50 replies to this topic

[Mechanus]

And why the heck are you apologizing?  Even if it's just a figure of speech, it still could be misconstrued as an apology.

I meant that it was unwise of me to say that, since (as you see) it distracts from more interesting issues, that's all.

so it's probably inappropriate to assert that no connection between immortalism and asexualism exists *whatsoever*.

There is some correlation, but I'd say the vast majority of immortalists have the same attitude toward sexuality as non-immortalists. I also deny that such things are the primary motivation or psychological mechanism for anyone to be a transhumanist. (Anyone I know, at least.)

And now for something completely different:

Staring into the Singularity on the Moravec Transfer:

Transferring a human mind into a computer system is known as "uploading"; turning a mortal into a Power is known as "upgrading".  The archetypal upload is the Moravec Transfer, proposed by Dr. Hans Moravec in the book Mind Children.  (14).


NOTE: The key assumption of the Moravec Transfer is that we can perfectly simulate a single neuron, which Penrose and Hameroff would argue is untrue.  (As of 1999, a lobster neuron has been successfully replaced with $7.50 worth of parts bought at Radio Shack; this is minor suggestive evidence, but it doesn't even come close to settling the issue.)  The following discussion assumes that either (A) the laws of physics are computational or (B) we can build a "superneuron", a trans-Turing computer that does the same thing a neuron does.  (Penrose and Hameroff have no objection to the latter proposition.  If a neuron can take advantage of deep physics to perform noncomputable operations, we can do the same thing technologically.)
The scenario given also assumes sophisticated nanomedicine; i.e., nanomachines capable of carrying out complex instructions in a biological environment.



The Moravec Transfer gradually moves (rather than copies) a human mind into a computer.  You need never lose consciousness.  (The details which follow have been redesigned and fleshed out a bit (by yours truly) from the original in Mind Children.)

1) A neuron-sized robot swims up to a neuron and scans it into memory.
2) An external computer, in continuous communication with the robot, starts simulating the neuron.
3) The robot waits until the computer simulation perfectly matches the neuron.
4) The robot replaces the neuron with itself as smoothly as possible, sending inputs to the computer and transmitting outputs from the simulation of a neuron inside the computer.

This entire procedure has had no effect on the flow of information in the brain, except that one neuron's worth of processing is now being done inside a computer instead of a neuron.

5) Repeat, neuron by neuron, until the entire brain is composed of robot neurons.

Despite this, the synapses (links) between robotic neurons are still physical; robots report the reception of neurotransmitters at artificial dendrites and release neurotransmitters at the end of artificial axons.  In the next phase, we replace the physical synapses with software links.

6) For every axon-dendrite (transmitter-receiver) pair, the inputs are no longer reported by the robot; instead the computed axon output of the transmitting neuron is added as a simulated dendrite to the simulation of the receiving neuron.

At the end of this phase, the robots are all firing their axons, but none of them are receiving anything, none of them are affecting each other, and none of them are affecting the computer simulation.

7) The robots are disconnected.

You have now been placed entirely inside a computer, bit by bit, without losing consciousness.  In Moravec's words, your metamorphosis is complete.
If any of the phases seem too abrupt, the transfer of an individual neuron, or synapse, can be spread out over as long a time as necessary.  To slowly transfer a synapse into a computer, we can use weighted factors of the physical synapse and the computational synapse to produce the output.  The weighting would start as entirely physical and end as entirely computational.  Since we are presuming the neuron is being perfectly simulated, the weighting affects only the flow of causality and not the actual process of events.

Slowly transferring a neuron is a bit more difficult.

4a.  The robot encloses the neuron, the axons, and the dendrites with a robotic "shell", all without disturbing the neural cell body.  (That's going to take some pretty fancy footwork, I know, but this is a thought experiment.  The Powers will be doing the actual uploading.)
4b.  The robotic dendrites continue to receive inputs from other neurons, and pass them on to the enclosed neural dendrites.  The output of the biological neuron passes along the neural axon to the enclosing robotic axon, which reads the output and forwards it to the external synapse, unchanged.
4c.  The robotic axon outputs 99% of the received biological impulse, plus 1% of the computed robotic impulse.  Since, by hypothesis, the neuron is being perfectly simulated, this does not change the actual output in any way, only the flow of causality.
4d.  The weighting is adjusted until 100% of the output is the computed output.
4e.  The biological neuron is discarded.
Assuming we can simulate an individual neuron, and that we can replace neurons with robotic analogues, I think that thoroughly demonstrates the possibility of uploading, given that consciousness is strictly a function of neurons.  (And if we have immortal souls, then uploading is a real snap.  Detach soul from brain.  Copy any information not stored in soul.  Attach soul to new substrate.  Upload complete.)

