64 replies to this topic

[John Doe]

John,

Thanks for the challenge, but that is what I thought I've been doing since the beginning.  Actually, I've grown quite weary of these boards, especially in light of comments like Hugh Bristic's, with their veiled disparaging undertones.

My time is VERY limited and it's comments like those that motivated me to distance myself from the Extropian community a few years ago.  Increasingly I feel the only reason I'm tolerated here at Imminst (with a few exceptions), is for those people who need a good "whipping boy" to further cement their pre-existing beliefs, and I'm just not going to play along anymore.

So I'm going to make this very easy.

You win.  You're right.

Hopefully this will make everyone whose beliefs I've challenged feel better.  I know I do.

That is rather dramatic. Of course, your complaining that you are being persecuted and are too busy for these message boards, instead of answering others' requests for you to explain how quantum indeterminism and metaprogramming relate to each other, seems most convenient.

You write that you have been trying to show how QM and metaprogramming are related all along. But it seems to me that your original essay suggested, without good reason, that such a relationship exist whereas the bulk of your later messages argued that an indeterminate interpretation of QM was correct. These posts were motivated, I think, by your tacit assumption that QM helps your case for free will. But in a post on April 25, 2004, I wrote the following to show that you had yet to show QM does help:

So you define free will as "this relative scale of increasing neurological metaprogramming freedom." Earlier you defined metaprogramming as the "ability to re-program our programs." Of course, re-programming programs does not require indeterminism. Programs reprogram themselves all of the time without indeterminism. I could write a program to do so on my laptop just to demonstrate this point. So when, after you define free will as "this relative scale of increasing neurological metaprogramming freedom", you add that there is no reason to deny your definition of FW except a dogmatic resistance to QM, you have switched domains. Considering everything you have written, the former statement is simly not relevant to the latter. This is why I say that you have yet to show why QM helps your case for free will. Metaprogramming, or re-programming programs, can be done without QM at all.

Since then, I have yet to receive an explanation or answer to this. To confuse things even further, you wrote on April 25 that:

Even the primitive study of neural networks by today’s current AI researchers depends on weighted connections (fuzzy logic) in order to work. So no appeal to QM is necessary. I throw in QM because it implies both the action of conscious receptors, and of indeterminacy, both of which challenge hard determinism and consciousness as a subset of a physically determinist universe, of which your side of this argument continues to depend on.

This paragraph suggests that the relationship between metaprogramming and QM is very weak -- that QM is decoration that you "throw in". The paragraph further suggests that you "throw in" QM because it challenges determinism -- a thesis that I have never committed myself too. So QM does not seem to help your case for FW much at all. Indeed, your emphasis upon metaprogramming, which is perfectly compatible with determinism, suggests to me that even if the indeterminate interpretation of QM were proven false, you would nevertheless assert that humans possess free will. You would therefore be a compatibilist, do you agree? This is the question that I keep wishing you would answer. Your reluctance to admit that FW, on your view, is compatible with determinism (because QM is just "thrown in") suggests to me that you have tacit incompatibilist intuitions, and suspect that metaprogramming alone is not sufficient to provide free will.

Your sarcastic "you win" does not provide a very satisfying conclusion to this discussion. I am not sure who is right or whether we should approach this subject with such an adversarial tone. Perhaps, if you explained your position better, I would see that in fact, you are correct, and I am wrong.

[PaulH]

John, There is nothing sarcastic about what I said at all. I was being both serious and honest with you.

Lets recap:

You've complained that I have dodged certain key arguments, but so have you. Every weakness I pointed out in your argument, you refused to answer. You swept each and every one aside as irrelevant, and yet insisted I don't do the same with you?? From where I've been sitting, you have continued to insist that this argument take place exclusively on your playing field, without even considering the logical frameworks I'm using. Yet this entire discussion is taking place under my article, not yours. That fact alone should have garnished a minimum of effort on your part to see it from my framework long enough to move the discussion forward. Comments like Hugh Bristic's highlight the transhuman community bias in how things are perceived here. So even though I have been gentlemanly throughout, Hugh would like to imply otherwise. He may not have meant to, but I found it to be a bit insulting. Who needs that kind of BS?

I kept thinking to myself, that if you at least tried to work within a fuzzy logical system, I could have moved my argument to the next crucial step. So perhaps you can imagine my frustration at never getting to that next step. Instead we just kept going in circles, becuase you refused to go anywhere else.

Since you have refused to examine this argument from anything other than your own framework, it has forced me to do one of two things:

1) Bail on the argument (which I've gracefully tried to do twice previously), or

2) Argue it exclusively within your own ideological position.

Since you have under no circumstance accepted #1 and are completely insistent on #2, I will say this only one more time John. From your position of yes/no, either/or binary logic, there is NO FW. Therefore, you are right and I am wrong.


Regading my time constraints, I'm being completely serious in my having grown weary of this.

Look at this from my perspective,

If you only had one hour a day to discuss your ideas on the net, would you spend that time discussing them with people where those ideas might gain some traction, OR effectively waste it on people who are so diametrically opposed to you that no amount of discussion will make the slightest difference?

In that light it makes absolutely no sense for me to continue. It's just not a productive way to spend ones time.

Additionally, and this is not directed at you specifically, but from on all the back-patting that goes on around here, I can see that the ideological space of the transhumanist community has expanded very little in my 4 year absence. So pardon me if I am a bit sad for assuming otherwise. Therefore, for the foreseable future I will no longer be engaging in any contentious arguments around these parts.

Lets stick with what we do agree on - physical immortality. Lets hope we can agree on it sufficiently enough to make it happen in our lifetimes.

