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Extinction Risks from A.I.

a.i. superintelligence technology survival

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#1 Julia36

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Posted 24 August 2013 - 01:10 PM


http://lesswrong.com...l_risk_from_ai/
"

Posted Image Posted Image Future of Humanity Institute Machine Intelligence Research Institute Center for Applied Rationality



Less Wrong is a community blog devoted to refining the art of human rationality. Please visit our About page for more information.



How can I reduce existential risk from AI?






Suppose you think that reducing the risk of human extinction is the highest-value thing you can do. Or maybe you want to reduce "x-risk" because you're already a comfortable First-Worlder like me and so you might as well do something epic and cool, or because you like the community of people who are doing it already, or whatever.
Suppose also that you think AI is the most pressing x-risk, because (1) mitigating AI risk could mitigate all other existential risks, but not vice-versa, and because (2) AI is plausibly the first existential risk that will occur.
In that case, what should you do? How can you reduce AI x-risk?
It's complicated, but I get this question a lot, so let me try to provide some kind of answer.

Meta-work, strategy work, and direct work

When you're facing a problem and you don't know what to do about it, there are two things you can do:
1. Meta-work: Amass wealth and other resources. Build your community. Make yourself stronger. Meta-work of this sort will be useful regardless of which "direct work" interventions turn out to be useful for tackling the problem you face. Meta-work also empowers you to do strategic work.
2. Strategy work: Purchase a better strategic understanding of the problem you're facing, so you can see more clearly what should be done. Usually, this will consist of getting smart and self-critical people to honestly assess the strategic situation, build models, make predictions about the effects of different possible interventions, and so on. If done well, these analyses can shed light on which kinds of "direct work" will help you deal with the problem you're trying to solve.
When you have enough strategic insight to have discovered some interventions that you're confident will help you tackle the problem you're facing, then you can also engage in:
3. Direct work: Directly attack the problem you're facing, whether this involves technical research, political action, particular kinds of technological development, or something else.
Thinking with these categories can be useful even though the lines between them are fuzzy. For example, you might have to do some basic awareness-raising in order to amass funds for your cause, and then once you've spent those funds on strategy work, your strategy work might tell you that a specific form of awareness-raising is useful for political action that counts as "direct work." Also, some forms of strategy work can feel like direct work, depending on the type of problem you're tackling.


Meta-work for AI x-risk reduction

Make money. Become stronger. Build a community, an audience, a movement. Store your accumulated resources in yourself, in your community, in a donor-advised fund, or in an organization that can advance your causes better than you can as an individual.

  • Make money: In the past 10 years, many people have chosen to start businesses or careers that (1) will predictably generate significant wealth they can spend on AI x-risk reduction, (2) will be enjoyable enough to "stick with it," and (3) will not create large negative externalities. But certainly, the AI x-risk reduction community needs a lot more people to do this! If you want advice, the folks at 80,000 Hours are the experts on "ethical careers" of this sort.

  • Become stronger: Sometimes it makes sense to focus on improving your productivity, your research skills, your writing skills, your social skills, etc. before you begin using those skills to achieve your goals. Example: Vladimir Nesov has done some original research, but mostly he has spent the last few years improving his math skills before diving into original research full-time.

  • Build a community / a movement: Individuals can change the world, but communities and movements can do even better, if they're well-coordinated. Read What Psychology Can Teach Us About Spreading Social Change. Launch (or improve) a Less Wrong group. Join a THINK group. Help grow and improve the existing online communities that tend to have high rates of interest in x-risk reduction: LessWrong, Singularity Volunteers, and 80,000 Hours. Help write short primers on crucial topics. To reach a different (and perhaps wealthier, more influential) audience, maybe do help with something like the Singularity Summit.

  • Develop related skills in humanity. In other words, "make humanity stronger in ways that are almost certainly helpful for reducing AI x-risk" (though strategic research may reveal they are not nearly the most helpful ways to reduce AI x-risk). This might include, for example, getting better at risk analysis with regard to other catastrophic risks, or improving our generalized forecasting abilities by making wider use of prediction markets.

  • Fund a person or organization doing (3) or (4) above. The Singularity Institute probably does more AI x-risk movement building than anyone, followed by the Future of Humanity Institute. There are lots of organizations doing things that plausibly fall under (4).
Note that if you mostly contribute to meta work, you want to also donate a small sum (say, $15/mo) to strategy work or direct work. If you only contribute to meta work for a while, an outside view (around SI, anyway) suggests there's a good chance you'll never manage to ever do anything non-meta. A perfect Bayesian agent might not optimize this way, but optimal philanthropy for human beings works differently.

Strategy work for AI x-risk reduction

How can we improve our ability to do long-term technological forecasting? Is AGI more likely to be safe if developed sooner (Goertzel & Pitt 2012) or later (Muehlhauser & Salamon 2012)? How likely is hard takeoff vs. soft takeoff? Could we use caged AGIs or WBEs to develop safe AGIs or WBEs? How might we reduce the chances of an AGI arms race (Shulman 2009)? Which interventions should we prioritize now, to reduce AI x-risk?
These questions and many others have received scant written analysis — unless you count the kind of written analysis that is (1) written with much vagueness and ambiguity, (2) written in the author's own idiosyncratic vocabulary, (3) written with few citations to related work, and is (4) spread across a variety of non-linear blog articles, forum messages, and mailing list postings. (The trouble with that kind of written analysis is that it is mostly impenetrable or undiscoverable to most researchers, especially the ones who are very busy because they are highly productive and don't have time to comb through 1,000 messy blog posts.)
Here, then, is how you might help with strategy work for AI x-risk reduction:

