I'm beginning to think that Hamid Gul's faction probably didn't play a role in sheltering Bin Laden, and were rather, somewhat indifferent to his activities. Because this group was more focused on the struggle over Kashmir, and maximizing Pakistani influence in Afghanistan, which was an interest that they decided that only Hezbi-i-Islami, the Afghan Taliban, and the Haqqani Network could best advance---due to the relative size of their networks, and their past roles in Afghan governance. In fact, I'm not even sure that it's fair to call this faction the "Hamid Gul faction," since the eponymous figure of this group has reached an advanced age, and at present, the torch may be carried by a prominent figure in one of the successive generations---perhaps Nadeem Taj. The process of reaching this conclusion was sparked by a reexamination of a crucial event that I discussed In a previous entry, which was the catalyst like importance of the murder of Col. Imam----which I should note, was in addition to the earlier murder and abduction of his comrade, Khalid Khawaja, whose career was strikingly similar to Imam's. The importance of their murders should not be understated, because for a numbers of years, it has been jestingly said that the mere mention of either of these two names could get you anywhere in the restive tribal area. But it's abundantly clear now that the landscape has changed, and the shockwave that their murder generated shook the security establishment to its core. And consequentially, the posture of the Gul faction has changed, which means that at least in regard to Al-Qaeda, a major obstacle to the execution of policy has been removed.
Because of their preferences and operational focus, the Gul faction probably didn't know the exact location of Bin Laden. Nevertheless, if there was a need to convey a message to Al-Qaeda, they had channels and envoys that they could use for this purpose. And because many of these groups were merely disposable pawns, they probably had some idea of which bushes should be shook if Al-Qaeda ceased to serve a useful function. This indefinite knowledge about Bin Laden's location, not to mention their distance with Al-Qaeda, was revealed during the protracted Imam and Khawaja affair----which actually began with their abduction last March. Because during this ordeal, multiple attempts were made through proxies---principally Sirajuddin Haqqani----to secure the release of these highly valued assets, but in spite numerous attempts, their demands were ignored by the perpetrators. While this failure came as a surprise to some analysts, there are three probable causes that aptly explain this seemingly unlikely outcome. First, Al-Qaeda had recently merged with several other militant organizations, which has diminished the Haqqani Network and the Afghan Taliban's influence in Pakistan---whose attention is mostly focused on Afghanistan. Second, the the audaciousness of this act suggests that Al-Qaeda could rely on state protection elsewhere, and thus, felt comfortable with incurring the wrath of Gul's faction. Third, Al-Qaeda sensed that the Gul faction were preparing to betray them, and to set an example for all other actors, decided to send a deafening message. The third cause was perhaps the most critical, because the Gul faction has been becoming increasingly vocal about its displeasure with Al-Qaeda, and Tehrik-i-Taliban in particular, which has since transferred its loyalty to the former. In particular, the unusually public Col. Imam had been unequivocally critical of Tehrik-i-Taliban, and due to its indiscriminate campaign against major population centers in Pakistan, went as far to brand the organization as terrorists----which as one can imagine, is a designation that he used very, very, sparingly. But furthermore, the Gul faction grudgingly accepted the changed conditions in Afghanistan, and through one of their public faces, Col. Imam, they suggested that Mullah Omar was willing to delink himself from Al-Qaeda if he was allowed to return to a position in power in Afghanistan. Similarly, Sirajuddin Haqqani---the son and public face of the organizational patriarch of the Haqqani Network---has made it clear in recent interviews that in spite of their past relationship with Al-Qaeda, the Haqqani organization's goals were separate and at odds with those of Al-Qaeda. So the willingness of the Gul faction to invite retaliation from Al-Qaeda and Tehrik-i-Taliban suggests that they were possibly unaware---or unimpressed----by a competing patron, their organizational changes, and relative strength.