Cheers,

Paul

Edited by planetp, 06 May 2004 - 11:43 AM.

[John Doe]

PlanetP, if you feel I dodged any of your questions, just tell me which ones and I will be glad to answer them.

For example, you express concern that I am not working within a "fuzzy logic" domain, but that I am instead using "Aristotelian logic". I did address this concern, however, on April 25. I asked questions such as: What exactly are "fuzzy logic" and "Aristotelian logic"? How am I using the latter? And why is this mistaken?

First I want to say something about "Aristotelian logic." Aristotle founded, in a sense, logic. But he was not perfect. Some of his mistakes persisted throughout history and were only corrected recently by people such as Bertrand Russell. This, however, is not the difficulty you seem to have with Aristotelian logic. Instead, you do not like logic because it is absolute. In particular, you seem attracted to the idea of breaking the Law of Non-Contradition, that p ^ !p cannot be true simultaneously.

Particles may very well break this law at the quantum scale. I think, however, that you appeal to this "weirdness" when working in inappropriate domains. For example, I hope we can I agree that I am either typing at the computer now, or I am not doing so. In other words, it could not be the case that I am both sitting here typing and also NOT sitting here typing simultaneously. Do we agree? If we do, is this not "Aristotelian" logic? Consider another example. Can we agree that men went to the moon in the twentieth century or they did not? Could it be the case that men both went to the moon and men did NOT go to the moon in the twentieth century simultaneouslY? Of course, that cannot be true. Men did go to the moon.

So, Aristotle's logic is quite useful in some domains. If we were discussing quarks and protons, I might disagree. But you have yet to show me why "Aristotelian" logic does not apply to statements such as "free will and determinism are incompatible" or "free will admits of degrees". Note that the vast majority of philosophers working today and throughout history who considered this question both found it coherent and answered either yes or no.

I also wrote in a later post:

This is what you meant by "Aristotelian logic?" I am not an expert in ancient philosophy but I am fairly sure that Aristotle did not mean this. In any case, why do you think that I am using logic in this fallacious way?

Of course !dogmatic communist does not imply dogmatic capitalist. It simply implies !dogmatic communist. Whatever you are, you are not a dogmatic communist. You could be passionate but not quite dogmatic. You could be apathetic. You could be fascist. There a countless number of things you could be. This is one of the first things we learn in an introduction to logic course.

But why do you think that I am committing this fallacy? How so?

So I have not dodged this question. If anything, there are many questions within these posts to which you never replied and I invite you to do so now. If there are any other questions you feel I am willfully neglecting, please tell me.

Now, if I am going to address your concerns, could you return the courtesy and address mine? I realize you do not have much time so I will repeat some short questions which I think would advance the debate:

1. What is the difference between Aristotelian logic and fuzzy logic? Why is the former inappropriate for answering the compatibility and existence questions?
2. Does FW, on your view, require indeterminism? (You suggest that the answer is yes by writing "probably".) If so, why?
3. Does FW, on your view, require a certain interpretation of QM to be correct? (You suggest that the answer is no by writing "no appeal to QM is necessary.")
4. How are QM and metaprogramming integrated in your account of FW? Is QM something you just "throw in" and is not necessary for FW at all? Or is the only reason a person would reject your metaprogramming account of FW "dogmatic stubbornness on the part of people unwilling to let go of an old dying deterministic paradigm, against the new empirically verifiable new paradigm of quantum mechanics?"

Kip

[eclecticdreamer]

Perhaps the paradox of consciousness & the origins of life, are one & the same - Ourself willed this reality into being to get to know ourselves better..

Or perhaps not.. =O\

[hughbristic]

Comments like Hugh Bristic's highlight the transhuman community bias in how things are perceived here. So even though I have been gentlemanly throughout, Hugh would like to imply otherwise. He may not have meant to, but I found it to be a bit insulting. Who needs that kind of BS?

I have found your attitude intolerant and arrogant and that is why I posted what I did. You come off as someone with a persecution complex--a little Napolean. Any time someone disagrees with you, it is because they are a small dogmatic mind--someone you can't waste your time with.

Have you ever stopped to consider that maybe your ideas just aren't that well thought out, and maybe that's why you can't convince anyone? It appears that you have read extensively in this and other fields, but just because you have read something doesn't mean you understand it. People like Dennet actually use experimental evidence from cognitive science and neurology to cast the issues of consciousness in a new light that has practical and pragmatic implications. What is the practical import of your musings? You use vague words and concepts to obfuscate the issues.

I too have felt frustrated with views in the transhumanist community that I disagree with--like yours. I worry the movement threatens to become an extension of the old New Age BS. I feel your views have been treated with great courtesy and considered thoughtfully. If you don't feel welcome here, leave.

Hugh

[bacopa]

It's my take that you were a bit rude to Paul as he was merely voicing an opinion, one which he is emotional about and that isn't considered the norm in transhumanist thinking, he feels you snubbed his ideas and didn't truly consider or think about them. Of course sometimes his arguments are a bit emotional and differ from a more mechanistic stance on free will, but I think there should be room for all types of arguments to be carried out here at imminsts. he feels you guys 'ganged' up on him, I don't see this as the case, but nonetheless he is a very sweet guy in real life and calling him arrogant and intolerant while accusing him of having a Napoleanic complex was a bit harsh. Maybe you should apologize Hughbristic, he was merely giving an arugment he feels adamant about the same way you feel adamant about your beliefs. He told me personally that he feels no one wants him here... surely this is not the case as he merely is participating in imminsts free forum discussions which I always believed should give everyone's side an equal chance, as well as respect...at no time did I think he was intentionally putting you guys down from the bits that I did read His views are somewhat 'new age' but this shouldn't be dismissed just because it doesn't bring with it the qualifications for hard science. I personally will refrain from agreeing on either side for obvious reasons and all view points should be tolerated. [thumb]

[hughbristic]

Yes. It was a bit harsh. I get frustrated, and the anonymity of the Internet makes it too easy to indulge in my anti-social instincts. I guess I feel I have less and less in common with the views expressed here and Paul's posts and his tone brought that to the fore. I haven't been posting here as much as I used to, and when I do I can't seem to avoid being pissy. Perhaps, I am the one who should leave. I apologize.