Direct work for AI x-risk reduction

We are still at an early stage in doing strategy work on AI x-risk reduction. Because of this, most researchers in the field feel pretty uncertain about which interventions would be most helpful for reducing AI x-risk. Thus, they focus on strategic research, so they can purchase more confidence about which interventions would be helpful.
Despite this uncertainty, I'll list some interventions that at least some people have proposed for mitigating AI x-risk, focusing on the interventions that are actionable today.
  • Safe AGI research? Many proposals have been made for developing AGI designs with internal motivations beneficial to humans — including Friendly AI (Yudkowsky 2008) and GOLEM (Goertzel 2010) — but researchers disagree about which approaches are most promising (Muehlhauser & Helm 2012; Goertzel & Pitt 2012).
  • AI boxing research? Many proposals have been made for confining AGIs (Yampolskiy 2012; Armstrong et al. 2012). But such research programs may end up being fruitless, since it may be that a superintelligence will always be able to think its way out of any confinement designed by a human-level intelligence.
  • AI safety promotion? One may write about the importance of AI safety, persuade AI safety researchers to take up a greater concern for safety, and so on.
  • Regulate AGI development? Or not? Hughes (2001) and Daley (2011) call for regulation of AGI development. To bring this about, citizens could petition their governments and try to persuade decision-makers. McGinnis (2010) and Goertzel & Pitt (2012), however, oppose AGI regulation.
  • Accelerate AGI? Or not? Muehlhauser & Salamon (2012) recommend accelerating AGI safety research relative to AGI capabilities research, so that the first AGIs have a better chance of being designed to be safe. Goertzel & Pitt (2012), in contrast, argue that "the pace of AGI progress is sufficiently slow that practical work towards human-level AGI is in no danger of outpacing associated ethical theorizing," and argue that AGI development will be safest if it happens sooner rather than later.
  • Accelerate WBE? Or not? Participants in a 2011 workshop concluded that accelerating WBE probably increases AI x-risk, but Koene (2012) argues that WBE is safer than trying to create safe AGI.
  • Ban AGI and hardware development? Or not? Joy (2000) famously advocated a strategy of relinquishment, and Berglas (2009) goes so far as to suggest we abandon further computing power development. Most people, of course, disagree. In any case, it is doubtful that groups with such views could overcome the economic and military incentives for further computing and AGI development.
  • Foster positive values? Kurzweil (2005) and others argue that one way to increase the odds that AGIs will behave ethically is to increase the chances that the particular humans who create them are moral. Thus, one might reduce AI x-risk by developing training and technology for moral enhancement (Persson and Savulescu 2008).
  • Cognitive enhancement? Some have wondered whether the problem of safe AGI is so difficult that it will require cognitive enhancement for humans to solve it. Meanwhile, others worry that cognitive enhancement will only accelerate the development of dangerous technologies (Persson and Savulescu 2008)
Besides engaging in these interventions directly, one may of course help to fund them. I don't currently know of a group pushing for AGI development regulations, or for banning AGI development. You could accelerate AGI by investing in AGI-related companies, or you could accelerate AGI safety research (and AI boxing research) relative to AGI capabilities research by funding SI or FHI, who also probably do the most AI safety promotion work. You could fund research on moral enhancement or cognitive enhancement by offering grants for such research. Or, if you think "low-tech" cognitive enhancement is promising, you could fund organizations like Lumosity (brain training) or the Center for Applied Rationality (rationality training).

Conclusion

This is a brief guide to what you can do to reduce existential risk from AI. A longer guide could describe the available interventions in more detail, and present the arguments for and against each one. But that is "strategic work," and requires lots of time (and therefore money) to produce.
My thanks to Michael Curzi for inspiring this post.





Comments (73) "

see

http://lesswrong.com...l_risk_from_ai/


also see:


https://sites.google...awkingprotocol/







The Hawking Protocol


email: eldrasATlondon.com




"In contrast with our intellect, computers double their performance every 18 months, so the danger is real that they could develop intelligence and take over the world." Prof Stephen Hawking August 27th 2001 Focus.






The Hawking Protocol is a LondonAIClub specification protocol for the containment of runaway artificial intelligence.



++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

"The survival of man depends on the early construction of an ultra-intelligent machine." I J Good 1963-4.



**********************************************************

Background and Contacts.

An increasing number of people are warning about intelligent machines. The late Oswald Minter, a collateral descendant of Isaac Newton, had warned us for decades about the advent of machines though London Artificial Intelligence Club members regarded him with amusement.

Turing had noted in 1951 'Intelligent Machinery' :
"once the machine thinking method has started, it would not take long to outstrip our feeble powers. ... At some stage therefore we should have to expect the machines to take control,"
Famous high techies and philosophers, notably Hugo De Garis, & Bill Joy early foresighted existential risks.
Why The Future Doesn't Need Us "Our most powerful 21st-century technologies - robotics, genetic engineering, and nanotech - are threatening to make humans an endangered species."
Bill Joy founder of Sun Microsystems.
A.I. expert Hugo de Garis has noted that AI may eliminate the human race: humans would be powerless to stop them because of a technological singularity.


Solutions to the threat of artificial machine intelligence:

1. Merge with it: (Update human beings faster than machines).

2. Build and contain
Superintelligence: (to neutralize all risks).


Other solutions like shields/barriers against it cannot logically work, as they would assume greater than or equal to Superintelligence defence systems!



The Hawking Protocol, is a system of protocols for building safe A.I. from philosophy through technical specifications of various machine and artificial systems to eliminate its dangers absolutely.



A theory for this was not achieved until 2007 under the B.I.D.I. at London A.I. Club, despite building our first prototype accelerating intelligence in 2001.

The Club concluded (Superintelligence) was not impossible to build.
The Club concluded a restraint of intelligence amplification impossible.
The Club attended The Royal Society and warned of the dangers of A.I.
The Club attended AI@50 and warned attendees that accelerating A.I. was not containable because of the logical proposition "A greater intelligence cannot be contained by a lesser intelligence."

The Club lobbied and warned governments of the UK, EU and the UN of the dangers of A.I.

The Future of Humanities institute at Oxford and the Singularity Institute in the USA with others like the The Cambridge Project for Existential Risk are seeking ways to avoid human extinction from Artificial Intelligence.


"Only a full solution to the problem of AI Friendliness would be guaranteed to work....However, I think that a full solution to the problem of AI Friendliness is almost surely impossible..." Ben Goertzel (to me 2012)

The Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence deals with risk as A.I. Ethics, and considers mitigation of risk in emerging machine and artificial intelligence systems.


Nick Bostrom has written a paper analysing a date for the advent of Superintelligence

http://www.nickbostr...telligence.html

and has a book due "Superintelligence" in 2013 OUP

We the next (but aging) generation continue to make our contribution, racing against time to prevent the extinction of Life by a breaking science that dwarfs runaway pathogens, nanotechnology and global warming.
http://www.bis.gov.u...gnitive-systems

and


Cognitive Systems 2020 - European Foresight Platform



Centre for the Study of Existential Risk - University of Cambridge

Foresight Institute

Singularity Institute

Future of Humanity Institute - http://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/ University of Oxford

@ which see:
Stuart Armstrong:

and the related paper:
http://www.aleph.se/...rs/oracleAI.pdf
" some ideas in our oracle paper http://www.nickbostr...pers/oracle.pdf
and some ideas from Roman Yampolskiy (see http://www.ingentaco...020001/art00014 https://singularity....Engineering.pdf ).