But with the passing of two of their senior members, the Gul faction likely decided to strike back, and began to shake the many bushes in Northwest Pakistan that Bin Laden might be concealed. Because Col. Imam's death was conspicuously followed---in a matter of days---by the arrest of Umar Patek in Abbotabad, whom was probably acting as a liaison to his allied organization in Southeast Asia--which Al-Qaeda offered their training facilities to, and assisted with the planning of their spectacular attacks against tourist destinations in Bali. However, if Bin Laden was being protected by a separate faction, then certainly the widely circulated news about Umar Patek would've provided ample reason for his protectors to urge the abandonment of his compound. This failure might be attributable to incompetence, but rather, I suspect that the ultimate death was decided to be in accordance with his protector's interests. So their change in position was probably the result of negotiations initiated by the Gul faction, which lead to an understanding with whatever group that Bin Laden depended on for protection. And If such a compact was formed, it probably contained the following provisions: a.) That a cease fire be put into immediate effect; b). That Al-Qaeda accept the Taliban's primacy in Afghanistan; c.) The replacement of Bin Laden as Emir of Al-Qaeda. If it was agreed that Bin Laden should be removed from power, then it might be fair to assume that the order to execute Khawaja and Imam was reluctantly carried out by their followers. Indeed, the reluctance of Bin Laden's subordinates might explain the duration of the Col's captivity---which was otherwise justified under the pretext of extracting ransom from the captives' families---which lasted about ten months.
In a previous entry, I illuminated the divisions within Al-Qaeda, which grew wider after Saif al-Adel departed with his dissenters to Iran. But following the abduction of Khawaja and Imam, these disagreements were no longer confined to deliberations among the leadership, because in 2010, Saif al-Adel et. al. began to openly address the supporters and members of Al-Qaeda. Which was an insubordination expressed in the form of books, interviews, messages, and fatwas that outlined an alternative strategy, new rules of conduct for members, and remarkably, culminated with a formal denunciation of the leadership of Al-Qaeda. To the surprise of many, this act of rebellion was met with a stunning silence, which suggests that either the usually autocratic Bin Laden was deeply shaken by this open challenge, or because of the deceitful reassurances of those that the he depended on, had developed a false sense of security. Alternatively, perhaps it was a combination of both explanations, but regardless of Bin Laden's reaction, al-Adel and his band made the journey from Iran to Pakistan, and in the Fall of 2010, effectively took command of the organization.
Admittedly, the most important components of the thesis of this entry are based on logical speculations made in the absence of all of the pieces of the narrative being connected by definitive evidence, but I find it difficult to believe that the timing and significance of the two Colonels' execution, Saif al-Adel defiance, and the final outcome of Bin Laden are not related. Because with the ascension of al-Adel, the two factions have a leader that will remain hostile to the West, deferent to the Afghan Taliban, and not at odds with national interests that both groups have defined. Additionally, in al-Adel, they both have a born leader of enormous intelligence that will operate from the shadows, slowly exhaust the West, and minimize the chances of a response equal to or exceeding that which followed 9/11. But of more substance, the successful targets of the drone campaign in the last year indicates that murder of the Colonels might have triggered the formation of a consensus to eliminate Bin Laden's closest followers. Indeed, the drone strikes are the sharp end of the counterterrorist stick, and the Pakistanis are more than willing to outsource the job with the intelligence that they trade. And in the last year, two of three most important links that Bin Laden had to his organization were victims of Hellfire missiles----his brother in law and chief of staff since 1989, Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, and his operational coordinator, Atiyah Abd al-Rahman. Additionally, the timing of their deaths should also be of some interest, because al-Yazid was successfully targeted about one month after Khawaja's execution, and al-Rahman suffered the same outcome one month before the return of al-Adel.
So assuming that I'm correct, just who is leading this separate faction that managed to help Bin Laden evade the world for at least 10 years? As I see it, the leading candidate would be Mahmud Ahmed, whom was the Director of the ISI between the years of 1999 and 2001. With the conservative side of the officer class, Ahmed was held in very high esteem, and during Musharraf's seizure of power in 1999, he played an instrumental role in mollifying the doubts of this wing, whom might have otherwise preferred a continuation of Nawaz Sharif's reign. But because of the illegitimate nature of Musharraf's entry into the Office of the Presidency, and the irreplaceable role of Ahmed in this process, an indebted Musharraf promised to loosen the leash that was around the ISI's neck----which was contingent, though, on an agreement to formally place the organization under the direct authority of an Army that Musharraf remained Chief until 2007. So in between the beginning of Musharraf's reign and Ahmed's dismissal, the ISI deepened its relationships with the Taliban, and countless militant groups within South Asia. One of these groups was Harkat ul-Jihad al-Islami, whose members at the time included Omar Saeed al-Sheikh, and Ilyas Kashmiri, Al-Qaeda's Director of External Operations. At the beginning of the union, Harkat ul-Jihad al-Islami was an independent entity, but maintained operational ties with Al-Qaeda----which among other endeavors, included the planning of the September 11th attacks. Additionally, a relationship of some sort was established with Al-Qaeda proper, but the details of this union remain murky. What is known is that the ISI's relationship with Harkat ul-Jihad al-Islami was more open, and may have been created as a conduit organization in order to maintain distance between a group that had publicly opened hostilities with the United States. And following the capture of Omar Saeed Sheikh---the orchestrator of the abduction and brutal murder of Daniel Pearl---it was discovered that the ISI's Director of Operations in Lahore, Ijaz Shah, was evidently in league with Ahmed, and given the responsibility of handling the Harkat ul-Jihad al-Islami---and by extension, Al-Qaeda---- portfolio. Which was an affiliation that was revealed once the controversy surrounding Daniel Pearl 's death became no longer possible to ignore, and compelled Ahmed to task Shah with convincing Omar to turn himself into his personal custody----during which he was debriefed for one week at Shah's private residence before being surrendered to the proper authorities.