Thanks for the conversation.

See you in the Singularity,
Hugh

[MichaelAnissimov]

I really can sympathize with Paul's time constraints, and I don't think it's too fair that people assume he is just running away from the argument, although I have to say that Kip sets down his arguments concisely and provocatively and I would probably consider answering them if I were Paul.

Paul, you shouldn't say "you win, you're right" to someone if you don't really believe it. John isn't so immature that he argues just for the sake of hearing that meaningless word string. John, you should also consider Paul's convincing pragmatic argument that it's not worthwhile to argue against people with whom your ideas have no traction.

Paul, yes, like 99.9% of the science and technological community, transhumanists are still materialist, just like 4 years ago. But please don't allow a semi-frustrating conversation with one or two transhumanists lead you to make blanket condemnations of the whole movement. Using your definition for "back-patting", one might label scientific communities as mutual admiration societies simply because they all agree on materialism or Darwinian population genetics, for that matter, and aren't afraid to talk about it.

I do think Hugh is being a bit impolite and aggressive here; why talk about anybody leaving? Whenever you sense a burning social emotion within yourself, my advice is to immediately stop what you are doing and focus on killing the emotion. Your apology is commendable, in any case.

Last point, of course... *sigh*, is that it's weird you guys sign your posts with "see you in the Singularity". Altruism and decency are complex, high-level behaviors that we shouldn't expect to emerge automatically in the first self-improving transhuman intelligences. Just as easily we could create a transhuman intelligence that doesn't give a damn about us, and ends up wiping out the whole of humanity through the sheer rearrangement of matter in accordance with its values. (Which would not include our continued survival.) The single greatest threat to your continued existence is an unfriendly transhuman intelligence that destroys you, all your friends and family, and everything else you hold dear. Please do not turn the Singularity into a religion by assuming that success in this endeavor is automatic. The Transhumanist FAQ contains more information on the topic, see the section on superintelligence.

[bacopa]

I wasn't trying to do that merely signing off on a friendly and yes optimistic thought. I've read enough of your warnings and some of your papers to understand the existential risks here. Incidently your paper on optimal states was really well thought out and I agree completely, it takes bravery and maturity to conceit to the potential benefits of higher superintelligence being an avid writer yourself i'd imagine. I think it's vital for people in the transhuman community to congratulate and praise one another because doing this kind of research I imagine is tiring and hard work worthy of praise. Anyway that's all for now and I'd like to help out in some way in promoting the Singularity, but I need to read more first...

[John Doe]

John, you should also consider Paul's convincing pragmatic argument that it's not worthwhile to argue against people with whom your ideas have no traction.

I do not mind writing these small posts.

Paul, yes, like 99.9% of the science and technological community, transhumanists are still materialist, just like 4 years ago. 

I am not a materialist. I agree with Chalmers in detail.

Last point, of course... *sigh*, is that it's weird you guys sign your posts with "see you in the Singularity".  Altruism and decency are complex, high-level behaviors that we shouldn't expect to emerge automatically in the first self-improving transhuman intelligences.  Just as easily we could create a transhuman intelligence that doesn't give a damn about us, and ends up wiping out the whole of humanity through the sheer rearrangement of matter in accordance with its values.  (Which would not include our continued survival.)  The single greatest threat to your continued existence is an unfriendly transhuman intelligence that destroys you, all your friends and family, and everything else you hold dear.  Please do not turn the Singularity into a religion by assuming that success in this endeavor is automatic.  The Transhumanist FAQ contains more information on the topic, see the section on superintelligence.

I wish transhumanists would avoid religious behavior too.

[PaulH]

Michael, Everyone,

John and I have been continuing this debate/conversation off-list. Not to avoid scrutiny, but to iron out some of our complicated differences without distraction. We both plan on publishing our correspondence as soon as we reach some point of completion. Stay tuned.

[Bruce Klein]

Excellent.. thanks for the update.

[PaulH]

Actually Bruce, this promising private debate has quickly come to an end. I was hoping the private nature of our conversation would have brought a greater degree of civility and politeness, as well as patiently going over each point and definition... We never got past defining the use of terms, when John went on the offensive. I insisted throughout that we should get on the same page semantically, and have mutual understanding of terms, before getting back into the body of the debate. This isn't happening.

I enjoyed my time here, and Bruce you are my hero. So keep up the good work.
Warmest Regards,

Paul

Edited by planetp, 13 May 2004 - 07:29 PM.

[Bruce Klein]

Thanks Paul,

I greatly appreciate the kind words and helpful feedback... and hope you return.

Take care,
Bruce

[Kalepha]

Man, Paul, I wish I knew a lot more just so I could’ve played the role of nuance identifier and moderator, because I too really appreciate your contributions.

[John Doe]

I find it disturbing that this thread, instead of being a philosophical discussion, instead keeps becoming focused upon human beings, friends and enemies, threats to leave and hints of returning -- like a soap opera.