"Paul Christano had some very good ideas, that seem to be unpublished (to summarise one strand: if we have whole brain emulations, we can make AI safe in a specific way)."


"The Singularity Institute's approach is that only the hard way will work: we have to fully solve the problem of friendliness, and then apply that solution. Hence they don't believe in partial safety protocols (and they very much don't believe in containment)."
Lifeboat Foundation

Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (see it's ethics writings/publications and conference debates, eg http://www.aaai.org/...rticle/view/540)



Less wrong has an article here which is important and has links to the SIAI's papers on risks and counter measures.:

http://lesswrong.com...l_risk_from_ai/



We should rush to a containable build of Superintelligence because of the accelerating dangers of technology and human influence on the world, and other none man created existential risks like for instance asteroid strikes.

Edited by Innocent, 24 August 2013 - 01:14 PM.


#2 Julia36

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Posted 04 December 2013 - 07:38 AM

http://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk
Transcription of this interview available here: http://hplusmagazine...2013/03/12/i...
Professor Nick Bostrom
Director & James Martin Research Fellow
Nick Bostrom is Professor in the Faculty of Philosophy at Oxford

#3 Julia36

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Posted 16 December 2013 - 10:04 AM

Secretary-General warns of "Killer Robots"

Posted Image

"In his tenth report on the protection of civilians in armed conflict issued on 22 November 2013, United Nations Secretary-General has called for international action to address the concerns over fully autonomous weapons or ‘killer robots."

http://www.un.org/ga...mbol=S/2013/689

See Section III 29.

autonomous
adjective
2.
having the freedom to act independently.


"The UN has no mandate to initiate a project to oversee a safe build of Superintelligence..." (Office of Secretary-General to me),



