041020090001.23335.qmail@rho.pair.com>
Subject: Wrap-up comments about Death and Immortalism
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 2004 08:08:00 +0100


>>>> all finite lifespans are valueless.
>
>>
>> It seems to me that our dialog has boiled down to this,
>> which seems to simply be a statement of your values
>> which I cannot personally relate to.


Fair enough; I can't relate to non-immortalist values.

Here's another angle: part of the psychological maturation
process is the development of delayed gratification, a
mechanism by which the planning for future gratification
generates current gratification. Immortalists have just
taken this process further than other people so that they
value future gratification as much as present gratification;
in this sense they are more mature than even life
extensionists (who still discount the future).


>> Aging and death are my "mortal enemies". This being
>> the case, you may think I would be an "immortalist",
>> but wanting to avoid death and believing that immortality
>> is possible are two different things.


Of course they are. One is a value, the other an
assessment of what's possible.


>> To leap immediately
>> from the former to the latter is *wishful thinking*,


Obviously. Just as it would be wishful thinking for
a life-extensionist to leap from wishing to extend their
lifespan to thinking that it is possible.


>> something I try to avoid.


Me too.


>> I believe death is inevitable, but in my case
>> I hope that I can avoid it for many thousands of years,
>> at least.


I do not claim to know enough about the workings of the
universe to state that death is inevitable; clearly we don't
yet know enough to settle the issue of whether immortality
is *possible*; but I know I want it, nevertheless.

Cheers,
Michael C Price

[Bruce Klein]

Message #24886
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 2004 01:36:05 -0700
From: Mike Perry
Subject: Immortalism, my comments

To me it is important to have a reasonable hope of immortality, or that
life--the life of the individual (me in particular, but not just me) not
come to a permanent end. A finite total lifespan, however protracted, will
not do--here I agree with Michael Price. (It is permissible to recover
consciousness after a period of unconsciousness, of course, and even do
this repeatedly, so long as the total subjective awake-time, in a
reasonable sense, is infinite.) The hope of immortality is my inspiration
for the things I do in cryonics, and without it the effort would, I'm sure,
be less or I might give it up altogether, knowing in the end it would be a
lost cause. It also inspires other things I do and it's hard to imagine
living without it, really. Since it is so important to me to have this
hope, and at a robust level, I decided some time ago that I would adopt the
most lenient stance I reasonably could on what it means for a person to
survive. (I should mention here that I discount any supernatural entity or
process, so all approaches I consider must be based on reason and science.)
So I became a pattern survivalist--your bits or information are both
necessary and very largely sufficient, according to this view. There are
difficulties with this position, paradoxes associated with duplicate
individuals, for instance, but all are resolvable in one way or another, at
least to my satisfaction.

As I see it, there are several theories of survival that I think there is
no way in principle, ever, to decide between scientifically. We can call
these theories of the soul--where by "soul" I mean simply what is your
identity--the real "you"--not necessarily anything supernatural. A
possibility then is that your soul dies each time you fall asleep and a new
soul that thinks it is you--but really isn't--takes its place. This theory
(it is essentially what is known as the day-person hypothesis) isn't taken
too seriously by most people, but something like it seems to bother some
would-be cryonicists. They are worried that, given that all brain activity
would cease under cryopreservation, it might kill your soul (to use my
terminology). So, while eventual reanimation may occur and restore a person
who seemed to be you in all respects to the outsider, it wouldn't really be
you, just another who thinks they are you. This is another issue that, I
submit, can never be decided scientifically.

Moving from the idea of the fragile soul that dies easily, never to return
(or maybe goes to an unknown location where there are creepy-crawly things
or lakes of lava) we can imagine the robust soul that simply inhabits any
place where, on the face of it, it seems to be present. Such a soul has no
difficulty, in principle at least, with being many places at once.
(Subatomic particles, and the matter they make up, seem to have this talent
anyway, however.) So if you had two duplicates exactly alike or close
enough to be thinking the same thoughts, it would simply be one soul in two
bodies. (And note that by our assumption, neither embodied consciousness
could tell which body it was in, so in this sense you could say you had a
single, shared consciousness rather than two. "A duplicate consciousness is
not the same as a shared consciousness" some would say, but I submit that
this too is one of those issues that can never be decided scientifically,
so taking the lenient view becomes permissible.) Slap one of the
duplicates, make a change in its thinking that does not occur in the other,
and presto! your soul instantly fissions into two distinct souls--there is
no insurmountable logical difficulty I see here, or anything scientifically
refutable.

