56 replies to this topic

[U_N]

Number 1
NO.

Number 2
No.

Number 3
No.

Number 4
Probably not.

Number 5
No.

Number 6
No.

Number 7
Someday.

Number 8
Yes.

Number 9
Yes.

Number 10
Yes.

[Kalepha]

Nate, would you agree that "self-observable numerical identities" are preserved if an original is destroyed and replaced with a duplicate? Where the original willfully chose beforehand to be duplicated in case of destruction.

No. I wouldn't agree. Although both are nearly qualitatively identical, they are not in fact qualitatively identical since they are not numerically identical. Numerical identity is also a qualitative property. Because the original willfully chose beforehand to be duplicated in case of destruction does not change the fact that the original and its duplicate are not perfectly qualitatively identical. Nonetheless, the original should be free to decide in this case. At most, it can only be persuaded to see the folly of its ways.

Also, do you agree with Dr. Wowk's statement "self is as self does"? Even as it pertains to the scenario described below.

If the statement is motivated by a behaviorist perspective, then I don't agree. If it pertains to Laz's scenario, then I do agree. I reconstruct that scenario in my previous post, concluding A + C <=> B + D.

Perhaps, instead, I would agree with the statement "self is as self is."

I may be mistaken, but shouldn't the copy be represented as A + < insert unique symbol > where the copy and original share A in common? Where A is the shared past history previous to the divergence point (or point of duplication).

Yes. We could let shared qualitative properties be denoted by A. If we then let B and C, for the original and the copy respectively, represent their unique self-observable numerical identities plus some other unique qualities such as a series of self-referential observer-states from the divergence point, then the original would be denoted by A + B and the copy by A + C. Since B < > C, we see that A + B < > A + C.

[justinb]

Yeah laz, I'd also hate to lose you.

-Infernity

lol

Yeah, my spelling is atrocious.

[Kalepha]

Does duplication ever preserve personhood?

Duplication bears unique personhoods, each having moral significance.

A being either has both a survivability function and a morality function or has neither function. If a being has neither function, then that being would be passive about losing its unique 'self-observable numerical identity' function if it was assured that at least one of its copies would continue on being. Remarkably the being would be assured even though its copy also has neither a survivability function nor a morality function. It cannot have both of these functions if it does not have a unique 'self-observable numerical identity' function to preserve and unique 'self-observable numerical identity' functions with whom empathize.

[Lazarus Long]

(Adi)
To the point:
Well, the thing is, if laz will turn his ways and be against immortality for some reason, the problematic thing will be- laz's word can be pretty convincing. And many might follow him

Yeah laz, I'd also hate to lose you.

Where to begin? So many issues so little time. [lol]

First off thank you (and others) for your expressions of kindness and consideration Adi . It is warmly appreciated. No fear however. I am a loyal partisan to our cause from way back, in fact since long before you were conceived. )

I do not shift conveniently in the wind like blowing leaves taking the easy path of the majority. I am flexible like the willow with ideas but deep rooted and strong like an oak when it comes to forming my commitments.

What is very pleasant for me though and deserves mention, is how long I have waited to share my thoughts and feelings with a like minded community. What for many of you seemed like eternity was measured in a few years but for me the struggle for recognition of our meme has already endured decades.

Yes it feels very good to be among those that can actually *think* about and *responsibly act on* what we are together creating. Have no fear that I am capricious in this respect. Please realize that I too would greatly miss any of you we lose as well and the loss of any one of us is felt by me as a loss personally and a setback to our cause.

Beware that the future holds the promise of great suffering as the odds are against us but I should also say that I try to take great pleasure from the celebration of life that is so strong in most of you I have met here. A passion for *purpose,* a lust for accomplishment and a true zeal for sharing our common goal with one another and the world. I would feel the loss of many of you as I would that of my own biological family but I try to experience the joy each day of *knowing you* one and all.

Also while I admire Socrates greatly it should be noted that he chose the hemlock not out of some disdain "spiritually”, but out of a precisely rational and very secular disgust at the corruption, hypocrisy and social decay of the community he loved, had helped defend, and built. It wasn’t out of some *belief* in an afterlife or any kind of heavenly reward or redemption but out of a view that he should demonstrate that he would not be manipulated by threats on matters of principle. It was his integrity that became his undoing, but it was also his personal and intellectual integrity that has helped preserve his memory as exemplary of an integral aspect of Western Social Memetics and ethical principle since.

