16 replies to this topic

[Clifford Greenblatt]

Case 1:
Suppose you sign up to have your brain preserved at the Cryonics Institute. You have no interest in being the first person to be reanimated. You instruct the Institute to hold off your reanimation until the technology has become extremely mature. You also leave a wish list of enhancements to your mind that you desire to be implemented in the reanimation process.

Now let us say that the reanimation technology has reached a great maturity and your brain is transferred from the Cryonics Institute to the Reanimation Institute. The Reanimation Institute follows your wishes to the letter. Your brain is kept frozen and is picked apart by nano-probes that carefully map out your brain, reconstructing essential data about your mind and storing that data in a gigantic data base. Once the data is collected and stored, your original dissembled brain tissue is discarded. A computer does an analysis on the data about your mind and discards all the kind of junk memories that you requested to be removed. It also performs an advanced psychoanalysis on your data to make the enhancements in your character that you requested. These enhancements could have been done through costly years of psychotherapy, but why go through it when centuries of hard research work have made it unnecessary? In addition, a great deal of updated knowledge is added to you data base. Why go through the time and expense of many years of schooling when the knowledge is readily available for fast download? Physical reconstruction is started when a new data base has been completed. The physical reconstruction is completed by high speed nanotechnology in a single day. At the end of the day, a posthuman you emerges which is radically different from the way you were in your precryonic life. However, the result of the reconstruction is something that could have been done through centuries of gradual modification without a single moment of loss of animation.

Case 2:
Suppose a vast funding effort by immortalists result in anti-aging technology becoming available to you in your natural lifetime so that you never have to go for cryonics. Now suppose you live for many centuries and benefit from technology that gradually transforms you to exactly the same posthuman state that you reached in Case 1. At some point, all of your personal atoms are arranged exactly the same as they would have been arranged in Case 1. However, this transformation is very gradual, being done over many centuries, and you remain animate the entire time.

Now, consider the two cases above and assume a philosophy of naturalism. Which of the two cases above preserve your identity? Is the new you of Case 1 really you? Is the new you of Case 2 really you? Please base your decision on a logically consistent interpretation of naturalism philosophy.

"I have a dream that my four little children will one day live in a nation where they will not be judged by (the history of their atoms) but by the content of their character."

Edited by Clifford Greenblatt, 25 June 2005 - 09:40 AM.

[ag24]

I'm definitely not a philosopher, but I wrote a bit about this sort of thing in my chapter in the ImmInst book (though without the enhancement part). Essentially I claimed that we will not care very much about these age-old philosophical questions, because our actual choices will be driven by practicalities -- specifically, the impact of such reconstruction (from cryopreserved brains, but even more interstingly from brain scans done while one is alive) on risk and risk aversion, which may be one of our main problems in a post-aging world.

[Clifford Greenblatt]

Would this be the lowest risk strategy in a posthuman civilisation? Save data from preserved brains in multiple data banks. Keep creating new and improved posthuman models. Equip those models with the latest in knowledge and capabilities but use a little bit of the data preserved from ancient brains to give their personalities some individual flavour.

[jaydfox]

Would this be the lowest risk strategy in a posthuman civilisation? Save data from preserved brains in multiple data banks. Keep creating new and improved posthuman models. Equip those models with the latest in knowledge and capabilities but use a little bit of the data preserved from ancient brains to give their personalities some individual flavour.

For me, the answer to that question is entirely a matter of perspective. If I were a member of an ancient civilization that had transcended what we know of as space and time, and had moved beyond our universe to another "place" where there existed the computing power to simulate our universe, or indeed perhaps the raw materials to run a "live" simulation with matter/energy rather than information, then if I were trying to create a posthuman society from scratch (like SimEarth, only much, much more realistic, and much, much harder), then this might be a sound strategy to use.

From a nearly diametrically opposed point of view, assuming that I live through Case 2 from your original question, so it's "me" that gets to that point, then I wouldn't want that strategy applied to me. While creating new copies of me would (hopefully) be good for society, it doesn't do me much good if a copy is created to replace the "original me" that gets killed in a fusion reactor accident (maybe I'm performing routine maintenance at the center/target in a laser ICF chamber when it goes off on "accident").

So I would want to be robust, but not in the sense of "information preservation" a la backups and modified/supplemented copies. I would want to be robust in the sense that a tank is going to do better in a crash test with a Hummer than a Geo Metro will.

As an intermediate step, being in a position to effect this sort of technology (either as a scientist helping to create it, or a politician or bureaucrat in a position to restrict it and slow its development), I'd probably favor it as a way to keep society going and continually improving. With provisos, of course, but I think creating copies with the latest and greatest skills, but with a kernel of 21st century experience (or 20th, for the lucky few of us who make it that far or were cryopreserved), would be very beneficial to society.

