104 replies to this topic

[fueki]

Let's say we can suppress brain to the level of no brainwaves and revive it after some time.
Imagine such experiment:
We turn someone's brain off and then create two identical copies of that brain by nanoassembler. Next the original brain is destroyed forever and the copies are turned on.

Lets make a premise that souls don't exist. If this was the case, the object from which you see the world would be determined by the structure of the brain or brain-like mechanism only. So you must go on living in the one of the copies after they are turned on, because they didn't experience any perceptions and didn't change while they were off. But it's obviously not likely that u could be in two places simultaneously and see things from 4 eyes. Thus this premise is contradictory and must be wrong.

The conclusion is that living beings contain something which can't be copied by our current or predicted to come technologies and we call this thing a soul.

I'd appreaciate your comments about inconsistencies or mistakes if you see any, especially by ocsrazor and other scientists.

Edited by ImmortalPhilosopher, 14 August 2006 - 03:15 PM.

[Pointdexter]

This is the exact reason why I don't believe subjective experience to be kept when one gets uploaded. But if your consciousness does arise from brain physiology, then I guess you can be in two or more places at once.

[bgwowk]

This is the exact reason why I don't believe subjective experience to be kept when one gets uploaded.

For the nth time, uploading and duplication are not the same thing. Duplication merely presumes that identity is determined by a particular pattern of matter. Uploading presumes that identity is determined by a particular algorithm that can be abstracted and implemented in alternative hardware designs. That's a much more radical proposition.

In any case, ImmortalPhilosopher's "proof" is merely a restatement of the classic duplicates paradox that we've all heard a million times. There are many resolutions to this paradox, which people like or dislike according to taste, none of which involve souls. Besides, who says that souls can't be duplicated? Duh!

---BrianW

[John Schloendorn]

The soul is exactly anything that goes on living. So you can't both assume that souls don't exist and that "you must go on living".

Assuming that the soul does not exist is assuming that "you" (=the soul) do not go on living in the sense you mean, even during ordinary survival. You would be a series of temporary slices related in certain ways, rather than a persistent entity that mysteriously sits on top of them.

So your starting point was contradictory, and it is not so surprising that one little step down the road you are still at a contradiction.

Assuming the soul does not exist: When you make a copy of a series of temporary slices related in certain ways, you would end up with two series of temporary slices related in certain ways and that is all there is to it.

[chubtoad]

"Assuming that the soul does not exist is assuming that "you" (=the soul) do not go on living in the sense you mean, even during ordinary survival. You would be a series of temporary slices related in certain ways, rather than a persistent entity that mysteriously sits on top of them. "

This is the perspective I have taken on this kind of question. There is either a soul or no continued self. I take the latter position since I see no reason to suppose a continued self. I see a long string of subjective experiences from an object that are not tied together by some sort of reality transcending continued self.

[bgwowk]

As John and chubtoad allude, it's actually difficult to objectively defend the idea of "self". Still, sense-of-self is a subjective reality that must be dealt with. I choose to deal with it by presuming that any events (inactivation, duplication, etc.) that don't change what my brain communicates to the external world it believes about self must preserve subjective self.

Look at it this way, if while you slept I copied your brain, destroyed it, and then perfectly reconstructed it before morning, the entity that awoke wouldn't have a clue what happened. That entity would be completely convinced it was you until I told him what happened. What would the entity then say? Probably, "Holy sh**, I feel my subjective self is completely intact. I guess the patternists were right."

---BrianW

[Pointdexter]

I know that uploading and duplication are different, but I was just trying to say that I don't think one's identity can exist in two places at once. Everyone keeps saying "if your brain gets copied and your old brain gets destroyed, you'd retain your identity", but I'm saying: (and I think immortalphilosopher was too) what if your old brain DOESN'T get destroyed - would you experience from two different locations?

[bgwowk]

I'm saying: (and I think immortalphilosopher was too) what if your old brain DOESN'T get destroyed - would you experience from two different locations?

No, two different copies of you each has their own experience at whatever location they are at. Although each is an equivalent objective continuation of you, and you can subjectively expect to wake as either one of them, they diverge from the point of duplication to live separate lives. (Word of advice: Don't ever create two conscious duplicates unless you also duplicate EVERYTHING in life that was important to you!)

Look at it this way: We know that multiple copies of ourselves exist across time. There was a "you" yesterday, a "you" today, and probably will be a "you" tomorrow. We shouldn't be any more philosophically disturbed by different versions of ourselves operating in different regions of space at the same time than we are disturbed by the knowledge that different versions of ourselves operate at different times at the same places in space.