Given the soul springs up where conditions are right we see how the dead
could be raised, even in the absence of information describing them, by
producing the appropriate constructs such as replicas of the original,
functioning brains--this could occur by a lucky accident for instance.
Though that may seem so unlikely as to be impossible for practical
purposes, in fact I think the prospect of such resurrections is realistic
due to certain other possibilities I consider likely, such as parallel
universes. It's important to me that a pathway to the renewal of life
exist--so the dead will have not died in vain, and all will, one hopes,
eventually enjoy eternal bliss. Overall it suggests that life, not death,
is the ultimate fate of any individual, even those who are sure they don't
want immortality--you will just have to learn to live with it, whether you
like it or not. (You will like it in the end, however, I feel reasonably
sure.) In the scientifically engineered heaven that I imagine, however,
there will be a special, privileged position for those of today who choose
cryonics, and who then may contribute to the engineering process.

More will be found at
http://www.universal...surrection.html
and in my book. I don't feel that science and religion need be separate but
that a scientific religion is both possible and desirable.

Enjoy eternity,
Mike Perry

[tiresias]

>Having more people alive is a good because there will be more minds working to solve challenges...

This, to me, suggests a rather idealistic view of humanity-- people are stupid. Not some people, not even most people; almost all people. The more minds involved in the decision-making process, the more conflict wil inevitably arise. Even in the most obviously beneficial conditions, dissatisfied sects will arise--

At the dawn of the Italian Rennaisance, great works of art and beauty that were to make ideas and images immortal were coming forth. A man named Savanarola (I apologize if I misspelled his name...) led a popular rebellion and annihilated the artwork of... Florence, I believe.

The point I mean to bring up is that more people in existance will not necessarily increase problem-solving potential-- or, even if it does contribute to some degree, we're talking about geometric population growth-- doubling every 20ish years after the distribution of immortality. That'd leave something along the lines of 60 years to solve the problems of too many people, not enough resources. I don't think that's realistic.

Also...

>We're alive now. We know it works. Let's make heaven on earth because all indications point the fact that when people die, there's nothing.

Sorry if I'm not remembering correctly... but I thought you had at some point said that avoiding alienating religious communities was a goal to acquire more universal support of immortalist research. Considering that many- almost all, even- religions of the world believe in something after death, is it wise to assert that there is nothing after death?

[tiresias]

>If an
infinite number of years has infinite value, n years has
n(infinity)/(infinity) which is indeterminate

... I was under the impression that n(infinity)/(infinity)=n, not indeterminate...

[tiresias]

>The answer is: very different indeed. Rather than do algebra on this
(which I will get wrong, as it's been too long since I studied this) I
will just use a worked example. Suppose that this year your chance of
death (however old you are) is 50%, next year it's 25%, and it carries
on halving each year thereafter. Then, your chance of surviving:

1 year = 0.5
2 years = 0.375
3 years = 0.328125
4 years = 0.3076172
5 years = 0.2980042
6 years = 0.2933478
7 years = 0.2910561

The asymptote of this is apparently 0.288788095086602421278899721... (I
have not found a name for this number). That's to say, if your survival
chances in the future follow the trajectory just described you have a
better than one-in-four chance of a *genuinely* infinite lifespan, i.e.
of not *ever* dying, *despite* the fact that you always have a non-zero
probability of dying in the coming year. One in four doesn't sound much
good, of course, but obviously that can be raised arbitrarily close to 1
by speeding up the rate of improvement of risk of death.
(from aq24)

Your math seems good, but the principle behind it seems to me flawed. You assume a constant rate of medical progress per unit time-- halving the remaining medical difficulties to life extension every unit time. This does not take into account the fact that, in all likelihood, the rate at which medical advances will be made is not constant.

Actually...

I'm sorry if this response is a little disjointed-- I got around four hours of sleep last night, and my thoughts are wandering a bit.

This looks to me as if you've not taken into account age, beyond assuming constant medical progress. You're saying the chances of dying decrease by half per year... but doesn't chance of death normally INCREASE with age? Studies have shown that on the cellular level, the body has more and more trouble maintaining itself with age-- maining a proper apoptosis balance, whatnot. Isn't it a bit presumptuous to say that medical science will not only utterly eliminate all negative aspects of death through age and also decrease other threat factors as well?

Also... it looks like your math is roughly analogous to saying I have a 50/50 chance of flipping a coin and having it land heads 100 times in a row, in that you're considering probability on a year by year scenario, when the numbers for an overall number of years lived would be more morbid.

The asymptotic value you come up with looks rather alot like e... just an off the wall observation...

[eternaltraveler]

I've read the first few pages of this thread and scanned the rest so if this is a point that was already addressed I apologize.

When I am speaking with others, namely religious people, a method I have found to bring them over to my way of thinking on immortality is to convince them that, yes, they still will eventually die anyway. Their heaven or hell will still be waiting for them in 5 years or 5 billion. So maybe it really isn't wise to hammer home how truly infinite life spans may indeed be possible.

I've convinced a devout catholic that the quest for "physical immortality" is not a bad thing since his God will still be waiting for him in the end. (he is of course still vehemently against the idea of embryonic stem cell research).

