That said, and if forced to choose immediately, I would say that the chief national executive that I find the most captivating, enchanting, and identifiable would be John F. Kennedy, whom I may start thread about at some point in order to bolster and protect his legacy on this forum. This interest is not meant to suggest that his reputation has ever been in peril here, but rather, I want to help diversify our discussion focuses a bit.
I will eagerly read your take on that Rol82, as I've been under the impression that JFK is often regarded by American historians as being a sort of "shooting star" president, full of idealism and an inspirational speaker but not entirely an achiever if you look at hard facts ( like many critics would say about a certain other US chief executive ...), except the space program :
- Pig Bay Invasion - big time fail due to refusal to provide air support to Brigade 2506, which failure in turn contributed partly to
- Cuban Missile Crisis, but the fact the world didn't blow up should actually be attributed to both Kennedy's and Chruschev's sanity obviously
- I think I read that still as a senator he was unwilling to condemn McCarthy even when his paranoia was already becoming apparent, but I'm not sure about that atm
- During his time in office, Kennedy increased the number of U.S. military in Vietnam from 800 to 16,300, but then again one's assesement of that will depend on if somebody thinks this war made sense or not, but the subsequent decades proved the Domino Theory to be more or less false
- The bulk of the task of changing the racial relations in America was carried out by the somewhat less flaring Johnson.
BTW His handsomness - waaay overblown
The Bay of Pigs invasion, and the escalation of the US commitment to Southeast Asia were unfortunate byproducts of mass hysteria surrounding the growing strength of the international communist movement, and its implications for American interests, which gave rise to a voracious appetite for security in the minds of a shaken American public. To satiate this unruly appetite, the Kennedy campaign unveiled a bold new defense strategy that promised a radical paradigm shift from a New Look defense posture---that sought the achievement of only military parity, and relied on the threat of a retaliatory deployment of strategic nuclear weapons as a disincentive against crossing the sovereign red lines of important band-wagoning states---to a flexible response strategy that broadened deterrence to the threat of conventional military retaliation against the ostensibly global and monolithic campaign of communist aggression. Furthermore, the flexible response strategy aimed for the achievement of military supremacy instead of parity, and promised the provision of aid to band-wagoning states throughout the international system, not just to states where treaty obligations or private defense agreements compelled action. By making this audacious promise, Kennedy attacked Nixon (and the Eisenhower administration by extension) from the right, and helped to neutralize any doubts about his commitment to checking the red menace, which turned out to be critical to his ascension to the White House. But as a consequence, the adoption of such a strident position made it difficult for decisionmakers to change the trajectory of policy---even if clashed with their private sentiments. So, ironically, the flexible response strategy stripped policymakers of flexibility.
Since the interaction between domestic politics and foreign policy decision making is unavoidable in consolidated democracies, the pressure for action in Cuba and Vietnam was too difficult to ignore. This is not to mention the bureaucratic pressure that Kennedy was subjected to, and because of his initial insecurity, easily a victim to in spite of private reservations. But as his first term in the White House progressed, Kennedy's enthusiasm for both objectives became increasingly tepid. Evidence of his diminishing enthusiasm was palpable in the Bay of Pigs Invasion, which was developed and approved for execution by the Eisenhower White House, but repeatedly modified to lighten the US footprint and the risk of retaliation. Importantly, though, the CIA deliberately massaged intelligence assumptions in order to assuage the concerns of Kennedy, who they sensed to be ambivalent. Furthermore, neither the White House, nor the CIA were aware of the popular strength of Castro's government---since their ability to penetrate the country was limited, and because the veracity of intelligence assets would later turn out to be doubtful. Nor was the White House and other organs cognizant of the extent of the surreptitious Soviet commitment, and the compromise of the date, site, and details of the planned invasion by Soviet moles. So, the failure at the Bay of Pigs was understandable in the context of domestic political imperatives, bureaucratic models of decision making, the dangerous fog that impaired policy making decisions of the United States, and institutional hubris.
The Kennedy stance on Vietnam is one of the most controversial questions of his administration, and despite the impressive work of historians, remains shrouded with ambiguity. While Kennedy ordered the commitment of over 16,000 advisors, this was the predictable, and necessary consequence of his defense strategy and campaign promises, which he couldn't afford to betray if he wished to successfully pursue his broad and ambitious agenda over two terms. However, he became increasingly disenchanted with the enterprise as it became clear that the cognitive dissonance of the military and the intelligence community was leading to dangerously rosy assessments of a situation where the United States could have little traction. So, as a consequence of his changing attitude, efforts to reduce tensions between the two polar blocs were launched, and the American position in neighboring Laos was reassessed, ultimately leading to a serious de-escalation. In his final year, a previously unconscionable review of the situation in Vietnam was also begun at the great annoyance of some policymakers, and resulted in small, but meaningful changes that were meant to test the reaction of domestic political audiences, and determine the flexibility that the administration had for future changes before and after the election. The most important change, which was the withdrawal of 1,000 advisors, is of yet to be determined importance, because Kennedy's position was not without equivocation, and bore the hallmarks of a deeply conflicted leader terrified of divulging his innermost doubts. But, his doubts grew unabatedly, and became increasingly difficult to conceal. Although there is no primary source document that demonstrates his intention to withdraw from Vietnam, he did confide to one of his closest aides, and de-facto chief of staff, Kenneth O'Donnell, that he intended to begin the American withdrawal in earnest after the 1964 election. So, I believe he's undeserving of blame for hopelessly escalating the conflict, and in all likelihood, would have carefully ended our relationship in manner similar to Truman's abandonment of Nationalist China.
