158 replies to this topic

[eternaltraveler]

umm, you could try reading the article I posted . It clarifies my position greatly. And since this writing already exists I do not feel the need to write it all over again.

[DJS]

Elrond, you just dumped 10-15 pages of thought experiments on us, give us a chance! [:o]

[eternaltraveler]

[eternaltraveler]

I was reffering more toward this.

You have drawn your line in the sand. Now you must justify it. Merely repeating a belief does not justify a belief. You seem to be operating from a reductio ad absurdum that says if a chain of argument proves you can be duplicated, then that's proof that something in the argument is wrong. No sir. It's the other way around. If no fault can be found in the chain of argument itself, then the conclusion stands. The world is what it is, whether it suits our prejudices or not.

And it seems to me that the argument he is making here is that two objects with identical characterizes are in fact one object. This I contend is not true. If you take two one kilogram spheres of gold that have all of the same physical characteristics, no where in the laws of physics that I know does it say they are the same object.

The same holds true with two identical, though admittedly much more complex human brains. Honestly I really don't see how one could contend that they are the same object. The process that runs within them (the mind/soul/ whatever) is a physical process, inseparable from the physical object.

Having a view other than this is pure mysticism IMHO [tung]

Once you do have time to read the article I have posted perhaps realize that it does not merely repeat a belief. However you must realize that from my perspective all you are doing is merely repeating a belief. It would be wonderful if you could prove otherwise to me, because it opens up a lot more possibilities for my survival. And I like surviving.

[bgwowk]

elrond wrote:

umm, you could try reading the article I posted  . It clarifies my position greatly.

Where? How?

And since this writing already exists I do not feel the need to write it all over again.

You can at least explain to us where in this tome your position is justified. The essay conclusion doesn't even mention duplication of the type we are discussing. You are going to have to be a lot more specific than 18,000 words of tangential material.

I'm dismayed that you dismiss my succinct and carefully constructed argument without explanation. I'm still waiting to hear why the distance cells are moved apart before being moved together again has any bearing on survival. How do the rejoined cells even know they were ever moved apart? Your assertions are arbitrary and unjustified.

---BrianW

[DJS]

I just printed it out on one of my university's printers and killed a tree in the process. [lol] It's 20 pages by the way. But it looks interesting and I will read it after my papers done on Thursday.

One more thing. Elrond, I would like to know what your position is on gradual replacement scenarios. What do you think about the position I have laid out in my previos post?

[DJS]

Alright now Brian, no need to get "huffy". I'm sure everyone here is doing the best they can defending their position, and furthermore that your well argued position will be appreciated by the readers of this thread. [thumb]

[eternaltraveler]

One more thing.  Elrond, I would like to know what your position is on gradual replacement scenarios.  What do you think about the position I have laid out in my previos post?

I think gradual replacement has a much higher chance of preserving the self than a sudden replacement scenario. I do not know if it would or not. However I would very likely do it because I am well aware that many parts of my brain are continuously dying and not being replaced (other than the rare neuron that actually is replaced).

This quickly could get to the point where I do not have enough neurons to maintain bodily functions, and I die, nor do I have enough neurons to access those neurons that I do have. Replacing the neurons that die would mean that my bodily functions are maintained and those neurons left can survive longer, and I can access their information longer.

Now at some point say 50% of my neurons have died, and have thus been replaced. This person may be 50% me, or perhaps all me. I don't know. But even if that person is 50% me, he will still be 100% himself, and he would very likely wish to continue this replacement even after the remaining 50% of me is gone.

It could continue in this fashion indefinitely. I can look toward the horizon. At the horizon is where I see the complete destruction of myself. However I can continuously walk toward said horizon and never reach it. Even though at some point I'll look back and not be able to see the original self I started with.

So in answer Don, perhaps your gradual replacement scenario would keep me in tact, perhaps it would not. But the end of me is just the horizon, and the being standing there will see a brand new horizon for himself.

[bgwowk]

elrond wrote:

It could continue in this fashion indefinitely. I can look toward the horizon. At the horizon is where I see the complete destruction of myself. However I can continuously walk toward said horizon and never reach it. Even though at some point I'll look back and not be able to see the original self I started with.