[Kalepha]

My previous post should be amended.

I maintain my conclusion and additionally acknowledge the possibilities that a being can also have one or the other of the survivability and morality functions. In principle, a being is not restricted to having just both or not having either. This considered, we see that we still run into problems if our philosophy of mind, or personhood theory, is not rigorously derived.

If a being has a survivability function, regardless of whether it has a morality function or not, then by definition it has a unique 'self-observable numerical identity preservation' function (please be sure to scan "preservation," as you are probably tired of reading its preceding phrase) and thus will not allow this function's failure as it desists while a similar qualitative identity persists. Such a being, therefore, does not elicit an expected utility of being dispensable or creating dispensable replacements.

If a being has a morality function, regardless of whether it has an explicitly embedded survivability function, then by definition it empathizes with unique 'self-observable numerical identity preservation' functions and thus will not allow any of those functions failures, regardless whether similar or very different qualitative identities are lying around. Such a being, therefore, does not elicit, regardless of circumstance, an expected utility of the dispensability of any being with a self-observable numerical identity.

Just because we are machines and our machines are machines does not mean that any of us are free from pulling ourselves up by our own bootstraps. Functionalism is not a denial of robust personhoods to overcompensate for the intuition failures of mind-body dualists.

[Lazarus Long]

(Cosmos)
Laz:
QUOTE 
If a copy of *you* existed and apart you had led two entirely different lives but upon meeting one of you lived and the other died but together go forward in one body with two sets of overlapping memories how would either ever distinguish who really *owned * the body you would together by your perception be inhabiting?

****

Assume both individuals previously arranged for the merger in case of either one's imminent death. Also assume that both individuals were aware of the implications of the merger. Given these conditions, wouldn't you then agree that they are at least partially preserved in the body of one subjective observer?

Yes that might be but it is also not the scenario I was presenting.

However I could see how a *tag* (like a distinguishing scar or tatoo) could be used to mark the physical body that continued but my point was more subtle in that once memory is shared it would become almost impossible to distinguish which memory was yours and which is the other *you*.

One aspect of the problem derives from what Nate was asking me to clarify. It is the confusion of cloning and copying in my opinon. Cloning could even theoretically reproduce maternal mtDNA. It is physically possible now to have more than one copy of you, identical twins. Obviously these two physical copies live their own lives and do not merge psychologically but if they could what would allow for the assimilated memories to distinguish themselves from the previous ones?

I was raising the question of chronological order and this again relates to Nate's question.

(Nate)
QUOTE (Lazarus Long)
I do not see the validity of a claim of prima facia (unique originality) existence once the question of copies enters the discussion.

****

Perhaps I don't understand what you mean here. Once the question of copies enters the discussion, it seems no less than pertinent to evoke the 'numerical identity' and 'qualitative identity' notions. Each side of a numerical identity equation theoretically is very flexible. The nature of its flexibility shouldn't mean that it's irrelevant in this sort of discussion.

I didn't mean to suggest irrelevant as in unimportant but that it may be impossible to distinguish for some of the same paradoxical reasons as we encounter in the observers paradox in Special Relativity.

You see the main claim to who is the *original* and who is the *copy* have to do with the order of creation or existence. This is a claim predicated on a linear space/time and while true within a given system begins to fail with the lack of a universal constant space/time.

Why?

Very simply because time is a relative factor.

Try superimposing the copy paradox on Einstein's twins' paradox.

In that model twins created at the same time would be separated in time and thus they would experience different chronological rates.

Now let's play that game with the idea copy and original.

Oh one point first.

Cosmos you are correct to suggest that by this model we are talking about how the copy and original share a common personhood to the moment of the creation of distinct copy. In that moment both go forward *perceiving* separate realities but until that moment their experience would be indistinguishably coincident and that is why I said it may be impossible to tell the difference between the copy and original *subjectively* (aside from physical markers like *spin states* or other distinguishing *objective* characteristics).

We are however creating competing models and they are predicated on slightly different conditions.

What if the original is assimilated into the copy?

Is the unified original/copy the original or copy?

Now ask the opposite. What if the copy were assimilated into the original?

Why is that any different a type of fusion of original/copy?