[Clifford Greenblatt]

Is it correct to equate physical discontinuity of a person with extinction of that person? First, let us view the person in strictly materialist terms. Begin with the person's sixth birthday. The child likes to play with toys, has a sweet tooth, and finds opera absolutely boring. The child remains like this the day after his sixth birthday. He is still like this one week, one month and even eleven months later. The child grows up and eventually becomes a sixty year old man. At the age of sixty years, the man has absolutely no interest in playing with toys, refuses every offer for candy, and enjoys nothing more than an evening at the opera. Could we say the six year old child has become extinct and the sixty year old man is another person altogether? Do the two just happen to share the same genetics like identical twins? Or do we say the six year old child never became extinct because there was a second to second, minute to minute, hour to hour, day to day, physical continuity from age six to age sixty?
Now let us consider a variation on the teleporter idea. Since Till mentions the importance of environment on identity, why not throw environment into the replication? Now consider a particular hand of cards. The likelihood of the same hand of cards being randomly dealt the next time is practically negligible. The likelihood of that hand being dealt in any of the next ten tries is still practically negligible. However, with an extremely huge number of tries, it becomes very likely that the hand will be dealt again. With an even more huge number of tries, it becomes very likely that the hand will be dealt at least ten times. With even more tries, it becomes extremely unlikely that the hand will be dealt less than ten trillion times. Now, a universe is much more complex that a hand of cards. However, if we go along with a lot of modern materialist cosmology, then there is nothing to limit how many universes can occur in the whole of reality. Here, I am referring to the multiverse speculation and not to the many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics (which is made obsolete by a time symmetry interpretation). Any two universes may be extremely different and even have much different laws of physics. However, if a sufficient number of universes are considered, then it is very likely that any given universe has a nearly identical twin within the collection. Considering an even larger collection of universes, it is extremely likely that any given universe has at least ten trillion nearly identical twins in the collection. Given a sufficiently large collection of universes, it becomes very likely that there would be at least one universe in which the lives of every person on Earth are very closely replicated by the lives of people on a practically identical planet in that universe. Given an even greater collection of universes, it becomes extremely likely that there would be at least ten trillion universes in which the lives of every person on Earth are very closely replicated by the lives of people on practically identical planets in those universes. Who would qualify more for being the same person as the child on his sixth birthday- the person fifty four years later on this Earth or a precise replica of the child in another universe on his sixth birthday? If an infinite number of universes are allowed, is it possible for anyone to become extinct? What principle is there to limit the number of universes in a purely materialist reality?
    Now let us move on to a reality that is not limited to material entities but which also includes spiritual entities. Suppose a person dies and the person's physical form is never replicated either in this or any other universe. However, suppose the person is resurrected with an entirely new physical form in an entirely new environment with little or no memory of life on Earth but retains the same supernatural spirit. Has not that person become truly immortal?

Edited by Clifford Greenblatt, 23 September 2003 - 04:57 PM.

[Omnido]

Interesting to note how this thread began, when alot of this has already been defined, failingly contested, and partially resolved prior.
I had part in this development [>] here back in December of last year.

Till, I salute your line of thinking. [B)]
Its nice to know there are others who see the picture on its broader levels than those who simply "dont care" which appears to be a common theme in many of these discussions.
I agree with you wholeheartedly about the notion of relevance to the aforementioned.
In fact, I postulated an idea of "Transferral conversion" as directly and near-violently opposed to "uploading."
You might have a look at it.

Edited by Omnido, 04 November 2003 - 12:01 PM.

[Clifford Greenblatt]

Originally posted by Omnido
Now, if we examine that bike, measure all its parts and dimensions, and then build an exact duplicate of that bike while discarding the previous, is it still the same bike?
This question doesn't take a Ph.D to answer, for logically, mathematically, and objectively, it clearly IS NOT. It may be a perfect copy, but the original bike was destroyed, plain and simple.

