106 replies to this topic

[bobdrake12]

The number of cities and complexitie for developing this system demonstrat that to try and protect ALL American cities wuold cost in excess of our entire GNP. The most that can be accomplished realistically within 50 years is to protect a top dozen cities marginally, like DC NY, LA etc. BUT from the very beginning of this itis clear that the first mission for SDI is to protect Strategic Forces against a First Strike. Also it is the redundancy required to match the threat of decoys and distance. SDI would have to be deployed 360 degrees around the Continent andstill leave bases like Hawaii out so they would need their own as well as Alaska, and the many bases we are now developing around the world. This is why they tried to create a consensus with the Russians and Chinese before they started so as to create a systematic defense posture whereby our various systems would in fact compliment one another against rogue states.

Lazarus Long,

We are no longer in a cold war where the US' only concern is a massive nuclear strike by the former USSR.

The threat now includes countries with more limited nuclear capabilities due to nuclear proliferation. That is reason for me including the article on the North Korean situation and also writing the following in my post:

Currently, US cities could be at risk considering what is happening in North Korea. Presuming the North Korean situation gets favorably resolved, it is only a matter of time that some other country could threaten US cities again. We cannot guarantee that all of these situations are going to work out like they have since the cold war started. The concern that I have is that there will eventually be a nuclear launch.

Let's consider the following scenario that some rogue country launches 7 missles with nuclear warheads at 7 US cities. Do you have evidence (including sources) that the US' plan would be just to let these 7 nuclear missles destroy the US cities without deploying SDI (once it is in place)?

bob

Edited by bobdrake12, 09 March 2003 - 07:51 PM.

[Lazarus Long]

If I were your enemy I would simply buy a house in your neighborhood get a good job and begin the assembly of such a device slowly over a period of years in my shop as the components were smuggled to me.

Who needs a missile at all?

They just stand out as targets to begin with.

[bobdrake12]

If I were your enemy I would simply buy a house in your neighborhood get a good job and begin the assembly of such a device slowly over a period of years in my shop as the components were smuggled to me.

Lazarus Long,

If this were so easy, why is North Korea developing missles?

My question to you still remains unanswered:

Let's consider the following scenario that some rogue country launches 7 missles with nuclear warheads at 7 US cities. Do you have evidence (including sources) that the US' plan would be just to let these 7 nuclear missles destroy the US cities without deploying SDI (once it is in place)?

bob

http://story.news.ya...rea_north_dc_51

CORRECTED: S.Korea Says North Nearing Missile Test (excerpts)

Fri Mar 7, 9:28 PM ET

SEOUL (Reuters) - South Korea (news - web sites)'s Defense Ministry said on Saturday North Korea (news - web sites) could fire a missile into the Sea of Japan in the next few days in what would be the second test in less than a fortnight.

The Defense Department said on Friday North Korea, locked in a standoff with the United States over Pyongyang's suspected nuclear weapons program, had declared a maritime exclusion zone off its east cost in the Sea of Japan.

The department said the three-day exclusion warning for March 8-11 had been declared in virtually the same area where the North Koreans tested an anti-ship missile on February 24.


"We are aware that they (North Korea) are preparing to fire a missile, probably between this weekend and early next week," a South Korean defense ministry spokesman said.

Edited by bobdrake12, 09 March 2003 - 08:00 PM.

[Lazarus Long]

http://www-tech.mit....raiten.52o.html

Strategic Defense Initiative is flawed in many ways
While I usually read the feedback section of The Tech with a measure of indifference, on this occasion I feel compelled to respond to the letter of John Pitrelli and Kevin Theobald ["SDI ensures our retaliation," Nov. 22], itself a response to Alan Szarawarski's guest column ["SDI is impractical and fatally flawed," Oct. 18].

For while they correctly point out some logical flaws of Szarawarski, they themselves make some serious errors in reasoning.

They state "the intention (of SDI) is that a high attrition rate on a Soviet strike would ensure that most of our retaliatory force would survive, so the Soviets would realize that attacking the US would be suicidal..." Do Pitrelli and Theobald not know that of the roughly 10,000 strategic warheads in the US arsenal, about 1/2 are on submarines, 1/2 of which are at sea and on alert status (DEFCON 3) even when all other forces are at their lowest state of readiness (DEFCON 1), not to mention that 1/3 of the bomber force (about 100 B-52's) is always at peak readiness, capable of being launched within 15 minutes?

Furthermore, a Soviet attack on US communications facilities would not prevent the subs from launching their missiles, since they do in fact have the capability to launch without the President's orders, albeit with some delay. I don't know what Pitrelli and Theobald think, but attacking with the full knowledge that my opponent will have at least 3000 warheads remaining sounds a lot like suicide to me.

In considering the costs of SDI versus the cost of the Soviets expanding their missile force by a factor of four, which they state as $1.5 trillion (from what source I wonder), Pitrelli and Theobald state "though we do not know exactly what an SDI system would cost, reasonable estimates are far lower [than $1.5 trillion]." In fact, a 1982 Defense Department report said that a system of space-based lasers, not including all the other systems which a complete SDI system might have, would cost up to $500 billion (see "Strategic Defense and Anti-Satellite Weapons," Hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 4/25/84, p. 67). And when was the last time a major military system was completed anywhere close to its original budget? The costs of SDI are likely to increase dramatically as the vicious race between countermeasure and counter-countermeasure gets into full swing.

The whole subject of countermeasures is a tricky area. For instance, during the boost phase, one could rotate one's ICBM's, so that any laser light would be distributed over a large area. Or each ICBM could continuously secrete a laser absorbing liquid from its nosecone.

Perhaps Pitrelli and Theobald (and their sources) could devise arguments against these measures, but I could always come up with more. The SDI system would have to have counter-countermeasures for every Soviet countermeasure already deployed in space, whereas the Soviets could decide at their leisure and on the ground which ones to use and which new countermeasures to research.

The worst error which Pitrelli and Theobald make concerns the survivability of the SDI battle stations.

They state "satellites are much more defensible than missiles because orbiting satellites are weightless and so can be armoured as heavily as necessary." They are weightless once they are in space, but their launching costs depend roughly linearly on their mass. In a report entitled "Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies" the Office of Technology Assessment, US Congress, state that "required shielding weights could reach up to many tons for each defensive satellite station." At $3000/lb for hundreds of satellites, that's tens of billions of dollars. You might say that that's negligible to the $500 billion figure I just threw out, but it's an indication of how these countermeasure costs can escalate so quickly.

Furthermore, shielding is rather ineffective against particle beam weapons, which destroy by penetrating a material, not by burning through a surface, and shielding is completely ineffective against an attack by small, high velocity pellets. With both the target satellite and the incoming pellets travelling at a few kilometers per second, any impact is likely to seriously damage the target. Shielding is also ineffective against space mines which would lurk nearby each defensive battle station, blowing itself up along with the target satellite on orders from the ground. It is also difficult to shield laser mirrors or optical sensors, since they must have access to the outside environment.

The potential for preemptive attacks against space-based ballistic missile defense systems is perhaps the worst aspect of SDI. Imagine that both the US and Soviet Union had SDI-type systems in space. Would there not be great incentives in times of crisis to strike the opponent's SDI system, destroying his defenses while safeguarding your own? This is an important point not addressed by Pitrelli and Theobald.

I could go on for pages, but I don't want to displace any of the cartoons, which is what most of us read The Tech for anyway, right? To Pitrelli and Theobald, my parting words are to check out both sides of the issue. Try the OTA report I quoted earlier or "The Fallacy of Star Wars" by the Union of Concerned Scientists for starters.

Eric J. Raiten '86->


Options: Look at other stories in this issue, send us a comment, or return to our home page.

----
Copyright 1985 by The Tech. All rights reserved.
This story was published on Tuesday, November 26, 1985.
Volume 105, Number 52
The story was printed on page 8.
This article may be freely distributed electronically,
provided it is distributed in its entirety and includes
this notice, but may not be reprinted without the
express written permission of The Tech. Write to
archive@the-tech.mit.edu for additional details.