People are comfortable with the idea of death. It's been with us since life evolved. Convince people that they will still die. They'll just live longer. I imagine that after living a few more centuries they'll come completely around.

[Illuminatusdarksoul]

printf("Maybe make immortality a religion? Anyway...\n");

A more disturbing problem with Immortality: A cult of angry clones, mortals, uneducated yobs and hippies seems like the only problem immortalists have in real 'i am going to kill you now terms'. Money doesnt have to be everything, rent mercenaries by promising immortality and then get willing scientists to do the research for free. Its war out there, nobody on this forum seems to understand that.

Forget heat death, difficult rejuvenation processes and the law. Money and time solve these things. When you are in the lab and you get rushed by a misinformed but no less lethal mob, remeber to take things one step at a time. Eat healthily and be prepared.

There are many trials to come, and right now, i fear humans more than anything else.

[stevethegreat]

However I am very concerned; which people won't want immortality if it'll become accessible?
You may say the people running the medicine companies or religious-men, but I don't see any real iisue with them. I mean medicines will continue to be consumed and religions will be evolved (or "die"), futhermore christianity was referring in this world, exclusively, at least in the first 300years of its existance; then the issue of after life added and then its fall started (I know many things of christian history, my father is theologist and myself done some research).

The main idea is that I don't see the point of existance of an evil person (from his nature), people become evil, they aren't bornt (evil). In front of the chance of immorality everybody, I mean EVERYBODY, won't want to become a terrorist/thief/killer, as there will alway be chance for him/her to reverse things. In addition people will tend to become more and more wise due to their age/experience and would never pass from their minds to put in danger their precious lives.

[stevethegreat]

Sorry for double-posting but I admit the folowing belongs to different post.

I have only read some articles about Aubrey de Grey and I am surprised of how many people are against his ideas (many scientists inclunding them) and how come we people remained the same. These people recall in my mind the people wanted to kill Gallileo because of his ideas. Although it was brighter than day's light that there was truth in his words nobody want to believe him (except few) staying stuck to what they had learnt until then.

I am wondering: how some people believe that all they have learnt in the course of their life are right? Science show us more than anything that everything we knew about our world was wrong and what we now know will be determined in the future it is also wrong. We humans as a specie survived because we continuously upgrade ourselves and our vision of the world. If in a given amount of time we remain the same we will be extinct for sure (call it nuclear war, chemical war etc). So why some people fight anti-aging as they will be called obscurantists from the following generations (just like Gallileo's deniers called today). And what will they manage by fighting anti-aging, the most probable will be to achieve anti-age in some generations after and then they will be the stupid ones don't get rid of that, but .... WHAT ARE WE OUGHT TO THEM.

[jaydfox]

The answer is: very different indeed. Rather than do algebra on this
(which I will get wrong, as it's been too long since I studied this) I
will just use a worked example. Suppose that this year your chance of
death (however old you are) is 50%, next year it's 25%, and it carries
on halving each year thereafter. Then, your chance of surviving:

1 year = 0.5
2 years = 0.375
3 years = 0.328125
4 years = 0.3076172
5 years = 0.2980042
6 years = 0.2933478
7 years = 0.2910561

The asymptote of this is apparently 0.288788095086602421278899721... (I
have not found a name for this number).

Came across this:
http://home.earthlin...s.html#l0_28878

0.288788095086602421278899721929... = 1/2 × 3/4 × 7/8 × 15/16 × 31/32 × ... × 1-2^-N × ...
   This is an infinite product of (1-2^-N) for all N. This is also the product of (1-x^N) with x=1/2. Euler showed that in the general case, this infinite product can be reduced to the much easier-to-calculate infinite sum 1 - x - x^2 + x^5 + x^7 - x^12 - x^15 + x^22 + x^26 - x^35 - x^40 + ... where the exponents are the pentagonal numbers N(3N-1)/2 (for both positive and negative N), Sloane's A001318.

Not sure of a more appropriate place to put this. The fact that "Euler showed..." something about this number implies that we may yet be able to find a name for it.

[Julia36]

I accept and state science IS a religion: a way of life and a belief system, that uses evidence, experiment, peer review and is seeking all the stuff other religions seeks like peace f mind (psychiatry) immortality (various) resurrection (quantum Archaeology) and miracles (technology).

It is different from other religions.

It has no proof of God from inside it, but that is being attempted: the future can view you, and an Omega point.

A difficulty is guarding against dogma.



Science has to achieve resurrection, immortality and proof of god within it's own systems.

It is not true that belief and evidence are opposites. I'll believe the evidence when I see it.

Th fact or belief is that we refute other belief systems which may or may not be true.

We judge they are false.
They may be.
But they may be non-evidence based truths.

I'm not sure I could be a scientist unless I were atheist.