[*]If I upload my brain, will that upload be me?
[*]If I clone myself and download my brain into that clone, will the clone be me?
[*]If I copy my brain, only one neuron at a time, replacing each neuron with that copy, over a long period of time, will I still be me at the end? When will have the transition occured?
Most of the posts (above) examine a reanimation scenario of some kind, and conclude that "it wouldn't be them" or rather, "it wouldn't be me" (in their case). But, none of them seem to begin by setting forth a criterion for what it
would take to "be me" in the first place. So, these arguments that "it wouldn't be me" seem empty. Yet, at the same time, they reflect serious concerns about perceived losses of identity that could occur in the course of cryonics reanimation.
The more you think about changes that take place on a moment to moment basis, the more nebulous the concept of "me" becomes. "I've changed my mind!" you say, and yet you still claim to be "you". How can you do that? It's now a different "you", isn't it? Aren't you now making reference of a "you" of the past, who held a different point of view? What's the bridge of continuity? What is there that *hasn't* changed?
Starting with the most mundane things, over the course of a few minutes, you haven't changed your clothes, probably, and the credit cards in your wallet (if you have any) still probably have the same numbers on them. The same goes for your driver's license (if you have one), and the weight of your body (unless you've taken nourishment or gotten rid of the waste products of that) is very much the same, corrected for respiratory input/output and evaporation of perspiration.
However, in those same few minutes, many, many synapses in your brain will have gone through alterations in state, and whole centers of activity will have shifted. You may have written things down, changing the informational infrastructure many others would see as being "yours". You look in the mirror and say, "Yep, it's me, alright!" but what does that mean? To you? To anyone else?
The fact is that in that few minutes, a few things have remained constant, and others have changed very little. Taken on the average, your genome is probably very much the way it was, long before those few minutes began, and it will be that way until you die, to a large extent. By comparison, it is like the "Rock of Gibraltar" of your life. Also, ideas to which you firmly subscribe will have a certain momentum to them, and habits of response that you'd like to feel are subject to "free will" are far more ingrained and automatic than you'd like to have to face. If this is what we mean by "what's me", then it is perhaps reducible to something far simpler than exact patterns of atoms or other hypothetical analogues of what *might* "be me". And it still gets us no closer to a feeling of comfort for whether or not it will still "be us" when we are awakened at some later time, if cryonicly suspended.
Taken in the simplest terms, each night when you fall asleep, something very much altered, as to molecular arrangement of your brain, will probably "awaken" the next morning, remembering the same social security number as being "yours" and having a strong association matrix associated with many persons' names and facial appearances. It will look in the mirror and say, "That's me!" and it will be right, about that. But, how is that different from an uploaded version doing exactly the same thing? Or, how is it different from a clone with an uploaded/downloaded brain of yours doing it, either? As seen by any observer, could they tell the difference?
If the original and the clone with the uploaded/downloaded brain (starting point state of "mind') were "shuffled" as to location and then called upon to give evidence for their origin, could they do it? I think that would be easy. They could probably compare their memories of where scars should be on their bodies with the actual existence of the scars. The clone wouldn't have them, unless we were going to great lengths to fake the scars to fool them both! And, taking the simpler assumption that we are not playing games of that sort with them, we would hope that the original and the clone would agree that this wouldn't be a problem. By the time they had had such a conversation, their neurological systems would have diverged to a considerable extent anyway, and the non-identical nature of a clone's body would contribute to the rapidity of that divergence as well.
Now, having meandered about, a bit, let's take a second look at the questions:
If I upload my brain, will that upload be me?
No! But, the "you" that wakes up tomorrow morning will not be "you" either, in any absolute sense. If you're concerned about uploading, you perhaps should be concerned with how your identity is in flux, at every moment, and especially "overnight"!
If I clone myself and download my brain into that clone, will the clone be me?
No! And, as discussed about, you should be able to quickly sort it out, and come to some kind of amiable "live and let live" arrangement. I still have scar on my thumb where a large wart was removed at the age of five years old (and a lot of other scars as well). The clone would not have them. However, the clone with the downloaded brain would be more "you" than you will be after a few nights sleep, with reference to the "you" from which the download was uploaded/downloaded. By that standard, "you" are "not you" anymore. Soon the clone will not be who he (or she) was a few days earlier, either.
If I copy my brain, only one neuron at a time, replacing each neuron with that copy, over a long period of time, will I still be me at the end? When will have the transition occured?
For those who are really concerned about this issue, and who do not bother to think about the fact that they are changing all the time anyway, in more ways than could ever be produced by the substitution of one neuron for another (assuming that the functional characteristics of the neuron and its interconnectivity are reasonably well replicated), it is possible, even likely, that they would still perceive themselves to "be me at the end". They would be wrong, of course, from the standpoint of the dynamic unfolding of each of our identities that takes place as a usual result of being alive, but if it gave them a sense of comfort, to believe that "it was still them" who are we to take it away?
Back when I was in electrical engineering school, a long time ago, there were two majors, power and electronics. In a course titled "Lines and Networks", which was a preparatory class for "Microwaves", a point was reached at which electrical power moved across a small gap with no physical connection. The equations described it, and the lab equipment demonstrated that it happened, but some of the students could quite "get it".
A classmate of mine laughed, and said, "That's where the line is drawn between power and electronics majors! The ones that can see how the power gets across the gap and are confident that it really happens will major in electronics. The rest will be power majors!"
In a similar manner, life extensionists may be divided by these questions of identity. Some will be more comfortable with the idea that "it will still be them" after a transition of some kind than others, and will be receptive to transitions of those kinds. Others will huddle with their backs to the wall, and resist the notion that anything could possibly be done that would change them in any way, without "it not being them".
In many cases, perhaps, those who have these concerns with identity will drag their feet in signing up for cryonics, and may be left behind, utterly. That's sad, but I think it's where this discussion leads. At some future time, those who then live may look back at these discussions and shake their heads in dismay.
A recent
posting I made on this subject, that addressed how much we may need to be prepared for, in the way of change, goes into what I believe is a far more practical and realistic question about reanimation, and that is: How much change are you ready to be willing to tolerate, upon reanimation? How much "unlike you" are you willing to be, when you wake up? If you are not receptive to a great deal of change, upon awakening it seems likely that you could be left far behind, faced now with an entirely new quandry, "How much are you willing to change, to catch up?" An even different question may exist also, that is, "In that society of the future, how much ease would you have in electing to upgrade yourself, if you came back with serious shortcomings owing to your resistance to shifts in identity? We do not know what the future holds in store, and there are risks either way. Each of us will be receptive to different kinds and levels of risks
None of this is intended to weaken your resolve to survive, but being frozen is, in many ways, being willing to face unknowns of all kinds, some of which may be extremely challenging. At the same time, the alternative is, unless you believe in the supernatural, oblivion.
boundlesslife