This is a real issue. It has been called "death by self-transcendence". But it is not the progressive replacement of atoms or other components that will cause it. It is loss of memory. And perhaps progressive dilution of early memory with a profusion of new memories over deep time. I believe the cure for "death by self-transcendence" is to value early memories highly, and regularly refresh them by reflection and connection to the person you now are.

elrond, I didn't say that two objects are the same object. A person is not an object. A person is a process, more specifically a process history, that is supported by an object (brain) with material components that are constantly in flux. In my thought experiments I drew attention to how extreme that material component flux could theoretically be.

Since it bothers you so much, forget duplication and just sincerely consider the extreme scenarios that would validly lead to survival of just one of you. Those scenarios clearly include complete matter repalcement. Rate of replacement is not an issue. Fidelity of replacement is.

---BrianW

[jaydfox]

Okay, once again I leave for a few hours and things take off. I'll go back to Don's rebuttal to my position, and try to clarify things as to why this "line in the sand" is justified.

No, but its not elementary – it is one of the main areas of contention between the two sides presented here on this thread! I am contending that your memories, your unique emotional responses to situations, your sense of humor, your love of fly fishing, your penchant for buggery – your *database* is *YOU*!

It may seem rather counter-intuitive to think that there could be two of you in the same time/different space, but it in no way contradicts the laws of physics.

Here's where we differ, and it twists the initial axioms upon which our arguments are built.

I do NOT believe that "me" is my memories, etc. Simply copying with perfect fidelity my memories will not create "me", just another Don or Brian or Elrond who happens to have my memories (and desires, and dreams, etc.).

Some believe that their memories are both necessary and sufficient to qualify a second person as being the same as "me". Some consider it necessary, but not sufficient; or vice versa. However, I consider it neither necessary nor sufficient.

My reasoning is thus: as I mentioned before about my dream, I realized that my memories are not necessary to make me. I could live someone else's life and have their values and goals, and it wouldn't destroy "me". It would destroy the essence of who I am, I suppose, but not "me". I am the observer, and I observe my life, not Don's, but if I could observe Don's life, it would be "me", not him. So, I don't think it's necessary, but it would be very nice to keep my memories.

As for sufficiency, we take the flipside. If Don's observer were to enter my body and take on my memories and my experiences and thoughts, etc. (and don't start going off about mysticism and all that crap just yet), it would be "Don", not me.

Now about the mysticism portion. I say "observer", but I don't necessarily mean "soul". Clearly I observe myself. Whether that is because of a soul, or merely a metaphenomenon of my material basis in this universe, I don't think it matters. Why does it need to be mysticism or reliance on something immaterial. If I create another person who is in ALL respects a complete duplicate of me, I do not share that person's experiences. From my point of view, that person is not me. Conversely, that new person does not share my experiences; from his point of view, I am not him. Yet we are identical. As Elrond pointed out, two identical spheres of gold are not the same object. And it's not just because of the space-time separation between the two, although if that's the route you want to go, then technically no duplicate can be me, so you shoot yourself in the foot with that one.

In other words, I don't think the universe is using compression, and keeping one copy of "me", with two soft references. They are two distinct entities, and therefore they are not the same. Similar, but not the same. Creating a duplicate of me and destroying the original creates a new copy of me, but it's not me, it's another Don with my memories. I could care less about that new person. I'd be flattered that he had my memories, but flattery won't make me feel better about being cast into oblivion.

[DJS]

Just realized there was a parallel discussion going on here--> Brain-Computer Interfacing


Truth be told, I am not *convinced* of the validity of duplication, I only tend to favor that side of the argument. I think anyone who rationally assesses this issue will conclude that there is no way of knowing one way or the other for certain. We may never know.

Alright, I think I understand you, and I think you understand me. Let's see if I can summerize our positions.

For you, an individual is a unique mental phenomenon at a specific point in space/time. The continuity of this phenomenon (both spacially and temporally) is a crucial aspect of its identity. There can only be one "me" at any given point in time.

For me, "I" am my *database* and my consciousness is a direct product of physical processes which take place within my brain. From this strictly materialistic perspective, duplication is a valid option. IOW, if physical processes are the sole determinant in the creation of consciousness, then exact replication of these processes would result in the exact replication of the correlative consciousness.

