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What Constitutes "me"?


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#1 Bruce Klein

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Posted 25 August 2002 - 06:40 AM


Originally posted by Another God <-from bjklein.com


This is one of the oldest Philosophical questions, and I still don't think it is resolved. And this is a serious philosophical question which will need to be faced by all Transhumanists, and possibly all wanna be immortals...
  • If I upload my brain, will that upload be me?
  • If I clone myself and download my brain into that clone, will the clone be me?
  • If I copy my brain, only one neuron at a time, replacing each neuron with that copy, over a long period of time, will I still be me at the end? When will have the transition occured?
In star trek, the matter transporters.... do they kill the people that they transport? (they break up all the matter in their body, then rebuild them at the other side)


So, what is it exactly, which is 'me', and how can I keep 'me'. I don't want to copy 'me', and then be a copy. I want to be 'me'.

#2 Bruce Klein

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Posted 25 August 2002 - 06:43 AM

Originally posted by Quicken

I thought about this one quite a lot back when I was studying philosophy of self and mind. The questions you raise are closely related to an ancient (Greek I think) quandry that went something like this:

A brand new flagship is constructed for some noble's puposes and being a flagship it is the subject of continual repair to keep it in excellent condition. Eventually, every part of the ship has been replaced but it still looks pretty much the same as the original and it still bears the same name. Meanwhile, an enterprising hobbyist has been meticulously collecting each component of the ship that was discarded for new parts. Eventually he manages to put together a fully reconstructed ship. It doesn't float and doesn't look like the original but has all the original (warn down) parts. Which is the original ship? I would answer the former for two different reasons:

1) The pattern argument - the first ship has a much more similar physical arrangement to the original than the second (assuming the parts have been accurately replaced). It isn't constructed of any of the same sub-atomic particles but it is constructed of the same types of sub-atomic particles and they are arranged in a pattern closer to the original.
2) The continuity argument - The first ship is formed by gradual adjustment of the original. It's parts are replaced but there is a certain degree of spatio-temporal continuity to the change. The second ship meanwhile was really nothing more than a jumble of parts until it was reconstructed. Arguably the hobbyist might have put it together gradually but at no stage until the end did it really begin to resemble the original ship. It lacks spatio-temporal continuity.

For me, both of these are powerful arguments but the copy-without-destruction-of-the-original argument (whether based on uploading or teleportation etc.) can put the two postitions at odds with one another. The original has both pattern similarity and continuity while the copy has only pattern similarity and I think this is why people naturally tend to favour the original in these situations. However, the waters are muddied by the question of whether I am the same person I was two years ago - the same self. Here we immediately see that pattern has not been retained as we learn and change. Spatio-temporal continuity on the other hand has been maintained and consequently I would argue that we are the same person.

Thinking about these sorts of questions I came to the slightly radical view that both pattern and continuity are sufficient for self but neither are necessary.

#3 Thomas

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Posted 26 August 2002 - 07:12 PM

The most radical solution - one self - answers on all those questions.

It's very contra intuitive, to be simultaneously around in many (all) bodies, but many thing are weird, but true.

Ten minutes open techno telepathy with somebody - would make that only one self option - quite obvious.

Imagine, just imagine.

B)

- Thomas

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#4 Lazarus Long

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Posted 26 August 2002 - 10:42 PM

Thomas says:
The most radical solution - one self - answers on all those questions.

It's very contra intuitive, to be simultaneously around in many (all) bodies, but many thing are weird, but true.



First of all the argument being made isn't counter intuitive it solipcism. It is often the result of psychological as opposed to philosophical predelictions. It is one viable answer that remains unverified or it simply could be false.

And why do you think it is your dream of existence anyway? This is my reality, not yours. ;))


Thomas says:
Ten minutes open techno telepathy with somebody - would make that only one self option - quite obvious.


As I tried to quip about above the very concept of "self" begins to be absurd when trying to subsume multiple selves into a single identity. But to be even more distasteful, the argument you are making parallels the reasoning behind why some have argued that all sex is a form of rape.

The insecure need of the male psyche to dominate all openly vulnerable situations wherein their emotions are subject to scrutiny by their partner. I don't believe this but many cultures are Parochial Patriarchies with a vested interest in the promulgation of this kind of atavistic logic. :(

If the two become one, it doesn't mean that it is either irreversible or that the *one* is originally the dominant member of the source pair. There is also the idea that the entitiy created by joining is greater than the sum of the parts. This is also the premise for team endeavors. [B)]

You are being a little simplistic here. I do however think that uploading will create the state that you are referring to for an individual capable of simulataneous multiple expression of their psyche in different physical manifestatons. But it doesn't mean that a person MUST engage in the kind of Psychic Vampirism or Parasitism that you are implying. [sfty]

These are the risks we run in creating technologies that allow individuals with aberrant behavioral standards and neurotic/psychotic conditions access and clearly they do have the potential to create the kind of mentally abusive states that you describe. But they DON'T have to. [huh] [":)]

BTW, you've inspired me, I like the phrase Technolepathy. I was looking for a one word idea to describe what we are tallking about. [lol] [g:)] [!]

#5 Davidov

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Posted 01 September 2002 - 07:43 PM

The concept of self is probably the most important to any individual. In this world, a materialist's idea of consciousness blurs the line of individual identity even further. Being that there is no immortal soul to claim individuality from, we're seemingly stuck wondering if the same particles claim the consciousness, or just the same thought patterns. If you want to get to the base of qualia, I believe a person is the same as another if the experience of a "copy" is exactly the same as the original's experience (and if they are copied, they should be considered one citizen, and if the citizen wants to harm himself.. theoretically he might be allowed to hurt... his other copy).
From a external view, people can claim the copy isn't the original. But that is because their subjective view is their subjective view. The person's copy experiences the same thoughts as the original, therefore it should be given the same rights as the original. Given that selfness in a world of over selves is hazy, this is the best we can determine (but who knows, after the Singularity[!]).

#6 wall

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Posted 02 September 2002 - 05:37 AM

If I upload my brain, will that upload be me?

If I clone myself and download my brain into that clone, will the clone be me?