Suppose a child's bicycle is replaced with a perfect copy without the child's knowledge. The copy is so perect that it includes every scratch, dent, rust spot and discolouration to great detail. The original bicycle is destroyed. Will the child ever know the difference? On the other hand, suppose the original bicycle is not copied but is repainted to look different, has a new bell, and horn installed, and all scratches and dents, and rust spots are repaired. How hard would it be to convince the child that the bicycle is a replacement and not the original?

Now, suppose a person is in a deep and dreamless sleep in the night. During this time, a perfect copy of the person is made and the original is destroyed. The perfect copy is placed in the bed, still in a deep and dreamless sleep. When the copy wakes up in the morning, how would the conscious experience of the copy differ from what the conscious experience of the original would have been?

[Omnido]

I already answered that question [>] here

It would seem that many people here are missing the entirety of the point.
And members like Lazarus Long and Bruce wonder why I vanished from the forums for so long a time...[!]
It appears that many people seem to have difficulting comprehending logic.

[Lazarus Long]

This is an issue that does seem to go around and around. I have noticed from studying the history of science and society that when an event like this occurs it is usually a preface to a synthesis or totally different alternative appearing to cut the Gordian knot. That is unless this subject is another that simply will be here until an event or technological breakthrough establishes all new parameters for discussion.

[Omnido]

Well said, well said indeed Lazarus. [lol]

[David]

"If you don’t believe me, try to find the barrier, the dividing line between your ‘inside’ and what’s ‘outside’. " (Till, 2003)

I think its in the LGN (Lateral geniculate neucleus). It seems to be the connection between input (stimulus features) and the person (Memories, traits, behaviours, emotions). But that's just a theory.

I think this is the most interesting question there is at the moment, the no mans land of the battle between true psychology and physiological psychology.

"Mind is defined by its context" (Till, 2003) . So true, if medical science manages to enhance me beyond my current Intelligence Quotent, (Perhaps by repairing years of damage through injecting re-grown stem cell cultivated brain cells) will it still be me? Or, interfacing my "self" with a computer based memory reserve? Improving Processing speeds through cognitive trining?

By the way till, the original piece of writing was awesome, should be more like it! Good on you!

David.

[Clifford Greenblatt]

Originally posted by Omnido
It would seem that many people here are missing the entirety of the point.
And members like Lazarus Long and Bruce wonder why I vanished from the forums for so long a time...
It appears that many people seem to have difficulting comprehending logic.

Pure logic is fairly simple, but application of logic to real situations can sometimes get tricky and confusing. I do not wish to make anyone's forum experience unpleasant by being slow to properly understand certain ideas. Here is a spatiotemporal continuity enigma presented in an effort to understand proper logical application of spatiotemporal continuity.

Two jigsaw puzzles from the same lot are assembled. Each jigsaw puzzle has a thousand pieces. One puzzle is assembled on a white table and the other puzzle is assembled on a black table. When the assembly of the puzzles is complete, the puzzle on the white table is named W and its identical twin on the black table is named B. The puzzles are kept on the tables for three years. Once each day, a single piece is swapped between the two puzzles. After a thousand days of this, every puzzle piece has been swapped exactly once. In the end, where is puzzle W? I will now examine the complications of various possible answers. If the answer is that puzzle W is on the black table, then when did it move from the white table to the black table? If the answer is that puzzle W no longer exists, then is the puzzle on the black table something new that did not exist before? If the answer is that puzzle W is on the white table or on both tables, then why are all the pieces to the original W puzzle on the black table, fully assembled, and none of them are on the white table? What is the correct logical answer concerning the whereabouts of puzzle W according to spatiotemporal continuity principles? If I understand the spatiotemporal principle correctly, then puzzle W remains on the white table from the beginning to the end of the thousand days. The puzzle on the white table changed by only 0.1% each day and thereby maintained spatiotemporal continuity as puzzle W on the white table. Therefore, the spatiotemporal argument ignores the identity carried by the puzzle pieces. Is this a correct understanding of spatiotemporal continuity?

Edited by Clifford Greenblatt, 10 November 2003 - 02:05 AM.

[Omnido]

Now this is an excellent example of logical demonstration.
*applauds* [lol]

This example is very well thought out and demonstrates a nice piece of the puzzle.
The question of what happened to puzzle W with releation to puzzle B is simple: Both puzzles ceased to exist in their originality and became composited together as part of eachother, and eventually the same construct with which they originated, merely arrriving at a different location.