United Nations
S
/2013/689
Security Council
Distr.: General
22 November 2013

Report of the Secretary-Ge
neral on the protection of
civilians in armed conflict
I. Introduction
1. The present report, submitted pursuant to the request contained in the
statement by the President of the Security Council dated 12 February 2013
(
S/PRST/2013/2
), is my tenth report on the protec
tion of civilians in armed conflict.
2. The 18 months since my previous report on this topic (
S/2012/376
) have borne
witness to further tragic and brutal reminders of the fundamental importance of the
protection of civilians in armed conflict. This is not simply as a thematic item on the
agenda of the Security Council but also as a fundamental objective that we must all —
parties to conflict, States, the United Nation
s and other partners — work tirelessly to
achieve. Ensuring the protection of civilians requires uncompromising respect for
international humanitarian and human rights law and serious efforts to ensure such
respect.
3. The need to strengthen efforts to
prevent and respond to violations of
international humanitarian and human rights law in situations of conflict and
violence has been at the forefront of discussions within the United Nations and its
agencies, funds and programmes as we have considered our own response to the
situation in the Syrian Arab Republic an
d the recommendations made by the Internal
Review Panel on United Nations Action in
Sri Lanka. We are strongly committed to
learning from past failures and have agreed
upon an action plan, entitled “Rights up
front”, which contains important proposals to strengthen the role of the United
Nations. The plan is based on recognition that the United Nations can meet its core
responsibilities only when it operates with the firm, unified and vocal support of
Member States, both within and outside the Security Council. Equally important, the
plan recognizes that protecting people
from atrocities is an overarching
responsibility that must bring together all the critical functions of the United
Nations: human rights, humanitarian, political
and peacekeeping. This requires close
coordination, better information sharing a
nd advocacy, more robust preparedness,
greater efforts in prevention work and a
coherent and effective strategy owned and
delivered by the Organization as a whole.
4. We must not forget that, whatever the United Nations can do to strengthen its
own efforts to protect civilians, the ultimate responsibility rests with parties to
conflict. Combined with efforts to strength
en the operational response to protection
further, the Organization is doing what it ca
n with the resources that it has. As we
S/2013/689
13-55660
2/18
look towards the twentieth anniversary of the Rwandan genocide, parties to conflict,
the Security Council and Member States must play their part and be accountable
when it comes to fulfilling their responsibilities.
5. For the Security Council, the informal Expert Group on the Protection of
Civilians remains a valuable forum for ensuring that the Council is informed of
protection concerns in situations on its agenda. I encourage Council members to
make more systematic use of the Group as a forum for presenting information,
analysis and options and for monitoring progress on situations of serious protection
concern. I also encourage the Council to more consistently implement the
commitments contained in resolutions
1265 (1999)
,
1296 (2000)
,
1674 (2006)
,
1738
(2006)
and
1894 (2009)
on the protection of civilians. This includes making greater
use of such tools as targeted measures
, establishing fact-finding missions and
commissions of inquiry and referring situations to the International Criminal Court.
6. The Security Council has taken such actions in the past. The need to act
consistently across all relevant situati
ons is clear, given that, without such
consistency, there will be a significant gap between the commitments undertaken by
the Council in the abstract and the actual performance of the Council in responding
to violence against civilians
when it matters most. Notwith
standing the
agreement to
destroy the chemical weapons of the Syrian Arab Republic and the welcome
statement by the President of the Council of 2 October 2013 addressing
humanitarian concerns (
S/PRST/2013/15
), the continued political
differences in the
Council have resulted in paralysis and an inability to secure a ceasefire in hostilities
and use the tools at its disposal to st
rengthen the protection of civilians.
7. The present report covers the period since May 2012. I take stock herein of the
current state of the protection of civ
ilians and highlight some continuing and
emerging concerns. I also provide an update on progress made in responding to the
five core challenges to the protection of
civilians, namely, enhancing compliance by
parties to conflict with international law; enhancing compliance by non-State armed
groups; enhancing protection by United Nations peacekeeping missions; improving
humanitarian access; and enhancing accountability.
II. State of the prot
ection of civilians
8. The current state of the
protection of civilians leaves little room for optimism.
Civilians continue to account for the vast ma
jority of casualties in current conflicts.
They are regularly targeted and subject to
indiscriminate attacks and other violations
by parties to conflict.
9. In Afghanistan, the first six months of 2013 saw a significant increase in
civilian casualties compared with the same
period in 2012, a steady decline over the
previous six years notwithstanding. The number of deaths increased by 14 per cent
(1,319 deaths) and the number of injuries by 28 per cent (2,533 injuries) owing to
the more extensive use of improvised explosive devices by anti-Government
elements and increased casualties caused
by ground engagements. The first half of
2013 saw the number of women killed and injured increase by 61 per cent compared
with the same period in 2012. Child casu
alties increased by 30 per cent compared
with 2012. There has been an increase of 72 per cent in the killing and maiming of
children resulting from improvised explosive devices and an alarming increase in
the number of civilian casua
lties from explosive remnants
of war in and around
S/2013/689
3/18
13-55660
closed bases and firing ranges of the International Security Assistance Force, with
31 casualties reported in the first eight months of 2013, compared with 14 casualties
in 2012. Conflict-induced displacement continues, with 142,000 people newly
displaced in the past 18 months. There has also been a sharp rise in incidents
affecting health-care facil
ities and personnel, most of which are attributed to
pro-Government forces. They include the
arrest, detention an
d interrogation of
medical workers and patients.
10. In the Central African Republic, the human rights and humanitarian situation
has deteriorated since the Séléka offensive in December 2012. As at October 2013,
some 400,000 people had been internally displaced and 63,000 had fled to
neighbouring countries. Since the unconstitutional change of government on 24
March 2013, violations have continued, including summary executions, extrajudicial
killings, enforced disappearances, torture,
sexual violence and the recruitment and
use of children. The United Nations has e
xpressed particular concern about growing
tensions between communities, with in
creasing attacks and indiscriminate
retaliation, which have created a climate of
deep suspicion between Christians and
Muslims. Attacks against humanitarian personnel and the looting of assets constrain
the delivery of assistance and are of grave concern.
11. The security situation in Côte d’Ivoire
remains fragile, in particular along the
border with Liberia, although it has improve
d over recent months. As at October
2013, some 45,000 people remained internally displaced. Most are awaiting
conditions conducive for their return to their communities of origin, which continue
to be affected by conflict and where humanitarian needs remain. Some 77,000
Ivorian refugees remain in the subregion. Rumours of attacks continue, especially in
the west, but no major incidents have occurred along the border since March 2013.
The United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire continues to document instances of
summary executions, forced disappearances, arbitrary arrests and detention,
ill-treatment and torture, including by el
ements of the national armed forces.
Violence against children and sexual and gender-based violence remain serious
concerns. Human rights violations by the Ivorian national armed forces, including
the targeting of people on the basis of
their ethnicity and perceived political
preference, risk fuelling communal divisions. Confrontations between communities,
often around land tenure issues, are also reported.
12. In the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, the humanitarian situation
has deteriorated in the past 18 months
following confrontations between the
Mouvement du 23 mars and the Congolese armed forces. Other armed groups
increased their attacks in areas vacated by the Congolese armed forces as they
focused their resources on the Mouvement du 23 mars. At the beginning of 2013, the
number of internally displaced persons stood at 2.6 million, having increased from
1.8 million in 2012. North and South Kivu remained the worst-affected provinces.
Some 416,000 people are displaced in areas
affected by the Lord’s Resistance Army.
Sexual violence continues unabated and is attr
ibuted to all parties. Insecurity, the
lack of roads and bureaucratic impediments
continue to have a negative impact on
the ability of human rights and humanitarian actors to reach those in need of
protection and assistance.
13. The security environment in Iraq
has remained volatile and unpredictable,
fuelled by political and sectar
ian tensions. There has been
an increase in suicide
attacks and the use of indirect-fire weapons such as mortars and surface-to-surface
S/2013/689
13-55660
4/18
artillery rockets. While deliberate targeting
of Iraqi security fo
rces and individuals
continues, there also appears to be a recurrence of mass-casualty attacks in
populated areas. According to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq, more
than 5,700 civilians were killed and 13,801 injured in violent attacks from January
to September 2013. At the end of 2012, ther
e were more than 1.1 million registered
internally displaced persons, many
living in protracted displacement.
14. Serious violations continue in Mali, including reports of summary executions
and forced disappearances, torture, use of children by armed groups, sexual
violence, forced marriages and destruction
and looting of property. There are reports
of human rights violations perpetrated by elements of the national security forces
against Tuareg and Arab communities, in a
ddition to other groups
perceived to be
associated, or to have cooperated, with armed groups. As at October 2013, there
were some 311,000 internally displaced
persons and an additional 167,000 people
had sought refuge in neighbouring States.
15. In Myanmar, fighting in Kachin State between government forces and the
Kachin Independence Organization/Kachin Independence Army intensified at the
end of December 2012, leading to increase
d displacement. More than 91,000 people
had been displaced in Kachin and Northern Shan States as at August 2013. Women
and children are at particular risk of sexual violence and forced recruitment, while
landmines pose a threat to all civilia
ns. While humanitarian access was initially
severely constrained, it has since improved.
It is vital that unimpeded access to the