If the question revolves around a logic of A’ being the original then all copies contain A’ and diverge only after they go forward from that point. That is why this is NOT like cloning a physical body. A’ ( A prime for lack of a better designator) could even be the basis of later convergence from multiple copies theoretically since they possess a core *sense* of origin psychologically. Divergence for the copy is only the experience after the copy exists and from the moment a copy exists neither can claim to be a perfect *original* and that is why I was in a sense dismissing the point as a non issue.

Actually it is physically possible to distinguish on the basis of atomic age but then again you enter that strange realm of Special Relativity that I was referring to but Justin predicated this analysis on even creating identical spin states.

(JustinB)
Number 3
Do you believe that a copy of you (down to the last spin state) is subjectively you? (Meaning your consciousness will be carried on in the copy; i.e. you wont die.)

(EDIT 1)

Added (To clarify, subjectively doesn't counts. You need to follow it to its logical conclusion.) to Number 2

This post has been edited by justinb on Oct 10 2005-11:05

Now Justin you are trying to have it both ways and frankly it is you that is not being logically consistent.

BTW as to the confusion and fallacy of the soul you also have that backwards too.

It is the fallacy of the soul that asserts individual personhood as unique and impossible to copy. If the idea of mind is predicated on a information theory, memory, sensory awareness and the cognitive processing of personality based on what amounts to algorithmic learning then of course we can be copied. I suggest to you strong AI is predicated on this idea of consciousness as information being true and basically only the human hubris of self identification based on some kind soul apart from the mind/body dependence is a means of getting out of the dilemma.

The only *objective* claim of originality if a copy *could* be created would be either the chronology of the material substrate or a metaphysical claim outside of the material to a principle of the soul. I am not advocating this but I want you to offer a measure for materials that are not subject to space/time relativity. If you are seeking a measure that is not dependent on physics then apart from the conflicts of MWT what do you apply as criteria?

Psychological determinism?

The problem of defining the self is that almost all measures are subjective and as such a copy and the original can claim equal *values.* Such equivalence from not just an ethical perspective but a practical logic one indicates that both can claim to be the *original*. Whether this means they diverge or can converge or that any number of copies could diverge and then converge into a super consciousness is all really a separate discussion.

[Infernity]

(Adi)
To the point:
Well, the thing is, if laz will turn his ways and be against immortality for some reason, the problematic thing will be- laz's word can be pretty convincing. And many might follow him

Yeah laz, I'd also hate to lose you.

Where to begin? So many issues so little time. [lol]

First off thank you (and others) for your expressions of kindness and consideration Adi . It is warmly appreciated. No fear however. I am a loyal partisan to our cause from way back, in fact since long before you were conceived. )

I do not shift conveniently in the wind like blowing leaves taking the easy path of the majority. I am flexible like the willow with ideas but deep rooted and strong like an oak when it comes to forming my commitments.

What is very pleasant for me though and deserves mention, is how long I have waited to share my thoughts and feelings with a like minded community. What for many of you seemed like eternity was measured in a few years but for me the struggle for recognition of our meme has already endured decades.

Yes it feels very good to be among those that can actually *think* about and *responsibly act on* what we are together creating. Have no fear that I am capricious in this respect. Please realize that I too would greatly miss any of you we lose as well and the loss of any one of us is felt by me as a loss personally and a setback to our cause.

Beware that the future holds the promise of great suffering as the odds are against us but I should also say that I try to take great pleasure from the celebration of life that is so strong in most of you I have met here. A passion for *purpose,* a lust for accomplishment and a true zeal for sharing our common goal with one another and the world. I would feel the loss of many of you as I would that of my own biological family but I try to experience the joy each day of *knowing you* one and all.

Also while I admire Socrates greatly it should be noted that he chose the hemlock not out of some disdain "spiritually”, but out of a precisely rational and very secular disgust at the corruption, hypocrisy and social decay of the community he loved, had helped defend, and built. It wasn’t out of some *belief* in an afterlife or any kind of heavenly reward or redemption but out of a view that he should demonstrate that he would not be manipulated by threats on matters of principle. It was his integrity that became his undoing, but it was also his personal and intellectual integrity that has helped preserve his memory as exemplary of an integral aspect of Western Social Memetics and ethical principle since.

Awww [!]


Heh. however, as I said in my intro, I don't remember myself not wanting to not die... I mean, I always had this little thing inside my wanted to live forever, till I realized that's not much of possible, and now I would like to live without limits ) . That's 14 and a half years...