During the Cuban Missile Crisis, the relatively cooler temperaments of Kennedy and Khrushchev were indeed critical to the successful resolution of the crisis, but because of the presence of tactical nuclear weapons in Cuba (that didn't require authorization for use in the event of an invasion), and the risk that situational stress might contribute to catastrophic miscalculations of many of the players possessing the capacity to launch a preemptive or retaliatory launch of strategic nuclear weapons, their mutual refusal to succumb to the hard liners within their administrations is deserving of our utmost appreciation. But in situations of a heightened security dilemma, even a carefully crafted response can result in a miscalculation, and a spiraling escalation of conflict. During the quarantine, for example, an attempt by the USS Beale to alter the course of the Soviet nuclear submarine B-59 led the commanding officer to panic, and order a unilateral change in the combat status of one of the nuclear torpedoes at its disposal----an order which was forcefully belayed by the submarine's executive officer, and evidence of the precariousness of the crisis, and the acute risk of escalation.
The Kennedy family's association with Senator Joseph McCarthy was indeed troubling, but owing more to the Senator's romantic relationship with two of his siblings (Eunice and Pat), the popular hysteria over the burgeoning strength of the international communist movement, the latter Senator's employment of his ambitious younger brother, and the family's guilt over their support of a posture of appeasement during the crucial events that preceded the outbreak of the Second World War. This guilt was especially affecting for JFK, who made the rationalization of appeasement policy the subject of his undergraduate thesis---which much to his embarrassment, was proudly published by his unrepentant father. So, when elected to Congress, there was an understandable insecurity over the family's previous stance on the matters of war and aggression, and a commanding need to prove their zeal as warriors of the Cold War, which unfortunately manifested in their support for McCarthy's Chairmanship of the Committee for Government Operations. However, there is evidence that JFK was privately dismayed by the tenor of the committee's proceedings, and its indiscriminate targeting. But, the combination of the aforementioned reasons, and the pernicious influence of his father likely gave him some pause on the question of censuring McCarthy.
While the Civil Right Act and subsequent Voting Rights Act were enacted during the Johnson administration, the legislation was prepared during the Kennedy administration, but because the state of racial inequality did not rank high on the list of poll determined priorities of the American public, it was rightly decided to be ill-advised to force the legislation, and incur serious opportunity costs through the expending of a higher than needed amount of political capital. Rather, the groundwork was laid through White House directed pressure against Congress, an attempt to raise public awareness of the issue, and measures that helped to construct a bridge towards the introduction and ultimate enactment of the legislation: such as the Interstate Commerce Commission's order of the desegregation of public buses, an aggressive implementation of the Brown vs. the Board of Education decision, the use of federal agencies to support the voting registration of African Americans, and the deployment of federal resources to protect activists in the South against wanton acts of violence and harassment. Had Kennedy survived his tragic trip to Dallas in the Fall of 1963, there is a general agreement that the legislation would have likely proceeded on the same schedule, and with the same urgency that the Johnson administration placed on its enactment.
This is all terribly unfortunate, because the palpable change of many of JFK's positions may have yielded important dividends had his life not been terminated prematurely. And while its true that his legislative achievements paled in comparison to the Johnson and Roosevelt administrations, the progressive scope of his vision was a decade ahead of its time, and so eminently agreeable on every front---from foreign to domestic policy---that I have little trouble overlooking his many deficits, and am utterly convinced of his sincerity and willpower would have led to seismic changes that would have destroyed any doubts about his historical importance.
Finally, I don't think it was his handsomeness that contributed to his sex appeal, but rather, it was his formidable charisma and uncommon vision that seduced the minds of so many susceptible women. For many, Camelot constituted a break from the unrevolutionary 50s, and a cure to so many unattended wounds that were allowed to fester. His presidency was of an exceptional importance, that's not analogous to that of the Obama administration or any other, because his ascension marked the beginning of the most important and dramatic shift in culture and norms that our country has ever witnessed, and may never be replicated. While President Obama, like President Kennedy, succeeded in captivating the American public, the former's powers of persuasion only had a transient effect, and thus not worthy of comparing to the enduring effects of Camelot.
Edited by Rol82, 25 September 2010 - 09:30 AM.