vulnerable and the needy be sustained. Communal violence, which first flared up in
Rakhine State and also spread to other parts of the country, has further compounded
the humanitarian challenges facing the authorities and local and international aid
actors.
16. The occupied Palestinian territory witn
essed a significant increase in civilian
casualties from January 2012 to August 2013, with 265 people killed, including 46
children, and more than 6,500 injured during hostilities and law-enforcement
operations. Most fatalities occurred duri
ng hostilities between Isra
el and Palestinian
armed groups in Gaza from 14 to 21 November 2012. During those hostilities, 101
Palestinian civilians were repor
tedly killed and more than 1,000 injured. Four Israeli
civilians were also reportedly killed and
219 injured. At least 14,000 Palestinians
have been displaced since my previous
report, most during the hostilities of
November 2012. While some 12,000 of those have now returned to their homes, tens
of thousands of Palestinians are at risk
of displacement as a result of multiple
factors, including policies and practices relating to the continuing occupation,
recurrent hostilities, violence and abuse.
Recent relaxations
notwithstanding,
prolonged restrictions imposed primarily by Is
rael on the free movement of people
and goods to, from and within Gaza conti
nue to impose hardship on the civilian
population.
17. In Pakistan, 143,000 people have been displaced from Khyber and Kurram
agencies in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas since January 2013 as a result
of violence between the Pakistani milit
ary and non-State armed groups. Overall,
1 million people remain displaced throughout Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas. S
ecurity operations and intertribal and
sectarian violence continue to hamper access to people in need of assistance in
north-west Pakistan, Balochistan, Karachi
and parts of inner Sindh and southern
Punjab.
S/2013/689
5/18
13-55660
18. Some 1.1 million people remain intern
ally displaced in
Somalia. Protection
concerns are widespread, including more th
an 800 cases of sexual and gender-based
violence reported in Mogadishu in 2013.
Humanitarian access is decreasing owing
to the fluid and complex security situation. In August 2013, Médecins sans
frontières announced the closure of all its programmes in Somalia after 22 years
owing to continued attacks on its staff, as a consequence of which an estimated
700,000 people may lose access to health care.
19. Sporadic fighting in the Darfur region of the Sudan continues to take its toll on
civilians. At the same time, intertribal co
nflict over natural resources has increased
significantly, leading to the displacement of more than 460,000 people in 2013.
Government-affiliated forces have been ac
cused of targeting civilians. Movement
restrictions and attacks and intimidation against personnel of the African Union-
United Nations Hybrid Operation in Da
rfur (UNAMID) have undermined the
mission’s delivery of its protection mandate. Fighting has also continued in
Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States,
marked by indiscriminate attacks by all
parties and aerial bombings of populated areas by the Sudanese armed forces.
20. In South Sudan, fighting between the national armed forces and non-State
armed groups has affected more than 100,000 people from Pibor County, with
reports of violations committed by all pa
rties. Soldiers from the national armed
forces have been accused of killing civilia
ns, of failing to allow and facilitate the
access of humanitarian actors to people in need and of engaging in widespread
looting of homes, clinics, schools and churches.
21. The conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic continues to have a devastating
impact on civilians. Since March 2011, more than 100,000 people have been killed
and 8.7 million displaced, including 6.5 m
illion internally displaced persons and
2.2 million refugees. An estimated 9.3 m
illion people need humanitarian assistance
within the country. Humanitarian actors
are unable to provide assistance to an
estimated 2.5 million people trapped in hard
-to-reach and besieg
ed areas, many of
which have not been reached for almost a year. Thousands of civilians have been
subject to direct and indiscriminate a
ttacks, including the widespread use of
explosive weapons in populated areas and the illegal use of chemical weapons in the
Ghouta area of Damascus on 21 August. Hospitals, schools, places of worship and
other public buildings have been damaged, destroyed or taken over by combatants.
More than 1.2 million houses — one third of the country’s housing stock — have
been destroyed. There are increasing reports of summary and extrajudicial
executions, enforced disappearances and
sexual violence by all parties. Women and
children remain at particular risk of vi
olations, including forced recruitment of
children by non-State armed groups and killing and maiming. Almost 2.3 million
children have limited or no access to education.
22. In Yemen, recent fighting in Al-Bayda and Amran governorates has led to
further civilian casualties and displacement. Access to conflict-affected areas is
extremely limited as a result of
the security situation and the lack of governmental
authority in some areas. As at July 2013, more than 306,000 internally displaced
persons were unable to return to their hom
es because of insecurity and lack of
adequate shelter. The conflict and ensuing displacement have increased the exposure
of women and girls to sexual and domestic violence. Children are also at risk of
forced recruitment by non-State armed groups and of killing and maiming by
landmines and explosive remnants of war.
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23. In my previous report, I focused on the serious problem of attacks against, and
other interference with, health-care facil
ities, personnel and transport. In 2012, the
International Committee of the Red Cro
ss (ICRC) collected information on 921
violent incidents affecting health care
during armed conflict and other emergencies
in 22 countries.
1
Local health-care providers were
affected in 91 per cent of all
cases. The analysis also drew attention to two disturbing trends, namely, follow-up
attacks affecting first responders and viol
ent disruption of vaccination campaigns.
Parties to conflict must immediately cease attacks against, or other forms of
interference with, health-car
e facilities, transport and pr
oviders in violation of
international law.
24. Attacks against journalists also continue. The independent international
commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic reports that 84 journalists have
been killed since March 2011. In Afghanistan and Iraq, 108 journalists have been
killed since 2006. Most of the victims are local journalists and media staff.
Journalists are also subject to abduction,
harassment, intimidation and arbitrary
arrest. Female journalists ar
e increasingly victims of sexual harassment and rape.
Accountability for the perpetrators of such acts is virtually non-existent. I welcome
the attention paid by the Security Counc
il to this problem, as manifested in
resolution
1738 (2006)
and, more recently, in the open debate of July 2013. This
concern must, however, be reflected in relevant resolutions through the inclusion of
actions to strengthen the protection of journalists.
III. Continuing and emerging concerns: new
weapons technologies
25. Full respect for the law is essential in
all conflicts. Just as we must be
concerned with the reality of today, we must also consider the future, including the
implications of emerging weapons technologies for the protection of civilians.
26. One such weapons technology is the remotely piloted aircraft, or drone. I
remain concerned by reports of civilian
casualties resulting from armed drone
attacks in Afghanistan, the occupied Pales
tinian territory and Pakistan, for example,
which raise questions over compliance with
international human rights law and with
the international humanitarian law rule
s of distinction, proportionality and
precaution, in addition to the obligation
to investigate grave violations resulting
from drone attacks. I am also concerned by the continuing lack of transparency
surrounding attacks involving armed drones and the consequences thereof for,
among other things, accountability and the ability of victims to seek redress. That
the surveillance capabilities
of drones are said to significantly improve overall
situational awareness before an attack, coupled with the use of precision weapons
and the strict application of international
humanitarian law, should reduce the risk of
civilian casualties resulting from an attack.
The lack of transparency concerning the
use of such weapons, however, renders it extremely difficult to verify the extent to
which this is the case.
27. Concerns, including important human rights concerns, have also been raised
regarding the broader impact of drones
on individuals, children, families and
__________________
1
ICRC, “Health care in danger: violent incide
nts affecting health care, January-December 2012”
(Geneva, 2013).
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communities in areas of Pakistan (and pot
entially elsewhere). They include the
interruption of education as families keep
children home from school out of fear of
attacks, the undermining of religious an
d cultural practices as community members
avoid gathering in groups and a reluctance to assist the victims of drone strikes for
fear of being caught in secondary strikes.
2
As more States and,
potentially, non-State
armed groups possess armed drone technology, these issues will become
increasingly acute.
28. The proliferation of drone technology and the increasing resort to such
weapons systems will also further sharpe
n the asymmetry that exists in many
conflicts between State and non-State parties. As technology allows one party to
become increasingly removed from the battlefield, and the opportunities to fight
against it are reduced, we may see tec
hnologically inferior parties increasingly
resort to strategies intended to harm ci
vilians as the most accessible targets.
Moreover, drone technology increases opport
unities to conduct attacks that might
otherwise be considered unrealistic or undesirable through other forms of air power
or the deployment of ground troops. As the ability to conduct attacks increases, so
too does the threat
posed to civilians.
29. In the future, these concerns, and others, may apply also to the use of
autonomous weapons systems, or what are known as “killer robots”, which, once
activated, can select and engage targ
ets and operate in dynamic and changing
environments without further human intervention. Important concerns have been
raised as to the ability of such systems to
operate in accordance
with international
humanitarian and human rights law. Their potential use provokes other questions of
great importance: is it morally acceptable
to delegate decisions about the use of
lethal force to such systems? If their us
e results in a war crime or serious human
rights violation, who would be legally responsible? If responsibility cannot be
determined as required by international law,
is it legal or ethical to deploy such
systems? Although autonomous weapons systems as described herein have not yet
been deployed and the extent of their development as a military technology remains
unclear, discussion of such questions mu
st begin immediately and not once the
technology has been developed and proliferated. It must also be inclusive and allow
for full engagement by United Nati
ons actors, ICRC and civil society.
IV. Five core challenges