---BrianW

[akmuo]

If soul does not exist, copying you to another room and deleting the original is the same as goingt to that room, becouse consequences are the same - your body is in that room. So if soul doeas not exist, you should be in thet room, after the original was destroyed. But if we make and the second copy to second room too, so where you will be after destroyning oringinal? In which room will you wake up? So we see, that it is illgical to think, that after death of original you will be thransported to another body in anothar room. So after death of iriginal, you'll die.

But after going to anothar room you do not die, but after making copy to that room and killing yours original body, you'll die. Why? Bith situations, looking materelisticaly are the same - yours body is in the other room. So that thing, that makes your original different from copy could be defines as soul.

Edited by akmuo, 04 December 2005 - 05:59 PM.

[akmuo]

This is the exact reason why I don't believe subjective experience

This is the essence - if soul would not exist, there would be no subjective experiences at all. For example.

Can You answer - whats the difference between you and exact your copy?

As I have noticed, there are some contraarguments against this proove, and I'll trie to repel them.
Some people say, that copy would not be accurate after small time, becouse everything changes when time goes by. But you also notice, that you live, time goeas by, but all the time you feel yours pain, look from your eyes. So itmeans, that relatively small changes in your brains does not make you other person. The same is with copy - if it was the same person at the beginning, it will remain the same person too. Let assume, that soul does not exist. If not killing original body, you'll remain in your old bodym becouse it is unharmed. But If killing the original, you will vake up in your copy, becouse the effect is the same, as going to another room - your body is there, and no nody is in the first room. You will begin feeling your neww body pain, if soul doeas not exist, and pain is caused byu chemical reactions. But what have changed in your copy, that you started feeling it's pain? And what wuoud be, if we'll make two copies, one in 1st room, another in 2nd room? What is related between you and your copy, it have not changed. But why wouldn't you start feeling pain of another copy, if it is the same looking from materialistic side? In which room will you wake up? So wee see, that saying, that after death of original you'll wahe u p in your copy is illogical, so you will not. But why? There are two materialisticaly identical situations - one, when You went to another room, and other, when you was ccopied to another room, and origina was killed. But in one way you are stll alive, in the other - you're dead. Why? It means, that rthere exists something not materialistic, that detemrines your existence in one or another body. Tjis "something" matches soul's definition.

Edited by akmuo, 04 December 2005 - 05:56 PM.

[chubtoad]

You went to another room, and other, when you was ccopied to another room, and origina was killed. But in one way you are stll alive, in the other - you're dead. Why? It means, that rthere exists something not materialistic, that detemrines your existence in one or another body. Tjis "something" matches sole's definition. 

What if you just abandoned the idea that two subjective experiences from one body are ever somehow the same. Does this not solve your paradoxes without need to suppose there exists a soul?

[Cyto]

I really dislike the use of the word soul. The "metaphysical self" or the brain physiology, were now mostly talking about the latter thing right? Otherwise I think this is quite odd.

[akmuo]

What if you just abandoned the idea that two subjective experiences from one body are ever somehow the same.  Does this not solve your paradoxes without need to suppose there exists a soul?

No, it does not. After getting to conclusion, that you will not be "transported" to any copy after death of original, you have to make a conclusion, that there is another, not materialistic difference between you and your copy. That what is beeing tried to proove.

[akmuo]

I really dislike the use of the word soul. The "metaphysical self" or the brain physiology, were now mostly talking about the latter thing right? Otherwise I think this is quite odd.

Word "soul" is used becouse of the following reasons:
1. It's short and easy to type.
2. The conclusion, that teher exists something not materialistic, that defines your existence, mathces definition of soul.

[John Schloendorn]

This is the essence - if soul would not exist, there would be no subjective experiences at all

Why not? Subjective experiences are momentary. I cannot directly experience past or future. So why would momentary subjective experience depend on a persisting entity?

[bgwowk]

So we see, that it is illgical to think, that after death of original you will be thransported to another body in anothar room.

It's not illogical. It all depends on whether your personal survival depends on the operation of a paticular pattern of atoms or particular individual atoms. If it only depends on the pattern, destroying the original matter doesn't kill you because the pattern survives elsewhere.

It's really hard to argue that we depend on anything but pattern. For example, if we move parts of your brain apart and then back together, have you been destroyed and replaced by a copy? What if we move all the atoms apart and then reassemble them at the same location? What if we reassemble them at a different location? What if we replace some or all of the atoms? In all cases, the restored brain behaves exactly as the original. So what physical basis is there to claim that subjectivity doesn't survive?