[bobdrake12]

They state "the intention (of SDI) is that a high attrition rate on a Soviet strike would ensure that most of our retaliatory force would survive, so the Soviets would realize that attacking the US would be suicidal...

Copyright 1985 by The Tech. All rights reserved.
This story was published on Tuesday, November 26, 1985.

Lazarus Long,

With all due respect, the Soviet Union no longer exists.

The article you provided is almost 20 years old.

High tech has advanced considerably since 1985.

Again, the new concern is nuclear proliferation and rogue countries having nuclear weapons with lauch capabilities to hit US cities. My question related to a current situation regarding a rogue country launching 7 missles with nuclear warheads a 7 US cities.

My question to you still remains unanswered:

Let's consider the following scenario that some rogue country launches 7 missles with nuclear warheads at 7 US cities. Do you have evidence (including sources) that the US' plan would be just to let these 7 nuclear missles destroy the US cities without deploying SDI (once it is in place)?

bob

Edited by bobdrake12, 09 March 2003 - 08:18 PM.

[Lazarus Long]

Lazarus Long,

If this were so easy, why is North Korea developing missles?

bob

I am not saying it is that easy thank goodness; I am saying it is easier then trying to develop ICBM's technology with the world unaware.

Suitcase bombs are not as difficult to do as we wish and we are only NOW monitoring the borders watching for radiactive substances coming in as we should have been doing for more than a decade.

But as we have discussed the permiability of the border is the REAL issue and so long as we see that contraband can be brought in so easilly, then so can WMD's for the right price.

In WWII the FBI secured a secret pact with the Mafia to protect the border because it acknowledged in advance that it couldn't accomplish this without their assistence. Look up the story behind Lucky Luciano.

DPRK is not targeting us we are targeting them. They are targeting South Korea. They are a proxy of China and that give them the same strategic advantage we have with Israel in the Middle East.

Israel is not targetting Russia, it is targeting its neighbors and defending our interests in the region which is in turn reducing our credibility. Demonstrating this about China and its relationship to the DPRK would be more effective at castrating N/Korea but we haven't engaged any of this particularly seriously for decades.

The DPRK's weapons are aimed at our Pacific FLEETS, Japan, Tawain, and S. Korea. They would come into play optimally in the event of a Battle in the South China Sea and they are exporting the technology for the same reasons.

Their missiles are designed for targeting concentrated naval and air/ground forces in tactical hot zones as we are beginning to expose with our troops in the Persian Gulf, NOT FOR TARGETING CITIES. That is just political polemic to get people agitated and "terrorized". The DPRK hasn't YET developed a true ICBM and could be stopped from even deveoping anymore nuclear warheads if we engage tehm corectly NOW.

I see them as far more the threat than Iraq.

[bobdrake12]

I am not saying it is that easy thank goodness; I am saying it is easier then trying to develop ICBM's technology with the world unaware.
Suitcase bombs are not as difficult to do as we wish and we are only NOW monitoring the borders watching for radiactive substances coming in as we should have been doing for more than a decade.

Lazarus Long,

If it were easy, North Korea would not be developing missles.

To achieve a peaceful solution to this who mess, I believe two actions need to be considered:

o 13 arrows - Continue to access risk and invest in systems that can best mitigate against those risks. In this arena, the layman is considerably in the blind because we are unaware of current technology.

o 13 olive branches - Begin to think outside of the box and use collaborative decision making to see that each other's goals are met. There is a huge difference between this method which has been limited to date than the other approaches which have continuously led to war throughout reported history.

In a post further back, I posted the following which I believe still applies:

A war is a war. People die no matter what methods are used. Currently, there is a "system" in place called MAD.

Perhaps the kiss of death is due to the vast majority of the humans on this planet thinking inside of the box rather than in a collaberative way.

Nothing is inevitable unless it is deemed to be inevitable.

We have a "catch-22" in place where scientists do not want to release their theories, research and inventions because of potential military use while a domino effect of wars possibly could occur because of fighting over scarce resources (With the scarcity condition existing that might have been mitigated had the scientists released their theories, research and inventions in the first place.).

There is a basic problem on this planet, and it goes way beyond WMD.


bob

Edited by bobdrake12, 09 March 2003 - 08:34 PM.

[Lazarus Long]

Again, the new concern is nuclear proliferation and rogue countries having nuclear weapons with lauch capabilities to hit US cities. My question related to a current situation regarding a rogue country launching 7 missles with nuclear warheads a 7 US cities.

As I was explaining as of right now the opportunity exists to prevent the market development of rogue states to ever do this. But if I were the rogue state I would prepare a mobile launch ability from a converted cargo vessel under a surrogate flag and then just get close enough to launch from inside the continental shield. Smaller missiles like the kind being developed by the DPRK ARE EXACTLY this type.

The scenario you fear is the least likely threat but it is the most popularized in order to justify building the system. The letter I included was old but its message is still valid and all you have to do is substitute the word China for Soviets and the arguments remain the same.

[bobdrake12]

But if I were the rogue state I would prepare a mobile launch ability from a converted cargo vessel under a surrogate flag and then just get close enough to launch from inside the continental shield. Smaller missiles like the kind being developed by the DPRK ARE EXACTLY this type.

Lazarus Long,

This is a valid threat that needs to be considered along with our current and developing technologies. It will not go away by ignoring it.

The scenario you fear is the least likely threat but it is the most popularized in order to justify building the system.

Fear is for other people, we are discussing risk and risk mitigation. The point is the system needs to mitigate the threat you discussed. The system also needs to address real situations like the North Korean one which currently exits.

The fact is that there is has been considerable nuclear proliferation since the 1985 (the date your article).

The system also needs to address greater risks based upon current technology, but it is one step at a time.

The letter I included was old but its message is still valid and all you have to do is substitute the word China for Soviets and the arguments remain the same.

A lot of things changed in the last 20 years and a lot more will change the next 20.

Repeating what I reported in a prior post:

Continue to access risk and invest in systems that can best mitigate against those risks. In this arena, the layman is considerably in the blind because we are unaware of current technology.

bob

Edited by bobdrake12, 09 March 2003 - 08:53 PM.

[Lazarus Long]

If it were easy, North Korea would not be developing missles.

Again DPRK is developing technology directed at its theater of operations NOT the mainland of the United States, yet. It hasn't been in their strategic and tactical interest to attempt a "one on one" contest until now.

They have exported terrorism and supported proxy groups but only engaged in active terrorism against their immediate neighbors. They have accepted China as the titular commander of global intelligence operations and relied on that nation for its ability to compromise our security, which it was most effective at doing.

We (both the populous and the government) have been lulled effectively into complacency by being relatively inobservant as a people as we depended upon government to defend us. Our focus has been elsewhere for decades and only after we made it clear to them that we are putting them BACK into focus did they decide on this current precipitous course.

The mistake wasn't in addressing the threat they respresent with the Axis of Evil speech. It was announcing this for public approval while doing nothing serious beforehand OR after to actually confront the possible responses. Now DPRK is committed to a confrontation as its only "immediately" possible negotiating position. More so because it sees us as playing catchup.

[Lazarus Long]

If anybody wants to be serious about regional defenses that meet a variety of future threats as opposed to old obsolete ones then we should be developing "Coherent Field Defenses" that create the physics for force fields that can actually deflect incoming objects and offer no offense that anyone would percieve. Orbital forts are OFFENSIVE in principle and massive investment in SDI ICBM deployment and maintenance is vastly more costly then is understood.

It is however possible that true City Scale & Border Force fields could be deployed world wide. We could even export the tech once the applied physics is developed. I would accept a rationall R&D proposal that takes us forward not backward. Force Fields offer some limited shield protection against even an asteroid impact that wasn't direct.

If the arguments that "good fences make or good neighbors" is true then this is the logical approach.