For how long are you an immortalist?

-Infernity

[Lazarus Long]

I was about 12 (that's forty years ago) when I understood enough about the limitations of velocity and enormity of the distances involved in space travel that made longevity a requirement.

I was always (as long as I remember) a strong survivalist and intent on both extending life and making it *meaningful.*

Not long afterward I started reading Heinlein, Asimov and Greek mythology in earnest. It was all downhill after that. I was working in cryogenics with my dad for tissue preservation at about that same time.

My focus then was in determining what allowed for hibernation in mammals. I was less interested in the idea for preserving the *dead* for reanimation as in preventing death by being able to treat the untreatable in the future. I was doing this as my fathers' lab home lab assistant (my poor hamsters) even before I read authors like Andre Norton and her predictions for dismembodied brains running spaceships and cryonically suspended astronauts.

[Kalepha]

Divergence for the copy only is the experience after the copy exists and from the moment a copy exists neither can claim to be a perfect original that is why I was in a sense dismissing the point as a non issue.

Laz, we agree here, so I must have misunderstood you. In an earlier post I implied that the idea of 'an original' is irrelevant in analyzing a set of duplicates, one of which may or may not be denoted as being 'an original.'

Somehow it seems like we still disagree on other very subtle points, but I'm having great difficulty pinpointing and surfacing them. To me it still seems like you are resisting, for whatever reason, the 'self-observable numerical identity' concept and its implications.

The problem of defining the self is that almost all measures are subjective and as such a copy and the original can claim equal *values.* Such equivalence from not just an ethical perspective but a practical logic one indicates that both can claim to be the *original*. Whether this means they diverge or can converge or that any number of copies could diverge and then converge into a super consciousness is all really a separate discussion.

We both agree that identifying 'an original' is irrelevant, yet we seem to conceive different, incompatible implications. You seem to think that there would be some sort of irreconcilable conflict in a mergence of beings that previously had unique self-observable numerical identities. No sufficient conflict would exist if one evokes the concept of 'a unique series of self-referential observer-states.' Indeed, perhaps no sufficient conflict would exist if we would acknowledge the more precise notions of 'numerical identity' and 'qualitative identity' in the first place.

Please observe Diagram 1.



At the outset, here, it's presumed that it's uncontroversial that, regardless how intelligent a being is, its observer-states proceed at a slower rate than its process-states. It is also presumed that we are only concerned with a proximal location in spacetime such that space and time are shared as independent variables. If space and time, indicators of qualitative properties, cannot be shared as independent variables between any qualitative identities in N, then no qualitative identity in N can merge with any other qualitative identity in N. If objection is found in these presumptions, then we must understand each other and come to an agreement at this level or else go our separate ways until some other time but in acknowledging that we are doing this so that we are not playing games in the realm of tacitness.

Otherwise, let:

• t denote proximal time
• t₁ and t₃ denote an arbitrary beginning and end, respectively, for our analysis
• t₂ denote the time of mergence
• s denote proximal space (it's negligibly affected by time)
• s₁, s₂, s₃ each denote unique spacetime locations
• p₁, p₂, p₃ each denote unique beings
• gray areas denote process-states
• white segments denote unit observer-states
• R₁, R₂, R₃ each denote a unique series of self-referential observer-states

If interpreted in the way intended, the diagram simultaneously depicts the nature of any self-observable numerical identity and of any series of self-referential observer-states.

Explicitly, Diagram 1 demonstrates mergence between p₁ and p₂ at t₂. Whether or not p₁ or p₂ regard the other as sufficiently qualitatively identical, they are not in fact precisely qualitatively identical because they are not numerically identical. They are not numerically identical because s₁ along t₁ to t₂ is a qualitatively distinct property from s₂ along t₁ to t₂. Also, it's explicitly demonstrated, along t up until t₂, R₃ does not exist.

Under the intended interpretation, Diagram 1 subtly demonstrates the problem with believing that sufficient conflicts arise from mergence or that there being arbitrarily similar qualitative identities warrants destruction of any particular qualitative identity of arbitrary similarity. Understanding 'series of self-referential observer-states' as 'self-observable numerical identity' is crucial.