Again, there is no way to settle this. However, I would point out another aspect of this to consider, and that is the difference between subjective experience and objective reality. I know, I know -- we are our subjective realities. I understand, and this once again hilights our difference in perspective.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

At this point I would like to try a slightly different angle. I am unsure of whether we are all THist here or not, but I will for now assume that none of us view mental augmentation as the destruction of one's "being". Afterall, learning is a form of mental augmentation...(I don't find it necessary to continue proving this unless it is required of me)

The hypothetical:

1. I implant a bunch of artifical nodes in my brain which provide for super human data transmission and retention.

(Now I'm going to use an idea originally discussed by Lazarus...)

2. I create an exact duplicate of myself and send him to collect data on tree frogs in the South American rain forests.

3. After two years the duplicate comes back and has his *acquired data base* transmitted into my brain.

4. The duplicate is then destroyed (with consent).

The duplicate's experiences are *my* experiences (because I have assimilated them), and since the duplicate no longer exists they are even my unique experiences. Put another way, I would be able to recall memories from my *database* of the duplicate's experiences in South America and they would seem as if they were my own experiences! This then, is a sharing of consciousnesses, and a logical way of demonstrating that YOU could have a record of two subjective realities taking place simultaneously.

Edited by DonSpanton, 17 November 2004 - 04:42 PM.

[jaydfox]

After the fact. But yes, I don't find anything to dispute at a casual glance. This again draws the distinction between the memories (the database) and the "me" with which I am concerned. I would be able to get the memories and the thoughts and desires of my South American clone, even though I still argue it wasn't me. From a philosophical perspective, we can disagree on the "how", but I suppose we both still agree with the final outcome: I am still "me", and I have the database of that experience to operate with. An outcome I am sure we both would be pleased with.

[DJS]

Of course, this scenario is infeasible for you, since your duplicate would have the same attitude as you on matters of duplication and destruction.

Another possible scenario has multiple duplicates engaged in a "symbiotic web" where individuals periodically hook up to "share ware" to maintain a multiple or "group" consciousness.

All interesting thoughts, though not really germane to the current discussion.

[ocsrazor]

Interesting discussions gang, been skimming through, although I dont have time to jump in in full force right now. The thread intially scared me off because I didn't want to deal with the overly simplistic worldviews of mysticism on the one hand or the also overly simplistic views of reductionist materialsts on the other.

In short, my view on the original question is that the religious picture of soul is actually a low resolution concept for what we now call consciousness. Consciousness does not exist without a requisite level of uniquely sepecified informational complexity. There is a self, but it is a process, not a thing and it is not material, it is informational, i.e. it is not tied to any one particular substrate but is dependent on the dynamic relations between material object.

Replacing neurons does create a different person, but then your self is never a constant, it changes every moment on the millisecond scale as your brain constantly rewires itself. Continuity of experience is the only rational way to define a self. If you do create two separate individuals they are no longer the same self as they rapidly begin to diverge in experience. In the same way if you were to integrate two individuals so that they shared the same experience they would be for all practical purposes one self.

Peter

[bgwowk]

jaydfox wrote:

If I create another person who is in ALL respects a complete duplicate of me, I do not share that person's experiences. From my point of view, that person is not me. Conversely, that new person does not share my experiences; from his point of view, I am not him. Yet we are identical. As Elrond pointed out, two identical spheres of gold are not the same object.

Certainly duplicates are separate entities, and in that sense are not the "same." But that's a straw man. What we are REALLY interested in is the following assertion:

Creating a duplicate of me and destroying the original creates a new copy of me, but it's not me, it's another Don with my memories. I could care less about that new person.

The latter assertion does not follow from the former. Without getting into details, the problem is that the word "same" is suffering serious semantic absuse in this discussion.

Let me cut to the chase. Consider the scenario where duplication is by a completely symmetric process that results in an equal number of atoms being dispensed to both copies. There is no way to assign to either copy a greater connection to the original. They are symmetric. Before waking, one copy is destroyed. Did you, or did you not, survive?

Before answering, realize that the woke person (as with all reasonably faithful "duplication" scenarios) will absolutely insist that they are still the orignal person. Even elrond (if this process was forced on him in some kind of assault) would on waking admit he was wrong in this thread.

