164 replies to this topic

[John Schloendorn]

The probability distribution of all that you can possibly be and do within nature has always been intrinsic to the laws of nature... recognition of our absolute limitations.

The claim that we have absolute limitations is a very bold one. I don't think it's valid to make it without even presenting some sort of preliminary evidence. Of course, there can never be evidence in the way scientists use the word that anything is "absolute". So basically, you are asking us to swallow that. Of course, we don't want to, but rather actually try to obtain evidence by trying to live that long and trying to make the transhumanistic vision real.

Thus:

What will you be doing for the next 10^(10^(10^(10^(10^(10^(10^(10^(10^10)))))))) years?

If we knew that now, then we might indeed have less of a reason to try. Luckily, we don't.

Your thoughts on personal identity are fascinating. I would recommend Harris' exchange with Glannon

Glannon W. Identity, prudential concern, and extended lives. Bioethics. 2002 Jun;16(3):266-83.
Harris J. A response to Walter Glannon. Bioethics. 2002 Jun;16(3):284-91.
Glannon W. Reply to Harris. Bioethics. 2002 Jun;16(3):292-7.

In addition: Parfit, Derek. 1971. "Personal identity," Philosophical Review 80:3-27 (Or why not the book "reasons and persons" in the first place)
And importantly: Whiting J. 1986. "Friends and Future Selves" Philosophical Review 95: 547-580.

What it boils down to is this:
Personal identity cannot be caused by psychological similarity, because the former is transitive and does not admit of degrees, while the latter is intransitive and does admit of degrees. Thus, the classical argument from psychological change against desiring long personal lives fails. This is not entirely satisfactory for the immortalist who believes in personal identity, because the invalidation of psychological similarity leaves him without any measurable grounds of personal identity. This is why immortalists are often Parfitian reductionists or personal-identity agnostics.

[John Schloendorn]

But there is more than this in your question. What you are advancing is similar to what is often called the "extreme claim":
If "personal identity" is an illusion, and a person is just a series of momentary psychological states, then why would one part of the series be more concerned with another part of the same series than with any other series?[1]" (i.e. pursue the

advancement of the world population

)

You can accept the extreme claim, but if you do, then better do it consistently, i.e. include also parts of your own series that are in the relatively close future. Live as if tomorrow were just a day in someone else's life. (Note that it is a major part of my motivation to give everyone else a choice not to age.)

To say that the extreme claim holds not for short times, but only for very long times requires a good argument of why that would be so. I have not seen any such argument, but I'm not saying it is impossible. I would encourage you to try.

[1] Sidgwick "Methods of Ethics Book IV Chapter 2"

[Clifford Greenblatt]

The claim that we have absolute limitations is a very bold one. I don't think it's valid to make it without even presenting some sort of preliminary evidence. Of course, there can never be evidence in the way scientists use the word that anything is "absolute". So basically, you are asking us to swallow that. Of course, we don't want to, but rather actually try to obtain evidence by trying to live that long and trying to make the transhumanistic vision real.

The evidence for our limitations is in the microscopic nature of matter. You cannot divide matter endlessly but eventually reach a level of quantum particles. All elementary particles of a given kind are identical and the number of kinds are not very many. This fact of indivisibility limits the number of ways you can be configured. The limitations do not become evident in hundreds, thousands, millions, billions, or even trillions of years. However, they would become quite evident in much less than
10^(10^(10^(10^(10^(10^(10^(10^(10^10)))))))) years. Most immortalists want to live forever and forever is infinitely many times longer than this. In order to increase the number of possibilities of all you can personally be or do, you would have to increase your size. As you become bigger, you run into problems of signaling time between your various parts. Gravity also places limits on your size as you would collapse into a black hole if your mass becomes too great. You could overcome the black hole problem by spreading your mass over a larger volume but this would worsen the signaling time problem. Finally, you are limited by the total amount of useful energy available in the universe.

What it boils down to is this:
Personal identity cannot be caused by psychological similarity, because the former is transitive and does not admit of degrees, while the latter is intransitive and does admit of degrees. Thus, the classical argument from psychological change against desiring long personal lives fails. This is not entirely satisfactory for the immortalist who believes in personal identity, because the invalidation of psychological similarity leaves him without any measurable grounds of personal identity. This is why immortalists are often Parfitian reductionists or  personal-identity agnostics.