This example serves very well for continunity of consciousness, if we were to presume that if, lets say, each puzzle piece represented a collection of neurons in a mind. The only problem with this example is that there is no transience with respect to the "Swapped" pieces. The model is accurate but lacks the "activity" with respect to its theory.

Let me try a twist on your model. Suppose each of the puzzle pieces had a number labeled on them, and were all connected to each other by way of an optical transceiver. As each piece is first assembled on each seperate table, each piece and its corrisponding number are integrated one at a time with the other pieces. Hence, the beginings of puzzle W start with 1, then another piece is added which has a numerical value of 2, and so on until the puzzle is completely finished.
That is only the first part.
The second part of this example is that, upon each piece becoming part of the whole, each piece knows what its neighbors are, in relation to its own number.
For instance, Piece #445 knows that it is connected in part to piece #1 and piece #2, etc...
For the puzzle on the Black table, the same rules apply.

Now lets continue this example with the "switching" that takes place. Pieces are moved from Puzzle B to Puzzle W, and vice versa. The pieces once removed one at a time, at first might not notice a severe impact upon their original whole, but the new piece from the opposite table has its own label, and therefore integrates itself with its new neighbors. The same applies to both pieces being interchanged between tables. After all pieces are eventually swapped, you have a collective of both puzzles. Puzzle B and Puzzle W become Puzzle BW, seperated into two identical duplicates that now occupy positionally different locations, but have been integrated together in the process of transference. Puzzle B and Puzzle W are now a combination of eachother, drastically different from their beginnings only due to integration, even though the only difference that is notable is their respective different originating locations. While their structure is identical, they are now combinatorial with respect to their seperate origins.

This model suffices to demonstrate the change brought about by transient integration of parts, with respect to their whole.
Application of this theory with neurology, serves to demonstrate a successful cross-integration of two systems with duplicative properties, and is associatively correct with one distinction: At some point, either Puzzle W or Puzzle B will have to be eliminated, unless cross-intergrational duplication was the intention from the beginning. With regard to transference, that is not the intention. However, even this example does not infer the "uploading" methods as they have been discussed thus far, so youre on the right track.

Again, I applaud you Clifford for your efforts in explanation of a logical idea with which you modeled out an example. I found it very easy to understand, and analyze. If only everyone who posted could give examples as such with relation to other reality events. [sfty]

[kevin]

Hmmm..

Reality..

I wonder what that might be.. ? [":)]

[Clifford Greenblatt]

Thanks Omnido for your encouraging comments and discussion of the importance of transience and integration. Since a jigsaw puzzle is not well suited to model something with a great deal of activity, communication, and cross linkage, I have described another model below in an attempt to capture the ideas of integration and transience. However, in this attempt, the transfer will be neither gradual nor active but will involve a total freezing of all activity during duplication.

A system of one thousand computers are connected to each other by communication ports. Each computer can communicate directly with ten other computers in the system. Any computer can be the original sender of some data, the final receiver of some data, or a repeater of data. Each computer can also process and store data. Although each computer can communicate directly with only ten neighbouring computers, every computer is effectively linked to every other computer by the chain of communication links.

Now suppose the system of computers is halted with all stored information being preserved but all dynamic processing and flow of information stopping. Another system of one thousand computers is built that has the same arrangement of interconnections as the original system. Each computer in the new system processes data in exactly the same way as its corresponding computer in the original system. All data from each original computer memory is copied to its corresponding new computer's memory. All memory in both computers is nonvolatile. The new computer system is connected to peripherals that have the same characteristics as the peripherals to which the original system was connected. All communication rates and data processing rates are the same in the new and original systems.

Once the new system is fully set up, it is switched on. Immediately, the computers process data and communicate with each other and with the peripherals. The original system is never switched back on but is squished by a pile driver. Are transience and integration fully preserved in this operation? The assumptions are that all the original computers are halted at the same time and they all have discrete states that are frozen exactly as they were the femtosecond before being halted. All computers in the new system are started at exactly the same time and they proceed immediately from their stored state with absolutely no booting up process. Another assumption is that all inputs from all peripherals continue from exactly where they were at the moment that the original system was halted.

[Omnido]

Unfortunately, no. The act of "freezing" only suspends the transience, and its aftermentioned duplication invalidates it entirely. The original computers do not speak with one another again, ever, since the pile driver ended their former transient existence. The new computers however preserve all the aforementioned computers information in great detail, but the fact of the matter remains: The original computers are lost and destroyed.