And yes, I only briefly touched on the "me" question, and I think that it applies more to your case 1&2, but no so much to the question of what's best for society (since that is by and large looking at the objective, not the subjective, point of view, and I think most of us agree that case 1 and 2 are for all intents and purposes identical for objective observers. I could be wrong about that. Does anyone think that objectively there's a meaningful difference? At any rate, subjectively, it's a much different question, but as I said, that's largely irrelevant from a societal perspective).

[jaydfox]

Since I brought it up, and since I haven't really addressed Clifford's original question about the difference between case 1 and 2: From a purely objective standpoint, I don't see any difference between the two. From a tainted objective standpoint, i.e. seeing it in the third person, but trying to imagine how the two persons in case 1 and 2 would feel subjectively, I'm not sure. The reason I'm not sure is that I see no compelling case why the two cases are the same subjectively. However, I'm not sure how to interpret that objectively, "that" being that I don't see a compelling case why the two cases (Clifford's 1 and 2) are the same subjectively.

As for Aubrey's point that "we will not care very much about these age-old philosophical questions, because our actual choices will be driven by practicalities": I agree that, as a society, and especially as political bodies, regulatory bodies, ethics councils, research labs, and, ultimately, economic production and distibution channels, those questions will be largely moot in the face of practicalities.

However, I don't think that the practicalities will obviate the philosophical questions for a large number of individuals. Probably not the majority, since the majority of people aren't that interested now. Of course, in a posthuman world, I'd hope that people would have both the capacity and the drive/need to be interested in those sorts of questions. But as I said in my previous post, they'll mostly apply to us at a very subjective, personal level. To be quite honest, I don't think it would bother me much if I found out that everybody I knew, including my own children, wife, family, best friends, etc., were duplicated and the originals destroyed (while sleeping for mercy's sake). Assuming they were duplicated with at least atomic/molecular fidelity, and possibly even with only sub-micron structural fidelity, I wouldn't be able to tell the difference, and that's what really matters in an objective sense.

But I wouldn't want that to happen to me. I have a feeling that a large proportion of people won't care, and a large proportion of people will care. That split will drive multiple directions in technology, e.g. brain augmentation, brain transfers to alternative substrates, etc.

[Clifford Greenblatt]

Jay,
It follows from a philosophy of naturalism that something is subjective because a cognitive system has a particular way of processing the data that enters it. The processing system itself is an objective physical entity. If two identical cognitive systems process the same objective data then their subjective experiences will also be identical. Changes can occur in your cognitive system with time. You may now enjoy some foods that you hated as a child. If you live for millions of years and go through much upgrading then your cognitive system would likely be radically different from one eon to the next. Therefore, there would be no fixed subjective identity.

[jaydfox]

Hmm, I guess I didn't follow the rules. Looking back, I remember seeing the "naturalism" stipulation, which to admit I'm not entirely familiar with difference between naturalism and (supervenience) physicalism. To be honest, I've only even read one moderately broad (though not deep) primer on supervenience physicalism, so I'm not even entirely sure how to properly break this problem down under those rules.

Suffice it to say, I feel there is still a strong distinction to be made in analyzing the question from an objective versus a subjective perspective. For practical societal/economic/political purposes, the objective position matters the most, and I don't see a meaningful difference objectively. I say meaningful on purpose, because I'm still inclined to see a difference, but not one that will matter for all practical intents and purposes.

Subjectively, I see a big difference. But I will try to look up a primer on naturalism and see if I can see where you're going with this.

[bgwowk]

Both scenarios are subjectively equivalent. To say that they are not requires that there be aspects of subjective experience that are both

a) disconnected from physical reality (since both scenarios end with physically identical conditions)

b) completely isolated from language processing

(b) is the kicker for me. If differences in subjective experience are not substantial enough to generate verbal reports of a difference, can they really exist? What possible rational basis could there be for claiming such differences exist?

---BrianW

[chubtoad]

Which of the two cases above preserve your identity

I see no evidence for the idea that people have an identity which continues to exist from one moment to the next. An entity has a thought or experiences an emotion, then a short time later a very similar entity (perhaps changed by the addition of a new memory to its brain structure about the old entity's thought or emotional experience) in the same location experiences a thought or an emotion. I don't see a difference between the results of case 1, case 2, or if the new body was created before the destruction of the other.

[bgwowk]

In response to chubtoad, identity is in the eye of the beholder. The important thing that you, I, and Clifford (I think) agree on is that case 1 and case 2 behold the same thing, whatever name we call it.

---BrianW

[Clifford Greenblatt]

I may have made a poor choice by starting this thread under the cryonics topic. The ideas shared here would be great material for continuing the "What Constitutes 'me'?" thread under the philosophy topic. They could also be good material for someone's oblivion essay. Is oblivion a meaningful concept at all? I very much appreciate all the contributions made above.

