104 replies to this topic

[Pointdexter]

Everyone here sounds as if consciousness were explained (I know, there were entire books written, but they were all rather futile). [wis]

The problem is that we don’t really understand anything about consciousness, and that means the Identity problem is left somewhat unaffected. We don’t really know if there’s a NCC (Neural Correlate for Consciousness) or if consciousness is a consequence of the entire physiology of the brain. We don’t really know if consciousness occurs at a quantum mechanical level, or if the pattern really does determine everything.

We haven’t really figured it out yet, so we can’t go about saying that duplications, or uploads, or any other idea that states identity can be transferred, will be YOU.

[justinb]

Brian,

If you killed the original than you killed the original... the copy would carry on living, but not the original. I think you are making assumptions here. I have never been killed or have been copied. I am the same person, just changing and adapting. If a copy of me was made and then I was killed... I would die and the copy would be walking around. A copy of me wasn't made two minutes ago and a copy of me isn't going to be made in the next two minutes. Your thought experiment is not sound because it never has happened and I doubt it ever will happen, plus continuity defines awareness. I was alive two minutes ago and I am alive now. If all of my molecules in my brain where ripped apart suddenly and then put back together, I would die. When the molecules come back together a new me would exist. I am defined temporally, and temporally alone. You cannot be destroyed and then "recreated." The recreation would be a "consciousness" that comes into existence. It wont be me. If I gradually changed into something else, which is that I am doing right now, then I would live. Which is what I am doing right now, living.

The laws of physics tell us that the revived person will insist they survived in every case.

I insist that I am conscious, you can't prove that I am. And, of course, that person would insist they survived in every case. Just like a line of code that is copied and pasted would, if it could. This is one problem I have with uploading. How would we ever know for absolute certain that I didn't die during the process and that a new person came into existence? Please don't confuse personality and pattern with what constitutes me. Like I said earlier, I am a temporal being. Just because I am very similar from time period to time period doesn't mean the pattern is what creates me. To me, that idea is just another belief in a "soul." A pattern working through a temporal framework in the way it is doing now is what defines me.

I could make a thousand exact copies of me, and I would still be here, typing away. Although "I" would be able to do a lot of things. [lol]

Edited by justinb, 07 December 2005 - 09:49 PM.

[bgwowk]

photon wrote:

The problem is that we don’t really understand anything about consciousness, and that means the Identity problem is left somewhat unaffected.... We haven’t really figured it out yet, so we can’t go about saying that duplications, or uploads, or any other idea that states identity can be transferred, will be YOU.

Your point is somewhat valid about uploading, but it doesn't apply to duplication. All you need to understand duplication is the assumption of materialism. In other words, assume that consciousness is the product of some particular physical process. It doesn't matter what the details of the process are. If consciousness is the result of a physical process, and only a physical process, then wherever that physical process recurs, the same subjective feeling must recur. Either this is true, or materialism is incorrect and there is a supernatural basis to consciousness.

For further insight into this issue, Google "p-zombie". Materialism says there is no such thing as a p-zombie.

justinb wrote:

If you killed the original then you killed the original... the copy would carry on living, but not the original.

You are still caught in the trap of begging the question. The copy of the OBJECT carries on living, and the original OBJECT is destroyed. The PERSON continues. We agree on what happens to the object. The question is what happens TO THE PERSON. I am saying that personhood by nature is not bound to a particular object. You are operating with a bad axiom.

Your thought experiment is not sound because continuity defines awareness. I was alive two minutes ago and I am alive now.

So continuity defines personal awareness? Then does sleep destroy you? Anesthesia? Coma? Loss of brain function? Biostasis? Where do you draw the line, and why?

The thought experiments I proposed are emminently doable with advanced nanotechnology. You don't even need external nanotechnology for some of them. As I already said, the experiment of replacing the atoms inside someone while they are unconscious has already been done.

---BrianW

[justinb]

You are still caught in the trap of begging the question. The copy of the OBJECT carries on living, and the original OBJECT is destroyed. The PERSON continues. We agree on what happens to the object. The question is what happens TO THE PERSON. I am saying that personhood by nature is not bound to a particular object. You are operating with a bad axiom.

I believe the above is an exampe of a belief in a soul. The object and the person are the same...

The thought experiments I proposed are emminently doable with advanced nanotechnology. You don't even need external nanotechnology for some of them. As I already said, the experiment of replacing the atoms inside someone while they are unconscious has already been done.

Heh heh, we have atoms coming and going all the time when we are conscious... I don't see your point.

So continuity defines personal awareness? Then does sleep destroy you? Anesthesia? Coma? Loss of brain function? Biostasis? Where do you draw the line, and why?

Yes. I believe you think I mean continuity of a certain type of awareness. I am talking about continuity of self as defined by your neurological state from time to time. I am the "same" person when I am asleep, under the knife, did or did not take my Adderall, etc.