This logical point is still a point in case. While the duplication might be considered fundamentally equal, objectively it is not. No part of the original dynamasism from the original computers and their data-interchange in terms of its actual constant transience is preserved in this manner.

Using this model you provided, lets define transience in a variation.
Suppose the entire collection of computers wanted to "move" itself to a new location without the post duplicative destruction that is the concern for many.
This would require a dual connection between the new intented computer setup, versus the previous existing computer setup. The new setup remains empty, or essentially "blank". The old setup begins to communicate information on its various ports, 1 computer at a time, to the new setup. One of the new computers begins to receive, analyze, and duplicate the exact same information as the computer from the old setup which is sending the information. Eventually, both the new computer and the old computer send and receive the same information back through the old setup. After this is acheived, the old computer is switched off and the new computer transfers its information to the older setup, completely flawlessly and without any noticable discontinuity, since both computers once sent and received the same information simultaniously.
This is what I refer to Transient Intergrational Duplication.

The new system is integrated into the old, and the old changes its data slightly to accomodate this.
This process is continued until all computers have been duplicated, integrated, and eventually switched off.
In the end, the old "transforms" into the new, while keeping the same fundamental aspects of itself, and all transference occurs continuously as opposed to the pure suspended-duplication process. The old becomes the new, and the new becomes the old. The difference here is that the old is eliminated once it reintegrates itself on a new medium with its former self.

The difference between this and the "Pile Driver" method is that there is never lost a single actively transient piece of information. The integration is constant, and the computers being shut off become redundant, since the data is migrating to a new system.

Does this help to clairfy?

[Clifford Greenblatt]

Thanks Omnido for clarifying active integration. I apologise for the delay in responding as I did not get an e-mail notification this time. I think your explanation clearly defines the requirements for any system to maintain its identity as the original. The idea of my model was not to preserve the identity of a system as being the original but to capture its essence. The original system could gradually lose its essential functions but a physically much different system, not even a duplicate, could capture its essence and continue the processes that were done by the original. Here is another model to express this idea. Suppose a computer is used for designing electronic instruments. The engineer using the computer complains of frequent crashes and declining reliability of the computer. A new and improved computer is bought as a replacement. All design files are successfully copied to the new computer and the design programmes are successfully installed. The engineer continues on very happily with the new computer, losing absolutely no functionality or data and no longer experiencing the annoying crashes. The new computer is obviously not the original but the essence of its purpose for existing is fully captured and also improved. The old computer could get so bad that all the design programmes and files need to be deleted but it could still be used for lesser functions. The essence of the old computer has been lost to the engineer but is continued in the new computer in a better way.

[Clifford Greenblatt]

Originally posted by Kevin
Hmmm..

Reality..

I wonder what that might be.. ?

This is an excellent question, Kevin. To help understand this, let us look at three aspects of reality. First is observed reality, second is observable reality, and third is unobservable reality. Observed reality includes things about reality that scientists have been very successful in modeling. Physicists have done an excellent job of modeling the way that elementary particles interact. Astronomers have probed deep into the universe. However, there is still a great deal more that scientists could do to model the things in reality that they have not yet accomplished. These things make up observable but not yet observed aspects of reality. Unobservable reality is the part of reality that scientists will never be able to model, no matter how advanced they become. Both the observed, observable, and unobservable aspects or reality are fully real. Materialists understand that there are things that are too remote in space-time for anyone on earth to ever observe. They also acknowledge the possibility that there may be some things that exist on such a tiny scale that they will never be observed despite being extremely close to us in space-time. However, materialists are confident that scientists will have access to all that is necessary to eventually succeed in fully modeling all that is essential to consciousness. In this case, scientists could eventually gain the power to create artificial consciousness that would fully capture the essence of the mind of any person. However, if consciousness includes something that is unobservable and which can be created only by someone who can fully observe it, then no scientists will ever be able to capture the full essence of the mind of a person.

Edited by Clifford Greenblatt, 17 November 2003 - 11:31 AM.

[gandalf]

At the root of all of these observations and musings is the fundamental thing that is doing the observation and musing. We speak of our consciousness as if it where something material, when nothing in anyone's experience that would make us believe our essential selves, the "me" or "I", is physical save that it's point of view is usually bound to the location of our physical body.