Here is my first reply to Paul after he tried to explain his view on FW again (I will leave it to him to post his own messages if he likes):

Of the ones you defined I like this one the best.  I'm not comfortable defining free will withing theological contexts.  My understand of FW is there are both qualitative and quantitative differences.  In other words FW is both a qualitatively and quantitative fuzzy thing.  The type and degree of FW is gradiated, even punctuated depending on the level of awareness one has of his/her own conditioning, heredity, imprinting, etc.  So in answer to your previous question I suppose I'm a compatibilist in the Dennettian sense, but only partially in that I believe the degree of FW is both an emergent and instrinsic phenomona that increases proportionally (punctuated, not continuous) to self awareness.  To be more precise, I think the degree of free will can fluctuate within a determinist system, only in that determinist complex systems give rise to emergent properties that cannot be predicted by a reduction to simplistic causes.  This is quite different than "billiard ball" physics where every behavior can be precisely modeled by initial conditions.  In this qualitative definition of FW I'm pretty sure I'm a compatibilist.  For convenience I'll call this qualitiative definition emergent FW (EFW)

1. Why and how do you now say that two types of FW exist?
2. How do you integrate the importance of unpredictability (due to complex systems) and "level of awareness" on your view of EFW? Once again, the idea of metaprogramming or metacognition does not need your limits (whether quantum or chaotic) upon what we cannot know about the future. Which of these is doing the explanatory work?
3. Your distinction between complex and simple systems and your idea of "simplistic causes" are not clear.
4. Even if they were, you have not established that human beings are like the former and not the latter (just as you have yet to show that a consciousness-as-fundamental interpretation of QM is in fact the correct interpretation).

However, I'm also an incompatibilist, in that I think the degree we don't have EFW is highly dependent on determinist previous causes.  So much of our behavior is clearly programmed by heredity, genetics, imprinting and conditioning.

Your ideas here are not clear at all. Earlier you wrote that complex systems allow humans to have EFW. Now you say that deterministic previous (simplistic or non-simplistic?) causes do not let us have EFW. Which is it (or what degree of each is it?)?

However we also have some EFW "wiggle room" out of these determinist factors to the degree we are self-aware of them, and ultimately through very deep self-wareness (i.e. meta meta meta meta if you will) there comes a quantum threshold where determinism no longer holds sway.  And an altogether both greater degree of FW becomes possible (quantitatively and qualitatively), at least in the mind.  Lets call this Ulimtimate Free Will (UFW), although I don't necessarily think its dependent exclusive on QM indeterminancy, I think it might help or act as an enabler. Externally at the macroscopic level, our bodies are still subject largely to determinist forces, but awareness of this quantam/post quantum level is something like UFW. Unfortunately we cannot exercise this same level of freedom through our bodies, as they are largely subject to determinist forces as I described above.  How much of this type of UFW can be exercised while operating your body, rather than merely in your head, remains to be seen.  I suspect not much, until we have complete control over matter at the quantum/post-quantum level.

This is completely ad hoc. There is simply no reason at all to think that deep reflection somehow removes human thought from a determistic to a quantum realm. Furthermore, even if this did somehow free us from the tyranny of determinism, you have yet to show how indeterminism helps people have FW. FW does necessarily follow from the negation of determinism.

To put it another way, we live in both a determinist and indeterminant world.  On a macroscopic physical level, we are almost entirely subject to macroscopic determinist forces with some degree of possible EFW, and little or no QFW, and within the exclusive domain of the mind, both EFW and UFW become possible, until a certain level of technological self-reconfiguration takes place, at which point a much greater level UFW can be excersized externally.

Again this is both vague and ad hoc.

[John Doe]

Here is the second reply:

I employed fuzzy logic to make the point that in PFW it's not something we either have or don't have, but are subject to a wide variety of external determinist factors that influence our behavior. The fuzzy part comes in describing the increasing level of EFW that is possible as we become more self-aware of these determinist factors, and can choose another outcome outside of their control. You of course argue that this meta-level is still a program and is still deterministic, and I will argue the opposite as this continues.

You never argue the opposite. You propose, suggest, conjecture the opposite. You write something like "at this point the mind is no longer deterministic" which translates into "it is at least conceivable that the mind does have these quantum functions, and my view of FW depends upon this being the case, even though I have yet to show why freedom from determinism helps people have FW."

You also write we "can choose another outcome outside of their [antecedent determining factors] control". Again, this translates into something like "I suppose it is conceivable that if we knew enough about the deterministic causes affecting human behavior we might have some special power to overrule them." This must be the case unless you are suggesting the universe is deterministic, in which case you have overruled nothing -- the antecedent factors DO have control.

I want to say both yes and no. I think EFW does not require it, but QFW does. However, as I mentioned earlier my suspicion is QFW influences EFQ, I'm just not sure to what degree. I will expound on this idea further as well.

At this point I find your ideas so nebulous that I have difficulty understanding, much less analyzing, them. If QFW can affect EFW, how? Can you even assert, rather than conjecture, that something like QFW (involving quantum indeterminacy in the brain) and EFW (involving both metaprogramming and complex systems -- it is not clear which one is doing the explanatory work) exists?

Not necessarily. On the surface, something like the Copenhagen Interpretation lends greater support to the idea that consciousness is a fundamental, but the possibility is not altogether incompatible with MWI either. Even if MWI is correct, who is to say, that consciousness is not choose which world to inhabit? If that choice is possible, and I think it is from the experiences of certain inner space explorers, especially John Lilly, then such a choice would be the domain of QFW.