If I copy my brain, only one neuron at a time, replacing each neuron with that copy, over a long period of time, will I still be me at the end? When will have the transition occured?


I believe no, that won't be you. It will be someone just like you up to that point - but not you. The only way it can be you is if it is connected to you at all times and is being updated at all times. You can upload a copy of me as I was at 12:28 pm, but that's not me, that was me. Its now 12:29 and everything that has happened to ME in the last minute has not happened to my upload/clone. And everything that has happened to the upload/clone in the last minute has not happened to me. You would start with one person, but it would break off....

Think of this less then symbol < it starts at one point but then gradually the lines move further apart from each other. This is what I think would happen with clones, the more time that has passed since the cloneing, the more difference there would be between the person and the clone.

There is a slight possibility that if you could connect the clone and the original and have them do 2 way communication and updates in real time, going both way's, that maybe the clone could still be "me" but It couldn't just be the clone being me for this to work, I would also have to become the clone. Being that if something happened to the clone, it would also have to happen to me. It couldn't just be a 1 way thing, it would have to work both ways.

#7 Thomas

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Posted 02 September 2002 - 11:45 AM

It was I, 10 Planck times ago, several Planck lengths away (for that and that observer - more away for some other).

Just as I was teleported. Just as I was destroyed and recreated again.

Wasn't I. Isn't it so?

[>]

#8 Davidov

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Posted 03 September 2002 - 02:02 AM

I don't know why people can't accept that a single identity can exist simotaneously; after the Singularity things are really going to get crazy. If a being has virtually all the memories, theories, beliefs, etc, then for all intents and purposes of uploading, it IS the same being.
Besides, our awareness is dynamic, not static! Would you say that a man that was once a Christian, and eventually became agnostic, was a different person after his beliefs changed? I wouldn't say so, he seems to be essentially the same person, despite his change in perception of reality. If you believe in static consciousness (where only consciousness resides in non-changing systems), all of humanity's individuals are changing infinitly fast into other individuals (then you can conclude consciousness doesn't exist at all)! In effect, uploading is simply a VERY rapid change of how a sentient being's substrate functions (but does not change the overall subjective consciousness). It is basically transcendence.
An idea of nanotechnology slowly altering a brain to eventually a non-biological substrate is uploading by slowly changing from a biological substrate to a non-biological substrate. Uploading to say a arbitrary computer system is just a very fast way of uploading, compared to the slow procedure of using nanotechnology. Uploading is not only to a arbitrary computer, it is transcendence just as much as sentience changes as we learn throughout life.
The definitions of sentience, I think, may be altered to complement these new types of technologies that could forever change our understanding of the world.

#9 Thomas

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Posted 03 September 2002 - 12:32 PM

But of course. Me too, can't understand, why is this so difficult for almost everybody.

One could had the single soul for the eternity, if the religious point was correct.

If you gave up the religion - you gave up the unique soul as well.

May be played again. On many locations at the same time.

- Thomas


B)

#10 Guest_Enter your name_*

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Posted 10 September 2002 - 08:00 PM

I see my self as a force field. My life's force vector is accompanied by other life force vectors of the biosphere. By working for the benefit of all life I can strengthen my own force field through synergetic induction. Creating a down load or a copy can only result in the existence of two similar entities for but a moment. New experiences and the inability to coexist in the same place at the same time means the copy will be a different and separate consciousness virtually immediately. A force field can be presented as a torus of vectors. The hole of this donut that includes me is this biosphere. Life, and especially conscious life, is my coconspirator against the ravages of entropy.

May the force be with you.

#11 Guest_ii0001@ostic.demon.co.uk_*

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Posted 12 September 2002 - 08:38 AM

I used to be greatly troubled by the idea that a copy of myself would also claim to be me. I believed firmly that continuity was the essence of the self. I don't any more.

Assuming that the copying process wasn't perceptible to him as a discontinuity, the copy would be convinced that he was me. I would also be convinced that I was me. I no longer see this as a problem. You'd just have two guys walking around with a shared life history up to a certain point: what's the big deal? Apart from legal issues, and having to maybe re-think such concepts as sexual relationships(!), I don't see many problems.

I'm a 'patternist'. I think that the essence of my self is in the patterns that constitute the substrate of my mind - up to any given instant. If technology can arrange a bifurcation of some kind, then there is no longer a single 'me', so the claim by each physical person to be 'me' becomes meaningless; there are now two distinct patterns, so there are two people.

We only see this as a problem because all we have ever known in human history is people who are born, remain a single entity for a certain time while they age and have experiences, and then die. Making copies or transferring minds has never been done, so we don't know how to think about it.

The implications of this 'me + copy = 2 people' approach potentially include the classification of teleportation as murder; however, although I'd be extremely reluctant to be teleported in a deconstructive way, I still think that, in the instant after transportation I would still exist, because the pattern of my mind would have been preserved. The reason I think this is that I believe that what we call our 'self' is an illusion. The brain simply continues to function after the teleportation, and the same illusory 'self' is therefore present. The fact that it's made of different atoms is not relevant, in my view. My fear of teleportation is similar to my fear of undergoing major surgery; it's a simple case of not being entirely sure what's going to happen. I would not claim that teleportation is certain death; for me, the question is open.

Mike Ruane-Torr

#12 John Schloendorn

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Posted 20 September 2002 - 08:08 PM

Hi Mike,
You called yourself a patternist, yet allowed for personal identity bifurcations. I like this and shall discuss it a little.

Your teleporter is an interesting device. Quote: When “The brain simply continues to function after the teleportation”, then “the same illusory ‘self’ is therefore present.”
I rather like to follow the question, what if more than one brain continued to function after teleportation ? (That is the destination teleport repeated its creation of your body using the very same information and procedure.)

For the classical patternist, the answer is obvious: There must be one self that is you. The destination teleport creates n times your pattern and therefor n selves identical to you. As all are identical to you, they must be identical to each other. That is always n = 1.

If on the other hand personal identity bifurcations are allowed, then multiple persons may emerge from the destination teleport. That is n > 1. This is how an objective patternism objects bifurcations.