[bobdrake12]

The mistake wasn't in addressng the threat they respresent with the Axis of Evil speech. It was announcing this for public approval while doing nothing serious beforehand OR after to actually confront the possible responses.

Lazarus Long,

You might want to read the book, China Threat.

bob

[bobdrake12]

It is however possible that true City Scale Force fields could be deployed world wide. We could even export the tech once the applied physics is developed. I would accept a rationally R&D proposal that takes us forward not backward. Force Fields offer some limited shield protection against even an asteroid impact that wasn't direct.

Lazarus Long,

NBC keeps on getting more technologically advanced with these weapons eventually being proliferated to other nations.

While I believe what you are stating is of worth, are you just concentrating on the "13 arrows"?

bob

Edited by bobdrake12, 09 March 2003 - 09:06 PM.

[Lazarus Long]

Letter from the Union of Concerned Scientists
http://www.ucsusa.or...x.cfm?pageID=29
missile defense

The United States is currently attempting to develop several components of a national missile defense system (NMD) designed to protect US territory from attack by long-range (strategic) ballistic missiles.

The tragedy of September 11, 2001 has heightened Americans’ awareness of the vulnerabilities we face. Ruthless terrorists hijacked commercial US airplanes and crashed them into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Thousands of innocent Americans lost their lives.

We firmly believe that UCS’s work and position on global security issues and, in particular, on missile defenses are more important than ever. It is undeniable that even if the United States had an effective defense against long-range missiles -- a distant and uncertain proposition -- it would have provided no protection on September 11.

Rather than focusing on missile defense, the United States can and should do more to combat terrorism, diplomatically, economically, and militarily. US security -- and that of the rest of the world -- will require increased levels of international cooperation. The United States must work with other nations to prevent and counter terrorist attacks, and seek to address the causes of terrorism at its roots.

UCS’s position is based on four propositions:




1) For a terrorist group or a developing country, a long-range ballistic missile is the least attractive option to attack the United States.

There is little incentive for a terrorist group or a developing country to use long-range missiles. Other means of delivery are less expensive, more reliable, and can deliver much larger payloads more accurately than long-range missiles.




2) Missile defense is not the answer.

Unfortunately, some are using September 11 to justify rushing ahead with defenses against long-range missiles. While the goal of defending the United States from every conceivable threat is understandable, national missile defense cannot protect us effectively anytime soon.




3) It’s the warhead, not the missile.

We must distinguish between the means of delivery and the weapon. Unless armed with a nuclear or biological weapon, a missile would have caused far less destruction than the hijacked airplanes aimed with pinpoint accuracy and carrying tons of explosive fuel.

As devastating as the attacks were, they could pale in comparison to the casualties caused by an attack using a nuclear or biological weapon. The United States should greatly expand its efforts to prevent this possibility, so in the future the world does not have to look back and ask what more could have been done to prevent an even bigger catastrophe.




4) True security requires international cooperation.

The US needs Russian and Chinese cooperation on a range of non-proliferation and security issues. Getting that cooperation will be easier if the US does not proceed with a missile defense program that Russia and China find threatening.

The technology needed for an effective missile defense system still doesn't exist, and likely won't be ready to allow deployment for several years, despite the administration’s plans to have a rudimentary system ready by 2004. Moreover, the system that is the furthest along will offer little or no defense, since it can be defeated by simple countermeasures.

UCS is working to keep the country from making a costly mistake. We've prepared technical analyses. We've talked to scientists in other countries to understand their concerns about this program.

We've presented testimony before congressional committees, and we're meeting with congressional leaders and administration officials. We're making sure the press and the public understand what the recent and planned intercept tests do and do not show.

[Lazarus Long]

Documents Reveal US Intentions
Link
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Comments on documents revealing the US strategy for renegotiating the ABM treaty with Russia, leaked to the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists

by Lisbeth Gronlund and David C. Wright

Leaked Documents

What these documents reveal about US nuclear policy is far more interesting than what they reveal about the US proposed changes to the ABM Treaty.

The most interesting and revealing of these documents are the US talking points intended to address Russia's concerns about the US national missile defense (NMD). In these documents, the United States asserts that the US NMD will not undermine Russia's deterrent for two reasons, arguing that:

Both countries "will possess under the terms of any possible future arms reduction agreements, large, diversified arsenals of strategic offensive weapons."

Russia keeps its nuclear forces on constant alert (to permit launch on warning) and will continue to do so. The documents point out that by launching on warning of an incoming attack, enough of Russia's nuclear missiles would survive a US first strike that Russian forces could still overcome a US NMD.

The first point makes it clear that to deploy its NMD system, the United States is willing to give up -- indefinitely -- the potential for cutting the Russian arsenal below 1000 missiles.

If the United States is telling Russia that retaining a large arsenal for the indefinite future is its hedge against a US NMD system, then the United States cannot credibly argue that it is also taking steps toward the elimination of nuclear weapons. Just this week, at the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) review conference taking place at the UN in New York, Secretary of State Albright and other administration officials have been trying to assure the rest of the world that the United States remains committed to fulfilling its obligations under the NPT to pursue nuclear disarmament. These documents reveal just how empty those assurances are.

The second point makes it clear that the United States is also willing to pay an even higher price for its NMD system: it is willing to live with the continued threat of Russian unauthorized, accidental, and erroneous launches, which remains the biggest missile threat to the United States. Despite the end of the cold war, both the United States and Russia deploy large numbers of nuclear-armed missiles ready for immediate launch, so they could launch their weapons before a first strike could disarm them.

The document itself states that under tactical warning of a US first strike, "Russia's response to an assault would obviously be to send about a thousand warheads..." This is exactly the concern. A problem with Russia's early warning system that led to false warning could result in a devastating attack on the United States -- and the United States should be doing everything in its power to change this situation. Instead, in its talking points, the United States almost encourages Russia to maintain its launch on warning policy, because this would permit the United Stated to deploy its NMD without undercutting Russia's deterrent.

The US proposed protocol to modify the ABM Treaty would only permit the first phase of the planned NMD. US administration officials argue that it is in Russia's interest to agree to treaty changes now so it will have predictability about the future of the treaty and can plan accordingly. As reported in the New York Times (Jane Perlez, "US Says Russians May Want a Deal on Missile Defense," 27 April 2000, p.1):

As one administration official said, "The big sell is: 'Take a sure bet now. Don't take a risk in the future.'"

However, these documents make clear that even if Russia does agree, it will not gain predictability about the future of the treaty. In its unilateral statement, the United States anticipates that it will seek further treaty changes to permit a larger NMD. The protocol stipulates that the parties could begin these next negotiations anytime after March 2001 -- less than a year from now.

The US proposed treaty changes take the form of a protocol that would exempt the planned NMD from the restrictions of the original ABM Treaty. Because so many changes would be needed to the treaty text to accommodate even the first phase of the NMD, negotiating such an exemption is a more attractive approach for the United States -- from both a political and negotiating standpoint. This would allow the United States to argue that the changes to the treaty text were minimal. But this does not change the fact that the original treaty is altered significantly. For example, three of the first five articles of the treaty would have to be changed significantly just to permit the first phase of deployment.

As the ABM treaty now stands, the limits on radars are fundamental to the ability to prevent rapid breakout because it takes a long time to build a radar and doing so is visible. In these documents, the United States argues that limiting the number of interceptors and launchers (rather than restricting radars) would effectively limit the size of the defense and provide a long warning of breakout. The documents state: "In fact, our experience to date indicates that the speed with which the US could build interceptor missiles, not radars, is a key factor preventing rapid expansion." This argument is not compelling, for two reasons:

the United States is arguing that the reason it needs to begin construction of the radar in Alaska is that the radar -- not the interceptors -- is what will limit the deployment date of the first phase of the system, and it ignores the possibility of linking sea-based Navy Theater Wide interceptors into the NMD system, of which the US plans to deploy more than 600.