In considering a mergence, there is no sufficient conflict within p₃, because what's important is that any particular one of its observer-states, part of the series beginning at t₂, can reference observer-states occurring prior to t₂ with just as much or more fidelity as either p₁ or p₂ would independently. If subtle contradictions in beliefs arise from referencing prior-t₂ observer-states, that's hardly any different than how we experience inconsistent beliefs now. We simply exploit our process-states, for better or for worse, in the dogged struggle for resolve.

Directing my attention more to cosmos, in considering the scenario where p₁ or p₂ believe the other is sufficiently qualitatively identical, if one or the other is destroyed without mergence, then a unique series of self-referential observer-states – an entirely distinct, morally significant being of self-observable numerical identity – goes along with it, into oblivion.

[th3hegem0n]

Number 1
Do you believe in (a) God?
No. See my blog for a recent explanation.

Number 2
Do you believe in Free Will? (To clarify, subjectively doesn't counts. You need to follow it to its logical conclusion.)
No, but technically, my argument is the last post in the Free Will thread in the philosophy section.

Number 3
Do you believe that a copy of you (down to the last spin state) is subjectively you? (Meaning your consciousness will be carried on in the copy; i.e. you wont die.)
I can't even imagine.

Number 4
Do you believe that you will be able to live forever?
Belief isn't really a good word here.

Number 5

Do you believe in life after physical death?
No.

Number 6

Do you believe the universe is predetermined?
I don't think it's strictly known based on current physics theory, but it seems so, yes.

Number 7

Do you believe that cryonauts will be revived to their original selves? (Within the parameters of personality and continuity.)
Hopefully, again, the science seems inconclusive...

Number 8

Do you believe the singularity (the surpassing of current human intelligence among immortalists) will occur within this century?
Absolutely.

Number 9

Do you belive nanotechnology will be significantly developed (being able to manufactor objects with molecular precision) within this century?
Absolutely.

Number 10

Do you believe that strong A.I. will be developed within this century?
Absolutely.

[th3hegem0n]

logically incoherent (it is a paradox to be both omnipotent and able to create a rock one cannot lift)

Actually it is impossible by definition for something *infinitely* powerful to create something that is too heavy for it to lift. You can't create something [more than] infinitely heavy (let alone infinite at all).

[Kalepha]

You know what 'paradox' means, I'm sure. If a being is omnipotent, then by definition that being can create a rock it can't lift. If that being can't lift a rock, then it's not omnipotent. The being is omnipotent. Therefore, the being is not omnipotent. Paradox.

'More than infinite' and 'less than infinite' are meaningless. 'Omnipotence' isn't, for it means 'the state of being able to do anything.'

[jaydfox]

Nate, I think you're splitting a hair that doesn't matter. In computer science, an oracle is a black box of sorts than can decide any question relating to a Turing Machine. For example, the halting problem. In the world of Turing Machines, the oracle is "omnipotent".

Perhaps you're thinking of omnipotent as the hypothetical algorithm one might write for a Turing Machine that can solve the halting problem. Yes, that hypothetical program does not exist, because it creates a paradox from within the system. The oracle by definition is outside the system, so there's no paradox.

Of course, there are higher level problems which involve not just the Turing Machine, but a Turing Machine in conjunction with an oracle. There exist problems in such a setup that cannot be decided by an oracle (though they could be decided by an even higher level oracle), so in that sense, the oracle can't decide "everything". But it can decide everything that involves only the TM.

God may not be able to create a rock he can't lift, or impose a law on himself he can't break. But that's because you're using feedback. Within the physical universe, he can do anything. Creating a rock he can't lift doesn't count because that isn't doing something in the universe only, it's doing something in the universe-God combined system. God can do anything he wants in and to the universe. He just can't do anything he wants insofar as it might violate restrictions set by himself. Nothing within the system limits his options, nor restricts his power, unless he himself placed it there.

In the strictest sense, true omnipotence is logically impossible, but omnipotence within a system is not.

[Kalepha]

In the strictest sense, true omnipotence is logically impossible, but omnipotence within a system is not.

Jay, I agree. The idea is to try understanding whether or not the concept 'God' makes sense. There is no contention that a being could have created the physical universe as we know it. But this is consistent with being in a universe-as-we-know-it within a universe-as-we-don't-know-it that wasn't created by a relatively omnipotent being. So then we're back to trying to understand whether or not 'God' makes sense. Suppose a thing g makes sense if and only if the highest-order predicate of g is 'can't do anything it wants insofar as it might violate restrictions set by itself' and if that predicate makes sense in all cases. If g is God, I don't think God makes sense. I don't think ⌜g can't do anything it wants insofar as it might violate restrictions set by itself⌝ makes sense in all cases, since it doesn't make sense in the case that it creates a law with its power and then can't break that law with its power.