However, I still do not see you at a contradiction. When talking about numbers of persons, we are objectively counting subjective entities, which may be just inappropriate. If the number of subjective persons cannot be measured objectively in principle, then the “true” value of n may be irrelevant. No experiment could be done in that it was of any concern, which theory of personal identity was true.

In fact all kinds of experimentators are facing the seemingly insurmountable border between subjectivity and objectivity:
An (objective) observer is unable to tell n, because he simply knows no physical way to count subjective entities.
The teleporting subject is also unable to tell n, yet in a somewhat different way. If he is killed even though fellows from the destination teleport are present then n>1 and non-patternism holds. If he survives then n=1 and patternism holds. But being killed he won’t have much gain from his measure. And staying alive would bind him to share memory from some teleport fellow. Thus he is unable to tell his true identity and perceive his survival. In both cases he is unable to process or report the information discovered.

I think it was Epicurus who put it like the following: “When I am there, death is not and when death is there, I am not. So why would I fear death ?”
So far I agree, although the statement entirely neglects joy for life.

Reason being somewhat lost, it may be emotion’s turn to make a decision. I feel roughly equally attracted to the denial of any personal persistence and a kind of founded agnosticism along Epicurus’ and your lines. Still a very uncomfortable feeling about teleportation remains.

Greetings, John.

#13 Infinity Lover

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Posted 21 September 2002 - 12:00 AM

You know what... you go first. ;)

No but seriously... if the technology became available, it might very wel boil down to experiments on animals first.

I'm sorry but this cat is nothing like the Whiskers I know.
(Back to the drawingboard :( )

And ultimately the first brave human to try it out.

#14 Psychodelirium

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Posted 21 September 2002 - 03:48 PM

Well, the only way 'patternism' would allow personal identity bifurcations is through temporal divergence.

Thus, for instance, if one person stepped into the sending teleporter, and two persons came out of two receiving teleporters, at the instance of reception, there would only be one pattern, and consequently there would only be one identity. The point here is that identity is the message, not the medium, so it doesn't matter how many distinct physical systems there are realizing the same abstract relations; all that matters is that they are in fact realizing the same relations. As time progresses after the instance of reception, the patterns realized by the two brains will diverge, and so one identity will begin to diverge into two identities.

So when Mike says, "If technology can arrange a bifurcation of some kind, then there is no longer a single 'me', so the claim by each physical person to be 'me' becomes meaningless; there are now two distinct patterns, so there are two people," I have to disagree. At the instance of reception, there is still a single 'you', so the claim by each physical person to be 'you' would be valid. This is because at the instance of reception, there is only one pattern, but it is realized by different physical systems.

I explained this position in somewhat greater detail on the original thread.

#15 int_0x80

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Posted 24 November 2002 - 07:44 PM

  • If I upload my brain, will that upload be me?
  • If I clone myself and download my brain into that clone, will the clone be me?
  • If I copy my brain, only one neuron at a time, replacing each neuron with that copy, over a long period of time, will I still be me at the end? When will have the transition occured?

Considering structure and function, Im going to say that it *would* still be you. The structure of your brain is the same. So why wouldn't it function the same? Your memories are hard coded into your brain. Its like computer memory. There is a physical address for each thing stored by your mind. If you copy the entire brain. You copy those sectors containing "you" with it. Uploading into a computer would be somewhat different. You are changing the physical shape of the brain.

#16 Guest_Sebastian J_*

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Posted 27 November 2002 - 07:09 PM

Hello everyone,

I've been interested in transhumanism and related topics for quite a while now, and I absolutely share the opinion, that "why die if there may be an alternative?" Quite far fetched so far, but anyway...
But over to the question I've been wondering about for a while...


"If I upload my brain, will that upload be me?"
Or rather, if I use teleportation technology and send an exact reproduction of myself to the other part of the earth, or even the galaxy, which person will be me?
If my body here on earth simoultaneously cease to exist when the transfer occur, I guess that I will experience myself transported to that other place, wherever it may be.
But if that isn't the case, and my body here on earth and my copy continue to exist side by side, what will happen?

I see myself as a person that's looking out through the windows, the eyes, as if I and my body isn't the same thing, as a astronaut in his spacesuit.
So if I send an exact copy of myself to another place, and my "old" body continue to exist, will I continue as if nothing has happened still being here on earth, or will I experience myself at that other place, leaving my old bydy behind?
Clearly, at the exact time of the transfer, both two copys of myself will be me, so in that nanosecond it's irrelevant which body is the original one, both will be me, but after that, in which body will I continue to exist?
Of course there's no use for [b]me
to teleport a copy of myself without destroying my old body if I won't experience myself being at the other place. It's only like sending copys of myself that nanoseconds after the arrival won't be identical to the original me any more, that is, other persons.
So, if I teleport myself destroying my old body at the same time, I will experience the transfer, but if I leave my old body intact, will I experience the transfer or not?
Maybe the whole thing isn't possible, since the only time the two copies are identical is at a very short time, so for me it seems that destroying the old body is a prerequisite for the original self to experience the transfer.

This whole argument applies of course for uploading also.
I assume this whole argument is a sign of the limited thinking that's a result of being a very limited being, that is, a human...

I'm not english or american, but I try to make myself as clear as possible.
It would be interesting if someone wish to develop this line of thinking further.

Sebastian

#17 SouL RippeR

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Posted 08 December 2002 - 02:36 AM

Hi, I was recently introduced to this forum by Lazarus Long a long time friend and teacher. I have been reading around and I find this very interesting. Regarding this topic, there are many ways and points of view in which we could discuss about this. For us to be able to reach an agreement we must first establish the point of view from which we are going to analyze this. My point of view is that you can have 2 cups of water exactly identical; both have the same amount of matter, bith serve the same purposes. But is the cup on your right the same as the cup on your left are they the same one? I think they aren't, eventhough they look the same and are composed exactly the same, one is the cup on my right and the other the cup in my left and they will never be the same. Well as far as my vision and conciousness lets me see to this day.