I think that even personal identity, as viewed physically, would also admit degrees. If you lose an arm, does your personal identity change? If you lose half of your memory, does your personal identity change? Is some of your personal identity in your fingers and toes or is it all in your brain. If it is all in your brain then is it in all of your brain or is it in only part of your brain?
Some would extend personal identity to a larger scale by regarding the entire world population as one big person. If an individual dies, intelligence and sentience continue on in the living population.

[Clifford Greenblatt]

But there is more than this in your question. What you are advancing is similar to what is often called the "extreme claim":
If "personal identity" is an illusion, and a person is just a series of momentary psychological states, then why would one part of the series be more concerned with another part of the same series than with any other series?

There are many people who live for the moment without regard to how it affects their future. They may have the idea that their future selves are different persons in whom they have no interest. On the other hand, those who believe that there is some transcendent permanency to their personal identity would generally be very concerned for their future. However, there are also many who reject transcendent permanency of the person but also believe in living for the future. They may, to various degrees, view the world population as one big person.

You can accept the extreme claim, but if you do, then better do it consistently, i.e. include also parts of your own series that are in the relatively close future. Live as if tomorrow were just a day in someone else's life. (Note that it is a major part of my motivation to give everyone else a choice not to age.)

To say that the extreme claim holds not for short times, but only for very long times requires a good argument of why that would be so. I have not seen any such argument, but I'm not saying it is impossible. I would encourage you to try.

I do not personally accept the “extreme claim” but I presented it for the benefit of those who reject transcendent permanency of personal identity. In a purely natural view of the person, I would think that identity would change gradually unless interrupted by a catastrophic event.

[John Schloendorn]

I think that even personal identity, as viewed physically, would also admit degrees.

I think that anything that admits of degrees is a misuse of the word "identity". If I call the whole world population "me", that may be fine with me, but no one is going to understand me when I say "me". Thus let's use our words in a sense that is at least somewhat close to what they commonly mean. A more suitable designator for the whole world population would be something like "that which I strongly care for".
For that which you call "one big person", I am using different terminology: There are many important reasons to value things and persons for other reasons than being numerically identical to me. As I said, this is one of the reasons I am trying to fix aging after all.

As for limitations, Ok, I grant that you have alluded to the type of preliminary evidence I requested. However, in the face of similarly preliminary evidence to the contrary (and what is discussed in that thread is really far from all such evidence), can we not settle for a simple "we do not know yet"? No matter whether or not there are limits, I would like to live by pushing them as far as I can and like to push them. (Now that's nearly a tautology)

I don't think we're having any substantial disagreement on our metaphysical musings. (We just have a habit of naming a few things differently). But I am unsure how this relates to the embryo issues we were having earlier. So let me get back to this with a few questions:

- Do our metaphysical musings relate to the embryo issues?
- If yes, do you derive a definite ethical stance on the embryo issues from it?
- If yes, does this ethical stance imply any rules that you want others to observe?
- If any of the above was no, then do you have an ethical stance on the embryo issue that implies such rules?

[Lazarus Long]

I cannot overstate what John has so eloquently posited.

Do our metaphysical musings relate to the embryo issues?
- If yes, do you derive a definite ethical stance on the embryo issues from it?
- If yes, does this ethical stance imply any rules that you want others to observe?
- If any of the above was no, then do you have an ethical stance on the embryo issue that implies such rules?

In particular I am concerned for the social consequences of this discussion. I have a profound fear of the erosion for civil liberty associated with the attempt to push the potentiality arguments for a fetus back to the point of conception as defining the *potentiality of a person* because it is clearly one that could and WOULD be used to attack and undermine the right of a woman to obtain an abortion if it were granted any legal legitimacy.

There is a clear and present danger that the misguided attempts of some to limit ESC based SCNT are also to be used later if successful as the precedent to then establish a new bench mark to re-engage the debate over abortion.

[Lazarus Long]

BTW if you don't credit the connection of argument between ESC, embryos and conception as it effects medical technology then pay attention to what is happening in Italy as we speak.

http://www.nytimes.c.../11vatican.html

Vote on Fertility Law Fires Passions in Italy

By ELISABETH ROSENTHAL and ELISABETTA POVOLEDO,
International Herald Tribune
Published: June 11, 2005

MILAN, June 9 - As Italy's most powerful men - from politicians to bishops - debated the ethics of the country's restrictive fertility law this week, Lorena Pennati lay gingerly in a hospital bed here, rubbing the sore spot where doctors had just removed nine of her eggs.