These sentences are not grammatically correct. They make little sense. However, the possibility of a consciousness-centered MWI does not free you from the position that "my view of FW depends upon one or more interpretation of QM". For it might be the case that a MWI in which consciousness does not choose (whatever that means) is in fact correct. So, your view would seem to nevertheless be contingent upon these future discoveries.

4. How are QM and metaprogramming integrated in your account of FW? Is QM something you just "throw in" and is not necessary for FW at all?

This is where I loose you a bit. I consider my original paper to explain this connection very intimately. Perhaps you could expond on what you are finding loose or vague. Metaprogramming is definitely not something I'm throwing in. Quite the contrary I think it’s vitally necessary to lend weight to the merit of my arguments.

Throughout this entire discussion you have said "my original paper says that" or "that is what I have been trying to show all along" -- you do everything except actually show how the two are related. I even picked apart your paper and showed you how the two seem unrelated in your paper. For example on May 6 I wrote:

You write that you have been trying to show how QM and metaprogramming are related all along. But it seems to me that your original essay suggested, without good reason, that such a relationship exist whereas the bulk of your later messages argued that an indeterminate interpretation of QM was correct. These posts were motivated, I think, by your tacit assumption that QM helps your case for free will. But in a post on April 25, 2004, I wrote the following to show that you had yet to show QM does help:

QUOTE 
So you define free will as "this relative scale of increasing neurological metaprogramming freedom." Earlier you defined metaprogramming as the "ability to re-program our programs." Of course, re-programming programs does not require indeterminism. Programs reprogram themselves all of the time without indeterminism. I could write a program to do so on my laptop just to demonstrate this point. So when, after you define free will as "this relative scale of increasing neurological metaprogramming freedom", you add that there is no reason to deny your definition of FW except a dogmatic resistance to QM, you have switched domains. Considering everything you have written, the former statement is simly not relevant to the latter. This is why I say that you have yet to show why QM helps your case for free will. Metaprogramming, or re-programming programs, can be done without QM at all.

You never addressed this argument. You complained about other ganging up on you. Then you started writing me private messages explaining you theory all over again -- this time in terms of two different kinds of FW. But the question remains. How are QM and metaprogramming related on your view of FW? Which one is doing the explanatory work?

Your argument has been that metaprogramming is completely consistent with determinism, and this is where I disagree, or possibly don't understand your rebuttal. So I will try to explain in greater detail the nature of my argument that metaprogramming and then meta- meta- programming ad infinitum is FW as much as I could ever hope to understand it, ultimately terminating in what I call Super-FW... unbounded self-defined being itself.

Meteprogramming -- sets of programs that modify themselves -- is perfectly compatible with determinism. Programs reprogram other programs all of the time. Code rewrites code. You do not need quantum mechanics to do this.

[John Doe]

I want to note that in my previous message I wrote:

You never addressed this argument. You complained about other ganging up on you. Then you started writing me private messages explaining you theory all over again -- this time in terms of two different kinds of FW. But the question remains. How are QM and metaprogramming related on your view of FW? Which one is doing the explanatory work?

After writing this, one might expect Paul to simply clarify his view. Instead, Paul avoided doing so once again:

John,

I proposed some private PM'ing in the hopes that this conversation would be more civil, and instead your getting even more adversarial.  I also just read your comments about 'melodrama', so your feeligns about me are becoming more clear. It's as if I said something back at the very beginning of this argument that just pissed you off to no end, and you're not going to let it go until you get some kind of 'satisfaction'. Comments about my grammer arn't helping, especially considering that I wrote it 1 in the morning, which was the only time I had the oppurtunity to respond.

So John, feel free to think whatever you want about me.  Hell, publish it all over the place if you feel its necessary to get 'satisfaction'.  If you want to say my arguments are ad hoc, nebulous, badly written, badly argued, and just plain WRONG. Please be my guest.  I could care less at this point.

I just don't have the energy for adversarial debate on any topic, let alone this one, which clearly illustrates for me how wide the divide is between you and myself.  I'm all for healthy, pleasant, PATIENT debate yes.  You have been anything but patient.

Take Care,

Paul

P.S.  If you have nothing polite to say, please don't respond to this... it will be deleted without my reading any further.

[bacopa]

I don't see why this debate escalated this far clearly the two of you had different ideas as to how you wanted the debate to be carried out, and the manner in which you wished the debate to progress. Paul wanted to define terms and debate them later, while John wished to start breaking apart Paul's argument before Paul was even at that stage. Paul took offense to what he percieved as harsh criticism on behalf of John, and John didn't see it this way probably not seeing anything wrong with 'jumping right in' and breaking apart Paul's 'conjectures' one by one. This frustrated Paul thinking John was being harsh and overly judgemental. So this boils down to two people communicating with different intentions basically one big miscommunication, and furthermore it would seem both of you have different notions of how you like to debate. I think maybe Paul wanted to debate these issues in a more casual manner, whereas John immidiately made cutting statements saying Paul's arguments were weak, ad hoc, and nebulous, surely statements that could have been made in a more polite manner and without making cutting statements concerning his grammar, and after terms were more clearly established as was Paul's intentions initially. I don't see any reason for Paul to 'pack up' and leave, no one is angry at him, and there are no ill feelings as far as I can tell. [thumb]

P.S. Surely two people should be able to debate in a casual manner each listening to one another's arguments without immidiately passing judgement on each specific point that person brings up. Paul writes well, constructs thoughtful interesting statements and has clearly understood what it is he's debating. And John clearly has a grasp on his arguments. I won't say anything else...