Navy Theater Wide was the unresolved point of contention on the demarcation agreements because Russia feared it could be used as a strategic missile defense. And according to a recent Pentagon study (Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, "Summary of Report to Congress on Utility of Sea-Based Assets to National Missile Defense," 1 June 1999) the NMD X-band (SHF) radars could support the NTW interceptors in engagements against strategic missiles. The study concluded that integrating the NTW into the NMD would result in a more "flexible and robust" national defense. And there is a vocal constituency in the US for doing just that. So Russia's fears are well-grounded.

The documents also state: "Even a US national missile defense system with a large number of SHF radars, which we would like to deploy in the long term, would not be able to deal with an arsenal of the size or sophistication that Russia would likely deploy under START-III." This makes no sense because the full system will have nine X- band (SHF) radars that would provide world-wide coverage of ICBM launches and could be used to support a very large number of interceptors. It may be that these radars could not be used to defend against Russian submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) launched from some parts of the oceans, but Russia has never relied on its SLBMs and is not likely to do so under START III.

Finally, the documents include a long verification protocol. It is quite detailed, but contains a gaping loophole: how can Russia have confidence that US Navy Theater Wide (NTW) interceptors (of which the US plans to deploy some 600 on ships) would not be integrated into the NMD system, thus turning a limited defense into a much larger one?

The authors are senior staff scientists at the Union of Concerned Scientists and researchers at the MIT Security Studies Program. Gronlund serves on the Board of the Educational Foundation for Nuclear Science, which publishes the Bulletin.


***********************

As a separate point now add China into the mix since this government strategy was designed to oppose only a single offense. Defending ourselves against a mulitlateral theat increases our investiture exponentially.

What has come out of the recent spate of espionage cases that we don't address is that our highest levels of WMD weapon's tech has already been compromised. They are going to take a lot less time to catch up then we did to develop in the first place.

I am not only concentrating on the the "13 Arrows".

I am saying that this whole approach is outdated in that we aren't effective diplomatically, we are only depending on weapons, WMD's in particular, and MAD as the bulwark of policy. Constructive Engagement has never been given a serious effort and the way it was implemented only made espionage more possible in a one sided fashion. We gave much more than we received.

War as we have evolved to understand it is obsolete: either it is, or we as a species are.

LL/kxs

[Lazarus Long]

Tests Results of Exoatmospheric Missile Defense Systems
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Webpage & Links


IFT-6 launch and intercept -- July 14, 2001 -- BMDO images

Below is a chronology of tests of exoatmospheric, hit-to-kill missile defense systems, going back to the early 1980s. It contains tests of strategic missile defense systems as well as those being developed as upper-tier theater missile defenses. This list was originally compiled by George Lewis of the MIT Security Studies Program.

Ground-based Midcourse System
This system uses ground-based interceptors to launch a kill vehicle that would operate above the atmosphere, attempting to intercept incoming warheads during the midcourse phase of an attacking missile's flight. In its tests, the United States launches interceptors against long-range target missiles from the Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test Site, located on Kwajalein atoll in the Marshall Islands. For more detailed information about the midcourse system, please see the UCS report An Assessment: NMD Ground-Based Midcourse System. Starting with IFT-9, very little information about the tests has been publicly available.

Integrated Flight Test (IFT)-10: December 11, 2002
This test failed because the exoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV) failed to separate from the interceptor and the booster rocket. Note that this is the same failure as that in the IFT-5 (July 8, 2000), detailed below. This was the first IFT performed at night. Previous tests had been conducted in the evening, with the sun illuminating the targets from behind the kill vehicle, presumably to minimize glare on the sensors. In a night test, the kill vehicle would not be able to use its visible sensors, but would be able to detect the target using its infrared sensors, which are the ones it uses for homing regardless of the time of day. Therefore, a test at night is different in detail but is not inherently more difficult than past tests.
This test was observed by sensors designed for THAAD and the Air-Borne Laser for the first time.

IFT-9: October 14, 2002
The kill vehicle successfully intercepted the target. This test used the same decoys as the previous test, but a modified warhead. The ship-based SPY-1 radar observed the test for the first time, to assess the radar's capacity to track long-range missiles. For a detailed analysis of the IFT-9 test, see the UCS report The Target Set for Missile Defense Test IFT-9.

IFT-8: March 15, 2002
The kill vehicle successfuly intercepted the target. This test included three balloon decoys (one large and two small). While increasing the number of decoys increased the complexity of this test, the additional balloons did not increase the difficulty of the discrimination task, since their appearance was very different from the warhead. For a detailed analysis of this test, see the UCS report Decoys and Discrimination in Test IFT-8.

IFT-7: December 3, 2001
In this test the kill vehicle successfully intercepted the target. One decoy balloon was used. This test was a repeat of IFT-6.

IFT-6: July 14, 2001
After several months of delays, the fourth test of the ground-based NMD resulted in a successful intercept of a mock warhead 144 miles into outer space after two straight failures in similar tests. One 5.5-foot decoy balloon was used in the test, which again involved a ballistic missile launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California and a kill vehicle launched from Kwajalein Atoll in the Pacific Ocean.

On July 27, the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization acknowledged that the mock warhead, as in previous tests, carried a beacon or "transponder," that allowed a radar on Hawaii to determine its location. This information was then used to calculate a predicted intercept point and launch the interceptor toward this point. Defense officials emphasized that the beacon is a surrogate for an early warning radar in the tests, and will no longer be used once the existing early warning radar at Beale, California (near Sacramento) is upgraded next year.

This artificiality appears to be on par with others in the tests so far; in particular, the defense is told in advance what the signature of the mock kill vehicle and balloon decoy will be to allow the radars and kill vehicle to distinguish one from the other.

IFT-5: July 8, 2000
The third intercept test failed when the kill vehicle did not separate from its Minuteman III surrogate booster rocket, dooming the test before it had the chance to attempt an intercept. NMD supporters wrote off the failure as a problem of engineering, and not of science. However, communication problems between the kill vehicle and booster showed that many problems in this area exist - and will become more obvious when the prototype booster is integrated into the testing. The prototype booster, which has seen numerous delays in production, accelerates at a much higher rate than the surrogate booster used in previous tests, and it has yet to be shown that the kill vehicle can withstand the stress of a higher acceleration. For the first time, IFT-5 used the In-Flight Interceptor Communications System (IFICS) -- a ground-based station that is designed to allow the battle management center to communicate with the interceptor once the interceptor has flown out of the field of view. A secondary failure of the test occurred when the missile carrying the mock warhead failed to successfully deploy its balloon decoy.

IFT-4: January 18, 2000
This test differed from IFT-3 in that it incorporated other components of the system, including the Defense Support Program early warning satellites, the prototype ground-based radar on Kwajalein, and the battle-management system in Colorado. A failure of the two infrared sensors on the kill vehicle caused it to miss the mock warhead, reportedly by a distance of 100 feet. The failure of the sensors was attributed to a coolant leak.

IFT-3: October 2, 1999
The test was originally scheduled for June 1999, but was postponed several times, reportedly due to a series of minor problems with the kill vehicle. A surrogate booster carried the prototype exoatmospheric kill vehicle from the Kwajalein Missile Range to intercept a target launched from Vandenburg AFB, California. The intercept reportedly occurred at about 140 miles (225 km) altitude at a closing speed of 15,000 miles per hour (6.7 km/s). The NMD ground-based radar observed the test but was not used to guide the kill vehicle -- instead a global positioning system transmitter on the mock warhead (along with a backup C-band radar beacon) told the interceptor missile where to release the kill vehicle. In January 2000, the Pentagon acknowledged a series of anomalies in the test that led to the kill vehicle initially being unable to find the mock warhead. Eventually, the kill vehicle started to home instead on the bright balloon decoy that was included in the test. Fortuitously, the balloon and warhead were close enough together that the warhead then appeared in the field of view of the kill vehicle, which was then able to home on and intercept the warhead. According to the 1999 annual report by the Pentagon's Director of Operational Testing and Evaluation, there is no basis to classify the test as either a success or a failure since it is unclear whether the intercept would have occurred if the brighter balloon had not been present.