[psudoname]

Number 1
Do you believe in (a) God?

No.

There is no way to prove that the univerce was not created by some entity, perhaps as a computer simulation or in a physics experiment. However it is less plausible that this entity would be any of the gods worshipped today. In fact the old norse or greek gods are more plausible as the problem or why an all powerfull god would allow suffering is answered. Zeus would find our suffering and struggles highly amusing. Christainty has a big problem with this by believing in an all loving and forgiveful god.
If we are in a computer simulation, then perhaps an analogy would be Big Brother. In this case god is more likely to be voyuristic, not all-loving.
As far as the physics experiment idear goes, I have heard that the new LHC particle accellerator will actually create tiny black holes that will evapourate in hawking radiation before they do any damage. There is also a theory (compleatly unproven) that the creation of every black hole is mirrored by the creation of an offspring univerce.
Put these theorys together and the LHC will be creating univerces and everyone who contributed to it (including by paying tax) will be a god.
Not that we would know for certain whether these univeces existed, nor would we be able to influence events inside them.

It may in fact be extreamly likly that the univerce was created. But not by traditional gods, and since there is no evidence one was or te other, it's fairly irrelivent.

I don't find the argument about creating a rock too big to lift a plausible way to disprove god. It's just a paradox.



Number 2
Do you believe in Free Will? (To clarify, subjectively doesn't counts. You need to follow it to its logical conclusion.)

Yes, but I am uncertain.


Number 3
Do you believe that a copy of you (down to the last spin state) is subjectively you? (Meaning your consciousness will be carried on in the copy; i.e. you wont die.)

No.

An exact copy is immpossible because of quantum uncertaincy for one thing. This applied regardless of whether Penrose's theory about conciousness being a quantum effect is correct.
I think an approximate copy would not be you. For one thing, what would happen if you made two copies? Would there be two copies of you?
However even if uploading can not be done by copying, the brain could still be rebuilt with nanotech which I think would allow the transition from a natural organic body to an artificial one, while retaining what makes you you.

Number 4
Do you believe that you will be able to live forever?

Well I've done enough pure maths to know that you can't reach infinity, only tend towards it.
And there are problems with that, like the second law of thermodynamics.
Living for a vast ammout of time (longer then stars) is certainly possible, but nowhere near certain as grey goo or nuclear war etc are also possible.
As for the question of would you get bored, I suspect the number of interesting things to do is infinite. For one thing, try playing chess in N dimentions, with X types of pieces and Y squares. Then let N, X, Y tend to infinity.
Alternativly, just switch off the part of your brain that deals with bordom and bliss out. You may say that is a pointless exestence but there are people who do this at the moment and they seem to enjoy it.

Interestingly, if you lived an infinite ammount of time, you would meet an infinite number of monkeys who would write hamlet, and that would be really weird.

Even if you got rid of all the monkeys (not very nice thing to do) more would pop into existance through random quantum fluctuations.

We will probbly only know if all these problems of bordom, thermodynamics, monkeys etc. can be solved after the singularity

Number 5

Do you believe in life after physical death?

No, see q1

Number 6

Do you believe the universe is predetermined?

no

Number 7

Do you believe that cryonauts will be revived to their original selves? (Within the parameters of personality and continuity.)

Probbly not. Regardless of philosophical problems, the ammount of damage involved in dying and being frozen must be massive. Still, as long as there's any hope it's better then being buried.

Number 8

Do you believe the singularity (the surpassing of current human intelligence among immortalists) will occur within this century?

Yes, see below

Number 9

Do you belive nanotechnology will be significantly developed (being able to manufactor objects with molecular precision) within this century?

Yes, see below

Number 10

Do you believe that strong A.I. will be developed within this century?

Yes.

Questions 8-10 are linked, in that any SI would be able to design nanotech very quickly, and nanotechnology would quickly be able to build any hardware that we could invent. Therefore the invention of one will probly lead to the invention of the other very quickly. Possibly later the same afternoon.