[Kalepha]

Kip, I had a chance to read “The Transhuman Condition” and think I got the gist of it. So basically, according to my interpretation, it seems you are saying that there exist particular causal forces that are and would be beyond the absolute control of any mind on the minds-in-general continuum, essentially limiting and transitively determining the range of its outputs.

My question is, and it may be based on a previously-addressed assumption I overlooked somewhere, is there a hypothetical barrier such as, perhaps, the speed of light at which all deterministic factors would be freely malleable by minds? For instance, if a mind was capable of assimilating all previous causes, approach and reach present occurrences, while synthesizing abstract models and manipulating matter or anti-matter at some speed faster than light to widen ranges of output toward infinity, would such a mind have free will? Is it an anthropomorphic conceit, or just simply unwarranted, to speculate that smarter-than-human intelligence may find a way around causal forces that limit output ranges such as rearranging physics before it can have any affect on the next instance?

[John Doe]

I don't see why this debate escalated this far clearly the two of you had different ideas as to how you wanted the debate to be carried out, and the manner in which you wished the debate to progress.  Paul wanted to define terms and debate them later, while John wished to start breaking apart Paul's argument before Paul was even at that stage. 

Paul and I discussed and agreed upon definitions for existence question, compatibilism, incompatibilism, and free will before I wrote the above messages.

I think maybe Paul wanted to debate these issues in a more casual manner, whereas John immidiately made cutting statements saying Paul's arguments were weak, ad hoc, and nebulous, surely statements that could have been made in a more polite manner and without making cutting statements concerning his grammar, and after terms were more clearly established as was Paul's intentions initially.

I only used the words weak, ad hoc, and nebulous if they accurately describe Paul's ideas. If doing so is impolite, I am not sure how I can avoid being impolite and speak truthfully about his ideas simultaneously. The comment about his grammar was not intented to be petty or "cutting". If you read my own messages, they are filled with grammatical mistakes. Rather, I simply could not understand what Paul was saying and I think the grammatical mistakes contributed this confusion. Clarifying one's ideas and correcting grammar, instead of taking offense, might be the more appropriate response.

[John Doe]

Kip, I had a chance to read “The Transhuman Condition” and think I got the gist of it. So basically, according to my interpretation, it seems you are saying that there exist particular causal forces that are and would be beyond the absolute control of any mind on the minds-in-general continuum, essentially limiting and transitively determining the range of its outputs.

No. I have rewritten the Transhuman Condition to clarify the FW section, by the way. The notion of "particular causal forces versus us" suggests images of compulsion or antagonism which compatibilists such as Dennett remind us are inappropriate. Rather, the argument in the Transhuman Condition is that our sense of free will depends upon certain aspects of the current, but not future, world. In particular, this sense depends upon our limited ability to predict human behavior and our limited alternatives to punishment. In the future, if we can predict behavior and control it with moral chips or pharmaceuticals, the sense of free will would vanish.

More generally, Galen Strawson describes the argument against FW, without referring to future technologies or determinism. See, for example:

BLVR: Well, let's move on to the argument then. There's a famous saying of Schopenhauer's that goes like this: "A man can surely do what he wants to do. But he cannot determine what he wants." Is this idea at the core of your argument against moral responsibility?

GS: Yes—and it's an old thought. It's in Hobbes somewhere, and it's in Book Two of Locke's Essay, and I bet some ancient Greek said it, since they said almost everything.

Actually, though, there's a way in which it's not quite true. If you want to acquire some want or preference you haven't got, you can sometimes do so. You can cultivate it. Perhaps you're lazy and unfit and you want to acquire a love of exercise. Well, you can force yourself to do it every day and hope you come to like it. And you just might; you might even get addicted. Maybe you can do the same if you dislike olives.

BLVR: But then where did that desire come from—the desire to acquire the love of exercise...or olives?

GS: Right—now the deeper point cuts in. For suppose you do want to acquire a want you haven't got. The question is, where did the first want—the want for a want—come from? It seems it was just there, just a given, not something you chose or engineered. It was just there, like most of your preferences in food, music, footwear, sex, interior lighting and so on.

I suppose it's possible that you might have acquired the first want, that's the want for a want, because you wanted to! It's theoretically possible that you had a want to have a want to have a want. But this is very hard to imagine, and the question just re-arises: Where did that want come from? You certainly can't go on like this forever. At some point your wants must be just given. They will be products of your genetic inheritance and upbringing that you had no say in. In other words, there's a fundamental sense in which you did not and cannot make yourself the way you are. And this, as you say, is the key step in the basic argument against ultimate moral responsibility, which goes like this:

(1) You do what you do—in the circumstances in which you find yourself—because of the way you are. (2) So if you're going to be ultimately responsible for what you do, you're going to have to be ultimately responsible for the way you are—at least in certain mental respects. (3) But you can't be ultimately responsible for the way you are (for the reasons just given). (4) So you can't be ultimately responsible for what you do.

BLVR: I suppose it's the third step that people have the most trouble accepting.

