195 replies to this topic

[bioconservative]

Kurt9

He believes that therapeutic cloning is wrong and, yet, is pro choice. This is about as inconsistant as it can get. If you believe that embryos are human beings, then both abortion and therapeutic cloning are wrong because they both involve the murder of a human being. If you decide that an embryo is not a human life, then there is simply no moral argument for saying that therapeutic cloning is wrong but that abortion is OK. Its either one way or the other.

Kurt, you are juxtaposing terms and this is a no-no. Most of your confusion as to my position probably stems from this fact. (And Sonia, this applies to your question as well: First, will you explain what you think makes something human? ) There are human beings which are sentient (autonomous moral agents). Then there is human life which is a biological contiuum from which human beings arise.

So no, my position is not inconsistent, but instead perhaps more naunced than you are used to. As I've stated previously, I do not believe that a human soul comes into existence at the moment of creation. I do however believe that embryos AKA 'potential human beings' (which are human life, but not yet human beings) are not simply "another mass of cells". Embryos carry moral weight. Not as much weight as a human being mind you (which is why I favor women's reproductive rights), but certainly enough weight to prevent their exploitation and commoditization.

[bioconservative]

Bioconservative, I believe you owe us a clarification here.

I owe you nothing Kurt. Do not be presumptuous.

Are you trying to defend the rights of a new class of human beings here, or are you meerly using the question of embryos as a smoke screen to attack people's right to life?

To clarify once again. I am not "trying to defend the rights of a new class of human beings". I am defending the dignity of human life, a biological continuum which includes both actual and potential human beings.

The second half of your question is ambigious and contains implications which I do not accept. People have a right to life. How much is another question altogether.

[bioconservative]

Elrond:

bioconservitive:
Please clarify.  You seem to be stating here that life extension and human augmentation is wrong precisely because it would result in superior beings.  Perhaps we should surgically lobotomize gifted people so they don't make everyone else feel bad about themselves.  Actually we'll probably have to do it to most people just so below average people don't feel bad about themselves either.  After all they don't stand a chance now.

This is a common argument I see among Transhuman types. Please read again my post where I critique Bostrom. The type of human augmentation we are discussing here is not normal varation around the mean. We are discussing drastic, fundamental changes to the species homo sapiens. We are altering the delicate balance which exists within our society between generation, between social classes, etc etc.

The way to conceptualize this Elrond, is not between dull and bright humans, but between chimpanzees and humans. This IS the Transhumanist Agenda.


On a side note, I also find it amusing that Transhumanists so often try to pin me down by saying, "Well, what is human? Define human?" etc etc. Why don't you tell me? In fact, explain to me exactly what you mean by "greater than human capabilities". Obviously, you guys had something in mind when you came up with your phraseology. )

[bioconservative]

Randolfe:

Some of those involved in this discussion have "bought into" Jaenisch's "cloned-animals-can't-be-normal" argument by using a term he suggested in a paper published recently in Pub Med, "clonotes".

Randolfe, I am not contending that they "can't be normal", only that they are "not yet normal". There are significant differences between a clonote and a zygote, both in terms of the means by which they are produced, as well as their internal composition there after.

That Dolly died prematurely and suffered from severe arthritis is not debatable. What is debatable is whether this was just coincidence, or the direct result of inadequacies in current reproductive cloning technologies. (I am sure that we will know one way or the other soon enough). The real problem with the current efficacy of cloning technologies is that mtDNA is not cloned along with nDNA. This is a significant fact which it seems you are failing to take into consideration.

[Kalepha]

Unfortunately, as Reason mentioned, “the dignity of human life” is too vague to be defended in any rigorous manner. Its underlying notions are controversial – they can be articulated in various conflicting ways, and none have very strong justifications, except that consenting individuals can be coherent between belief and action.

Suppose there existed only a small tribe of humans on Earth and all decided that to attain a sense of pride for human life they each must hang themselves. By so doing they would have achieved the greatest good for all human life, for they are the sole arbiters of defending the dignity of human life. In other words, there are no particular facts about humans from which one can draw the imperative “ban therapeutic cloning.”