[bgwowk]

I believe the above is an exampe of a belief in a soul.

Nothing supernatural about it. I'm saying a person is a physical phenomenon, not a particular object.

The object and the person are the same...

If I play a song, would you say that the vibrating air molecules and the song are the same? Are you saying that if you experience the sensation of seeing red, that you can never experience that sensation again unless the SAME photons interact with the SAME retina atoms and same brain atoms? You know from experience that this is not true.

It makes no sense to say the object and person are the same because you ARE NOT the same object you were a few weeks ago. Even on that timescale, the majority of your atoms have been replaced. To equate personhood with particular matter is to deny our own biology.

---BrianW

[Pointdexter]

For further insight into this issue, Google "p-zombie". Materialism says there is no such thing as a p-zombie.

I did read some of those articles about philosophical zombies, and I do see the inconsistencies. By the way, John Searle believes otherwise - his belief in the prosthetic brain experiment is that eventually you will lose your awareness when enough neurons get replaced, and that if you get asked a question while the operation is taking place, you will feel that another person answers for you - you actually, but you'll have no control over it. I do, however, stick with the idea that Searle's view is illogical. [thumb]

[Kalepha]

Justin, when you've lost an argument, you've lost. Jesus.

I do disagree with Brian on at least one other thing, however.

We shouldn't be any more philosophically disturbed by different versions of ourselves operating in different regions of space at the same time than we are disturbed by the knowledge that different versions of ourselves operate at different times at the same places in space.

Sure we should be disturbed. Self-observable numerical identity, the crucial process of personhood, is a configuration that doesn't deviate from non-overlapping self-referential observer-states. If you want to believe that a set of duplicates is you, that's fine, as long as they share the same topology and your higher-order consciousness (you'd necessarily be smarter than a single one of your nodes) accounts for all their observer-states, culminating as a series of non-overlapping self-referential observer-states.

[chubtoad]

Nate, I don't understand your lingo have you defined it all on a different thread? Can you post a link?

[Kalepha]

The meanings of word combinations are deducible, and I'm sure the component words are already in your vocabulary. Any other non-obvious terms should already be obvious to those who care about the subject of personhood theory.

[bgwowk]

Yes, per the link posted by cosmos, I believe self-observable numerical identity (the perception of ourself as one person) exists in each and every copy. Self-observable numerical identity persists through copying by the subjective perception of randomly waking in only one of the copies. That doesn't mean that only one copy becomes the "real" copy, and the rest are p-zombies. It's just the trivial observation that every copy will wake feeling like there was no particular reason they woke in that body.

By the way, one of the reasons I get upset with claims that p-zombies can exist (especially biologically human p-zombies) is that such beliefs are a form of racism. They are like justifying slavery with beliefs that Africans weren't real people with real feelings. In the same vein, I fear awful injustice if after certain biological repairs patients are denied the rights and property claims of the "original" patients because some meddler believes they are a new person, or worse, a "soul-less" person.

---BrianW

[Kalepha]

That one may observe random dislocations in a series of duplication experiments doesn't trivialize self-observable numerical identity. The experiments would simply multiply unique self-observable numerical identities, each with a unique history and moral relevance. I would expect to end up as a persisting branch and not receive capital punishment after a duplication experiment because of an experimenter's philosophical handicaps. The experiments would cease once all particular branches got bored, though not necessarily at the same time or for the same reasons, with playing Dislocation. You're right; none of us is a p-zombie.

[John Schloendorn]

Nate,

Sure we should be disturbed. Self-observable numerical identity, the crucial process of personhood, is a configuration that doesn't deviate from non-overlapping self-referential observer-states.

So why exactly is this disturbing? In other words, why would you want to preserve self-observable numerical identity, or the form of personhood that it is crucial for?

[Kalepha]

Because arbiters might want to kill you if you are A and you and they believe you are A XOR B when in fact you are just A.

[John Schloendorn]

Is that all? I mean with a 100% effective anti-crazy-arbiter-defense shield, would you no longer care about self-observable numerical identity?

[Kalepha]

Would you want to die once you conquered death? You have no point.

[justinb]

Why can't you guys get it! If I died right now, I would be dead. The fact that an exact copy exists has no bearing on my own survival! If I evolved into that copy then I would survive, but then it wouldn't be a copy, would it?

I swear to god, every intelligent person I have spoken with becomes incredibly stupid when it comes to identity... No offense, but this is absolutely absurd! If you think I am acting this way because I want to win an argument and/or feel better, then f--k off.

It is so obvious! WHY CAN'T YOU GUYS GET IT? Honesty, you all are scaring the holy shit out of me right now.

If two exact brains existed, an original and a copy, than what would happen if one of them died?

If you guys can't get that, there is absolutely no point in going on... This whole thing is absolutely absurd.