Is this a matter of faith? No, it springs automatically from the axiom that the awareness within a brain occurs as a result of brain activity. Are we materialists here or not? If the subjective experience of "elrond waking up on Saturday morning" is the result of a brain existing on Saturday morning in a pattern that is substantially similar to elrond's brain on Friday night, then "elrond waking up on Saturday morning" will happen no matter how that brain on Saturday morning comes to be. During the night, elrond's brain could be vaporized and then reassembled, and the experience of "elrond waking up on Saturday morning" would still happen provided the reassembly was accurate. How could that brain know otherwise?

Indeed, how *could* elrond ever know whether he was secretly duplicated and then one copy destroyed overnight?? That is THE problem with all beliefs that subjective personal identity can't survive duplication. THE BELIEF IS COMPLETELY UNTESTABLE. Proponents of this view cannot even provide clear criterion for when subjective personhood survives and doesn't survive. Thus we have elrond's line in the sand that disassembly into dozens of brain pieces is survivable, but not disassembly into cells followed by reassembly. Without explanation.

C'mon guys! If it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck (down to the last atom), it's a duck! If I find a brain sleeping on Friday night, and Saturday morning I find a substantially identical brain on the same pillow, and that brain wakes up and vehemently claims to be the same person I conversed with Friday evening, then why wouldn't personal identity have survived the night?

If a belief is not measurable, observable, verifiable, or at least modelable to be consistent and predictive of observable reality, then THE BELIEF IS NOT REAL.

---BrianW

[jaydfox]

If a belief is not measurable, observable, verifiable, or at least modelable to be consistent and predictive of observable reality, then THE BELIEF IS NOT REAL.

I completely disagree, but I also am sure that there's no point to arguing this point of contention.

The latter assertion does not follow from the former. Without getting into details, the problem is that the word "same" is suffering serious semantic absuse in this discussion.

Let me cut to the chase. Consider the scenario where duplication is by a completely symmetric process that results in an equal number of atoms being dispensed to both copies. There is no way to assign to either copy a greater connection to the original. They are symmetric. Before waking, one copy is destroyed. Did you, or did you not, survive?

The word "same" is quite lacking, and hence my attempt to show there is some clarification required by using "similar" and "same" in the same breath:

They are two distinct entities, and therefore they are not the same. Similar, but not the same.

I contend that if I am destroyed and simultaneously replaced, the new person will not be "me". I have no doubt that the new doppleganger will claim that he is me, and from his perspective, as long as he is unaware of the replacement, it won't really matter to him that he is not me. And I, having been consigned to oblivion, will be unaware that I am no longer in existence. It's a win-win situation. But that doesn't mean that I consider the new person "me". It's Don with my memories. I wish "Don in Jay's clothing" the best of luck with his usurpation of my life...

And notice that this scenario isn't so troubling. As pointed out by others, if death=oblivion, then we won't care that we're in oblivion once we're dead, because we can't care. But we can care before the death occurs, can we not? If I knew or had a reasonable suspicion that I would be destroyed and replaced tonight, it would worry me quite a bit. In my mind, I may as well have found out that I'm going to die and not be replaced. In the latter scenario, and hence in the former, I would be scared beyond description and in the throes of sorrow. What little comfort I could get in my religion might prevent me from falling apart completely, but it would not keep me level and rational by any means.

But if I didn't know it was going to happen, and it happened, then I wouldn't have cared before it happened, and I clearly would be incapable of caring afterwards, so I suppose no "real" harm would be done, and as I said, if I could I wouldn't begrudge the new guy taking my place.


And Brian, unless I missed it somewhere, you still haven't answered my supposition that my "database" as it were is irrelevant to my continuity, to "me". I am interested to see your thoughts on this.

[jaydfox]

Of course, this scenario is infeasible for you, since your duplicate would have the same attitude as you on matters of duplication and destruction. 

Another possible scenario has multiple duplicates engaged in a "symbiotic web" where individuals periodically hook up to "share ware" to maintain a multiple or "group" consciousness.

You know, I got a few miles up the road after leaving work last night, and these two very thoughts came to my mind, and in that order.