Ahmed probably also had a relationship with Omar---previously I mistakenly attributed this connection to Hamid Gul----but because of the profound implications that it might have on Pakistan's foreign relations, and the unavoidable questions about the source of the intelligence, the principle piece of evidence that is often cited as support remains a matter of considerable controversy. The evidence in question came from a cellular phone conversation intercepted by India's external intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), whom was surveilling Omar because of his group's terrorist activities in Kashmir. To their surprise, one of Omar's conversations was determined to be with Ahmed. And in this conversation, Ahmed startlingly instructed Omar to wire transfer $100,000 in funds to Mohammad Atta---the leader of the 9/11 attacks. Nevertheless, the intensity of India's strategic rivalry with Pakistan raised serious doubts about the story's credibility. But in their own defense, they claim they passed this piece---and other pieces---of supporting intelligence to Washington for further analysis, which yielded results that convinced some prominent policymakers---including members of the present administration----of its authenticity. However, critics claim that a seasoned intelligence professional like Ahmed would've been unlikely to use a cellular phone to take part in a conversation of such an incriminating nature, especially with the community's widely held knowledge about celluar phones' vulnerability to interception.
Regardless of the truth to what transpired, Ahmed's history and tenure as ISI Director has helped the question of his complicity to endure, and even if the ISI was left outside the planning of the attacks on 9/11, there was less controversy surrounding his affiliation with organizations linked to Al-Qaeda. Indeed, because it was his personal commitment to these ties that made him a liability for Pakistan after 9/11, when it was offered the stark choice of joining the United State's campaign against Al-Qaeda----and its state sponsor---or as attributed to Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, being "bombed into the Stone Age." For Musharraf, the choice was clear, but because of the initial resistance he faced from security services, he realized some additional house cleaning would also be required if Pakistan's foreign policy was to undergo such a radical transformation. So Ahmed was ultimately forced into an early retirement, but to accompany him, his former ISI colleagues Mohammed Aziz Khan---Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff---and Muhammed Yusuf----the Army's Vice Chief of Staff----were also expelled for their views, history, and the agenda they shared with Ahmed.
It is said that a member of the ISI doesn't cease his occupation, and never changes his organizational loyalty. Confirming this reputation about the ISI's members, giants like Ahmed are believed to continue to exert their influence through the many loyalists that pervade their former agency and other organizations in the security services. But many of the forcibly retired like Ahmed insist that they have indeed moved on, even though their names invariably come up whenever major acts of terrorism are committed in the region. So they apparently cover their tracks well, and take advantage of their opponents' reluctance to fittingly punish them for their crimes. So in consideration of recent events, I think that these men have the sort of power and twisted views that make them the most likely suspects in directing an enterprise that included the sheltering of Bin Laden. Still, their ostensible decision to base him in Abbotabad, though, remains a matter of some debate.