IFT-2: January 1998
This was the second infrared sensor flyby test for the NMD program. A Raytheon sensor was launched on a Lockheed Martin Missiles & Space Payload Launch Vehicle (PLV) from Kwajalein Missile Range and crossed the flight path of a Lockheed Martin Astronautics Multi-Service Launch System (MSLS) fired from Vandenberg Air Force Base. The test used the same reentry vehicle/decoy conditions as IFT-1A. Reports that the Raytheon sensor successfully imaged the targets.

IFT-1A: June 1997
This was the first infrared sensor flyby test of the NMD program. A Boeing infrared sensor crossed the flight path of a Lockheed Martin Astronautics Multi-Service Launch System carrying nine targets -- a simulated reentry vehicle and eight decoys. The sensor reportedly imaged the targets successfully. However, Pentagon claims that the kill vehicle was able to successfully discriminate among the objects are a subject of ongoing controversy.

LEAP Testing
LEAP stands for "Lightweight ExoAtmospheric Projectile." It was being developed as a kill vehicle that could be used for intercepts above 80-100 kilometers altitude, and is intended for use on the Navy Theater-Wide missile defense system.

Aegis-LEAP Intercept (ALI) Test Series
The Flight Mission (FM) series of tests have all involved the firing of a developmental Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) from the Aegis ballistic missile defense cruiser USS LAKE ERIE (CG-70) to engage a ballistic missile target launched from the Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) on the island of Kauai, Hawaii.

FM-4: November 21, 2002
LEAP intercepted the target missile during the ascent phase of its flight for the first time. The primary objective of this test was to demonstrate the Aegis BMD system's capability to engage the ballistic missile target in the ascent phase. The target was again a full missile rather than a warhead; the kill vehicle struck the missile body rather than the warhead.

FM-3: June 13, 2002
The target missile was successfully intercepted. The target was again a full missile rather than a warhead; the kill vehicle struck the missile body rather than the warhead.

FM-2: January 25, 2002
This test resulted in a successful intercept of the target. However, the target used in the test was a full missile, which is considerably larger than targets that LEAP is presumably being developed to engage, such as a warhead from a North Korean Nodong missile. Using a larger target increases the range at which the Aegis SPY-1 radar can detect and track the target, and provides a larger target for the kill vehicle to impact. In the test, the kill vehicle apparently collided with the booster of the target missile, and would not have destroyed a warhead on the missile. For details, see the UCS report An Analysis of the 25 January 2002 Test of the Aegis-LEAP Interceptor for Navy Theater-Wide.

Earlier LEAP Tests
Original plans called for a series of 8 LEAP flight tests, with closing speeds ultimately reaching 10 km/second.

LEAP 4 test. This test was to have used the Hughes LEAP, but apparently never took place.

LEAP 3 test. This test was originally scheduled for September 1992, using the Rockwell LEAP. The test was apparently conducted in June 1993, with the LEAP passing "within 7 m of a target traveling at 750 m/s." There appeared to be little if any reporting on this test at the time it actually occurred.

LEAP 2 test. June 19, 1992. This test, using the Hughes version of LEAP, took place at White Sands and resulted in a failure to hit the target. The LEAP was supposed to receive target position and speed data, but it did not and instead used default values, resulting in a miss. The test showed that the LEAP was able to track the target.

LEAP 1 test. February 18, 1992. This test used the Rockwell Advanced Hover Interceptor Technology (AHIT) kill vehicle. The test was described as a success. Although there was a target, hitting it was not a test objective (officials claimed that actually hitting the target was only an "extra credit" objective). One objective of the test was to have the interceptor pass within 400 meters of the target -- its actual closest point of approach was 418 meters.

June 18, 1991. First hover test of LEAP (Hughes version). The test involved a seven second flight at an altitude of about 10 feet, while tracking a target outside of the test hanger.

January 31, 1991. Successful 17 second hover flight of Rockwell-Boeing LEAP.

Earlier Tests

THAAD Testing
THAAD, or Theater High-Altitude Area Defense system, is the US Army's ground-based, exo-/high-endoatmospheric interceptor. It is intended to be able to intercept above about 40 kilometers altitude. The original plan for THAAD testing called for a series of 14 flight tests to be completed by March 1997. The third flight test was intended to be the first intercept attempt for the system.

August, 1994: Simulated THAAD launch (to an altitude of roughly 200 feet) using a short-burn booster.

First Test: April 21, 1995: The first THAAD flight test tested the flight of the interceptor and the kinetic kill vehicle sensors (by observing the moon and stars). There was no target involved in the test. The test was labeled a success.

Second Test: July 31 or August 1, 1995: This flight test had no target. After an energy management maneuver, the THAAD velocity was higher than expected, and the missile was destroyed in order to prevent debris from leaving the test range boundaries. The destruction happened before the seeker shroud was dropped.

Third Test: October 13, 1995: This was the first test with a target. However, because of range safety concerns, no actual intercept was attempted (the kill vehicle was programmed to miss by 20 meters or more). The primary purpose of the test was to collect seeker data, and the interceptor apparently performed well. However, the THAAD ground-based radar (in its first use in a flight test), which was not the prime radar for the test, malfunctioned and failed to track either THAAD or the target.

Fourth Test: December 13, 1995: This was the first intercept attempt for the system. The THAAD kill vehicle failed to hit its Storm target. The miss was attributed to a software error which caused an unneeded kill vehicle divert maneuver, causing the kill vehicle to run out of divert fuel before an intercept could be made. The THAAD ground-based radar, again used only in an observing role, apparently worked well. The intercept was to have been exoatmospheric.

Fifth Test: March 22, 1996. This was the second intercept attempt for the system. The THAAD interceptor missed the Hera target. The THAAD kill vehicle did not respond to commands following separation from its booster. The failure was attributed to a broken cable connecting the kill vehicle with its supporting electronics module. The intercept was to be in the high endoatmospheric region.

Sixth Test: July 15, 1996. This was the third intercept attempt for THAAD. The THAAD kill vehicle again failed to hit its target, although it apparently came close. The intercept was meant to take place in the high endoatmospheric region. The failure was caused by a problem with the seeker. It appears that the precise cause of the seeker failure could not be conclusively determined. The most likely explanations were that one of the connectors holding the electronics boards to the back of the seeker was loose or there was contamination. The ground-based radar reportedly worked well.

Seventh Test. March 6, 1997. This was THAAD's fourth intercept attempt. The system once again missed its target. The failure was attributed to a cable electrical problem in the THAAD divert and attitude control system, which had worked in previous tests. The intercept was to have taken place in the high endoatmospheric region.

Eighth Test. May 12, 1998. This was THAAD's fifth intercept attempt, and its fifth consecutive miss. A booster malfunction caused the missile to go out of control. The intercept was to have taken place in the high endoatmospheric region.

Ninth Test. March 29, 1999. The sixth intercept attempt for THAAD was its sixth consecutive failure. The target was a Hera missile simulating a Scud-class missile. The interceptor apparently came within 10-30 yards of the target.. Telemetry data was lost one minute into the flight, making it more difficult to determine what went wrong. The explanation for the miss was that one of the ten thrusters used to steer the interceptor failed.

Tenth Test. June 10, 1999. This test was the seventh intercept attempt and first success for THAAD. The test target was a Hera missile flown on a highly lofted trajectory, and travelling at about 2 km/s at intercept. The intercept apparently occurred at 60-100 km altitude. The target did not have a separable warhead.

Eleventh Test. August 2, 1999. THAAD's eighth intercept attempt and second success. The test used a Hera target flown on a highly lofted trajectory, and travelling at about 2 km/s at intercept. The intercept was said to have occurred above 80 km altitude, but appears to have occurred well above 100 km. A 4-meter-long reentry vehicle separated from the missile booster and was hit by the kill vehicle.