I realized that, while the original "me" didn't have a problem with the scenario, the new "me", being a copy of me and having my value system, would simultaneously realize he's a copy and yet that he does not want to be terminated, valuing his own existence as much as I do mine. So he would not willingly self-terminate. Thus the original "me", being aware of this, would not allow the new me to be terminated, even if the decision were solely up to the original "me".

Of course, only a few moments later I realized that this wasn't a problem: I'll probably want a new me to go to Africa next, after having completed the South American trip. Why destroy Me2 and create Me3 to go to Africa, when Me2 could just go to Africa after having re- and de-merged with Me1.

[bgwowk]

cosmos wrote:

Just because a belief cannot be proven or substantiated, does not equate to it being wrong. If a belief makes a statement of something existing outside of the realm of observation or testability, it does not make that statement false automatically. It likely makes that belief unprovable, or even unsupportable, however it does not make it false and as difficult as it is to prove it remains just as difficult to disprove. Even if this belief is true, it would seem to have no influence on the material universe as we know it so it may be of no importance to us within this universal system.

Alright then. You opened the door on this, so here we go. The majority of quantum physics experts (particularly quantum cosmologists and quantum computing experts) now advocate the many worlds interpretation (MWI) of quantum mechanics. Among other things, this theory predicts that ALL OF US everyday are being duplicated into innumerable copies that are mutually undetectable because of quantum decoherence effects. That being the case, this whole discussion is moot. All of you who claim you don't care about "copies" because you don't believe they are still "you" should have no sense of self-preservation whatsoever.

But you do have a sense of self-preservation? But if you are being continuously copied by quantum processes, this is a mere doopleganger illusion, right? You should be able to use your intellect to overcome the illusion, right? Or does the existence of your continued sense of survival and united self disprove MWI? But wait! Some of you have already acknowledged that duplicates would necessarily feel that they were still the original, even though they were "really" not. So you are not entitled to reject MWI on the basis of personal experience at all. You are forced to face that fact that a according to the best theories of modern physics *combined with your own doctrine* you have never lived longer than one picoseond. Instead you are a one-picoseond-old doppleganger doomed to be killed in one more picosecond, and succeeded by succession of other dopplegangers with the mere illusion of a previous existence. What a silly and useless doctrine that is!

---BrianW

P.S. to jaydfox

And Brian, unless I missed it somewhere, you still haven't answered my supposition that my "database" as it were is irrelevant to my continuity, to "me". I am interested to see your thoughts on this.

If a future version of "you" didn't share some minimum amount of recalled memory with the present you, how would the future entity even know it was you? In that sense, your "database" is critical to your survival.

Now please answer my question:

Consider the scenario where duplication is by a completely symmetric process that results in an equal number of atoms being dispensed to both copies. There is no way to assign to either copy a greater connection to the original. They are symmetric. Before waking, one copy is destroyed. Did you, or did you not, survive?

[jaydfox]

If a future version of "you" didn't share some minimum amount of recalled memory with the present you, how would the future entity even know it was you? In that sense, your "database" is critical to your survival.

So then you concede that fidelity is not an issue? If fidelity is not an issue, then being a perfect copy of me does not make another entity "me". If it's not a necessary condition, why is it a sufficient condition?

[jaydfox]

Now please answer my question:

Consider the scenario where duplication is by a completely symmetric process that results in an equal number of atoms being dispensed to both copies. There is no way to assign to either copy a greater connection to the original. They are symmetric. Before waking, one copy is destroyed. Did you, or did you not, survive?

No way to assign to either copy a greater connection to the original? Please elaborate?

In one scenario, the original is destroyed and two new ones are created. This would be symmetric. No, I did not survive, but best of luck to the two new guys.

In another scenario, the original is continuously preserved, and a new copy springs into existence. Yes, I survive, and best of luck to the one new guy.

In yet another scenario, the two duplicates are created in addition to the continuous preservation of the third entity, the original self. Again, I survive, and best of luck to the two new guys.

There are probably lots of other scenarios. Feel free to ask which you need clarification on.

[jaydfox]

The majority of quantum physics experts (particularly quantum cosmologists and quantum computing experts) now advocate the many worlds interpretation (MWI) of quantum mechanics. Among other things, this theory predicts that ALL OF US everyday are being duplicated into innumerable copies that are mutually undetectable because of quantum decoherence effects. That being the case, this whole discussion is moot. All of you who claim you don't care about "copies" because you don't believe they are still "you" should have no sense of self-preservation whatsoever.