It may be possible to dupilicate my physicality with such precision that the duplicate with think and believe it is me, yet the destruction of the original, IMO, is the destruction of "ME". I don't like the ideal. A copy may be good, but it isn't the original, no matter how good. There is something to be said for the history of a thing having much to do with its "isness".

To those who don't wish to formulate their discussion around anything that has to do with "spirit", I would like to point out that the current work being done in quantum mechanics points to connections that, to all intents and purposes, may be considered "spiritual", in as much as they are not subjected to the percieved understandings of random chance. Almost all of quantum science is now caught up in the understanding that only an act of will, conciousness, and observations determines the outcome of the "random" events that constitute the underlying structure of the universe.

Ok, the word spirit might conjure up many far out ideas, such superstitions that we have long since seen the truths of. However, much of what is accepted as scientific dogma meets the same criteria as opinion and faith. Because something cannot be proven to exist has never disproven it's existance. Nothing we believe we know now is sancrosanct in the future; our understandings have overturned past knowledge time and again.

I "believe" I am more than the neural patterens operating in my grey matter, yet I recognize that what others percieve as me, my personality and current appearance, ARE a function of my physical being. I "beileve" that something fundamental to who "I" am, not my personality or lifestyle, has lived other lives, had other personalities and that "I" will somehow be again should I lose the use of the "me" that is typing this.

My reasons for this belief are totally experiencial and cannot be proven, so don't bother to ask for proof. All I can offer, to the interested, are the memories of the experiences that have led me to this belief. I understand that my belief in no way excludes the possibility that I am totally wrong. But then again, those that don't believe as I do may be wrong as well.

I am an emmortalist because I value continued existance with continuity of memory and personality. I hope to keep this one going for a long and enjoyable time. I love life, and experience is all we have; memory. We get to construct that memory with our experience and form the type of lives, hopefully, that we can look back upon without regret and maybe a bit of pride.

In Love,
Gandalf the Grey Wonderer

[kevin]

Clifford:

Unobservable reality is the part of reality that scientists will never be able to model, no matter how advanced they become.

The above is a statement based on our current knowledge and I see it in no way as absolute. Never is a long time and many things can happen between now and then. Infinite ignorance is not an option for me, therefore I think that all that is observable, in this universe, will be explained, perhaps in the not too distant future (a couple centuries or millenia depending on many factors of course). There is nothing to say that once we break through the ceiling of comprehending the physical laws of this universe, that we won't emerge into some even more complicated superstruture and in fact I think this is likely.

Just more metaphysical garbledygook.. but hey... where else can I think about these things..

In recent abiogenesis articles I've read it is being suggested that the physical laws of the universe are uniquely tuned to produce life and in fact that as soon as the earth provided an environment to support life, it began to appear. Life it seems, is probably not nearly as fragile or scarce as we might have thought and prevalent as an underlying force to matter, space and time, equal and opposite to that of entropy. 'Time' will tell just how this emerging view pans out. To me it seems to provide circumstantial evidence that there is an underlying motive force to our 'reality' that is geared towards producing more and more complex and self-regenerating forms.

If there exists a pervasive 'Will to Organize' that is as experimentally verifiable as the "Will to Dissemble", our viewpoint as to the nature and purpose of reality may turn to a more eastern philosophy where life is thought to exist in all things, both animate and inanimate. This reinforces my intuition that before matter, space and time, 'existence' is fundamental. We do not exist as a result of randomly congruent forces, we are the product of the of a machine which has been designed to produce us. For what purpose and who is the designer remains to be seen, if any. Perhaps the Christian imperative "Be fruitful and multiply" can be taken on different levels than just biological. Perhaps we design ourselves much like that piece of artwork where the hand is drawing itself. One thing is certain, in the new physics, which I hope to comprehend better someday, there is a sense that we are getting close to the quarry, a Unified Field Theory, and that day will be an interesting one as we will see the beginning of the possibility of unification of many of those things which divide us into 'individuals' and provide us with our sense of 'identity'.

[Clifford Greenblatt]

Looking at Kevin's, Gandalf's and Omnido's points together reveals two vastly differing philosophies of personal identity. The interesting thing is that Omnido does not express any explicit view on the dualism vs materialism issue as far as I am aware but implicitly supports the dualism philosophy by placing a great emphasis on spatiotemporal continuity. Here is why I say this. I think the most compelling reason for a person to insist on spatiotemporal continuity is to ensure that the personal spirit is not lost in a transformation process. If spatiotemporal continuity is maintained during a transformation, then the person being transformed gains a sense of security that the personal spirit does not disappear and become replaced with a different spirit because the spirit is continually observing the process.