Edited by Clifford Greenblatt, 26 June 2005 - 12:21 PM.

[Clifford Greenblatt]

Here are some brief comments on points mentioned above. The laws of nature make the resulting persons in Case 1 and Case 2 both objectively and subjectively identical with the resulting person being the beholder of his subjective experiences. Given only the laws of nature, any argument against this position would necessarily contain a logical fallacy. The philosophy of naturalism regards the laws of nature as being the ultimate law of reality. The persons in Case 1 and Case 2 can, however, be rationally regarded as different if a system of law that transcends the laws of nature is introduced. In this case, the persons could possibly differ by means of transcendent association. I will end my comments about this here because this gets into the content of a paper that I submitted on 1 June 2005 for peer review.

Edited by Clifford Greenblatt, 26 June 2005 - 02:51 PM.

[jaydfox]

At some point, all of your personal atoms are arranged exactly the same as they would have been arranged in Case 1. However, this transformation is very gradual, being done over many centuries, and you remain animate the entire time.

Now, consider the two cases above and assume a philosophy of naturalism. Which of the two cases above preserve your identity? Is the new you of Case 1 really you? Is the new you of Case 2 really you? Please base your decision on a logically consistent interpretation of naturalism philosophy.

In looking back, I can see one place I got tripped up over your specification of naturalism. You specified that the atoms were arranged identically, not that the two versions of me were identical in every conceivable physical manner.

Not that I subscribe to naturalism, but I thought that distinction needed to be made. There is more to the physical than just the atoms. More to the point, in a very strict manner, the two versions would not likely be the same anyway, because the most we can stipulate is that two identical physical universes must be the same. In the universe of case 1, the body might be laid out atom for atom in the same manner, but the universe surrounding it would be different (the cryonics tank from which I was pulled and revived, for instance, or the gravitational waves sent out from the cryonics facility while I was being revived, versus the gravitational waves sent out from the me that lived a normal life).

Yes, nit-picking, but your blanket statement that the two cases must be objectively and subjectively the same is frought with technical errors of logic. In the universe where Case 1 and Case 2 were the same, noone would know that the person in Case 1 had been cryonically suspended, so the question would only have any relevance to an observer outside the universe.

[markm]

I suppose it comes down to what defines a personality. If I went through the process of increasing my intelligence/capabilities, would that really change who I am as a person? Think of it this way: compare posthumanity/humanity with adulthood/childhood. My past self was no less me than I am now, it just had a lesser set of experiences to work from. I see posthumanity working in the same way, in both cases. The speed at which the change happens is irrelevant, it's just more noticeable in Case 1.

[Set]

I think case 1 is cloning. Doesn't seem like cryonics to me.
I would want the same brain not a copy because that defeats the purpose.

[Clifford Greenblatt]

Not that I subscribe to naturalism, but I thought that distinction needed to be made. There is more to the physical than just the atoms. More to the point, in a very strict manner, the two versions would not likely be the same anyway, because the most we can stipulate is that two identical physical universes must be the same. In the universe of case 1, the body might be laid out atom for atom in the same manner, but the universe surrounding it would be different (the cryonics tank from which I was pulled and revived, for instance, or the gravitational waves sent out from the cryonics facility while I was being revived, versus the gravitational waves sent out from the me that lived a normal life).

Yes, nit-picking, but your blanket statement that the two cases must be objectively and subjectively the same is frought with technical errors of logic. In the universe where Case 1 and Case 2 were the same, noone would know that the person in Case 1 had been cryonically suspended, so the question would only have any relevance to an observer outside the universe.

What I was concerned with is the subjective and objective conditions of the persons as a particular moment rather than the subjective and objective conditions of their worlds. If the arrangement of atoms of two persons are identical at a particular moment and conditions at their sensory boundaries are identical then the condition of those two persons would be both subjectively and objectively identical at that moment if granted an assumption of naturalism philosophy. The fact that their worlds may be very different and other persons may perceive them differently does not change the very short term conditions of the two persons.

You could argue that even an identical arrangement of atoms are not truly identical but differ in submicroscopic detail. However, the arrangements of atoms will be much closer to each other than either will be to itself one nanosecond later. As far as each person's mind is concerned, even conditions at sensory boundaries require transit time to reach the brain.

Edited by Clifford Greenblatt, 22 August 2005 - 10:39 AM.

[Clifford Greenblatt]

In my arguments about identical arrangements of atoms I need to add an identical arrangement of electrons. In computer technology, a memory device can have a constant arrangement of atoms but change in memory content by redistribution of electrical charge. The argument could be further refined to include identical energy levels of electrons and identical velocities of electrons and atoms. Positions, velocities, and energy levels need not match to perfect precision but only close enough for whatever is essential to the mind of the person.