Similarly, there are no particular facts about humans from which advocates can draw the imperative “support therapeutic cloning,” except for being consistent with their belief that the perceived good outcomes outweigh any perceived bad ones. On both sides of this issue, our rhetoric must be reduced to expressing preferences and willing sacrifices. Thus, you can’t avoid adopting a consequentialist method, regardless whether you’re against it. That is your first contradiction.

Your other contradiction, which minimizes the function of this thread to mere artifact, is that you wish to preserve the dignity of human life (meaning that you assign particular values to it), while also wishing to avoid commoditizing it (meaning that you also wish to avoid assigning particular values to it).

[bioconservative]

Randolfe:

Bioconservative

(Quote)Twinning occurs in approximately .4% of births and is the result of biochemical disturbances between cells during the early development of the embryo.(quote)

Well, here we have a serious error on the part of our very well informed Bioconservative.  Perhaps, I am reading the statistics incorrectly.

Source: Human Cloning and Human Dignity (2002)

It is interesting that Bioconservative opposes twinning.

Oppose twinning?? [huh] Certainly not, I was only opposing the way in which the "twinning argument" is used to argue against the notion of the individuality of the early embryo.

I'm not following you on this:

Why does he have to believe that for two people to be born sharing a very close and special human relationship (and an identical genotype—the first organ transplant was between identical twins because there was no rejection problem) has to be rooted in “biochemical disturbances between cells during early development of the embryo”?

I have explored the literature about twins and have never encountered this statement.  I think it is rooted in the “yuck” factor so promoted by Bioconservative’s mentor and/or hero, Leon Kass.

Leon Kass is a great man who cares about the future of society. (And if I were him Randolfe, wouldn't that be a rather pompous thing of me to say [lol] ). In regards to "not encountering this statement, check out Human Cloning and Human Dignity - its in there. [thumb]

[bioconservative]

I'm going to be lazy and, rather than actually make a presentation, I will just post this info on potentiality and actuality which I found through google. As I'm sure you are aware, Aristotle was around before Christianity came into existence. Are you starting to get the picture yet? There's nothing "fundamentalist" about a bioconservative's perspective.

Actuality and Potentiality

In Metaphysics ¦¦, Aristotle introduces the distinction between matter and form synchronically, applying it to an individual substance at a particular time. The matter of a substance is the stuff it is composed of; the form is the way that stuff is put together so that the whole it constitutes can perform its characteristic functions. But soon he begins to apply the distinction diachronically, across time. This connects the matter/form distinction to another key Aristotelian distinction, that between potentiality (dunamis) and actuality (entelecheia or energeia). This distinction is the main topic of Book ¦¨.

Aristotle distinguishes between two different senses of the term dunamis. In the strictest sense, a dunamis is the power that a thing has to produce a change. A thing has a dunamis in this sense when it has within it a ¡°source of change in something else (or in itself qua other)¡± (¦¨.1, 1046a12; cf. ¦¤.12). The exercise of such a power is a kin¨ºsis ¡ª a movement or process. So, for example, the housebuiler's craft is a power whose exercise is the process of housebuilding. But there is a second sense of dunamis ¡ª and it is the one in which Aristotle is mainly interested ¡ª that might be better translated as ¡®potentiality¡¯. For, as Aristotle tells us, in this sense dunamis is related not to movement (kin¨ºsis) but to actuality (energeia)(¦¨.6, 1048a25). A dunamis in this sense is not a thing's power to produce a change but rather its capacity to be in a different and more completed state. Aristotle thinks that potentiality so understood is indefinable (1048a37), claiming that the general idea can be grasped from a consideration of cases. Actuality is to potentiality, Aristotle tells us, as ¡°someone waking is to someone sleeping, as someone seeing is to a sighted person with his eyes closed, as that which has been shaped out of some matter is to the matter from which it has been shaped¡± (1048b1-3).

