I think this is a great effort, and one we can build on.
However, I do agree completely with the guy who said that a brain dump of our complete memories and knowledge, will not be a continuation of ourselves. In other words, we cannot back up ourselves up on a hard drive in case our physical body is destroyed. The memory dump will not feel to us like a continuation -- it will be someone or something else that just happens to have our memories. The person whom originated the memories will be dead, and they will not experience immortalhood.
Although this is veering off topic I just couldn't help adding my two cents worth.
There are many who take issue with the theoretical possibility of duplication, but I have yet to hear an argument which is truly convincing (from my perspective, at least). Implicit in the statement made above is the belief that there is some aspect of identity which is above and beyond 'brain states'. I do not see evidence for this belief. Why would a duplicate with all of my memories, dispositions, and personality quirks not be me?
I go to sleep and lose consciousness. When I wake up in the morning, am I not still a close approximation to the Don of the night before?
Unless one is to contend that there are various active neurobiological
processes taking place during my down time which preserve/maintain my identity. Taken further, one could argue that even during periods of deep anestheticly induced unconsciousness there is
some level of brain activity which keeps identity intact. Whether such brain activity is an empirical reality has been debated at length by Jaydfox and BriaW, but it is also irrelevent IMO. The problem is an erroneous starting point, the belief that there must be an active process constantly occuring to preserve identity (ie, whether there must be a 'continuity of consciousness').
Without falling into the ever-so-futile debate over subjective experience, there is another approach for defending the 'uniqueness' of a volitional agent. From what I understand of Nate Barna's conception of identity theory, part of an agent's unique identity could be contained in its precise location in space/time. I tend to view this as a more objectified (and cogent) version of the continuity argument. And,
if there were a such thing as an objective standard for space/time, then in all likelihood, it would be of great significance in questions of *identity*. The problem however is that, as per Eistein's relativity theory, space/time is not absolute - it is relative. Consequently there is no objective standard that could lend itself to identity theory. (Note: If two individuals were to observe one another and
experience discrepancies in space/time this would only be an
effect of the discrepancies of their two respective localities in space/time).
Thus, the question for me is really that of analogous function. Could the original system, along with the contents of its database, be duplicated to a level of perfection where a hetero-phenomenological evaluation of a subject satisfies some predetermined standard for identity preservation? I think this is a possibility, but once one goes down this road, the debate becomes less one of philosophy, and more one standards.
Edited by DonSpanton, 21 February 2006 - 10:57 PM.