2020 seems to be a popular guess for when this will happen, based on moore's law. It could be delayed by the brain being more complicated then we think (e.g. penrose's quantum theory), but I doubt even this would dely it more then a decade or two.

What could delay it far more is human stupidity. Most people are bioconservative. More people in the US belive in creationism then evolution. The whole transhumanist movement may be driven underground, which would slow or even stop the singularity. If some countries ban transhumanism and others don't, this could lead to war, which would also slow the singularity. Nuclear or biological war is one of the few things that could perhaps stop the singularity happening this century, though even if civiliseation collasped some people would probbly survive in bunkers or remote places and would enevtually rebuild.

Let's hope for the best, but perhaps prepare for the worst.

[justinb]

Lazarus

It is the fallacy of the soul that asserts individual personhood as unique and impossible to copy. If the idea of mind is predicated on a information theory, memory, sensory awareness and the cognitive processing of personality based on what amounts to algorithmic learning then of course we can be copied.

Laz,

We are temporal beings. Consciousness cannot happen under a certain threshold of time. Thus, all we are is physical states changing from time to time. A copy of you, down to the lowest level possible, will just be another person that has very similar experiances as you do. Your "self" will not be carried on, since your "self" is time dependant. Of course, this goes back to free will. If you believe in absolute freewill, that "you" can choose something or not and that "your" choice is not determined by physics, than you will never come around to the scientific side of things when it comes to the self, and many other things that are tied intimately to yourself... namely.. your perception and classification of reality. [tung]

Edited by justinb, 01 January 2006 - 12:44 AM.

[liorrh]

1:
no
2:
yes
3:
no
4:
no
5:
no
6:
no
7:
no
8:
no
9:
yes
10:
what is the difference between 10 and 8 again?

[chubtoad]

1: no
2: yes
3: yes
4: no
5: no
6: by whom!
7: no I don't think there is a continued self. I'm a different person than the one who started this response.
8: yes
9: no
10: yes

[liorrh]

PS there is an interesting article on what is self - neurologically in scientific american. apparently there are brain regions connected to self

[justinb]

what is the difference between 10 and 8 again?

liorrh,

A particular human can become smarter than he or she is now, through intelligence augmentation.

It is conceivable, but not likely before the so-called singularity, that certain humans with reach and surpass the current hights of intellect... (200 on a set of tests measuring global g) through some type of surgery...

Imagine if we augmented a few hundred Immortalists to the level of 200 or more... that would definitely not only help the Immortal meme, but also the rest of the world...

Edited by justinb, 02 January 2006 - 10:06 AM.

[DJS]

Nice questionaire Justin.

Number 1
Do you believe in (a) God?

No, for all of the reasons stated above.

Number 2
Do you believe in Free Will? (To clarify, subjectively doesn't counts. You need to follow it to its logical conclusion.)

No, I do not believe in 'classical Free Will' as that would require a causa sui (first cause) that could only come in the form of an immaterial (and completely unsupported as a concept) soul. I do however believe in volitional free will which consists of increasing our potential range of actions through a number of means. This type of free will often goes under the heading of *compatibilism*, and I do believe that it is, and will continue to be, of great significance.

Experiencing 'free will' or even just 'will' (if one refuses to allow latent values to corrupt their perspective) subjectively may be indicative of the fact that no system can have a complete and comprehensive understanding of its inner workings (ala Godel's incompleteness theorem, etc) and thus will always experience moments of 'surprise' when committing to a reevaluation of its actions.

Number 3
Do you believe that a copy of you (down to the last spin state) is subjectively you? (Meaning your consciousness will be carried on in the copy; i.e. you wont die.)

Yes. Objectively speaking, there is no such thing as a distinct point in space/time so using such a criteria as part of an identity theory would seem to be arbitrary IMO.

IOW, in order for an entity's spaciotemporal location to be relevent to its identity (its internal constituency) it would have to be able to actually objectively define it. Since I do not see this as possible I do not agree with Nate's notion of identity theory, though admittedly I am still fuzzy on some of the details and will try to better acquiant myself with his arguments.

Number 4
Do you believe that you will be able to live forever?

I understand and agree with Ken's distinction here. If what you are meaning to ask is "Do I believe that I will be able to indefinitely extend my life span" then I would have to say that I honestly don't know. I do, however, believe it is physically and logically possible.

Number 5

Do you believe in life after physical death?