This last illustration is particularly illuminating. Consider, for example, a piece of wood, which can be carved or shaped into a table or into a bowl. In Aristotle's terminology, the wood has (at least) two different potentialities, since it is potentially a table and also potentially a bowl. The matter (in this case, wood) is linked with potentialty; the substance (in this case, the table or the bowl) is linked with actuality. The as yet uncarved wood is only potentially a table, and so it might seem that once it is carved the wood is actually a table. Perhaps this is what Aristotle means, but it is possible that he does not wish to consider the wood to be a table. His idea might be that not only can a piece of raw wood in the carpenter's workshop be considered a potential table (since it can be transformed into one), but the wood composing the completed table is also, in a sense, a potential table. The idea here is that it is not the wood qua wood that is actually a table, but the wood qua table. Considered as matter, it remains only potentially the thing that it is the matter of. (A contemporary philosopher might make this point by refusing to identify the wood with the table, saying instead that the wood only constitutes the table and is not identical to the table it constitutes.)

Since Aristotle gives form priority over matter, we would expect him similarly to give actuality priority over potentiality. And that is exactly what we find (¦¨.8, 1049b4-5). Aristotle distinguishes between priority in logos (account or definition), in time, and in substance. (1) Actuality is prior in logos since we must cite the actuality when we give an account of its corresponding potentiality. Thus, ¡®visible¡¯ means ¡®capable of being seen¡¯; ¡®buildable¡¯ means ¡®capable of being built¡¯(1049b14-16). (2) As regards temporal priority, by contrast, potentiality may well seem to be prior to actuality, since the wood precedes the table that is built from it, and the acorn precedes the oak that it grows into. Nevertheless, Aristotle finds that even temporally there is a sense in which actuality is prior to potentiality: ¡°the actual which is identical in species though not in number with a potentially existing thing is prior to it¡± (1049b18-19). A particular acorn is, of course, temporally prior to the particular oak tree that it grows into, but it is preceded in time by the actual oak tree that produced it, with which it is identical in species. The seed (potential substance) must have been preceded by an adult (actual substance). So in this sense actuality is prior even in time.

(3) Aristotle argues for the priority in substance of actuality over potentiality in two ways. (a) The first argument makes use of his notion of final causality. Things that come to be move toward an end (telos) ¡ª the boy becomes a man, the acorn becomes an oak ¡ª and ¡°the actuality is the end, and it is for the sake of this that the potentiality is acquired ... animals do not see in order that they may have sight, but they have sight that they may see ... matter exists in a potential state, just because it may come to its form; and when it exists actually, then it is in its form¡± (1050a9-17). Form or actuality is the end toward which natural processes are directed. Actuality is therefore a cause in more than one sense of a thing's realizing its potential. As we noted in ¡ì11, one and the same thing may be the final, formal, and efficient cause of another. Suppose an acorn realizes its potential to become an oak tree. The efficient cause here is the actual oak tree that produced the acorn; the formal cause is the logos defining that actuality; the final cause is the telos toward which the acorn develops ¡ª an actual (mature) oak tree.

(b) Aristotle also offers (1050b6-1051a2) an ¡°even stricter¡± argument for his claim that actuality is prior in substance to potentiality. A potentiality is for either of a pair of opposites; so anything that is capable of being is also capable of not being. What is capable of not being might possibly not be, and what might possibly not be is perishable. Hence anything with the mere potentiality to be is perishable. What is eternal is imperishable, and so nothing that is eternal can exist only potentially ¡ª what is eternal must be fully actual. But the eternal is prior in substance to the perishable. For the eternal can exist without the perishable, but not conversely, and that is what priority in substance amounts to (cf. ¦¤.11, 1019a2). So what is actual is prior in substance to what is potential.

[kurt9]

Bioconservative:

No, you really do owe us a clarification. Whenever there is an argument between someone who advocates personal choice and someone who advocates restricting personal choice, the burden of argument is ALWAYS on the person who argues for restricting personal choice.