[John Schloendorn]

No, I don't have a point, I have a question, and I still do. (if you are uncomfortable answering this, you do not need to)

[John Schloendorn]

I obviously haven't delved into the topic (into why your reasoning is faulty), and I don't want to because I see it as a waste of time

Good. So why don't you stop posting here.

[eternaltraveler]

It is so obvious! WHY CAN'T YOU GUYS GET IT? Honesty, you all are scaring the holy shit out of me right now

If two exact brains existed, an original and a copy, than what would happen if one of them died?

Obviously we believe it is you who doesn't get it.

If an exact copy of me was made down to the last spin state while I was for example in a state with zero brain activity (as is purposefully induced for some types of surgery) and the original was never brought out of that state and was destroyed, but the copy woke up feeling just fine (other than still having to take my exams tomorrow), then I would have survived. Me=database.

What is so hard to understand? (ok fine, i didn't get it for a couple years at first either ) )

[Kalepha]

No, I don't have a point, I have a question, and I still do. (if you are uncomfortable answering this, you do not need to)

Oh, I am, and I did. You probably just don't understand what I'm saying.

[justinb]

You are a neuronal superstructure that reacts to the environment. The "you" you are talking about is just a holographic process that takes place within the physically dependent system of your brain. Perceptions are a biodynamical process that are both temporally and spatially dependent. A rock that is thrown is a process that is both temporally and spatially reguired to conincide to be a rock being thrown. You are no different. I hope I make sense.

If you guys want to die so badly, than go ahead. Another me would just be another me.

I am a physical process that knows it is me, nothing else.

A physical process that knows it is a physical process.

[bgwowk]

The problem is, Justin, that you don't get the precariousness of your own existence. Your consciousness winks on and off daily, your atomic makeup is turning over constantly, and the only physical process on which to hang a hat of personal identity at all is a recurring pattern of activity because that is the only thing in this world associated with "you" that has any endurance at all. And endurance of even that is questionable over a lifetime.

Question for Nate: If a copy is not accountable for crimes committed by an original before duplication, then is the original still accountable? What if the atoms of the original are split evenly between two copies? Which one does "the time"?

---BrianW

P.S. Are we having fun yet?

[justinb]

Good. So why don't you stop posting here.

Your semantical arguments are which bother me. Logically correct but untrue. It is extremely difficult to point out semantically false arguments since the semantics in question are not my own. Get it? Good.

[justinb]

The problem is, Justin, that you don't get the precariousness of your own existence. Your consciousness winks on and off daily, your atomic makeup is turning over constantly, and the only physical process on which to hang a hat of personal identity at all is a recurring [I]pattern[I] of activity because that is the only thing in this world associated with "you" that has any endurance at all. And endurance of even that is questionable over a lifetime.

A pattern this is created by a previous state, and certainly not a seperate but identical state.

I am a series of reactions taking place within a specific time and place, I am nothing else.

[John Schloendorn]

You probably just don't understand what I'm saying

Precisely. Which is why I am asking what you're saying ;-) In particular, I fail to relate "Would you want to die once you conquered death?" to "why would you want to preserve self-observable numerical identity, or the form of personhood that it is crucial for?" and to my request to neglect the fear of being killed by others in error.

[bgwowk]

justinb wrote:

A pattern this is created by a previous state

Let's explore that. Your brain is full of natural nanomechanical hardware that changes out most atoms on a timescale of months. Instead of over months, suppose we use synthetic nanobots to replace the atoms in your brain in one night while you sleep. The original atoms are then reassembled into the justinb pattern. Come morning, will you wake in the new-atom brain, the old-atom brain, neither or both? Why?

---BrianW

[justinb]

justinb wrote:

A pattern this is created by a previous state

Let's explore that. Your brain is full of natural nanomechanical hardware that changes out most atoms on a timescale of months. Instead of over months, suppose we use synthetic nanobots to replace the atoms in your brain in one night while you sleep. The original atoms are then reassembled into the justinb pattern. Come morning, will you wake in the new-atom brain, the old-atom brain, neither or both? Why?

---BrianW

If it just speeds up what happens all the time, than of course...

What I am saying is, a seperate reaction will not be me!

Another brain out there that memics me in everyway wont preserve my consciousness.

My reactions are me! The totality of myself is the reaction! A seperate reaction wont be me!

[Kalepha]

Question for Nate: If a copy is not accountable for crimes committed by an original before duplication, then is the original still accountable? What if the atoms of the original are split evenly between two copies? Which one does "the time"?

Brian, if forensics can't prove who's accountable, that's the Government's problem. If they can enforce it, the only alternative to guessing would be to make each person instance accountable. But I don't presume that government will always be transcendent of fickle and rugged individualists whose histories can't be proven true or false but whose futures can be made more probable.

[bgwowk]

justinb wrote:

My reactions are me! The totality of myself is the reaction!

If I stop your reactions and then restart them, are you still you?

---BrianW