Upper Tier Tests (Terrier/LEAP)

These were early tests in the development of the Navy Theater Wide system, which uses the LEAP as its kill vehicle.

FTV-1: (Functional Technology Validation or Flight Test Vehicle). 24 September 1992.
A modified Terrier missile was fired from the USS Richmond S. Turner to test the high-altitude aerodynamics of the missile. An 18" extension and ballast was added to the missile to simulate the LEAP. No LEAP or target was involved. The test was apparently considered a success.

FTV-2: September 1993.
This test involved an SM-2 Block 3 interceptor launched from the USS Jouett. The missile was reported to have successfully ejected a mock-up of the Rockwell LEAP. There was apparently no target involved.

FTV-3: March 4, 1995
This test was the first intercept attempt for LEAP/Upper Tier, and was launched from the USS Turner. The LEAP failed to hit the target because a guidance error during the second stage caused the missile to fly too high, putting it in a position from which it could not make an intercept. This test used the Hughes version of LEAP. Two earlier attempts to conduct this test (on February 10 and 12) were canceled at the last minute.

FTV-4: March 28, 1995
This test used the Rockwell version of LEAP, again launched from the USS Turner. The LEAP failed to hit the target, reportedly because the battery that supplied its power failed.


ERIS Tests
ERIS stands for exoatmospheric Reentry Vehicle Interceptor System. Lockheed was the prime contractor for this $500 million program, which was part of SDIO's Ground-Based Interceptor Program. The ERIS program built on technology developed as part of the Homing Overlay.

January 28, 1991: First intercept test. The ERIS kill vehicle reportedly hit and destroyed a mock reentry vehicle target. The dummy warhead was accompanied by two 2.2 meter balloon "decoys," tethered to the warhead about 180 meters apart. The ERIS was told to home on the center one of the three objects. About one second before impact, the kill vehicle deployed an inflatable octagonal kill-enhancement device. The intercept occurred at an altitude of 145 nautical miles (270 km) and at a closing speed of greater than 30,000 mph (13.4 km/sec).

May 11, 1991: Second intercept test aborted. About one minute before the ERIS was scheduled to be launched the launch was called off because of a "telemetry anomaly" with the target, which had already been launched. This failure apparently led the planned series of three intercept attempts to be reduced to two.

March 13, 1992: Second intercept attempt. The ERIS failed to hit the target, reportedly missing by "several meters." This time the target was accompanied by a single balloon "decoy." The decoy and target were separated by about 20 meters and the kill vehicle flew between them. Discrimination was accomplished by using a one-color infrared sensor, using data from the first test (and two-color infrared data was collected for use in the future) with the ERIS being programmed to intercept the cooler target. The miss was apparently a result of two factors: a greater than anticipated separation between the decoy and target and a late detection (by about 0.2 second) of the target relative to the decoy. This delay, together with a preprogrammed one-second data collection period, left the kill vehicle with insufficient time to maneuver to an intercept. The intercept attempt reportedly took place at an altitude of 180 miles (290 km) and a closing speed of 25,000 mph (11.2 km/sec).


Homing Overlay Tests
The Homing Overlay tests used a large, infrared homing interceptor, which unfurled a fifteen foot diameter sets of spokes just prior to intercept. There was controversy in 1993/94 over the revelation of a deception program in which a small amount of explosive placed on the interceptor would be used to blow up the interceptor following a near miss in order to deceive the Soviets into believing a hit had been scored. Neither of the first two intercept attempts came close enough to the target to employ the deception scheme, and it was discontinued after the second flight. The target was also heated (to about 100 degrees F) prior to launch to enhance its infrared signal.

December 1982: First flight aborted

February 7, 1983: First intercept attempt misses by a large distance. The miss is attributed to anomalies in the sensor cooling system that prevented it from homing.

May 28, 1983: Second intercept attempt misses by a large distance. The interceptor began homing, but missed due to a failure in the guidance electronics.

December 1983: Third intercept attempt misses. The miss was caused by a software error in the on-board computer, which prevented the conversion of optical homing data into steering commands.

June 10, 1984: Fourth intercept attempt hits target. The closing speed was said to be greater than 20,000 feet per second (6.1 km/sec). The target was reportedly acquired at a range of "hundreds of miles."

[bobdrake12]

As a separate point now add China into the mix since this government strategy was designed to oppose only a single offense. Defending ourselves against a mulitlateral theat increases our investiture exponentially.

What has come out of the recent spate of espionage cases that we don't address is that our highest levels of WMD weapon's tech has already been compromised. They are going to take a lot less time to catch up then we did to develop in the first place.

I am not only concentrating on the the "13 Arrows".

I am saying that this whole approach is outdated in that we aren't effective diplomatically, we are only depending on weapons, WMD's in particular, and MAD as the bulwark of policy. Constructive Engagement has never been given a serious effort and the way it was implemented only made espionage more possible in a one sided fashion. We gave much more than we received.

War as we have evolved to understand it is obsolete: either it is, or we as a species are.

Lazarus Long,

You are going to need to be specific. I don't know what specifically may or may not have been compromised and the degree it was comporomised. Do you?

Also as they are developing their weapons, the US is not standing still.

No matter what type civilization you have, Type-1, Type-2, Type-3, Type04, you need a solid defense. Being weak is not the answer for that weakness can result in an invitation to aggression.

The root cause of war is not the weapons by themselves, Lazarus.

What is missing here is what are some of the major reasons for war and then how can they be mitigated. The paradigm needs to change.

The species will survive just like it reportedly has before, but the civilization might not.

Constructive Engagement has never been given a serious effort and the way it was implemented only made espionage more possible in a one sided fashion. We gave much more than we received.

How do you know the last sentence is a fact?

Regarding constructive engagement, what was done and how was it done? Who performed them and what was accomplished? What should be improved?

Unless the paradigm changes with an out of the box thought process, it will be the same old results with that being war. As the technology increases allowing for greater destruction, there needs to be a paradigm shift in how to better handle international affairs.


bob

Edited by bobdrake12, 10 March 2003 - 01:41 AM.

[bobdrake12]

Tests Results of Exoatmospheric Missile Defense Systems

Lazarus Long,

I take this with a grain of salt. The results may have actually been a lot better or a lot worse than those reported.

If you have a better defense than SDI, I would certainly like to hear about it.

In the meantime, I don't care to see a rogue government lobbing missles to any US city or city friendly to the US without a defense system in place.

the Union of Concerned Scientists

While the goal of defending the United States from every conceivable threat is understandable, national missile defense cannot protect us effectively anytime soon.

Now this was both interesting and constructive. The issue that I have is that the UCS does not have all the facts regarding current technology.

We must distinguish between the means of delivery and the weapon. Unless armed with a nuclear or biological weapon, a missile would have caused far less destruction than the hijacked airplanes aimed with pinpoint accuracy and carrying tons of explosive fuel.

As devastating as the attacks were, they could pale in comparison to the casualties caused by an attack using a nuclear or biological weapon. The United States should greatly expand its efforts to prevent this possibility, so in the future the world does not have to look back and ask what more could have been done to prevent an even bigger catastrophe.

The UCS makes a lot of sense to me with their last sentence. Do you have a problem with that sentence, Lazarus?

bob

[bobdrake12]

My point is that it is LESS theoretical then the promise of the Star Wars Program. It is more likely to be an option played out by competing interests for Lunar development, if we go forward and REMILITARIZE Space Development by creating this technological avenue, instead of open commercial development that would allow a broad level of pragmatic oversight of Lunar development, as oposed to the creation of secret underground bases after we ALL get back there.

The Moon is the ultimate high ground and offers hardened bunkers as well. If we allow the military to dominant this process I am confident it will be to our collective doom.

But as Kissinger has alluded to the Neo Hawks see this as a deterrent against China and China sees it this way too. They have been saying as much for a decade now that they would prefer NOT to enter into a New Age Arms Race with us but if we continue to unilaterally develop these systems they feel compelled to, and will.