You are arguing for restrictions on medical technology on the defense of what you agree does not constitute a human being. You are trying to redefine human life as something other than an autonomous moral agent. I see no reason to accept this, especially if it results in restrictions on biomedical technology. If embryos are not a new class of human beings, then they are simply a commodity. A commodity no different than the gasoline I put in my car or the hardware I put in my computer or house.

Therefor, I see no reason why I should accept your notion of dignity of human life as you have defined it. Of what use is such a notion to me or anyone else?

You are not into living an indefinitely long youthful lifespan. Thats cool with me. I have no desire to convince you otherwise. All I ask is that you show respect those of us who are by respecting our right to make that choice for ourselves. I really don't consider this to be unreasonable to ask of you.

Amortality (there is no such thing as immortality) is freedom's final frontier.

You believe current society is somehow incapable of evolving into an amortalist society. First, why should the right to choose this be held hostage to this argument? If current social structures cannot adapt to amortalism, then those social structures should be replaced by those that can. Institutions are created to serve human beings, not the other way around. Human beings have unalienable rights, including the right to live as long as they want. Society's institutions should adapt themselves to this. If they cannot, they we really do have the moral right to replace them with ones that will. It says so in the Declaration of Independence.

Secondly, there is no reason to believe that society cannot evolve into an amortalist society. In fact, it already has in much of the U.S. Places like the Bay Area, SoCal, and NYC have already made the transition to an amortalist society. We're just waiting for the medical technology to catch up.

Much of the socio-economic trends since 1980 (in the U.S.) and in Asia (since '95 or so) are the kinds of changes that the emergence of amortalism would bring about. tat will continue with the emergence of amortalism. The downsizing of large corporations, the rise of small business and entrepreneureal start-ups, and the gradual disappearance of age-graded hiearchies in the business world. The traditional pattern of working for the same employer for life is going away. The new trend is the constant acquiring of new skills and knowledge and the continual mobility. These are all trends that are a natural part of an amortalist society.

In fact, those of us who are technical professional literally cannot afford to age, because it decreases our ability to continually learn new things, upgrade our skills, and to remain competitive players in the techno-economy.

Inter-generational dating and relationships are becoming more common and the conventional life-cycle of marrage, buying house, kids, and death is also going away. Most of my sales reps are either divoriced or on their 2nd or 3rd marrages. Some have kids. Many do not. Also, the option of not having kids is becomming more common as well (my wife and I don't have them). People are living the full, active life until they drop dead (maybe in an avalanch in Utah).

My point in all of this is that much of America and East Asia (believe me on Asia and the developing third world, I lived there for 10 years) have already undergone much of the socio-economic transformation that would be expected as an amortalist society. There is so much to say here that I intend to write a book on this very subject sometime in the next five years (after I get my trading company going).

I expect the social disruption of a cure for aging to be quite minimal, especially in the bay Area or SoCal, where we expected it yesterday.

In fact, I expect many more socio-economic problems in the U.S. if we fail to cure aging in the next 30-40 years than if we succeed.

[John Schloendorn]

[lol] [huh]  [thumb] (bioconservative)

Good to see you're having a good time here!

I see that you (or your colleagues) value the potential of human life to become a human being. How would you weigh this against the potential of an (aging) human being to remain a human being, if some human life were sacrificed for him, say to establish stem cell lines that may be used to treat him? Please respond in terms of quality and quantity of the life forms and beings involved, the probabilies of actualizing the respective potentials, and the validity of such a utilitarian approach.

Edited by John Schloendorn, 19 January 2005 - 04:30 AM.

[immortalitysystems.com]

Regarding AMORTALIST SOCIETY (i like that word) in the San Francisco Bay Aria, the
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADMARK OFFICE

Registered on April 7, 1998, #2,148,548

I M M O R T A L I T I S Y S T E M S ®
IS Extra Terrestrial Migration
Gene Engineering

For:Conducting educational conferences and demonstrations regarding extraterrestrial migration and the use of genetic manipulation to become immortal,(U.S CLS. 100, 101 and 107)
SN:75-054,657 filed: Dec. 1995
First use: June 1994 in commerce: June 1994

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

To my knowlidge this was the first Trademark granted to the concept of Homo Immortalis via Gene Engineering and Extraterrestrial Migration.