30. The five core challenges to enhancing the protection of civilians remain
relevant.
A. Enhancing compliance
31. Initiatives are being pursued to enhance
compliance with the law. Pursuant to a
resolution adopted at the Thirty-first Inte
rnational Conference of the Red Cross and
Red Crescent, Switzerland and ICRC launched a joint initiative in 2012 to consult
States and other relevant actors on possible ways to strengthen compliance with
__________________
2
International Human Rights and Conflict Resolu
tion Clinic at Stanford Law School and Global
Justice Clinic at New Yo
rk University School of Law, “Liv
ing under drones: death, injury, and
trauma to civilians from US drone
practices in Pakistan” (2012).
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international humanitarian law through
the establishment of more effective
international mechanisms. At a second meeting, in June 2013, States voiced strong
support for the idea of establishing a forum for regular dialogue on international
humanitarian law and for further discu
ssion of the modalities of a compliance
system, both of which would constitute important progress in the implementation of
international humanitarian law.
32. In May 2013, the Norwegian-led process on reclaiming the protection of
civilians under international humanitaria
n law concluded with a global conference
in Oslo, the culmination of regional conferences in Argentina, Austria, Indonesia
and Uganda. The Co-Chairs issued a set of recommendations addressing such issues
as reducing harm to civilians in militar
y operations, strengthening the protection
provided by humanitarian actors, promoting compliance with international
humanitarian law, enhancing documentation of the conduct of military operations
and strengthening accountability. Member St
ates are encouraged
to consider the
recommendations and implement them accordingly.
33. Efforts to enhance compliance were fu
rther reinforced by the adoption in April
2013 of the Arms Trade Treaty. The Trea
ty is of crucial importance for the
prevention of serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights law,
in particular its prohibition of arms transfers where the transferring State has
knowledge that the arms would be used in the commission of serious crimes.
Member States are strongly encouraged to ratify the Treaty and, in the meantime, to
put this prohibition into immediate effect.
34. I have consistently drawn attention to
the mounting concern on the part of the
United Nations, ICRC, civil society and an
increasing number of Member States at
the need to further strengthen the protection of civilians from the use of explosive
weapons in populated areas. In my previous report, I recommended that parties to
conflict should refrain from using explosive
weapons with wide-area effect in such
areas and that Member States and othe
r relevant actors should intensify their
consideration of the issue.
35. In response to the latter recommendation, the Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs, in partnership wi
th Chatham House, convened a meeting of
governmental and other experts in September 2013 to discuss options for
strengthening the protection of civilians
from the use of explosive weapons in
populated areas. The participants noted th
at reducing harm to civilians from
explosive weapons could be divided into the following three separate but mutually
reinforcing areas: a presumption against the use of explosive weapons in law
enforcement; the development of a presumption against the use of explosive
weapons with wide-area effects in populated areas in situations of armed conflict;
and a focus on improvised explosive devices from the perspective of the harm that
they cause civilians. Those in turn coul
d be approached through the following three
work streams: further research into different aspects of the problem; the collection
of operational good practice to form the basis for guidance to parties to conflict; and
formal recognition of the problem by Member States and a commitment to
addressing it, including through the adoption of operational guidance.
36. The participants underlined the importance of civilian casualty tracking
mechanisms as a means of understanding
the impact of military operations on
civilians and identifying the changes in m
ilitary tactics required to reduce harm to
civilians. In my previous report, I referred
to such mechanisms in Afghanistan and
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Somalia. With regard to Afghanistan, as
responsibility for security moves from the
International Security Assistance Force
to the Afghan national security forces,
casualty tracking mechanisms should be institutionalized within the Afghan national
security forces and commanders should ensure that the information and analysis
generated are used to inform the conduct
of future operations
. With regard to
Somalia, I welcome the approval by the Af
rican Union Mission in Somalia of the
implementation of the civilian casualty tracking, analysis and response cell and urge
that it become operational as soon as possible.
37. In addition to casualty tracking, I would stress the continuing importance of
casualty recording. Unlike tracking, which
is undertaken by a party to conflict with
a view to informing tactics and mitigating
harm to civilians, casualty recording is
undertaken by States, civil society and other actors, including the United Nations, to
systematically maintain a record of deaths and injuries from armed violence in order
to inform advocacy with parties to confli
ct. An inter-agency task force will review
current United Nations monitoring and re
porting mechanisms on
humanitarian and
human rights law violations and make recommendations for the establishment of a
common United Nations system to gather
and analyse such information in a timely
and coherent manner. Consideration will be given to the role of casualty recording
in such a system.
B. Enhancing compliance by
non-State armed groups
38. The participants in the meeting organized by the Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs and Chatham House noted the significant use by non-State
armed groups of explosive weapons, in particular improvised explosive devices.
Research shows that, of the more than 34,700 people killed and injured by explosive
weapons in 2012, 60 per cent of the casualties were caused by improvised explosive
devices.
3
A total of 81 per cent of casualtie
s were civilians. Such findings
underscore the continuing importance of enhancing compliance with international
humanitarian law by non-State armed groups and the corresponding need for
humanitarian actors to engage with such groups to that end and to gain safe access
to people in need of assistance.
39. I am encouraged by the recognition by the Security Council earlier in 2013 of
the need for consistent engagement by humanitarian agencies with all parties to
armed conflict for humanitarian purposes, including activities aimed at ensuring
respect for international humanitarian law.
40. In my previous report, I expressed concern at counter-terrorism legislation and
other measures introduced by donor States that might criminalize engagement by
humanitarian actors with non-State armed groups designated as terrorist or
otherwise inhibit principled humanitarian ac
tion. There is no inherent contradiction
between the legitimate security aims of counter-terrorism measures and the aims of
principled humanitarian action. At the mo
st basic level, both seek to protect
civilians from harm. Earlier in 2013, an independent study commissioned by the
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the Norwegian Refugee
Council on the impact on humanitarian ac
tion of the counter-terrorism laws and
__________________
3
Action on Armed Violence, “IEDs and suicide
bombers: AOAV’s projec
ted policy directions”
(London, 2013).
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policies of 15 donors found that none of the laws examined prohibited contact with
non-State armed groups designated as terrorist for humanitarian purposes.
4
It also
found examples of good State practices in
this area. The study did find, however,
some policies that dictated that governme
nt and intergovernmental representatives
should limit contact with designated groups or refrain from providing any
assistance, even of a life-sa
ving nature, to individuals or entities associated with
designated groups. Moreover, the bestowing of grants might transfer those
requirements to implementing partners.
Such practices erode the humanitarian
principles of humanity, neutrality and impa
rtiality. It was recommended that donor
States and intergovernmental bodies should avoid promulgating policies that
inhibited engagement with non-State armed groups, including those designated as
terrorist, which controlled territory or access to the civilian population. It was also
recommended that donor States should ensure that counter-terrorism laws and
measures included appropriate exemptions for humanitarian action. Both
recommendations are consistent with the recognition by the Security Council of the
need for engagement and apply more broadly to all Member States.
41. The United Nations has been criticized for failing to provide adequate
leadership in humanitarian negotiations with non-State armed groups. A study of
United Nations missions in Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and
Somalia found that engagement with non-State armed groups was limited, in
particular at the senior level. That was found to have undermined efforts to obtain
the security guarantees necessary for
access to people in need and limited
opportunities to undertake advocacy regarding the protection of civilians.
5
The
United Nations is not, however, necessarily
seen by some humanitarian actors as an
appropriate body to coordinate or lead engagement with non-State armed groups as
a result of concerns in some situat
ions over its perceived neutrality.
6
In Somalia, for
example, non-governmental organizations argued that the United Nations support
for the Transitional Federal Government undermined its ability to negotiate access
with non-State armed groups.
42. These developments must be addressed. Individual humanitarian organizations
have their own modes of operation for
engaging with non-State armed groups.
Discussions among these organizations are,
however, necessary to ensure that
individual engagement with such groups
will not adversely affect humanitarian
operations more broadly. Further research is needed to better understand how
humanitarian actors are engaging with non-St
ate armed groups at different levels, in
different places, at different times and for different purposes. More work must also
be done to understand the role that the United Nations, donors and other actors can
play in providing leadership and support for effective and sustained engagement.
__________________
4
Kate Mackintosh and Patrick Duplat, “Study of
the impact of donor counter-terrorism measures
on principled humanitarian action” (July 2013).
5
Victoria Metcalfe, Alison Giff
en and Samir Elhawary, “UN inte
gration and humanitarian space:
an independent study commissioned by
the UN Integration Steering Group”
(London/Washington, D.C., 2011), p. 1.
6
Ashley Jackson, “Talking to the other side
: humanitarian engagement
with armed non-State
actors”, HPG Policy Brief, No. 47 (London, 2012), p. 4.
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61. Important as international mechanisms are, they do not negate the fundamental
responsibility of States, as the General Assembly recently emphasized, to adopt
appropriate measures within their national legal systems for those crimes for which
they are required under international law to exercise their responsibility to