Here are some things that support a materialist illusion that the full essence of consciousness can be captured scientifically. Building blocks of nature have been clearly identified. Scientific models of those building blocks have been proven with extremely high reliability. A person's brain may be viewed scientifically as a hierarchy of building blocks from elements to molecules to cells, each with properties that are known or knowable scientifically. Materialists view consciousness as a flow of information amongst the various building blocks of the brain and they claim that no further explanation is required.. The dualism philosophy has been heavily criticised for proposing nonscientific explanations for things that can be well explained scientifically. However, as Gandalf has pointed out, quantum mechanics does leave some room for a dual nature of consciousness. A person's brain does depend on a natural and scientifically explainable flow of information, but additional activity, which is spiritual and not material, could occur on a quantum mechanical level and have a significant effect on that flow of information.

A materialist may suggest that someone volunteer as a guinea pig to testify that nothing is lost in a transformation that does not maintain spatiotemporal continuity. However, the testimony of the person would not be adequate proof. The duplicate could sincerely claim to have the same spirit as the original but could be totally mistaken. The duplicate would have an illusion of being the same person on the basis of having inherited all of the original person's memories and personality. Here is where the word "personality" is very deceptive. Personality refers to the psychological characteristics of a person. The word "person" in "personality" gives the impression that a person is fully defined by personality. This idea is deceptive because the duplicate person could have the same psychological characteristics as the original but have a different spirit.

[Omnido]

That is exactly my point Clifford.
I think you nailed it on the spot.

As far as the "Essence" is concerned, of course I will agree that the essence of a person in terms of recognizable patterns of activity can be based upon stored or otherwise duplicated information. However, it is the active consciousness that I referred to (to which thankfully, you have successfully identified with) for which all the information is parsed, evaluated, and integrated, that holds my concern.

Many can argue that the nature or essence of a thing can be quantified, and in truth, it can be.
However, if the "thing" itself regards itself as a singular essence in transience, then a duplication is only a reflection of the self, not the true self.
Im glad that this idea is finally being grasped by others.
Yet, even in light of this, there will still remain those individuals who wish only to have their quantitative properties preserved, and thusly, a purely duplicative process will suffice for them.
It will not suffice for me, nor for others who grasp, indentify, and relate with the ideas that I have been attempting to convey.

[gandalf]

Thank you ALL!

Being new to this forum, I fully expected my "spiritual" views to be ridiculed and lamblasted. I am pleasantly surprised, and very encouraged to see that among those whom I view as being thoughtful and intellegent, ideas such as these are not arbitrarily discarded. In the context of the discussion, I could have asked for no better reasurance that intellegent people from all walks of life share my own somewhat sceptical views about religion without giving up the core persoanal understandings of self.

Thank you.
Gandalf the Grey Wonderer

[randolfe]

I also dislike being 'hardwired for sex'.  I don't particularly enjoy having my thoughts hijacked by something my DNA would be better off telling a lesser evolved lifeform more free to both sociologically and psycholigcally take advantage of the urge to procreate.

Evolutionarily speaking, I think the human species has arrived at a point where we will be able to control more carefully when and where we choose to give in to these urges.  As the average younger (and older) male thinks of sex on the average of once every 30 or so seconds (unfocused), I wonder how much more could be accomplished without the constant interruption of our hormones.

Now we get down to basics. At the age of 65 I have been having the most interesting conversations with a friend only one month younger who has totally lost all interest in sex. My own sexual interest has declined greatly in the past few years.

On the one hand, we both feel free of that hormonal bondage that sent us off into the nights of our yoputh seeking climax.

On the other hand, I, at least, miss that desire and passion even though I realize that such desires if they were now trapped in a 65-year-old body, the same desires which gave my life pungent spice years ago, would be a living curse today. Is this "new freedom from desire" or "life without passion"?

I really can't answer that question for you. I am seeking it myself. Is life better without sexual drives and the social involvements such drives cause us to make? Or have we reached a new realm of social freedom by being freed from such physical constraints?

I am living it and do not know the answers. You tell me.