#18 Bruce Klein

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Posted 08 December 2002 - 05:52 AM

Welcome SoulRipper,

What happens if you take a small sip from the glass of water on the right and a big gulp from the one on the left? Then, are you the same person? What happens to the water? Then, what happens if you accidentally spit back a little from one into the other?


Could we be heading toward a computronium, the ultimate-network, and a sysop scenario? Well, that's what I'm leaning towards. I'm begining to understand that there is not really a "me". There are only figments, snapshots, and fleeting moments of seeming coherentness.. when in actuality, we're all part of the same networking mix... we're starting to figure out better and better ways to make this network stronger.. read modern telecommunications here, especially the internet.

#19 SouL RippeR

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Posted 08 December 2002 - 05:48 PM

What happens if you take a small sip from the glass of water on the right and a big gulp from the one on the left?  Then, are you the same person?  What happens to the water? Then, what happens if you accidentally spit back a little from one into the other?  

Ok, I understand your point. But regarding "me" I think that this "me" indeed exists. In response to your questions, nothing would happen to those glasses of water if you take a zip from the because it's not the water what constitutes their "me", and yes even if i drink the water I'm still "me" because my "me" is totally independent from that water, in this case. [8)]
I understand what you're trying to say, actually I discussed this on Wednesday and then again on friday with Lazarus Long, and in some ways this is true but in other things I would call it "locomaquia" [!]

#20 Omnido

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Posted 20 December 2002 - 01:00 PM

This subject has always been one for popular discussion.
However, due to the complexities and subjective natures concerning its content, few ever tend to agree.

So, let us instead state what is known, thereby eliminating any possible confusion as a result of ambiguity.

1) The human mind exists as a combination of neural networks; many billions of neurons which interconnect through a series of "bio-wires" that biologists call Axons and Dentrites. These number in the estimated trillions, as each neuron can connect with as many as 100 or more other neurons.

Our consciousness is therefore defined as an active interaction between the billions of neurons, covering the entirety of the human brain and all its sensory functions, as well as motor functions. The human central nervous system also supports bio-feedback, allowing for many signals to have their transmissions para-sympathetically sent back to their source. Hence, when I move my arm, not only am I sending the signal to move it, but my sensory systems are also sending signals back to me so as to make me aware of its movement. This bio-feedback is mostly taken for granted, but serves to be very important.

2) Since our cognitive selves owe their origin to the many cellular neural interactions on many simultainous levels, for one to transfer ones consciousness into another medium would require an alteration from biological function to artificial function. Any "purely duplicative" process would not be defined as a transfer, but instead as merely that: a duplication.

A simple example: Lets suppose that I construct a bicycle. Over time, parts of this bicycle begin to show wear, and many cease to function as a result. So, one replaces those parts with new ones as so to maintain the functionality of the bike.
Now, is that bike essentially the "same bike" as the one before such components were replaced? Essentially, yes. The same holds true of ourselves. We replace skin, blood, hair, and most of all our cells throughout our lives, save those in our mind. The ones we have are the ones we keep, throughout our entire lifetime. Granted, our brain does produce more cells at a very slow rate (This was proven by a group of bio-researchers who used radioactive dyes to search for possible new developing neurons. The results were conclusive. Reference previous issues of popular science.) but these cells do not serve to replace all of our mainstream neural use, as the majority of these developments occur between the ages of 2 - 12 years. Thus, our minds are centralized and specific.

Now lets suppose that one takes that bicycle and disassembles it, then rebuilds it in another location. Is it the same bike? Yes indeed it is. However, a bike is essentially not functioning unless it is being ridden, so a bike not being used could be ascribed to a human in cryostasis.

Now, if we examine that bike, measure all its parts and dimensions, and then build an exact duplicate of that bike while discarding the previous, is it still the same bike?
This question doesn't take a Ph.D to answer, for logically, mathematically, and objectively, it clearly IS NOT. It may be a perfect copy, but the original bike was destroyed, plain and simple.

Now, let us take that same comparison and relate it with a human conscious mind. If the same system were applied, the logical, rational, and objective answer would be the same. The duplication may function exactly as the original, but it clearly IS NOT the original.
The problem arises when the original is then "destroyed" in the wake of its duplicate, no matter what form that duplicate may take. Obviously to the original, this post-destruction is not acceptable for it clearly defeats the purpose behind its design. The person being duplicated, will never again experience anything. They are not in transition, they are destroyed.

Now, what would then be the solution to such an obvious destructive process?
Well, this would imply the use of a similar process as referred to with the bike example, only far more complex. The human's mind would have to be transferred one piece at a time, with all the tiny elements and patterns being duplicated in very small fragments, from one medium to another. However, this process isn't itself sufficient. Not only does the mind of such an individual have to be transferred piece by piece, but the transferred pieces must then be re-integrated with the original, as so to maintain an collective, active, consciousness.
Using the aforementioned process, the individual is transferred, not duplicated, into a different medium until all remaining biological processes reside within the new chosen medium, and none of the original remain. THIS is the solution to duplication, and the problems of identity as well as "who is really who" are solved. Granted, such a process is time consuming, intricate, and seemingly fragile. However, the result is the complete protection and successful integration of the true original. It is essentially a "change of states", only not done so with immediate entirety, but partial, allowing for the previous states combination AND integration with the newly established states.

I'm open to any comments or questions if anyone is interested.
But unless I have failed to elaborate more clearly than I already have, I don't think I missed anything crucial.

There is however one exception to the entire process. This exception lies in the possibility (although highly improbable given what is currently known about human cognitive biology) that the true essence; ones personality or "core being", does not reside among the billions of neural cells within the brain, but instead is some "Special stuff" that has yet to be defined. The most obvious examples are what have been dubbed "The Human Soul/Spirit" etc..
If those assumptions demonstrate to be true via scientific evidence, then such a transfer would fail entirely unless ones "Soul" were to follow ones mind into the new medium, whatever that may be.

Edited by Omnido, 01 November 2003 - 07:14 PM.


#21 Bruce Klein

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Posted 20 December 2002 - 01:26 PM

Excellent post Omnido, we need to make this into a Writer's Competition submission.