...Instead you are a one-picoseond-old doppleganger doomed to be killed in one more picosecond, and succeeded by succession of other dopplegangers with the mere illusion of a previous existence. What a silly and useless doctrine that is!

Possibly silly, but not useless.

As I understand it, in the branching process, a universe is not destroyed and replaced with multiple universes: at best it "splits", which we can argue over the meaning of.

So the original "me" of 10^-46 seconds ago would not cease to be, but would split into two or more "me"'s in multiple universes.

I cannot be duplicated within this universe under the continuity principle for a very simple reason: I cannot diverge in space. I'm too big. Heck, even a proton is too big to diverge. It can quantum tunnel beyond itself and "split" in this sense, but I'm too big for this to reasonably happen, so the point is moot.

Take a fat magic marker and draw a line heading up a piece of paper. It cannot be split into two lines without either drawing over itself or having a discontinuity. But now have two pieces of paper glued together and then come apart, and a marker line along each, and they can diverge without overlapping and without discontinuity. Whether we consider that it was one line all along, or two lines originally overlapping in the same time and space before diverging, I can't say, and given the other questions before me, I'm not too concerned yet.

Again, I am most concerned about duplication. Continuity in our universe precludes duplication. In the MWI, continuity and duplication can coexist. Perhaps this means reclarifying my position back to continuity; perhaps not. Something to think about, but it still does nothing to convince me that I'm not "me". It does nothing to convince me that I'm just a material blob that can be duplicated and destroyed and yet survive.

One final note: I have already conceded that if a quantum process (which precludes duplication) were to simultaneously destroy me and store or recreate me (and if I'm stored, then in recreating me, my "stored" version, by physical law, would be destroyed), then there is a possiblity that that which I call "me" would be preserved. This acceptance of quantum phenomena would not conflict with the MWI, though as I understand it the two concepts are not inextricably linked.

[bgwowk]

jaydfox wrote:

QUOTE (bgwowk)

> If a future version of "you" didn't share some minimum amount of recalled memory with the present you, how would the future entity even know it was you? In that sense, your "database" is critical to your survival.

So then you concede that fidelity is not an issue? If fidelity is not an issue, then being a perfect copy of me does not make another entity "me". If it's not a necessary condition, why is it a sufficient condition?

Fidelity is an issue. The less memory a continuer shares with a predecessor, the less of the predecessor survives. Survival is not a binary question, even in ordinary life when confronted with degenerative brain diseases or brain injuries.

QUOTE (bgwowk)

> Consider the scenario where duplication is by a completely symmetric process that results in an equal number of atoms being dispensed to both copies. There is no way to assign to either copy a greater connection to the original. They are symmetric. Before waking, one copy is destroyed. Did you, or did you not, survive?

No way to assign to either copy a greater connection to the original? Please elaborate?

I mean that in this scenario the brain neatly (albeit complexly) divides like a baterium into two identical copies. No scanning or destruction of an original. To which you reply:

In one scenario, the original is destroyed and two new ones are created. This would be symmetric. No, I did not survive, but best of luck to the two new guys.

In another scenario, the original is continuously preserved, and a new copy springs into existence. Yes, I survive, and best of luck to the one new guy.

But I only gave one physical scenario, not two. I'm asking you which of the two outcomes you describe is the correct one, and why. Specifically, if your outcome (1) is true, why do you believe fission with perfect fidelity is fatal? If you believe outcome (2) is true, on what basis do you decide which physical copy is the original when the process that produced them is completely symmetric?

So (in MWI) the original "me" of 10^-46 seconds ago would not cease to be, but would split into two or more "me"'s in multiple universes.

Exactly. That's exactly what I'm proposing happens in the hypothetical fission scenario above, the only exception being that the two new yous retain the ability to communicate with each other if they wish, while in MWI they go their separate ways.

I cannot be duplicated within this universe under the continuity principle for a very simple reason: I cannot diverge in space.

In my hypothetical (non-MWI) fission scenario, you can and do diverge in space by virtue of nanomachines swelling you to make room for cell fission giving rise to side-by-side cells and cell connections which are then carefully disentangled and moved appart. Or don't even disentangle the two parallel networks. Run them both in-situ, or selectively activate one or the other as you please. I assert that they are both you, and you will survive no matter which of the two are activated.