[bioconservative]

No, of course not Prometheus. I was just trying to do my best impersonation of him. )

Ah well, enough funny business. The spring semester is starting and I will not be able to dedicate the necessary time to all of the questions being thrown at me on this thread. The participants of this thread did a great job in shooting down this bogie. [thumb] There are far too many questions to be answered by one human being with unaugmented intelligence.

I hope none of you will be too disappointed in learning that bioconservative is a virtual personality. After all, we had such great fun together. Lots of great ideas have come from this mock dialog and I know that, for me personally at least, my level of understanding in a number of areas has been advanced. This thread has truly been a gem.

I tried to remain faithful to a Krauthammeresque bioconservative approach. How well I succeeded... to tell you the truth I'm not sure yet, but any comments or criticisms are appreciated as I'm sure it will add to what I've learned from this experience. In fact, I think a post game analysis of this thread is in order.

Let's see, what else.

Kudos to Aubrey, Lazarus, Elrond, Kurt, John Doe, Reason, Malchiah, Nate, Lucio, Sonia, Jeff, DDhewit, Randolfe...and a lot of other people I have probably failed to mention.

Aubrey, one of the reasons that I did not comment on you proposal is that I did not want you too read to heavily into this mock dialog. Speaking as a Transhumanist, I have a hard time finding any ethical problems with your proposal. (How do you rationally argue the "yuck factor"?) And yeah, you sort of caught me at the onset with my support of "intrinsic worth", but in actuality, this is more or less Krauthammer's position -- ie, a partial acceptance of "potentiality"??? (And as I've told Ken in PM, I felt like a slimy used car sales man trying to push potentiality on you guys. [lol] )

Kurt, way to take it to me. Sorry, I could not give you a real fighting response, but I just got hit with my first Chem homework of the semester. I agree with almost all of the points you've made. You were one of the few I saw on this thread who really questioned my "delicate equilibrium" hypothesis that I put forth on page 5. I also think (and I'm not sure if anyone mentioned this) that there is a drastic difference between life span augmentation and other types of augmentation proposed by Transhumanism. Now mind you, I support virtually every Transhumanist objective, but I think that within contemporary society life span augmentation will be easier to defend against the "delicate equilibrium" charge than other types of augmentation. I also think that remaining focused on indefinite life extension (which is one, very specific type, of Transhuman augmentation) will prove to be one of Immortalism's greatest strengths.

John Doe, you're post was in basic harmony with my own assessment of the bioconservative position. The only area that I would debate somewhat is your assumption that bioconservatism rests entirely on a Kantian ethical system. Although, for the more extreme reactionary members of the bioethics council this may be the case, member such as Krauthammer and Fukuyama can be seen as arguing for an integrated ethical system which combines Kantian ideals (yes, they still places a preeminence on them) with a consequentialist approach. However, my own understanding of Kantian ethics is still rather limited and some thing I'm looking to improve upon. I was utilizing a bare bones understanding of the Kantian system during this mock debate.

DDhewitt, I was waiting for some one to put me in my place with my equilibrium mumbojumbo.

Nate, as a Transhumanist I agree with you that appeals to "the dignity of human life" lack substance and are a distraction from the real issues. Regardless though, it will continue to be our duty as Transhumanists to remain vigilant and continue fighting through this smoke screen the bio-cons throw at us. I also agree with you that, arguing from a legitimate secular position, it is virtually impossible to avoid a consequentialist approach. The second contradiction you pointed out was actually quite clever and I'm still thinking it over in my head. Your application of consequentialist ideals on the bio-con Kantian ethical system makes their base line assumptions look ludicrious. Could you PLEASE elaborate further on how you have identified this apparent contradiction?