Just in passing, I agree in total with your assessment. Uploading can not be a *poof* event. It will take a relatively incremental process to succeed, and there will probably always be a chance for failure/death if done to quickly.
  • Agree x 1

#22 Mechanus

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Posted 20 December 2002 - 04:31 PM

I disagree completely, OmniDo. If you define your consciousness to be a particular set of interactions among neurons, then yeah, the consciousness of an upload is not going to be the same as your consciousness. But the point is that consciousness is not just a particular pattern in neurons - it's a pattern in anything, as long as that pattern functions and behaves the same. It could be microchips, or water flowing through sewer tubes, or pebbles and toilet paper.

I think it's simply meaningless to say "this person now is the same person as that person later" - at most, you can talk about "person-moments" being the same. From your bicycle example, it seems to follow that you think your personal identity is in the elementary particles you're made of. But that's silly - elementary particles don't have little name tags that say "I'm a part of OmniDo, and the others are fakes!". In QM, they don't even have individual identities - if that weren't true, there'd be no bosons and fermions, no Pauli exclusion principle, and hence no humans. Also, you'd fall through the floor, I think.

If this is not what you're claiming, then I don't see what is. Your identity stays the same, unless you get disassembled down to a certain level? Say, the level of bicycle parts? But what level corresponds to that in humans, and why would it matter? Calling something objective, rational, mathematical and logical lots of times doesn't make it true. There are so many things that are obvious but false, and as far as I can tell this is just one more of them.

At most, you've shown that according to one definition you made up, uploading does not preserve personal identity. What is so special about that kind of personal identity that I should care about it?

In my opinion, personal identity is a gigantic red herring.

#23 Omnido

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Posted 20 December 2002 - 05:36 PM

Mechanus Posted
If you define your consciousness to be a particular set of interactions among neurons, then yeah, the consciousness of an upload is not going to be the same as your consciousness.


It appears that by your own admission, you indeed agree that the two patterns are not the same. Excuse me, but what other Definition of consciousness would you adhere to being correct if Biology is not true?

But the point is that consciousness is not just a particular pattern in neurons - it's a pattern in anything, as long as that pattern functions and behaves the same.

This sounds as if you are implying that "As long as it looks the same, smells the same, and tastes the same, then it is this same."
It most certainly is not.
If that is the case, then why do not re-prints of famous artwork carry as much value as the originals? They can be made to resemble their originals in entirety, yet we will not pay nearly as much for them, and for obvious reasons. They are duplicates, not originals.

I think it's simply meaningless to say "this person now is the same person as that person later" - at most, you can talk about "person-moments" being the same.

And that is exactly what I did talk about. It is the Transience that define us as humans; a process completely lost with duplication. Duplication merely insures that the person at one moment is revived within another, leaving the original still in existence, (insofar as the duplication process isn't fatal while being performed) which defeats the purpose of the "upload" to begin with.

From your bicycle example, it seems to follow that you think your personal identity is in the elementary particles you're made of. But that's silly - elementary particles don't have little name tags that say "I'm a part of OmniDo, and the others are fakes!".

I hate to burst your bubble, but as far as biology, physics, and atomic principles are concerned, yes we are indeed the sum of our elementary particles. It isn't silliness, it is empirically and observationally correct. Of course, there are those who would refute such evidence in favor of their own stubbornness, and I am well aware that there exist far too many of those individuals...but that is a topic for another thread.

In QM, they don't even have individual identities - if that weren't true, there'd be no bosons and fermions, no Pauli exclusion principle, and hence no humans. Also, you'd fall through the floor, I think.

Actually QM supports Transient consciousness theory, as we affirm who we are, who we were, and who we hope to be, all in the same context.
However, the validity of certain QM principles contradict rational thinking, in that many tend to be logically contradictive. Again, another topic for another thread.

Your identity stays the same, unless you get disassembled down to a certain level? Say, the level of bicycle parts? But what level corresponds to that in humans, and why would it matter?

If a human is to maintain an active, transient, consciousness, the "level" depends on what elements to the human are involved in determining "Who we are now, who we've been, why we are who we are and who we've been, and who we hope to be."
Time plays a very important role here. If you have no interest in the elements involved in deciding who you are, then you really have nothing to worry about. Mechanus will be duplicated within some artificial system, and when the real Mechanus; you, finally closes your eyes while your body is committed to oblivion, you will cease forever while your duplicate falsely asserts to others that he is you. If you have no problem with this, then I bid you farewell when/if that time comes.

Calling something objective, rational, mathematical and logical lots of times doesn't make it true.

Well then the whole of QM, physics, biology, and all other sciences is completely incorrect. Wow, and here I thought we were making progress... [roll]

At most, you've shown that according to one definition you made up, uploading does not preserve personal identity. What is so special about that kind of personal identity that I should care about it?

As I stated previously, if it doesn't matter to you, then you shouldn't be concerned with post-duplicative oblivion at all. You will cease and your copy will survive.
However, if all we needed was some duplicated representation of ourselves in which to be satisfied and content within our preservation, then there really isn't a rational or logical reason to upload at all. A collection of ones affirmations, heuristics, personal testimony and base knowledges/experiences should be more than adequate, and that does not require any sort of consciousness whatsoever.

My apologies, but that simply will not do for me, as Im sure your disconcernment will not do for others as well. I would rather accept oblivion to natural causes than commit my shadow to some static database.

Edited by Omnido, 08 April 2003 - 01:58 AM.


#24 Mechanus

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Posted 21 December 2002 - 01:36 AM

Wait a minute - I'm not arguing humans are not (just) made of particles, or that consciousness can't be explained by way of the physics, chemistry and biology of neurons in our brain. We agree there (if only all people did).

What I don't agree with is that those characteristics define me. Right now, I'm mortal, but by any reasonable theory of personal identity that doesn't mean that if I became immortal, I wouldn't be me anymore. I'm also sitting in a chair; soon, I will no longer sit in a chair, and again that doesn't mean I will have become someone else. The same is true for being biologically human, or having a brain made of meat. These are properties of Mechanus, but not definitional properties of Mechanus.