No. There is absolutely no evidence for such a belief.

Number 6

Do you believe the universe is predetermined?

No. I do not believe that 'predeterminism' is a coherent concept philosophically.

Number 7

Do you believe that cryonauts will be revived to their original selves? (Within the parameters of personality and continuity.)

I honestly don't know. I believe that a legitimate restoration of cryonauts is a logical possibility.

Number 8

Do you believe the singularity (the surpassing of current human intelligence among immortalists) will occur within this century?

Once again, I honestly don't know but I do believe that a singular technological event happening on this planet is highly probable. I am just exceedingly vary of 'believing in' time frames.

Number 9

Do you belive nanotechnology will be significantly developed (being able to manufactor objects with molecular precision) within this century?

See 8

Number 10

Do you believe that strong A.I. will be developed within this century?

See 8.

[bgwowk]

I only just noticed Laz's post from back in October when he said

My focus then was in determining what allowed for hibernation in mammals. I was less interested in the idea for preserving the *dead* for reanimation as in preventing death by being able to treat the untreatable in the future.

The only difference between life and death under ideal conditions is a few minutes of cerebral ischemic injury, sometimes even less than that. (Doctors will sometimes "call the code" on conscious patients undergoing CPR when the heart can't be restarted.) Being pronouced dead in medicine is like being pronounced married in law. It's a legal event based upon a judgement call about the appropriateness of continuing care, not a metaphysical event. In the words of intensive care expert Dr. David Crippen,

"Cardiac death isn't a diagnosis of death, it is a prognosis of death."

The problem I have with what you wrote, Laz, is that you make it sound like the idea of cryonics is not to treat the presently-untreatable in the future, but something more difficult. In fact the idea of cryonics IS to treat the presently-untreatable in the future. Whether cryonics is worth doing by grabbing patients as soon contemporary medicine releases them is a question of whether a few minutes of ischemic injury is itself just another one of those presently-untreatable conditions that will be treatable in the future. A cursory examination of known mechanisms of cerebral ischemic injury and progress already made suggests the answer is "yes".

---BrianW

Edited by bgwowk, 06 January 2006 - 06:02 AM.

[Clifford Greenblatt]

Number 3
Do you believe that a copy of you (down to the last spin state) is subjectively you?  (Meaning your consciousness will be carried on in the copy; i.e. you wont die.)

The problem with speaking about a copy of a person that is accurate to the last spin state is that a person's physical form is continually changing. So, you may further specify that the copy is accurate to the last spin state over a certain period of time. We still have the problem of defining what is the person and what is peripheral to the person. Does a barber turn you into a different person by cutting your hair? The fact that this question continues to be kicked around indicates that science is still in a great state of ignorance concerning sentience, or what David Chalmers calls the "hard problem." If sentience were well defined, then there would be no need to specify the accuracy of a copy to subatomic precision. If sentience is a natural phenomenon, then the sentience of a person could be reduced to a formula which would allow a wide range of possibilities in its manifestation. On the other hand, if sentience cannot possibly be explained by means of intelligent information, then no such formula could ever exist. We could become highly advanced in AI but never get anywhere with artificial sentience. Intelligence can be developed and shared on a community level, but sentience is very personal.

[Grail]

Number 1
Do you believe in (a) God?

A: Not in any traditional sense no.

Number 2
Do you believe in Free Will?

A: Not currently no.

Number 3
Do you believe that a copy of you (down to the last spin state) is subjectively you? (Meaning your consciousness will be carried on in the copy; i.e. you wont die.)

A: No

Number 4
Do you believe that you will be able to live forever?

A: No

Number 5
Do you believe in life after physical death?

A: No, which is why I am here... [thumb]

Number 6
Do you believe the universe is predetermined?

A: No

Number 7
Do you believe that cryonauts will be revived to their original selves? (Within the parameters of personality and continuity.)

A: Current cryonauts? I don't know. Maybe in the future.

Number 8
Do you believe the singularity (the surpassing of current human intelligence among immortalists) will occur within this century?

A: There is the probability that it could, but also that it could not. I would be wary of labelling any of the answers from 8-10 with a definite yes or no.

Number 9
Do you belive nanotechnology will be significantly developed (being able to manufactor objects with molecular precision) within this century?

A: Refer to 8.

Number 10
Do you believe that strong A.I. will be developed within this century?

A: Also refer to 8.