Because of the law's strict limits on the use of eggs, sperm and embryos - the subject of a contentious national referendum here this weekend - Ms. Pennati, 34, is embarking on what doctors universally regard as substandard infertility treatment.

Since the law passed last year, the only treatment now permissible in Italy produces less than half as many pregnancies as the usual care does in many cases, a new study shows. As a result, doctors say, Italians with money now travel for treatment - to Spain, Switzerland or Ukraine.

******

"Everyone presents this as a political or religious position, but no one looks at this from the point of view of women and how it touches their lives," Ms. Pennati said, her husband huddled at her bedside. Perhaps no political issue since the 1981 vote on abortion has fired public passion and divided the country like the coming referendum, tearing rifts in political parties and setting off public debates between politicians and their wives.

The law, the most restrictive on medically assisted fertility in Europe, closely controls the creation and use of human embryos. Doctors cannot test embryos for genetic defects or freeze them in order to better a woman's chances of pregnancy, a method Ms. Pennati probably would have used were it not for the law. Researchers cannot use them to perform stem cell research.

Pope Benedict XVI expressed support for the law last week. It was his first foray into Italian politics.

The debate consumes the front page of every newspaper and seems to be the only topic on Italy's evening television talk shows. The opposing sides have plastered thousands of posters along the streets of Rome - featuring beaming starlets, earnest scientists, nursing mothers and even cute swimming sperm.

"We all come from embryos," says one advertisement, aiming to keep the law in place. From the other side, "Assisted fertility works," read a poster featuring an image of the Virgin Mary and Child.

For the referendum to count, at least half of the nearly 50 million Italian voters must vote, a high bar. Indeed, in a strategic attempt to jettison the referendum and keep the infertility law intact, Italian prelates have told parishioners to head to the beach instead of the polling places on Sunday and Monday, so that the quorum will not be met.

Whichever side wins, the political fallout has already been significant. Gianfranco Fini, Italy's foreign minister and the head of one of Italy's major conservative political parties, is facing an in-house rebellion after announcing that he would vote to overturn part of the law. Francesco Rutelli, a leader of the center-left opposition drew howls of protest when he said he would abstain.

Normally outspoken politicians like Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi have so far refused to take a public position. (He says only that his wife favors repeal.)

Some Italians said they were appalled that Roman Catholic Church leaders and elected officials would encourage people not to vote. "It's absurd that they would urge us not to exercise the most democratic instrument the citizen has," said Licio Zanetti, 44, a stockbroker.

Agata Fantauzzi, 33, an office cleaner in a black ITALIA sweatshirt, said she would heed the church's call not to vote, in order to protect the law. "We were all embryos once," she said. "I wouldn't have wanted to have been manipulated."

Such arguments hold little sway in the infertility clinic here, where Italian law has made treatment more risky and curtailed patients' options. Infertile couples may not use donated eggs, for example, required for success in many women over 40.

In much of the world, infertility patients take weeks of hormone injections to produce a large number of eggs, which are then combined with sperm to produce embryos. These are tested for genetic problems and then frozen for future use in as many pregnancy attempts as necessary. Because of the relatively high rate of miscarriage in medically assisted fertility, two to three embryos are generally placed in the womb per attempt.

But in Italy, embryos - considered under the law to be sacred human lives - can no longer be tested or stored; only eggs can be frozen, and they tend to lose potency. According to the law, exactly three harvested eggs are used in each attempt to create embryos, which must be immediately implanted in the womb.

But medically assisted fertility is an imperfect science, so three eggs often yield no embryos at all, requiring the woman to start over.
{excerpts}

[Clifford Greenblatt]

- Do our metaphysical musings relate to the embryo issues?
- If yes, do you derive a definite ethical stance on the embryo issues from it?
- If yes, does this ethical stance imply any rules that you want others to observe?
- If any of the above was no, then do you have an ethical stance on the embryo issue that implies such rules?

I would not say that all of our metaphysical musings in this thread are relevant to the embryonic issue but I would say that the principle of continuity of the person definitely is. I would also say that it is sufficient cause to answer yes to the above questions.