When I say that I'm still me after a few moments, I'm using the word in the imprecise sense - a person who has time-evolved from me for a short time and still has the same mental characteristics, memories and so on. I do not believe there is some absolute metaphysical fact as to whether a mind at time A is the same mind as a mind as time B, but I have no problem saying that I'm the same person as the one who wrote the message you were replying to, just as a very convenient way of speaking. There are many different sorts of personal identity you can talk about, and they all have legitimate uses for different purposes. For example, in criminal justice, it makes no sense to take the "identity is meaningless" point of view, though it might, in a sufficiently strange posthuman society. What I think is incorrect is when people think that some person is in some absolute Dog-given way Really Me, and other persons are not.

Then it becomes a question of what type of personal identity we mean when we say that we want to survive, that we want that there's still a "me" in the future. Well, I don't think there are any obvious answers to that one - in giving us survival instincts, evolution has never had to consider things like uploading and teleporters. Also, there's the instrumental value of living on - I want there to be a "me" in the future because I think a "me" might do and say useful things. But there it's obvious what sort of personal identity to use - any mind indistinguishable from me, and that still works by thought processes that I trust and so on, will do. I can't think of any other reason than those two why we would value our own lives above those of others. So when we need to select a type of personal identity we want to use in judging whether we have survived or not, there is no right answer and we have to make some arbitrary choice; one way of making such a choice is to choose so that as much account is taken of transhumanist/patternist insights as possible, so that everyone sufficiently similar to me (such as my upload) really is me.

Another choice could be the spatiotemporal continuity-of-atoms type of identity you propose, but I think it's much less elegant and it's not in accord with my intuitions about computer files, which say for example that if I move a file to a floppy disk from my hard drive, it's still the same file. It's also not in accord with my intuitions about humans, which say that if the cells of my body are replaced every so often, that doesn't mean it's a different body; and if the cells of my brain were replaced every so often, it would still be the same brain. (They're not, but if)
For works of art, taking such a point of view makes sense, because people tend to (probably irrationally, IMO) want "the real thing", meaning the one made more or less of the same atoms, the one more or less spatiotemporally continuous with the one the artist made, and that's where in practice much of the value of art comes from. Brains are different - my brain activity is not valuable because of some sentimental connection to the one that came out my mother. As an upload, I'm not going to start thinking, "drat, my brain isn't authentic".

For someone who doesn't really believe in personal identity, is it irrational to want to be uploaded as a fully conscious being? That depends on whether there is a rational goal or not. If there is somehow a goal that's logical to pursue, such as pleasure (regardless of whose pleasure it is), then I would (ideally) not want to be uploaded, I would want whatever created the most pleasure to happen, and that would probably not involve the existence of a Mechanus. So yes, in that case it's irrational.
If, on the other hand, morality is subjective, and I had to decide what I want without somehow deducing it, then I would probably prefer to be uploaded and prefer for my upload to be fully conscious and my previous physical self to be disassembled (assuming these things don't endanger anything important or somesuch), not because the upload is objectively me (my own meat-brain a moment later isn't me, either), but because that's the future I'd like more based on my own baked-in wants, my intuitions, and principles such as consistency and symmetry. That's the sort of (arbitrary) definition of identity I would choose to use then while realizing that there is no absolute fact as to my True Identity.

In summary, "self" is a concept that can be used in different ways in practice and meaningless until you choose some definition; it's not the case that it has already been clearly defined as something else and that we can proceed to find out what descriptions comply with that given definition. Specifically, the meaning of "self" derived by looking at physical continuity may not be the same as the meaning of "self" that corresponds to our wanting to survive.

Intuition says that first-person continuity of conscious experience, in a sort of magical line from a physical system to one and only one corresponding physical system at a later time, such as a soul, may be such a given definition, but intuition is wrong, I think.

I do hope all this makes any sense.

#25 Omnido

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Posted 21 December 2002 - 11:57 AM

Mechanus Posted
So when we need to select a type of personal identity we want to use in judging whether we have survived or not, there is no right answer and we have to make some arbitrary choice

I would disagree with that on a fundamental level.
This "selection", while it could be predisposed by some personal (whether logically demonstrative or not) meme, is not the fundamental cause and effect.

Another choice could be the spatiotemporal continuity-of-atoms type of identity you propose, but I think it's much less elegant and it's not in accord with my intuitions about computer files, which say for example that if I move a file to a floppy disk from my hard drive, it's still the same file.

I would agree that total discernment; inasmuch as that is possible, behind a human mind tends to destroy alot of the "elegance" as you put it, to our definitive nature.
Such is a fact of knowledge.
Many people have often looked into the night sky, played connect-the-dots and drawn images of their fabled imaginations, or ones corresponding to elements of their real life. But in the end, they are just stars, giant spheres of fusion, burning billions of miles away. To those who are not educated, the night skies do indeed hold wonders; depictions of ancient beasts and gods, and portray a "magical" nature.
The fact that we attempt to make meaningful patterns of otherwise random phenomenon, or to label something that is not objectively understood as exhibiting some "special magic", is a testament to our search for a personal connection to things and states of affairs.

As to the file manipulation on your hard drive, that couldn't prove my point more.
If you copy a file to another location, then indeed it is duplicated. While the contents are exactly the same, it is a duplication, not the "original."
Now let us say that you instead specify to your computer that you merely want to "Move" a file to another location. The file is then literally copied, one byte at a time to another location while the previous file is deleted one byte at a time.
Now of course, this is only ideally. The software OS doesn't actually do this, but the principle is the same. The "Moved" file is still the original, but merely in transient. Obviously when applying a similar concept with regard to human biological neural architecture, one must make sure that the parts being transferred to another location/medium are also re-intergrated with the previous medium by way of information interaction processes. And also, there may exist elements to the human biological mind that are not required to be integrated within active transience. Such as memories of ones youth that are scarcely ever recalled, but still remain within our minds.

That's the sort of (arbitrary) definition of identity I would choose to use then while realizing that there is no absolute fact as to my True Identity.