Okay, I think I have said enough. One more time, great job to everyone involved! [thumb]

DonSpanton (Navigator) AKA bioconservative

P.S. -- Yes, I am still 100% Transhumanist. [lol]

Edited by bioconservative, 19 January 2005 - 08:57 PM.

[John Schloendorn]

Hehe, man, you were good! I bet you had some good fun during the last couple of days [lol]. Now imagine a real bioconservative tried something like this in the future. He'd never get taken seriously!

[Kalepha]

Thanks for the kind words, Don. To elaborate on that one point you bring up, your mock arguments were imbued with consequentialism even though your second or third post made it explicit that you would try avoiding making these judgment types.

Excellent DA, my man!

[DJS]

Thanks for the kind words, Don. To elaborate on that one point you bring up, your mock arguments were imbued with consequentialism even though your second or third post made it explicit that you would try avoiding making these judgment types.

Excellent DA, my man!

Thanks Nate, I tried my best... This is an interesting point you raise. Can a hybrid ethical system be created which utilizes different aspects of varying ethical systems? I do not have Human Cloning and Human Dignity in front of me, but in his opening statement Kass made it quite clear that the council was trying to avoid either extreme. Can the two systems be reconciled/merged, or is this indefensible?

Was it my presentation which was inconsistent, or their position....? [glasses]

Ah, I am becoming more and more interested in bioethics everyday. In many ways it is like politics for the thinking man.

[DJS]

Hehe, man, you were good! I bet you had some good fun during the last couple of days [lol]. Now imagine a real bioconservative tried something like this in the future. He'd never get taken seriously!

Yes, it was lots of fun -- got me out of a mind funk I was in. And yes, I can imagine a bio-con coming on here and being like, "Hey, I want to take you guys on." And everyone saying, "Yeah whatever Don, we're not falling for that one again." [lol]

[Kalepha]

Don Thanks Nate, I tried my best... This is an interesting point you raise. Can a hybrid ethical system be created which utilizes different aspects of varying ethical systems? I do not have Human Cloning and Human Dignity in front of me, but in his opening statement Kass made it quite clear that the council was trying to avoid either extreme. Can the two systems be reconciled/merged, or is this indefensible?

Was it my presentation which was inconsistent, or their position....?  [glasses]

Ah, I am becoming more and more interested in bioethics everyday. In many ways it is like politics for the thinking man.

Yes, there can be a hybrid ethical system, as long as none of its principles cancel each other out. It could be that their position, rather than your presentation, is inconsistent, assuming that you accurately represented them. I simply don’t see the compatibility between believing in intrinsic worth and believing we can come to a rational consensus based purely on cost-benefit probabilities. The reason is, if some disagree with some others’ cost-benefit analyses, instead of studying quantitative reasoning, they can too easily begin fantasizing about what’s mind-independently valuable, the domain not open to rational inquiry.

[ddhewitt]

Nice initiative, Don.

Impressive.

Duane

[John Schloendorn]

And yes, I can imagine a bio-con coming on here and being like, "Hey, I want to take you guys on." And everyone saying, "Yeah whatever Don, we're not falling for that one again."

And he will walk away and tell his friends: "Immortalists are really completely, hopelessly nuts! - Trust me, I tried..."
(Now he would merely have to read this thread to come to the conclusion anways )

[lucio]

*laughs* Well, you certainly had me going. It's a good thing that we all still have our sense of humour.

[benzealley]

Nate Barna

Your other contradiction, which minimizes the function of this thread to mere artifact, is that you wish to preserve the dignity of human life (meaning that you assign particular values to it), while also wishing to avoid commoditizing it (meaning that you also wish to avoid assigning particular values to it).

Surely that only holds if you accept that the value of the dignity of human life is finite - something with infinite value cannot be a meaningful commodity. Then the argument becomes that the dignity of human life can never be assigned a finite value.

Or am I missing the point?