The embryonic issue is highly divisive, but divisive issues are nothing new to history. Such issues can be very difficult to resolve but not always impossible. Great minds on both sides of the issue can be locked in intensive conflict. Consider the conflict between the North and the South in the American civil war. Abraham Lincoln firmly believed that slavery was morally wrong. The leaders of the South firmly believed that the North was violating their fundamental rights and threatening to destroy their economy. Even an appeal to the will of the transcendent Judge did not help because both Abraham Lincoln and the leaders of the South firmly believed in the same transcendent Judge and also believed the He was exclusively on their side. The slaves looked physically different and were snatched from a culture that was lacking in science and technology. Even long after they were set free, a Nobel Prize winning scientist presented a dissertation which he believed proved that their intelligence was fundamentally lower, despite a wealth of evidence to the contrary. The slaves were set free, but the South suffered neither the loss of liberty nor the devastation of its economy that it feared. The South is far more prosperous today than it was in slave times.

I did not intend to introduce matter of slavery as a red herring but presented it for the purposes of showing how divisive some ethical issues can become. I will restate my views of the continuity of personhood here. From its earliest stages, the human embryo is endowed with both the full intelligence and the relentless drive to mature to a full term human baby without the intervention of any external intelligence. The mother provides nutrition to the developing embryo, but not the intelligence to direct its development. I will agree that the embryo is not sentient in its earliest stages. However, neither are healthy, mature people sentient when they are not conscious. The embryo in its earliest stages does not have the will to live in the sense of mentally thinking about it, but neither does a newborn baby. The embryo does demonstrate a most powerful will to live in its incessant pursuit of maturity. The intelligence for development may be found in an unfertilised egg but not the incessant pursuit of maturity that is demonstrated by the embryo. Also note that the human embryo’s intelligence and drive toward maturity is not in pursuit of becoming a mature tree, dog , or kangaroo but is in pursuit of becoming a mature human.

Edited by Clifford Greenblatt, 14 June 2005 - 09:41 AM.

[DJS]

I'm sure others will have more to add, but my logic here is rather simple.

What you are arguing Cliff, is that human embryos are "potential human beings". And I agree with you, embryos have the innate potential to become unique "persons". But "potential" humans are not "actual" humans. The rights of an embro do not over rule the rights of a female to have complete autonomy over her body, nor does it over rule the Therapeutic Imperative to develop medical technologies that can save actual (real, currently existing, etc) human lives.

Actual vs Potential. I think the distinction is obvious, though I invite you to prove their equality Clifford.

[Clifford Greenblatt]

I'm sure others will have more to add, but my logic here is rather simple.

What you are arguing Cliff, is that human embryos are "potential human beings".  And I agree with you, embryos have the innate potential to become unique "persons".  But "potential" humans are not "actual" humans.  The rights of an embro do not over rule the rights of a female to have complete autonomy over her body, nor does it over rule the Therapeutic Imperative to develop medical technologies that can save actual (real, currently existing, etc) human lives.

Actual vs Potential.  I think the distinction is obvious, though I invite you to prove their equality Clifford.

I am not arguing that embryos are potential human beings. I am arguing that embryos are actual human beings. The continuity of the person begins with the fertilised egg.

[bgwowk]

Clifford wrote:

I am arguing that embryos are actual human beings.

If embryos are actual human beings, then is not a droplet of saline containing an egg and sperm also a human being?

If an embryo was genetically engineered to be incapable of growing beyond the blastocyst stage, would that embryo still be a human being? Members of the President's Bioethics Committee have said "no."

If embryos are human beings by virtue of maturation potential when placed in the proper environment, then why is not every cell nucleus in my body a human being by virtue of maturation potential when placed inside an egg cell (SCNT)?

---BrianW

[Clifford Greenblatt]

If embryos are actual human beings, then is not a droplet of saline containing an egg and sperm also a human being?

No, the egg must be fertilised to be driven to development of a person. By itself, the egg is not driven at all to develop into a mature person.

If an embryo was genetically engineered to be incapable of growing beyond the blastocyst stage, would that embryo still be a human being?  Members of the President's Bioethics Committee have said "no."

This would no longer be a human as it lacks the drive to develop to human maturity. If the embryo did have the drive to develop into a mature human at one point then it was killed at the point that it was altered to lose that drive.