I would disagree with that, and here is why.
As I stated, our "True identity" is the preservation of our active, transient, consciousness, nothing more. Using spatiotemporal continuity couldn't be closer to the truth. Now while granted, ones mind changes slightly from moment to moment, it is this transience that defines us. It requires a bit of abstract thinking.
Example:
I am who I am today, because of who I was yesterday, and who I wanted to be yesterday when I thought of being who I wanted to be today.
Hence, the affirmation of who we are, based on who we were, and who we wanted to be.
Now, lets take that in a slightly smaller time frame.
I am at this second, because of who I was a second ago, and who I wanted to be a second from then, which is who I am now.

Time plays a crucial role. It isn't necessarily maintaining yourself from the exact same "Brain meat", for as we all know, this "meat" is in constant transience. It is ever changing with what we eat, what our cells metabolize, etc. In the literal sense, nothing of our original matter still resides within ourselves, except for perhaps bone and tendon matter. Muscles have all be replaced, blood replaced, skin, hair, cellular membrane fluid, etc...since we were born.

Perhaps a better definition might suffice. Lets instead say that it is: "The collective states and conditions by which our conscious minds exist in transience, from moment to moment, in reference to present, previous, and future moments."

This does not mean that every last atom must be considered, no. Indeed, as I previously stated, many memories and skills are locked away, somewhere amidst the billions of neurons, some never to be recalled for years after they were imprinted. Now our fundamental "Now" selves might have culminated the various aspects of such memories into more commonly used pathways, and eventually integrated base properties of those aspects into what we would then refer to as "Active consciousness."

It is those properties of active consciousness; that which defines me at this moment, that would be lost forever if a mere "snap-shot" of those conditions were made and then stored for some future program to run in a different location.

Perhaps this might help to clarify what "Definition of self" I am referring to.
But as you said, many people may not really care what form their "selves" take, and or whether or not their active consciousness survives any "uploading" process, and that's perfectly acceptable. Let those who wish to be lost (what I would ascribe to "Semi-objectively lost) be lost; only to exist as a continuance in some other form. While those who are hard-pressed to retain as much of their "active self" as they can, be allowed to pursue such a venture as well.

In the end, it ultimately is a decision that is up to the person(s) involved.

Edited by Omnido, 08 April 2003 - 04:56 AM.


#26 John Schloendorn

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Posted 21 December 2002 - 04:02 PM

I cannot see how or wether an objective definition of the person ‚me’ could be given. We can read our survival into any bunch of stuff that happens, but that has always a certain arbitrary character. Though I cannot assert what matters in ‚my’ survival, I do have a certain sense for what matters to me. Agreed with Mechanus on that. But I’d suggest a more pragmatic conclusion:

I do not know wether any conditions for my survival are given. But it is a condition of what matters to me that I do not know. When forced to make any actual decisions, I’d like to act as if conditions for my survival were given, just to play it safe.
Suppose, for example, we would travel to Io in order to watch a dolphin show. We have made an extensive philosophical argument to prove that teleports do not kill. We are almost fully convinced, but only a slight uncertainty remains.
Thus, when we go by teleport there is an extremely small chance that we shall die. When we go by space ship (assuming that space ships are safe by this time), the chance is zero. Since our life depends on it and that is literally indefinitely much, it can be rational to go by space ship.

Now when I chose to play it safe and assume that there are some definite facts involved in our survival, what exactly should this assumption be ? It seems safest to assume that what matters in survival is all that is actually involved in normal lives. And this is just not teleportation and uploading. It is for example the physically and psychologically continuous functioning of the nervous system, as it might be provided by stem cell technology or glial telomere therapy.

Finally one point makes me worry.
If evolution should reach the posthuman stage with all its alleged glamor, then persons with the play-it-safe-attitude might be easily fall behind. Those who regularly upload themselves to the state-of-the-art pattern expression device will certainly have an easier job in accumulating computer power than those who chose to extend their biological brains. Even if uploading amounts to personal suicide, the computer power will still be accumulated, arguably leaving biological organisms with relatively dismal prospects.

Greetings, John.

#27 Lazarus Long

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Posted 21 December 2002 - 06:00 PM

Omnido, while I agree with much of what you say, including the fact that we have actually referred to much of this already, I think that there are two areas that deserve additional review.

First that the question of the physicality of the neuro-topology and function could be more complex than just the cellular structure, as the electromagnetic sphere of operation could either be a simple consequence of synaptic activity, or it could be a coherent field structure that operates as a bio-electric interface for a dynamic field possessing complex magnetic and chemical storage and processing ability.

In the latter example the brain can be seen as a medium for a complex quantum computer composed of an organic substrate, in which our identity and personality are functions of programing (learned behaviors), operating system (DNA and Neurophysiology) and personality, memory, identity (a complex interaction of one and two combined with causal aspects of experience and survival). But the Mind is contained within a medium that is BOTH physical AND energetic in the form of not just simple electrochemical memory and functions but a complex structure of pure energy that isn't just magnetic but more complex then we at present understand. The analogy is how the rest of the body functions to support and reflect the brain's demands as both need and desire.

Mentation exists within the brain as a similar complex interdependent relationship. Many functions of the brain reflect the actually "wiring" of the neuro-network's connection to the body's machinery and operation. Much of the "software" of body function is "hardwired" into the brain like a kind of BIOS system that monitor's and regulates simple functions like heart rate, body fluid levels, body temperature, fuel levels, etc. as a feedback sensor control system that uses chemical as well as direct signal controls to direct body function. But the identity is more subtle.

I compare "identity" to a kind of organic "operating system" that is capable of learning and decision. It's prime directives are determined through evolutionary psychology but is a potentially adaptive as individual mutation and memetic perceptive ability allows.

So as to the question again of "uploading" it first becomes a question defining where the actual property called a mind resides and what it is composed of. Then it is a question of translating that property we call a mind into a medium that is definable in terms that can be transposed into a substrate that interacts in a supportive and interactive fashion within a new medium (body).