Also, as a technical point about MWI, universes doesn't "split" in MWI. Different components of quantum wavefunctions lose the ability to communicate with each other in a they-might-as-well-be-in-separate-universes kind of way. Hence the term "many worlds". But all this happens in only one universe. If MWI is correct, you do share space with your duplicates. You just can't interact.

---BrianW

[jaydfox]

Also, as a technical point about MWI, universes doesn't "split" in MWI. Different components of quantum wavefunctions lose the ability to communicate with each other in a they-might-as-well-be-in-separate-universes kind of way. Hence the term "many worlds". But all this happens in only one universe. If MWI is correct, you do share space with your duplicates. You just can't interact.

Hmm, I have some ignorance to correct. I was quite into physics in my youth (about 10-14 years ago), and I haven't been reading the denser works since then, just the abstracts. Something I wish but have not had time to correct in recent years.

I mean that in this scenario the brain neatly (albeit complexly) divides like a baterium into two identical copies. No scanning or destruction of an original.

Okay, I see what you're saying. The focus had shifted away from gradual splits to instantaneous ones, and I was answering it with that assumption in mind. The gradual split is more complicated and I will have to circle back to it.

However, while we're on the topic of instantaneous duplication... Where do you stand, so we can be clear?

If I make an exact copy of you and simultaneously destroy (i.e. kill) you, do you survive?

If I make an exact copy of you, let the two of you go on with your separate lives, and then kill the original copy twenty years later, then A) do you survive? and B) as far as the original is concerned, does he think he survives?

If I kill you today, but an exact copy of you is made ten years from now, then do you survive?

If I kill you today, and a copy could be made, but is never made, do you survive?

If I kill you today, do you survive?

I'm just looking for the breaking point in the chain. If it's at the first link in this chain, then I think I have misunderstood you.

[jaydfox]

If a future version of "you" didn't share some minimum amount of recalled memory with the present you, how would the future entity even know it was you? In that sense, your "database" is critical to your survival.

So then you concede that fidelity is not an issue? If fidelity is not an issue, then being a perfect copy of me does not make another entity "me". If it's not a necessary condition, why is it a sufficient condition?

Fidelity is an issue. The less memory a continuer shares with a predecessor, the less of the predecessor survives. Survival is not a binary question, even in ordinary life when confronted with degenerative brain diseases or brain injuries.

Okay, okay, I was a little sensationalist with that. Fidelity is an issue. But I still would like an answer to the question: If an imperfect copy of me can be me (e.g. the version of me that existed a minute ago compared to the current me), would a perfect duplicate be me? If we can agree that some degree of fidelity is required, but that 100.000000000000% fidelity is not required, then why is it sufficient?

[bgwowk]

jaydfox wrote:

However, while we're on the topic of instantaneous duplication... Where do you stand, so we can be clear?

If I make an exact copy of you and simultaneously destroy (i.e. kill) you, do you survive?

Yes.

If I make an exact copy of you, let the two of you go on with your separate lives, and then kill the original copy twenty years later, then A) do you survive?

After 20 years of divergence, there will be two distinct people (with a shared common past). The killed person dies. The non-killed person survives. The *original* person (the person that existed before the duplication) also survives in the same sense that your present existence constitutes the survival of the person you were 20 years ago.

and B) as far as the original is concerned, does he think he survives?

If I'm facing death with the knowledge that a copy of me was made 20 years ago, I might derive some solace from that, but I would still feel that I was going to die. If I'm facing death with the knowledge that a copy of me was made 20 seconds ago, the question becomes more interesting.

If I kill you today, but an exact copy of you is made ten years from now, then do you survive?

I assume you mean that you will record my brain state, vaporize my brain, and then reconstruct my brain ten years later exactly as it was before destruction. Yes, I would survive. My subjective experience would be suddenly waking up ten years in the future.

If I kill you today, and a copy could be made, but is never made, do you survive?

Nope.

If I kill you today, do you survive?

Nope. Not unless my brain state has been recorded somewhere for later reconstitution, and is someday reconstituted.