GS: Yes, although the step seems fairly clear when you look at it the right way. Sometimes people explain why No. 3 is true by saying that you can't be causa sui—you can't be the cause of yourself, you can't be truly or ultimately self-made in any way. As Nietzsche puts it, in his usual, tactful way:

The causa sui is the best self-contradiction that has been conceived so far; it is a sort of rape and perversion of logic. But the extravagant pride of man has managed to entangle itself profoundly and frightfully with just this nonsense. The desire for "freedom of the will" in the superlative metaphysical sense, which still holds sway, unfortunately, in the minds of the half-educated; the desire to bear the entire and ultimate responsibility for one's actions oneself, and to absolve God, the world, ancestors, chance, and society involves nothing less than to be precisely this causa sui and, with more than Baron MŸnchhausen's audacity, to pull oneself up into existence by the hair, out of the swamps of nothingness.

http://www.believerm...03/strawson.htm

My question is, and it may be based on a previously-addressed assumption I overlooked somewhere, is there a hypothetical barrier such as, perhaps, the speed of light at which all deterministic factors would be freely malleable by minds? For instance, if a mind was capable of assimilating all previous causes, approach and reach present occurrences, while synthesizing abstract models and manipulating matter or anti-matter at some speed faster than light to widen ranges of output toward infinity, would such a mind have free will? Is it an anthropomorphic conceit, or just simply unwarranted, to speculate that smarter-than-human intelligence may find a way around causal forces that limit output ranges such as rearranging physics before it can have any affect on the next instance?

This reminds me of the philosophy of John Searle, who is as mistaken about free will as he is about AI. I certainly do not think the mind has any priveleged exception from the light speedlimit. I could be wrong. The burden of proof is upon the person who suggests that physical laws have exceptions. More importantly, that a mind could, in a sense, fuction faster than its environment would not answer the free will problem as described above.

[bacopa]

The latest Skeptical Magazine, Vol 10, issue 4, came out today, and it argues much the same as Paul has throughout, illustrated the limits of binary logic at addressing this complex issue, and illustrates how the conceptual confusion between determinism and free will are in reality not incompatible. Like Paul, it used his point about emergence to articulate this. So obviously someone over at Skeptic Magazine has the same understanding of FW that Paul does and argues along very similar lines. The author even goes into discussing Quantum mechanics, and talking about how there are different domains of free will, one within a deterministic framework, where the author employs Emergence (same as Paul), and the other in indeterminstic terms, arguing that indeterminate randomness and order are not incompatible either (again, same as Paul has argued).

So John, for you to accuse Paul of having nebulous concepts is not truth, but is merely an opinion, no more or less valid than anything that he has said up to this point.

For those who haven't read this article, I highly recommend it. I'm not going to defend it, as this is not my area of expertise. But from what I do understand the Sketptical Mag author makes a very good case, and is remarkably in alignment with Paul's reasoning throughout this debate.

[John Doe]

The latest Skeptical Magazine, Vol 10, issue 4, came out today, and it argues much the same as Paul has throughout, illustrated the limits of binary logic at addressing this complex issue, and illustrates how the conceptual confusion between determinism and free will are in reality not incompatible.  Like Paul, it used his point about emergence to articulate this.  So obviously someone over at Skeptic Magazine has the same understanding of FW that Paul does and argues along very similar lines.  The author even goes into discussing Quantum mechanics, and talking about how there are different domains of free will, one within a deterministic framework, where the author employs Emergence (same as Paul), and the other in indeterminstic terms, arguing that indeterminate randomness and order are not incompatible either (again, same as Paul has argued).

So John, for you to accuse Paul of having nebulous concepts is not truth, but is merely an opinion, no more or less valid than anything that he has said up to this point.

For those who haven't read this article, I highly recommend it.  I'm not going to defend it, as this is not my area of expertise.  But from what I do understand the Sketptical Mag author makes a very good case, and is remarkably in alignment with Paul's reasoning throughout this debate.

I subscribe to Skeptic (not Skeptical) and I read this article the day it arrived. I will be blunt: I thought the rasoning was total rubbish. Nor do I think any of the philosophers (such as Honderich, Kane, Pereboom, Strawson, Van Inwagen, Clarke, etc) who work on the subject to today would be impressed -- that is why the article was published in Skeptic and not a professional journal. Yes, the author does drop many of the same buzzwords such as emergence, fuzzy logic, and Quantum Mechanics that Paul does, but, like Paul, it is not clear at all how these help the case for free will. The author acknowledges this failure in the conclusion: "How, then, does free will work? We do not completely understand."

One reason for this shortcoming is how the author approaches the definition of free will. The argument from Galen Strawson shows in explicit steps how free will does not exist -- the argument in Skeptic does not approach this precision. The Skeptic article even refences this argument "A few of these philosophers even smugly claim that anyone can see the logical impossibility of free will by reflecting on the relevant arguments from the comfort of his own couch" but the article's attempt at refuting Strawson's conclusion is limited to the description of him as "smug".

Just as soon as the author, Mole, realizes the importance of definitions ("The first thing we need to do is clarify what "free will" really means" -- this on page 63, the sixth of seven pages), he rejects an uncompromising definition and says "To claim we have free will, then, is merely to claim that we have some range of possible choices." This definition does not address the issue (of Ultimate Responsibility or causa sui) that Strawson does and is vulnerable to a range of counterexamples depending upon how "choice" is understood. In one sense, there can be no choices in a deterministic world. In the article's penultimate sentence he writes "we will realize the conceptual confusions that cause us to see determinism and rational choice as incompatible" -- but free will and rational choice are not synonymous. Nor do most of those who deny that free will exists, such as myself, also deny that rational choice exists. Does Mole -- or you -- really think for centuries a number of celebrated philosophers have denied that people can be merely rational?

So John, for you to accuse Paul of having nebulous concepts is not truth, but is merely an opinion, no more or less valid than anything that he has said up to this point.

Why? Because the article from Skeptic Magazine asserts that we have free will and also mentioned emergence and Quantum Mechanics?

If these ideas are so explicit and reasonable, why do you think that neither you nor Paul are willing to explain them? You even wrote "I'm not going to defend it, as this is not my area of expertise." Isn't saying "this is not my area of expertise" just another way of saying you do not understand? Consider this sentence from the Skeptic piece:

"Quantum Mechanics may supply more variety for these laws to act upon, and the neurons of our brain may be close enough to quantum size level for this variability to be considerable."