Second I question the COPY/REPLACE, or AUTO DESTRUCT of Original Identity issue. Your argument of copying the bicycle is valid if we are doing something like cloning, or reproducing just the hardware of the mind. It is like the pirate copy of a song, is it the same as the original copy? Actually yes it can e seen as the same, but neither are the Live Performance. The semantic issue here is a little more subtle then the example you provide because we haven't really defined the mind in a satisfactory manner and the questions left open are too numerous to just gloss over. Again however we have described many of these in some detail in the posts you mention.

I suggest that much of the problem are the questions of self awareness and self definition. That the question of uploading is more an issue of continuity of consciousness and the ability of an individual to define them self as more then just a reflection of the body. What of the case that a consciousness that is uploaded, isn't destroying the original as much as it is metamorphosing the identity of the individual. In fact as I have argued before, once accomplished the question of duplicate manifestation can also be solved by an individual developing awareness of inputs from more then one source of experience. The analogy for this in nature is the development of different senses. One mind can process multiple sources of information as a related data stream that provides experience of physical reality.

This is not the same as what I am saying however, the question remains what if like a network of computers the psyches of multiple individuals could share their experience together? And expanding on this, what if an "uploading" identity can extend their awareness, analogous to how we extend our awareness to a vehicles outer limits, a remote controlled vessel, and thus expand our sensory inputs. I do not think it is beyond our ability to adapt to this kind of experience but as I said it really depends almost as much on the individual's adaptive ability more than an externally derived definition of what is human.

I have to go on to another issue before I am satisfied with this response but chores are chores and require attention regardless of my desire to accomplish them, or perhaps in accordance with my conflicting desires. ;) So I will post this both here and at "What constitutes Me?" because the two areas are merging for discussion.

#28 kolevjt

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Posted 14 February 2003 - 08:21 AM

QUOTE
 If I upload my brain, will that upload be me?
 If I clone myself and download my brain into that clone, will the clone be me?
 If I copy my brain, only one neuron at a time, replacing each neuron with that copy, over a long period of time, will I still be me at the end? When will have the transition occured?


Why we need to copy neurons. Neurons are not the consciousness. Consciousness I think should be regarded as a kind* of system of information. So it’s not a point to copy neurons with all temporal damage they care (older cell is also damaged cell) but our goal must be to find way to copy only informational system from a personality to it’s clone. OK? This idea also preserves from need of material teleporters and this kind of staff because we already possess a technique to extract, transport and copy information.
So I think that immortality is achieved when we can simulate “spatio-temporal continuity” (by BJK) for our consciousness (our “me”, which differs us from rest of the world). If you just create a copy of your mind in a clone (or whatever kind of carrier of mind) your actual body will die one day and the actual “copy”, which it carries will die with it too.

QUOTE
I don't know why people can't accept that a single identity can exist simotaneously; after the Singularity things are really going to get crazy. If a being has virtually all the memories, theories, beliefs, etc, then for all intents and purposes of uploading, it IS the same being.


So, I propose a little bit different scenario.
If we examine the human memory, we found that our memory is not an addressable one. There is no sectors or clusters on the “hard drive” and files with names. The human memory is associative and distributive. The last feature can be described by a hologram. When you cut a hologram you do not obtain two pieces of one picture, you obtain two copies of that hologram, opposed to an ordinary picture where you will obtain two pieces of the picture which are differ from each other. This analogy best describes the human memory. So when you cut a part of human brain “the patient” does not lose any memory. But here we can make one another deduction. What if we can connect two brains so they can work together as one integrity (for example my brain and the brain of my clone)? The consciousness will “expand” from one carrier (my brain) to the next (for simplicity we can accept that the brain of the clone is “blank” carrier) for a interval of time two carriers work together carrying my consciousness, my memories, my psychological processes.
Here comes the question:
What if the older body dies?
Should I die in this case or this process will be felt as “contraction” (process opposite of expansion) of consciousness but not death?

It’s easy to extrapolate, that if the connection is broken before the death of one of carriers we will obtain two persons who called themselves “Me” and with further experience they will begin to differ from each other. Exactly like twins, which start from one zygote and their evolution is common for a while but further ontogenesis is different and they grow as different persons.

I think that the problem of bifurcation is not so much interesting as the other question we can pose:
If we can connect a man with his receiver, what will happen if we connect two persons?
Imagine a society without communications, without languages, Me is You, We are They etc.?

But let go back to the main question: What constitutes "me"?
I think "me" or self consciousnes (knowledge of myself) can be regarded as hyperstructure* of psychics. It's not a simple sum of my memories but dissipative* system of information, which have arrised in the informational space of the brain. So "me" is not my brain, "me" is not my memories, but is the interference between psychological patterns, which interact in that way to produce high order and stability far from "termodinamical equilibrium". At some level of development this system is able to recognize "Me" from "external".

Always open for different opinion and creative critics Jivko Kolev.

#29 Lazarus

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Posted 22 February 2003 - 12:26 PM

In thge end I put it to you, do you honestly care? Does it matter to you weather you are you or not, so what, so maybe your just a copy, that does not mkae you any less a centiant indivudual, capable of acting fully and totally with thier own will unless somehow restricted.if you wewre to make a perfect copy of yourslef then from its birth cry it would no longer be an exact copy of you and would go on breathing at a different paces, thinking diferent thoghts and making different desicion than you, makingit a similar individual yes, but no less unique, in the end I really wouldn't care if I was a copy of myself because the past is unchangeable, and its is only the present(if there is such a thing) and the furture that dertermines who "I" am from every second foward.



~Lazarus A. Epicurus~

#30 sixfootbrit

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Posted 03 March 2003 - 07:45 PM

Just a thought.....

Could be that we are all multi-dimensional "elecromagnetic" beings projecting into three-space matter. The three-space matter is a form of "puppet". Therefore the download (or upload) into a new three-space physical pattern would be possible only if we master the "withdrawal from 3-space" mechanism. I believe this mechanism is currently refered to as death and reincarnation (and to a less drastic extent, unconciousness and sleep). It follows that a gradual replacement of 3space physical components is possible, with the discarded pieces being "dead" matter. The trick would be to not cause a complete withdrawal of our multi-dimensional self. It would seem that this approach has been successful, organ transplant and synthetic replacement have not resulted in a loss of "self".




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