Yeah, I know John and chubtoad like to say that survival of self from moment to moment is illusory anyway, but I just don't find that view useful for medical planning (e.g. what kind of medical repairs or backup strategies are tolerable vs. not).

---BrianW

[wassname]

John and Chubtoad, what does the extention of personal identity being an illusion mean for immortality, loyalty (and altruism), and goals?

Perhaps identity depends on power structure, as in a corperation, country or species, and the internal-content is not important.
I guess this would mean that if two things are so unified, that they would not compete, and one part would sacrifice itself for the whole. Then it is one unit. (This is similar to spatial-continuity but without the pattern, and possibly spatial elements).

[lightowl]

Word of advice: Don't ever create two conscious duplicates unless you also duplicate EVERYTHING in life that was important to you!

That depends on how those copies would perceive each other. If they know they are copies of each other and thus actually the same person, they would perhaps recognize things that belong to the other copies as belonging to themselves.

If I where to be able to make copies of myself, I would also seek to make it possible to merge those copies into One, at some point. If that where to be possible, all copies would expect at some point to be the same exact consciousness again, though with all experiences intact. That would make a shared sense of self. Of course this requires that the mind can handle having been doing many things at the same time, which I don't think will be a significant problem.

The problem that one or more copies could rebel, is of course pressing. But if they do, they would no longer be perceived as part of the future merged consciousness.

This is of course all rather speculative. Who knows how reality will be with this kind of technology. Everything we perceive as important today might be trivial at that point.

[John Schloendorn]

I know John and chubtoad like to say that survival of self from moment to moment is illusory anyway

I'm not saying that, I'm merely arguing that ImmortalPhilosopher's thought experiment does not pose a problem for views in which a soul does not exist, but does pose a problem for views in which it does exist and is determined by the brain. (with soul = persistent entity that is separate from our experiences while it has them) For such views the question about the "tolerability" of a medical procedure seems indeed less important and the answer can be unsharp.

John and Chubtoad, what does the extention of personal identity being an illusion mean for immortality, loyalty (and altruism), and goals?

In my view, personal identity is not an illusion, in the sense of non-existent or worthless. It is merely a blurry concept, defined by our liking, rather than by metaphysics, but very valuable as such. If we a series of momentary states related in certain ways, it is great fun being so and orchestrating these relationships and those with the outside world in cool ways. So as for the ethics of immortality yes, of course I like to remain alive personally. But this motivation is comparatively low in the face of the 100,000 fellow persons painfully dying from aging each day.

[bgwowk]

I think I know what you are saying, John. People exist as a collection of discrete line segments in space-time. During periods of unconsciousness the lines don't exist, the same as before we were born or after we are dead. Indeed, there is nothing that distinguishes death from any other loss of consciousness except the question of whether a similar line reappears at a later time, which can be hard to say prospectively.

Many people are uncomfortable with this view, perhaps because it forces them to confront the reality that death and unconsciousness are the same thing. They are constantly trying to draw a dotted line joining interrupted line segments from birth to death. Duplication is a real problem for them because they don't know what to do with their dotted line. The fallacy is likely the belief that there is a dotted line at all.

---BrianW

[Cyto]

2. The conclusion, that teher exists something not materialistic, that defines your existence, mathces definition of soul.

Ah, so were talking about the religious "soul." First, shouldn't one have "soul detection" methods before talking about anything else? I mean it "hidden" somewhere in the body right? [wis]

[wassname]

collection of discrete line segments in space-time

If we are a collection of line-segments, wouldn't a line segment which loops survive. While a segment which changes, and does not arise again, effectively die?
Which would mean we should change as much as posible. Or maybe at some future simulate all previous versions of ourselves in closed loops (to ensure they survive - if thats even desirable)

It is merely a blurry concept, defined by our liking, rather than by metaphysics, but very valuable as such.

If it's defined by our liking, does that mean you think there is no objective answer?

Thanks this has been troubling me A-LOT! And you guys have philosophys seems to be in a promising direction.

[justinb]

As John and chubtoad allude, it's actually difficult to objectively defend the idea of "self".  Still, sense-of-self is a subjective reality that must be dealt with.  I choose to deal with it by presuming that any events (inactivation, duplication, etc.) that don't change what my brain communicates to the external world it believes about self must preserve subjective self.