I'm just looking for the breaking point in the chain. If it's at the first link in this chain, then I think I have misunderstood you.

I believe survival is broken if the current operational state of a brain is stopped without recurrence of a substantially similar brain state anytime, anywhere in the future.

If an imperfect copy of me can be me (e.g. the version of me that existed a minute ago compared to the current me), would a perfect duplicate be me?

Yes.

If we can agree that some degree of fidelity is required, but that 100.000000000000% fidelity is not required, then why is it sufficient?

Something can be sufficient without being necessary. Maybe I don't understand your question.

---BrianW

[DJS]

The thread intially scared me off because I didn't want to deal with the overly simplistic worldviews of mysticism on the one hand or the also overly simplistic views of reductionist materialsts on the other.

Well considering that none of us are neuro-scientists (except you [lol] ) I think that most of us are forced to discuss these kinds of topics in at least mildly reductionist terms...

In short, my view on the original question is that the religious picture of soul is actually a low resolution concept for what we now call consciousness.  Consciousness does not exist without a requisite level of uniquely sepecified informational complexity. There is a self, but it is a process, not a thing and it is not material, it is informational, i.e. it is not tied to any one particular substrate but is dependent on the dynamic relations between material object.

I was thinking about what you said in this post yesterday. How is what you're saying in the above quotation different from that of a materialist perspective? (Again, I stress that although materialism makes intuitive sense to me, I am also interested in learning more about information and systems theories) I have read quite a bit of Dennett, and I have never once heard him claim that consciousness is actual "material". Rather, he claims that consciousness is a direct correlate of physical processes taking place in the brain. IOW, that the entirety of conscious phenomenon can be explained by the activity of the materials it is connected to.

Replacing neurons does create a different person, but then your self is never a constant, it changes every moment on the millisecond scale as your brain constantly rewires itself. Continuity of experience is the only rational way to define a self. If you do create two separate individuals they are no longer the same self as they rapidly begin to diverge in experience. In the same way if you were to integrate two individuals so that they shared the same experience they would be for all practical purposes one self.

I agree that the subsequent "divergence of experience" by the duplicate would render him/her a distinct individual, but let me try to nail you down to an answer here. At the exact moment of duplication is the original and the duplicate the same conscious entity?

DonS

[jaydfox]

While I'm mulling over how to respond to various questions, and to try to better understand my own position (because while I have one core belief at this point which I am not flexible on, the rest of my beliefs which are only loosely tied to that core belief are somewhat flexible to reasonable debate), I'll propose another thought experiment:

Let's say that Don and I were to have our brains' structures copied at the atomic, electric, and kinetic level. With these perfect material copies in place (stored in a binary format in a computer database, and thus excluding certain quantum pieces of information), our brains were slowly rewired (by nanobots?) so that, after whatever period of time (a second, a day, a month, a year, etc.), I had Don's brain and Don had mine. The process would be gradual, in whatever sense that is required, so that we were each conscious through the whole process. Remember, the copies are from a specific moment in time.

(If it matters from the perspective of motor coordination and the one-to-one correspondance of nerve pathways external to the brain, you can even assume that our entire bodies were copied, though I don't see how it affects the outcome.)

Now, after the process is completed, who are we?

Am I "me" with Don's memories, goals, dreams, emotions, thoughts, etc.?
Or am I really Don?
Or am I neither, but a third individual who happens to have Don's "database"?

From the materialist perspective, I can only assume that I am Don. I am neither "me" nor a new third person. I am Don, and only Don.

From my perspective, I am either "me" or the new third person, but I am not Don.

Assuming the process is sufficiently slow as to allow the consciousness to try to adapt right up to the moment when it is with 100.0000000% fidelity contained within Don's brain, I am leaning more in favor of "me" with Don's database. After all, my database today is almost completely detached from that of when I was 6, and I consider myself still that person. While I cannot "feel" my connection to my 3-year-old self of 24 years ago, I know that my 6-year-old self, with which I "feel" a connection, would have felt a connection to my 5-year-old self, which would have felt a connection to my 4-year-old self, etc. down to my 3-year-old self. So while I feel no connection to my 3-year-old self, as I feel no connection to Don's current self, I would still think that if the process were gradual enough, then I would still be "me" with his database if this transformation were to take place.