[Kalepha]

benzealley Surely that only holds if you accept that the value of the dignity of human life is finite - something with infinite value cannot be a meaningful commodity. Then the argument becomes that the dignity of human life can never be assigned a finite value.

To say that human life has infinite value is meaningless. Please note, however, that I wish this wasn't the case. We are constrained to assigning it the most value we can comprehend and act upon within our willing capacity – which is not an infinite comprehension or an infinite ability to preserve it. Thus, we are constrained to specifying a finite set of values in all of our discussions. Not one cognition yet can convince any clear-thinking person that it has infinite comprehension and preservation ability of that person; therefore, no one needs any cognition to tell a fiction story about how that cognition infinitely values human life.

[benzealley]

Nate Barna

To say that human life has infinite value is meaningless. Please note, however, that I wish this wasn't the case. We are constrained to assigning it the most value we can comprehend and act upon within our willing capacity – which is not an infinite comprehension or an infinite ability to preserve it. Thus, we are constrained to specifying a finite set of values in all of our discussions. Not one cognition yet can convince any clear-thinking person that it has infinite comprehension and preservation ability of that person; therefore, no one needs any cognition to tell a fiction story about how that cognition infinitely values human life.

I think that's exactly the wrong idea - if human life has finite value, one can perform what Zindell called "a calculus of killing" and say that it's justified to kill one person to save a hundred. That's clearly in violation of the idea that the ends do not justify the means.

Just because one considers human life to have infinite value doesn't necessarily mean that one is always going to act on that consideration (people are not always rational, after all), or even that one is capable of doing so (in terms of information available, or ability). It just means that it's impossible to do maths with it, except inasmuch as it should outweigh any consideration that isn't another human life.

Do you disagree?

--
Ben
Who considers human life to have finite value, but enjoys playing devil's advocate. [tung]

[Kalepha]

Someone with this view, Ben, would have a mistaken impression about the ends-means ethical principle. Within a deliberating group having large responsibilities, it would be their duty to restrict their value expressions to a fully comprehensive set rather than one of specious vacuity. This way, no one could get away with deceitful value expressions that don’t entirely represent their motives.

[kurt9]

Perhaps I should ask this:

When it becomes possible to "dedifferentiate" regular cells into stem cells, eliminating the need for cloning and making embryos, would bioconservative or anyone else here still have any objection to stem-cell regenerative medicine?

Is bioconservative's objection to stem cell medicine based exclusively on the exploitation of embryos? Or does he have other objections to it as well?

[eternaltraveler]

thanks for the laugh Don. You did a good job on the Bio conservative position.

Hmmm.... Perhaps too good [:o]

[DJS]

Thanks Elrond. [thumb] I have always had a knack for polemics, but since the paradigm shift I experienced a little under two years ago I have found that it is exceedingly easy for me to "take on" alternate conceptual frame works. This is especially true with my uncanny ability to represent both the traditional "liberal" and "conservative" perspectives.

[During Christmas dinner I really threw my Mom's second husband for a loop when I started the meal arguing as a traditional Neo-con, and finished sounding like Noam Chomsky. ) ]

[DJS]

Kurt

Perhaps I should ask this:

When it becomes possible to "dedifferentiate" regular cells into stem cells, eliminating the need for cloning and making embryos, would bioconservative or anyone else here still have any objection to stem-cell regenerative medicine?

Is bioconservative's objection to stem cell medicine based exclusively on the exploitation of embryos? Or does he have other objections to it as well?

Beware, for the eloquent pronouncements of the silver tongued bio-con can create the most impressive subterfuge.

They have many other objections. Most of those within the bioconservative camp are not stupid. They understand where this technology is headed and oppose the ends as well as the means. In fact, the primary source of the conflict we are witnessing in contemporary bioethics is the result of two diametrically opposed visions of the future clashing with one another. That, Kurt, is the real source of the conflict. All else is just strategy and tactics -- also known as ethics.

Edited by DonSpanton, 22 January 2005 - 01:13 AM.