That is why I have included the specter of them starting a Lunar Project NOW as they have recently announced. They are going directly to the prize and aren't going to wait for us to decide what our course will be.

They have already begun the dvelopment of TransLunar vessels. We are sitting on our laurels and not paying attention. We have no fleet, we have no boosters, we have no tooled up production facilities. And the cost to do these is in DIRECT competition with SDI for not just capital, but actual manpower.

Lazarus Long,

Apparently you have a concern about weapons in space. To me, this seems irrational because WMD will kill whether they are deployed from space or not. I am missing something here. Maybe you can share a little more what your concern is because I am not hearing it.

I feel that we shoud have a solid military. If the weapons are more effecitve in space, including the Moon, I see no reason not to utilize those locations.

bob

Edited by bobdrake12, 10 March 2003 - 01:29 AM.

[bobdrake12]

Again DPRK is developing technology directed at its theater of operations NOT the mainland of the United States, yet. It hasn't been in their strategic and tactical interest to attempt a "one on one" contest until now.

Lazarus Long,

Perhaps, you could explain the article below from your point of view.

I believe that North Korea currently has the capability that its missiles could hit the mainland of the United States. Their specific threat is to "carry the war to the US mainland, and with their apparent goal being that New York, Washington and Chicago would be aflame".

If SDI were (or is) in place, these three cities in the United States could possibly be saved if North Korea elects to launch like they are threatening to do so in the article below. In such an instance if the technology were in place, I believe the US would attempt to save its cities by deploying SDI.

I am discussing a current situation (2003) which is a real threat to these three United States cities. We are discussing millions of lives on the line here.

This all goes back to my original question:

Let's consider the following scenario that some rogue country launches 7 missles with nuclear warheads at 7 US cities. Do you have evidence (including sources) that the US' plan would be just to let these 7 nuclear missles destroy the US cities without deploying SDI (once it is in place)?

It is my firm belief that the US would use SDI (if the SDI or similar capability existed) to save these cities because it would be in the best interest for the country to do so under such a limited strike.

bob

http://www.smh.com.a...6826533281.html

Pyongyang: We'll put a torch to New York (excerpts)

By Shane Green, Herald Correspondent in Tokyo

March 8 2003

North Korea would launch a ballistic missile attack on the United States if Washington made a pre-emptive strike against the communist state's nuclear facility, the man described as Pyongyang's "unofficial spokesman" claimed yesterday.

Kim Myong-chol, who has links to the Stalinist regime, told reporters in Tokyo that a US strike on the nuclear facility at Yongbyon "means nuclear war".

"If American forces carry out a pre-emptive strike on the Yongbyon facility, North Korea will immediately target, carry the war to the US mainland," he said, adding that New York, Washington and Chicago would be "aflame".

Copyright © 2003. The Sydney Morning Herald

Edited by bobdrake12, 10 March 2003 - 04:23 AM.

[Lazarus Long]

You are going to need to be specific. I don't know what specifically may or may not have been compromised and the degree it was comporomised. Do you?

Sadly I suspect yes, Bob,

Part of what has been compromised is known: Neutron Bomb tech, HMP's, Cruise Missile engine, and much of our advanced fighter tech has all been compromised. And this is what we do know. There were a number of laptops with sensitive classified data that disappeared from Los Alamos during the the investigations about Wen Ho Lee and they were never recovered. They know they our WMD Weapons programs and tactical combat systems were massively compromised.
Affidavit for Wen Ho Lee

Over sixteen hardrives as I remember disappeared at teh labs at Los Alamos and actually it was probably more. The news was out there it just wasn't spelled out to the general public at the time. This was during the Clinton administration and cover up back then was as second nature as spin after a while.

The Chinese had MORE that one mole it is figured somewhere inside our nuclear weapons development program all during the later 80's and early 90's and as far as arrests have been WITH convictions. There may still be moles inside various sectors from the Hansen example in the FBI to Cubans in Customs and who knows who in various aspects of the Atomic Energy Areas.

I believe that North Korea currently has the capability that its missiles could hit the mainland of the United States. Their specific threat is to "carry the war to the US mainland, and with their apparent goal being that New York, Washington and Chicago would be aflame".

But as 9/11 demonstrates you don't need ICBM's to deliver a nuclear, or other type of payload. Do you want to give up civil aviation too?

It is reasonable to suspect every aircraft approaching our border but we have thousands everyday and it is really in the hundreds of thousands if you count domestic aircraft. The ability to circumvent the security is forever a very REAL threat. A plane that has been subverted for carrying a payload in its cargo bay would trigger no warning at all if they kept to the flight path and followed all normal approach procedures and then detonated on final near the major metropolis. It is easier to do this and doesn't require them building the entire infrastructure to design, manufacture and support ICBM class weapons and grond facilites. A Human Guided Cruise Missile is the most plentiful WMD on Earth.

The entire tactical make-up of the DPRK is programed to use tactical nukes at close range and attempt survival in underground bunkers, from which they hink thye can exit afterwards and assault our survivors. This basic strategy determined the design of much of their arsenal and applies to their missile systems. They have the ability to launch significant barrages of field level weapons that are stored undergound now. They have Rapid assault ability & tactical weapons cached undergraound all along the DMZ designed specifically for the threat they have been facing for decades, us, our Air Force, our tactical and Theater Nukes. Of course they know we can wipe them off the face of the Earth but if we do then there will be no stoppng the WWIII that ensues. So if you are small you have less to lose at calling the bluff of Goliath, but we on the other hand have a lot to lose.

It is a Poor Man's gambit.

The species will survive just like it reportedly has before, but the civilization might not.

Not necessarilly, we are playing with enough overkill to wipe out this planet's ability to sustain life. Possibly to the level below roaches. So I guess it might be their turn if any life form at all. But we can relatively easilly destroy any advantage mammals have gained from the K-T Event. We are playing with Extinction level energy, not just a civilizations threat, whether most want to believe this or not. It is only a question of degrees of use. The firepower exists, the problem is purely quantitative not qualititative in its most extreme level of force.

[Lazarus Long]

North Korea would launch a ballistic missile attack on the United States if Washington made a pre-emptive strike against the communist state's nuclear facility, the man described as Pyongyang's "unofficial spokesman" claimed yesterday.

Kim Myong-chol, who has links to the Stalinist regime, told reporters in Tokyo that a US strike on the nuclear facility at Yongbyon "means nuclear war".

Could they have a few ICBM class weapons?

Possibly, but they have never tested their system and that means that it is as likely to explode on top of them as actually clear the atmosphere. If I were the Chinese I wouldn't want them to play with this kind of weapon because it would have as much chance of landing on Beijing as LA.

A polar trajectory is not something you do that easilly without access to SAT & Inertial Guidence Systems along with ground controls that are remarkably advanced for someone to be able to master without stealing/buying someone elses proven tech or testing your own. Which is exactly what they are doing with the smaller Tactical Field Offensive Weapons. If you have seven bombs why take out LA, Chicago and New York when you can have a much better shot at Seoul, Tokyo, Osaka, Taiwan and the Naval Carrier fleets, and DMZ forces concentrated against you?

Terrorizing the American Public is the job of the media and they do it well but if you want to defeat the United States it must be done in the Battlefield and against our economy. Destroy three of our industrial powerhouses and demonstrate we can't protect our friends as well as wound our military fighting Proxy Wars and you achieve Strategic Advantage.

We end up winning a series of battles that leave us bloodied and licking serious wounds. Wounds we then respond to by further closing down the powerhouse economy we depend upon to fuel the industry we are depending on to protect us. I often wonder if we are walking into a Byzantine trap.

[Lazarus Long]

Lazarus Long,

Apparently you have a concern about weapons in space. To me, this seems irrational because WMD will kill whether they are deployed from space or not. I am missing something here. Maybe you can share a little more what your concern is because I am not hearing it.

There are two aspects that I am addressing in this respect, but before that let us remember this thread is about SDI.