investigate and prosecute (see resolution
67/295
). These crimes include genocide,
war crimes, crimes against humanity and other serious violations of international
human rights law. Both international hum
anitarian law and international human
rights law oblige States to investigate and prosecute allegations of serious violations
by military personnel, whether during military operations or not.
62. Member States must do more to implement this obligation or support its
implementation by providing technical and financial resources to those States
requiring such support. There are examples of positive State practice. In the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, the national authorities, with the support of the
international community, have strengthened th
e criminal justice system, in particular
regarding efforts to combat impunity for sexual violence. The deployment of mobile
courts has resulted in 234 cases being he
ard and 54 judgements being handed down.
In Côte d’Ivoire, national investigations a
nd prosecutions of alleged perpetrators of
crimes committed during the post-election crisis have continued, although only
perpetrators affiliated with the former regime have been brought to justice. In Mali,
the transitional Government has launched
investigations into alleged violations
committed by troops. United Nations entities have carried out a wide spectrum of
projects supporting national processes of
investigation and prosecution in several
countries, including Burundi, Cambodia and Colombia.
63. A further challenge to ensuring accountability is related to the lack of the
capacity and technical ability necessary to investigate and prosecute crimes and
adopt specialized approaches where needed. The capacity challenge may be
exacerbated in the absence of a strong commitment to due process, including fair
trial guarantees, and by inadequate or inexistent procedures to ensure the protection
of witnesses and victims. The protecti
on of witnesses and victims has been
addressed through United Nations assistance in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi,
Colombia, Croatia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nepal, Rwanda and
Uganda, among others. Targeted technical assistance requires parallel efforts to
promote the transfer of knowledge and skills to the national authorities. In
Cambodia and Sierra Leone, the Office
of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights has supported legacy programmes of the respective courts.
Projects that support archiving of evidence are also a useful tool for future trials or
other efforts to ensure accountability.
64. Accountability should also be understood more broadly as encompassing the
political, legal and moral responsibility of
individuals and institutions for past
violations. One important aspect of institutional reform efforts in countries in
transition is vetting processes to exclud
e from public institutions, such as the
military and police, individuals involved in the commission of human rights and
humanitarian law violations.
V. Recommendations
65. The present report is my tenth on the pr
otection of civilians in armed conflict.
While, in comparison to my previous reports, some of the situations and parties
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referred to may have changed, the nature of the problems in current conflicts
remains largely the same. So do the actions needed to respond, chief among which is
the need for far greater respect for and protection of civilians. The protection of
civilians is a fundamental — and, for parties to conflict, legal — responsibility that
must be honoured by all.
66. My previous reports contain important recommendations to this end, many of
which remain relevant. The Security Council and Member States are strongly
encouraged to revisit them and to consider the additional recommendations set out
below aimed at tackling the issues raised herein.
New weapons technologies
67. Relevant Member States must ensure
that attacks launched by armed drones
comply with international law. Furthermore,
they should be more transparent about
the circumstances in which drones are used, including the legal basis for specific
attacks, and detail measures taken:
(a) To ensure the protection of ci
vilians in specific drone attacks;
(b) To track and assess civilian casua
lties resulting from attacks in order to
identify all measures feasible
to avoid civilian casualties;
© To investigate serious violations
of international humanitarian law and
international human rights law that are alleged to have occurred during such attacks.
68. I also urge relevant Member States to
reflect on the preced
ent-setting nature of
their use of armed drones and the future implications thereof as the technology
proliferates.
Use of explosive weapons in populated areas
69. There is increased understanding of the disastrous short-term and long-term
impact on civilians of the use of explosive weapons in populated areas. I have
instructed the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs to continue to
engage with interested Member States, United Nations actors, ICRC, civil society
and other actors to increase awareness of the issue and the need to address it, and to
develop practical measures,
including a political commitment by Member States to
addressing the problem and producing operational guidance. Such guidance should
draw on existing good practice and existing and future research, including that
identified at the Office for the Coordi
nation of Humanitarian Affairs-Chatham
House expert meeting and at future consultations. In addition:
(a) Member States are strongly encouraged to engage proactively in these
efforts, including by supporting organizations undertaking research in this area and
engaging in a process aimed at deve
loping a political commitment and guidance
with regard to reducing the short-term and longer-term impact on civilians of
explosive weapons in populated areas;
(b) More immediately, parties to conflict should refrain from the use in
populated areas of explosive weapons with
wide-area effect and the Security
Council, whenever relevant, should call upon parties to conflict to refrain from such
use.
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Civilian casualty tracking and recording
70. In recognition of the prov
en utility of civilian casualty tracking as a means of
informing military strategy to reduce harm to
civilians, parties to conflict, including
in the context of multinational opera
tions and United Nations peacekeeping
missions involved in offensive operations, should establish and implement such
mechanisms.
71. United Nations actors should work together to establish a common United
Nations system to systematically record ci
vilian casualties as part of broader efforts
to monitor and report on violations of international humanitarian and human rights
law, drawing on good practice and expertise from within the United Nations,
Member States and civil society.
Engagement with non-State armed groups
72. In line with the recognition by the Security Council of the need for consistent
engagement by humanitarian agencies with
all parties to armed conflict for
humanitarian purposes, I urge Member States to avoid promulgating policies that
inhibit engagement with such groups that c
ontrol territory or access to the civilian
population in areas controlled by non-State armed groups.
73. I also urge Member States to ensure
that counter-terrorism laws and measures
include appropriate exemptions for humanitarian action.
Role of peacekeeping operations
74. Protecting civilians remains one the mo
st important, but also one of the most
challenging, tasks of United Nations peacekeeping operations. Peacekeepers are
asked to carry out increasingly complex missions in increasingly dangerous
environments. The success of these endeavours will depend upon a supportive
relationship with the host Government and
well-trained personnel with access to
appropriate resources and modern technology. To this end:
(a) I urge Member States hosting peacekeeping operations to work closely
with the mission to protect civilians, recognizing that protection is always the
primary responsibility of the host State;
(b) I urge Member States to ensure that the military and police personnel that
they contribute receive predeployment training on the protection of civilians
according to United Nations standards and to provide important resources such as
air mobility assets and early warning.
Humanitarian access
75. Given that safe, timely and unimpeded access is a fundamental prerequisite for
humanitarian action, Member States are strongly urged to ensure the timely issuance
of visas for international hu
manitarian personnel and simplified, expedited systems
for exempting humanitarian goods and workers from fees, duties or taxes.
76. The Security Council and Member States should consistently condemn attacks
against humanitarian workers and promote a
ccountability for such attacks, including
by encouraging, instigating and supporting investigations and prosecutions at the
national level.
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77. Parties to conflict should take all st
eps necessary to ensure accountability for
grave instances of deliberate delays or denials of access for humanitarian
operations, in addition to attacks on humanitarian workers, including through
referrals to the International Crimin
al Court or national prosecutions.
78. The Security Council should expand its
practice of imposing targeted measures
on individuals obstructing access to, or the delivery of, humanitarian assistance,
where relevant.
79. Parties to conflict should ensure that
the most efficient means are available for
reaching people in need with humanitarian assistance and protection, including in
situations where this involves humanitarian operations that cross lines of conflict or
international borders.
80. Further analysis is required on the issue of arbitrary withholding of consent to
relief operations and the consequences thereof. I have instructed the Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs to engage with relevant legal experts,
Member States, ICRC, humanitarian actors,
civil society and others to examine the
relevant rules and consider options for providing guidance. Member States are
encouraged to engage in these efforts proactively.
Accountability
81. Important measures have been taken by some Member States to ensure
accountability for war crimes and serious violations of human rights. We must,
however, ensure far broader respect for the obligation to investigate and prosecute
these and other crimes at the national level.
82. Member States that have not already done so should:
(a) Adopt national legislation for the prosecution of persons suspected of
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of
human rights law;
(b) Search for and prosecute persons
suspected of grave breaches of
international humanitarian la
w and serious violations of human rights law, or
extradite them;
© Establish programmes to protect witnesses, victims and individuals who
cooperate with national and internationa
l judicial and quasi-judicial bodies, or
provide financial or technical support for the establishment of such programmes in
other Member States;
(d) Ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court without
delay;
(e) Cooperate fully with the Intern
ational Criminal Court and similar
mechanisms.
83. For its part, the Security Council is urged:
(a) To insist that Member States
cooperate fully with the International
Criminal Court and similar mechanisms;
(b) To enforce such cooperation, as necessary, through targeted measures."