The first problem with this sentence is not that the idea is nebulous -- it is -- but rather that, as Strawson's a priori argument shows, whether or not QM produces randomness in our brain is irrelevant to the FW question. Even if this were relevant, this sentence is a mere conjecture. The author has not performed the required brain surgery to verify that QM does influence neurons in this way. Quantum mechanics may just as well supply nothing.

[bacopa]

I see your point why should one article validate the existence of free will, that's akin to me saying God exists because it says so in the Bible. I just thought it interesting that there existed an article that so closely reflected Paul's initial hypothoses. I can't explain them because I can't see in between the buzzwords as to whether these ideas have real validity or not. I can't begin to explain how and if QM effects our brains randomness, but it still seems that indeterminsim and order at least can exist in a Quantum level in the universe than perhaps, again I'm making a conjecture, this exists on level of brains as well.

[Kalepha]

I certainly do not think the mind has any priveleged exception from the light speedlimit. I could be wrong.

Perhaps not *the* mind, but perhaps *a* mind—a mind that might not exist yet.

The burden of proof is upon the person who suggests that physical laws have exceptions.

Nature-truths wouldn’t have any exceptions. Its domain currently consists of mind-truths. My question inquired into the possibility that if the mind-nature ontology was somehow disrupted and could generate only a mind ontology, is it still fair to charge transhumanists, specifically those who do in fact agree with Galen Strawson inside the present nature-truth domain, with being fourth-level anthropocentrically conceited? If super-minds had the capacity to break away from nature-truths, no longer computing inside its domain, its output ranges can’t be said to be buck-stoppingly and ultimately influenced by mind-independent originations. Under such conditions, FW would exist. Is it possible? We don’t know. Because we don’t know, it’ll be considered interesting to see where transhuman intelligence will take us.

[kevin]

It is widely held that through evolution we are related by an unbroken string of ancestors back to an 'original' stem cell. It may be that our lineage extends further back than that. How far back is not quite as clear, but it may be quite a ways in my opinion.

Although our consciousness may not have been in existence when this blueprint first was instantiated or when our personal schematic was arranged from the DNA of our parents, and as such we did not choose 'ourselves', this does not mean that we are merely a continuation of deterministic consequences.

I'm not an expert by any means, but from what I understand of quantum mechanics, it is a probabilistic phenomenon and capable of producing 'random' outcomes from a set of possibilities, and indeed until a 'measurement/choice' is made, they ALL exist. Now this sounds to me like a mechanism for the introduction of indeterminate outcomes.

This does not prove that free will results from the indeterminism that is proposed to be inherent in quantum mechanics, but it does provide a means for free will to operate. Even if the experiencing of seeming free will is only the illusion of experiencing one of many simultaneously occuring possibilities, it still does not mean that determinism exists. As long as there are multiple paths, there is room for free will.

I think I at least understand what Paul was getting at. I think he was trying to say that free will is an emergent phenomenon based on the interactions of our identity (conscious or not) with the environment, both being subject to random influences induced by quantum indeterminism. Whether this is the case or not I don't believe is verifiable although given the 'choice' I choose at least the few degrees of free will that might be offered by QM.

Personally, I think we're all quantumly entangled... and our 'outputs' are severely limited by this additional conjecture.

[John Doe]

Perhaps not *the* mind, but perhaps *a* mind—a mind that might not exist yet.


Nature-truths wouldn’t have any exceptions. Its domain currently consists of mind-truths. My question inquired into the possibility that if the mind-nature ontology was somehow disrupted and could generate only a mind ontology, is it still fair to charge transhumanists, specifically those who do in fact agree with Galen Strawson inside the present nature-truth domain, with being fourth-level anthropocentrically conceited? If super-minds had the capacity to break away from nature-truths, no longer computing inside its domain, its output ranges can’t be said to be buck-stoppingly and ultimately influenced by mind-independent originations. Under such conditions, FW would exist. Is it possible? We don’t know. Because we don’t know, it’ll be considered interesting to see where transhuman intelligence will take us.

I doubt that any future machine will be able to "break away from nature-truths" and I think most transhumanists would agree with me.

[Kalepha]

Right, but you seem to suggest that FW is impossible under every conceivable condition, when this isn’t so. However, a condition can be arrived at a priori, as it was shown. In the past, some prospective technological feats were considered to be absolutely impossible to ever achieve, yet have since been attained. To escape mind-independent originations is simply another feat that no one can say it will never be accomplished. Therefore, the intention of “The Posthuman Condition” is moot.

[John Doe]

Right, but you seem to suggest that FW is impossible under every conceivable condition, when this isn’t so.

I posted Strawson's argument that FW is impossible. But I only see an assertion that he is wrong. Where is your argument?

However, a condition can be arrived at a priori, as it was shown.

Huh? What condition?

In the past, some prospective technological feats were considered to be absolutely impossible to ever achieve, yet have since been attained. To escape mind-independent originations is simply another feat that no one can say it will never be accomplished. Therefore, the intention of “The Posthuman Condition” is moot.

The definition of "moot" is (i) "debatable" or (ii) "irrelevant". I assume that you are using the latter. I can understand the claim that my conclusion is mistaken, but how can the intention be irrelevant? Can you clarify what you mean? For example, what exactly are "mind-independent originations"? And how do you know that these are like "prospective technological feats" such as heaver-than-air flying machines, rather than logically impossible feats, such as being both a bachelor and a married man simultaneously?