So first understand that SDI will effectively end NASA and aalter teh character of ALL Space research and development for decades. It will more that likely end the chances for realistic development of system that can for example address asteroids and bllides that threaten this world, it will build a prison wall around the planet and float WMD weapons in orbit where INEVITABLY THEY MUST COME DOWN, one way or another.

Second, if we militarize Lunar development we have no effective way of forcing joint Lunar Development and this will mean that the possibility of Secret Lunar Bases for Strategic Military Advantage against any Nation can be achieved by all that build these Battle Stations. This would increase both the number of WMD's and their possible use because this new class wouldn't produce nearly as much long term radiation.

Also we have to use a variety of more Nukes to stop nukes, it isn't just missile to missile intercepts. I favor ground based beam weapons but they are too energy and infrastructur costly, plus by the time you have a shot at teh inbound bomb it is too late. The only effective strategy are orbital bases but this mean full fledged Battle Stations that everyone will want hence EVER MORE DANGEROUS LEVELS OF PROLIFERATION.

And when one of these ships sinks with its payload catastrophically back to Earth, somewhere is going to get hot inevitably. Again it is just not rerasonable from the other guy's side to play the hand the way we would. They are fighting and planning for the battle they think they can win, not just to harrass us to death.

[Lazarus Long]

The root cause of war is not the weapons by themselves, Lazarus.

What is missing here is what are some of the major reasons for war and then how can they be mitigated. The paradigm needs to change.

While in principle I agree with this there is a level of mental dependence on violence as the basis of defining strength. I see creativity as stronger than destructive force. There is also the clearly real and sinister side of the Arms Industry and that is, it is as self serving industry as any. It is suceptible to greed that compromises security from the level of blindsiding us to think that what ever we do will have the intended effect.

Those that plan an offense against our designs see WHAT we do clearly and adapt accordingly. This is part of the vulnerability generated by an open society, the same open society that can create the high levels of tech we depend upon to defend it.

I know guns don't kill, people with guns do.

But the paradigm shift comes from the power of the creative side, not the destructive one. We have already achieved the maximum necessary level of destructiveness numerous times over, it is a dead end. What we are desparate for is paradigm shift of creative energy that offers solutions to the apparant sociopolitical traps we ar falling into.

This is more than just a Diplomatic Issue, this is a Species Evolutinary Psychological one and that is why for me the paradigm shift comes from looking at how our species addresses resource ditribution as a Superbeing that is the level that must get reprogrammed and this can only be accomplished in time by Human Creative Force.

If we are lucky maybe we can get a little help from AI in time but I think we are basically still on our own at this. We definitely belong in a different thread however if I want to bring up Human Selection Theory.

[bobdrake12]

But as 9/11 demonstrates you don't need ICBM's to deliver a nuclear, or other type of payload. Do you want to give up civil aviation too?

Lazarus Long,

Not 9/11 but the two A-bombs delivered over Japan during WWII.

Do you want to give up civil aviation too?

I would not doubt that civil aviation has more controls on it with all these new bills in the works like "Patriot II".

Not necessarilly, we are playing with enough overkill to wipe out this planet's ability to sustain life.

I believe some will survive.

So first understand that SDI will effectively end NASA and aalter teh character of ALL Space research and development for decades. It will more that likely end the chances for realistic development of system that can for example address asteroids and bllides that threaten this world, it will build a prison wall around the planet and float WMD weapons in orbit where INEVITABLY THEY MUST COME DOWN, one way or another.

That is one scenario that you envision. I don't see it that way.

If we are lucky maybe we can get a little help from AI in time but I think we are basically still on our own at this.

Don't count on AI.

It comes down to the humans on this planet and their ethics or lack thereof.

This is more than just a Diplomatic Issue

It goes way beyond diplomacy.

But the paradigm shift comes from the power of the creative side, not the destructive one. We have already achieved the maximum necessary level of destructiveness numerous times over, it is a dead end. What we are desparate for is paradigm shift of creative energy that offers solutions to the apparant sociopolitical traps we ar falling into.

In this discussion as well as similar ones, the paradigm shift has not really been addressed. The real solution has not been addressed.

Unlike yourself, I don't see the horrors in defensive weapons, but my major point is why are we not discussing (on another thread) the cause of war and how to prevent it?


bob

Edited by bobdrake12, 10 March 2003 - 02:25 PM.

[Lazarus Long]

I believe some will survive.

In the end belief is irrelevent.

Only before the fact does belief influence behavioral choice. Faith based reasoning is leading to Armageddon. The Clash of Culures is a Crisis predicated upon the beliefs of all concerned.

Part of the Paradigm shift necessary to move from Type 0 to a Type 1 Level Step toward and Age of Reason is the Paradigm shift required to go beyond "Faith Based Reasoning".

[Lazarus Long]

QUOTE  
If we are lucky maybe we can get a little help from AI in time but I think we are basically still on our own at this. (LL)


Don't count on AI.

It comes down to the humans on this planet and their ethics or lack thereof.

QUOTE  
This is more than just a Diplomatic Issue (LL)


It goes way beyond diplomacy.

QUOTE  
But the paradigm shift comes from the power of the creative side, not the destructive one. We have already achieved the maximum necessary level of destructiveness numerous times over, it is a dead end. What we are desparate for is paradigm shift of creative energy that offers solutions to the apparant sociopolitical traps we are falling into.  (LL)


In this discussion as well as similar ones, the paradigm shift has not really been addressed. The real solution has not been addressed.

Unlike yourself, I don't see the horrors in defensive weapons, but my major point is why are we not discussing (on another thread) the cause of war and how to prevent it?

Basically you and I are very close in that we agree the threat is real and it is the specific characteristics of the Paradigm Shift we must undergo as a species AND as individuals, which is the fundamental challenge.

I will remind everyone reading this that species is a simple way of describing a class of INDIVIDUALS. In other words it isn't about how OTHER PEOPLE will change it is about how we deal with the transformative process from with in each and everyone one of us.

You and I can repectfully disagree about specific elements of the choices facing us for this crisis and any crisis we might face. In fact a "Rational Analysis" depends upon and DEMANDS a close examination of such contrasting viewpoints. But I concur that the real issue is WHY our Species depends on warfare and this topic is a valid sparate discussion that I have tried to raise under the Rubrik of Human Selection numerous times to be met with categoric denial.

Like Asteroids and Ancient Hisory I fear that it will be just the same old choir singing this lament. you and I are here raising this specter again because it is underlying this situation just as it has underlay them all.

I don't expect to be saved, I certainly am not holding my breath for AI and a Mythical Singularity to rescue us from a damnation of our own Creation. Too many here and everywhere are waiting for Godot and expecting that this will protect them from the all too real threats facing us in common.

Those of us that have successfully defended our selves and others against overt and demonstrable assualt understand teh value of strength. BUT BOTH THE BODY AND THE MIND REPRESENT FORMS OF SRENGTH.

Weapons are only effective when wielded with Intelligence. Otherwise it is all too easy for David turn the POWER of Goliath against himself. The bigger they are the harder they fall.

[bobdrake12]

In the end belief is irrelevent.

Lazarus Long,

But being prepared is relevant. That is why some will survive.



bob

[bobdrake12]

Like Asteroids and Ancient Hisory I fear that it will be just the same old choir singing this lament. you and I are here raising this specter again because it is underlying this situation just as it has underlay them all.

Lazarus Long,

We also had Saille on Ancient History. [B)]

http://images.google...ages/desatl.gif

bob

[Lazarus Long]

We also had Saille on Ancient History

Yes we did. She was here too but had communications difficulties.
I miss that lady's opinions. She demonstrates a side to the discussion that is sorely lacking and that is the female perspective.

She is correct in saying that women and children will suffer the lasting brunt of any action taken, litterally. I think that we would be benefitted by hearing the opinions of women more in this entire set of topics.

I heard recently that men were overwhelmingly for this war in our county but women are divided almost exactly 50/50. This is feeding into even the gender divide and debates.