In Abbotabad, the Pakistani Frontier Force would be principally responsible for security in the city, where its headquarters also happens to be located. Other civil security duties are performed by the local constabulary force, but since they at one point made an attempt to root out suspected Al-Qaeda militants, it seems more likely that the Frontier Force is a part of the conspiracy. The Frontier Force consists of paramilitary units commanded by regular army officers, and interestingly, I discovered that the unit----the 20th Frontier Force----responsible for securing the area where Bin Laden's compound was based----which is actually in the town of Kokal, 5km NE of Abbotabad---was first commanded by Anwar ul-Haq, whom is one of the sons of former President Zia ul-Haq. And given Zia's influence over the Pakistani officer corp, this unit has likely attracted officers interested in honoring his legacy. Unfortunately, though, I can't find information about the current commander of this unit, and the orientation of its officers. But at least superficially, the town of Kokal would be an ideal location for Bin Laden's compound.
Of course, the narrative that I've proposed is at odds with the account that has been given by the United States, which gave greater causal weight to the results of detainee interrogations and surveillance technology. Even with this conflict with the story that I've constructed, I dont't doubt that either explanation might have played a significant role in determining Bin Laden's end. But it should be pointed out that the lead that policymakers followed was the most promising of dozens of leads that were given some consideration at some point, and at odds with the assessments of a number of different analysts. In fact, prior to this breakthrough, the general consensus was that Bin Laden moved within a network of safe houses in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. For subscribers to this theory, there was somewhat of a significant emphasis on the region of South Waziristan, where it was thought that he could best rely on the support on the militant groups operating in the region, and the indigenous population. Alternatively, other schools proposed locations like Eastern Afghanistan, Kashmir, Yemen, Iran, the Northwest Frontier Province, or one of several urban centers in Pakistan. So there was still some significant doubts about the likelihood of Bin Laden inhabiting the targeted compound in Kokal. In fact, forecasters determined that the probability of the resident being Bin Laden was between 30 to 40 percent. However, I think the Pakistanis were fairly positive, though, and were only doubted because of their inconsistent track record. Because according to Pakistani accounts given off the record---which can be understandably treated as suspect----the compound had been under surveillance since last year, and that the positive intelligence confirming Bin Laden's residence was passed to their counterparts in the United States. Understanding the potential implications that such a strike might have on other operations in the theater, though, I imagine that the CIA thoroughly searched their collection of intelligence in order to determine if they could produce an assessment that was in agreement with the information Pakistan shared. And when they eventually concluded that their analyses of the compound in Kokal was congruent enough with the claims of the Pakistanis, and that the potential benefits greatly outweighed the likely costs, a final decision was made by policymakers to proceed with operation. However, if the United States declined to carry out the operation, the Pakistanis would have still almost certainly possessed the motivation and capacity to do the deed themselves. Because again, the killing of Bin Laden was in the interest of several factions, but due to their fear of the potential backlash----Bin Laden has a 18 percent favorability rating---from segments that believed Pakistani sovereignty to be absolutely inviolable, or rather, identified with the target, it was probably deemed to be much more preferable to share a portion of the domestic political costs with the United States.
So where does this leave the remaining leadership of Al-Qaeda? Well, I imagine Ayman al-Zawahiri will become leader by default, since it would be supremely stupid to assemble Al-Qaeda's ruling committee to render a decision on this matter----in fact it has been said that much of the senior leadership, including al-Adel, have left the country. But if Al-Zawahiri takes the top position, he's likely to be nothing more than a figurehead to divert attention----which might be the beginning of a new paradigm. And once he inevitably dies, he'll be most assuredly be succeeded by another insecure blowhard----like Abu Yahya al-Libi or Anwar al-Alaki---that derives sick pleasure from sending the outside world "frightening" videos. But the real leadership should probably look like the following:
Emir-Saif al-Adel
Deputy Emir-Abu Hafs "The Mauritanian"
Chief of the Military Committee-Abduallah Ahmed Abdullah
Chief of the Finance Commitee-Abu Fadhl al-Makkee
Chief of the Media/Public Relations Committee-Mustafa Hamid
Chief Theologian-Sulaiman Abu Ghaith
Chief of the Military Commitee-Abduallah Ahmed Abdullah
Chief of External Operations- Ilyas Kashmiri
Chief of Afghan/Pakistani Operations: Abdul Shakoor Turkestani
Chief of North American Operations- Adnan Shukrijumah
Chief of Persian Gulf Operations- Abdullah al-Qarawi (after he assumes control over the troublesome Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula)
Chief of North African Operations- Ali Sayyid Muhammed Mustafa al-Bakri
Chief of Kashmir/Indian Operations- Qari Saifullah Akhtar
Edited by Rol82, 14 May 2011 - 07:06 AM.