Look at it this way, if while you slept I copied your brain, destroyed it, and then perfectly reconstructed it before morning, the entity that awoke wouldn't have a clue what happened.  That entity would be completely convinced it was you until I told him what happened.  What would the entity then say?  Probably, "Holy sh**, I feel my subjective self is completely intact.  I guess the patternists were right."

---BrianW

You are just a physical process. Your identity lies in a configuration of atoms that is constantly changing but has a structure that allows for reflection of self, and memory of reflection of self, etc., and thus creates the illusion of continuity. If I made a perfect copy of you, one that has the exact same thoughts at the moment of duplication, and then I killed.... well, I killed you. You no longer exist. Sure, a copy of you exists, but your consciousness (the physical process that I just terminated) is not carried on, it is gone FOREVER. It doesn't matter if a "perfect" copy of existed after you died, it wouldn't change the fact that you died. You are not carried on. The fact that a copy of you exists doesn't have any bearing on your own personal existence... a rock has the same value as a copy of you when it comes to your survival. Why is this hard to understand? To me it is as simple as 1+1=2. It is elementary! I would think any logical person would come to this same conclusion within seconds... Why do highly intelligent people suddenly become very stupid when it comes to matter of identity?

[John Schloendorn]

If it's defined by our liking, does that mean you think there is no objective answer?

Well, all I know is I don't know or feel an objective answer, and don't see how it could be known or felt in principle. So as a working hypothesis, one could consider treating it like all things that cannot be known or felt: Not at all.

Why do highly intelligent people suddenly become very stupid when it comes to matter of identity?

Thanks for the partial compliment. For some (but luckily not others in this thread), the existence of a possibility that they might not be the souls they'd like to be takes getting used to and can be threatening. No worries.

[justinb]

Well, all I know is I don't know or feel an objective answer, and don't see how it could be known or felt in principle. So as a working hypothesis, it could be treated like all things that cannot be known or felt: Not at all.


Thanks for the partial compliment. For some, the existence of a possibility that we may not be the souls we think we are takes getting used to. No worries.

I have read the entire thread and I am not new to the topic... I made this observation ages ago... to me it is so obvious that it is absurd that others don't get it.

My view point still stands... no one has given me any reason to change it.

I can understand differing view points in almost any other topic and I respect them... but the idea that a copy will carry your consciousness on is absolutely moronic. I virtually never call people's ideas moronic; so you know that I am not just being argumenative here.

[John Schloendorn]

My view point still stands... no one has given me any reason to change it.

No worries, I am not attempting to do so.

[justinb]

No worries, I am not attempting to do so.

lol, that was quick!

I couldn't get in my usual fix-up editing before you posted. [tung]

[John Schloendorn]

the idea that a copy will carry your consciousness on is absolutely moronic

I do not think anyone here expressed that idea. Immortalphilosopher in fact demolished it with his initial thought experiment.

[justinb]

I do not think anyone here expressed that idea. Immortalphilosopher in fact demolished it with his initial thought experiment.

That is what is weird about the whole thing... you guys can't seem to see your own logical errors. I obviously haven't delved into the topic (into why your reasoning is faulty), and I don't want to because I see it as a waste of time. I just wanted to post that response because I am sick of hearing about duplication. Anyways, I hope I didn't offend anyone.

I find it interesting that many people in the Immortality meme have pseudo-scientific belief in the soul.

[bgwowk]

Justin, of course a copy is not the original. That is a tautology. The real question is whether a human mind is a particular physical object versus a particular brain structure. If your existence depends on a particular arrangement of atoms rather than particular atoms, then a faithful atomic copy IS the original you, not a copy at all. Only matter is copied, the information that is "you" carries through.

In every debate I've ever had about this issue, the same mistake is always made. People implicitly assume that personhood is defined by a collection of atoms, rather than a pattern of atoms, and then proceed to "prove" the assumption they started with. It's classic begging the question.

Justin, you need to do some thought experiments. In particular, consider

a) Taking brain pieces apart and putting them back together.

b) Taking all brain molecules aparts (e.g. hundreds of miles apart) and putting them back together.

c) Replacing some or all brain molecules and putting them back together in the correct pattern of the brain.

When does the "original" person cease to exist in these scenarios? The laws of physics tell us that the revived person will insist they survived in every case. Any declaration that they did not by a third party would be completely arbitrary. Society already recognizes this by considering people who awake from comas to be the original people even though almost all atoms in the "original" brain will be down in the sewer system after several months of coma.

---BrianW