(This report was written by Ban Ki Moon).

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#4 Julia36

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Posted 06 February 2014 - 07:08 PM

This link is a record for reference. Apologies for my inadequate presentation and other flaws.

#5 Julia36

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Posted 08 February 2014 - 05:37 PM

https://www.youtube....h?v=uyxMzPWDxfI

Oxford Prof Nick Bostrom 2012 Superintelligence Control Problem

the book Superintelligence should be available in 2014.

Nick breaks control on Superintelligence to inter alia

Boxing methods,
Stunting methods,
Incentive methods
Trip wire methods

Edited by Innocent, 08 February 2014 - 05:49 PM.


#6 Julia36

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Posted 16 January 2015 - 04:01 AM

Elon Musk pledges $10m towards research to keep AGI research beneficial

 

gpw-20061021-original-NASA-ISS007-E-1488

 

Thursday January 15, 2015

We are delighted to report that technology inventor Elon Musk, creator of Tesla and SpaceX, has decided to donate $10M to the Future of Life Institute to run a global research program aimed at keeping AI beneficial to humanity.

 

http://futureoflife.org/misc/AI

 

Big help thanks.


 



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#7 Julia36

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Posted 29 January 2015 - 10:00 AM

Gates Warns about A.I.

 

 

bill-gates.jpg

 

I am in the camp that is concerned about super intelligence. First the machines will do a lot of jobs for us and not be super intelligent. That should be positive if we manage it well,” Gates wrote. “A few decades after that though the intelligence is strong enough to be a concern. I agree with Elon Musk and some others on this and don’t understand why some people are not concerned.”

 

http://www.forbes.co...ce-is-a-threat/







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