If embryos are human beings by virtue of maturation potential when placed in the proper environment, then why is not every cell nucleus in my body a human being by virtue of maturation potential when placed inside an egg cell (SCNT)?

Your differentiated cells are driven to fulfill a human subfunction but are not driven to develop into a complete person in themselves. If a nucleus of one of your cells is actually placed into an egg, then it becomes a human separate from yourself because it is now driven to develop to maturity as a complete person.

[bgwowk]

No, the egg must be fertilised to be driven to development of a person. By itself, the egg is not driven at all to develop into a mature person.

I wasn't asking about the egg, I was asking about a sperm/egg system. If I enclose a sperm and egg in, say, a dissolvable membrane filled with saline, that system will be "driven" to develop into a mature person just the same the same as the fertilized egg, embryo, fetus, child, etc.

This (an embryo engineered to not develop) would no longer be a human as it lacks the drive to develop to human maturity. If the embryo did have the drive to develop into a mature human at one point then it was killed at the point that it was altered to lose that drive.

So if I inject a gene into an existing embryo to inhibit its development, that forced transition from a human to non-human would be murder?

Your differentiated cells are driven to fulfill a human subfunction but are not driven to develop into a complete person in themselves. If a nucleus of one of your cells is actually placed into an egg, then it becomes a human separate from yourself because it is now driven to develop to maturity as a complete person.

But the cell nucleus was ALWAYS driven to develop to maturity as a complete person! Just as placing an embryo in a specific environment (a womb) unleashes its drive to become a mature person, placing any cell nucleus in a specific environment (egg cell) unleashes its drive to become a mature person. There is no conceptual distinction.

---BrianW

[Clifford Greenblatt]

I wasn't asking about the egg, I was asking about a sperm/egg system.  If I enclose a sperm and egg in, say, a dissolvable membrane filled with saline, that system will be "driven" to develop into a mature person just the same the same as the fertilized egg, embryo, fetus, child, etc.

The egg must be fertilised to be a human. An egg is not fertilised until its DNA has been completed with the fertilising DNA within the nucleus of the egg. If this happens to occur in a saline solution then there is a human.

So if I inject a gene into an existing embryo to inhibit its development, that forced transition from a human to non-human would be murder?

Such action would certainly be ending a human life.

But the cell nucleus was ALWAYS driven to develop to maturity as a complete person!  Just as placing an embryo in a specific environment (a womb) unleashes its drive to become a mature person, placing any cell nucleus in a specific environment (egg cell) unleashes its drive to become a mature person.  There is no conceptual distinction.

I noticed that you said “specific environment (egg cell)” and not just any environment. The egg cell contains essential means of life support, such as proteins, mitochondria, etc. A DNA molecule in a vacuum will go nowhere at all. Also, a DNA molecule in a cell other than an egg cell may have all the life support it needs to fulfill a human subfunction but it cannot begin a separate human life in such an environment. The first cell of a human life is not a DNA molecule but a complete biological system.

[bgwowk]

The egg must be fertilised to be a human. An egg is not fertilised until its DNA has been completed with the fertilising DNA within the nucleus of the egg.

That is an assertion, not an argument that follows from any previous premise. You have previously asserted that it is the potential for maturation that defines humanity. A bag containting an egg and sperm has potential just the same as a united egg and sperm. If you don't acknowledge a bag with egg and sperm as human, you are repudiating potential as the criterion for defining humanity.

Such action (injecting a gene to inhibit further development of an embryo) would certainly be ending a human life.

So reversing the inhibitory process would be saving a human life?

I noticed that you said “specific environment (egg cell)” and not just any environment. The egg cell contains essential means of life support, such as proteins, mitochondria, etc.

A uterus contains essential means of life support, such a blood supply, micronutrients, hormones, etc. It is so sophisticated that it is nowhere near replicable with current technology.

A DNA molecule in a vacuum will go nowhere at all.

An embryo in a vacuum will go nowhere at all.

Also, a DNA molecule in a cell other than an egg cell may have all the life support it needs to fulfill a human subfunction but it cannot begin a separate human life in such an environment.

An embryo in an environment other than a uterus may have all the life support it needs to fulfull a subfuction (metabolism, limited cell division), but it cannot begin a separate human life in such an environment.

The first cell of a human life is not a DNA molecule but a complete biological system.

The first unit of human life is not a single cell, but a complete biological system of multiple tissues and organs (or so someone else may say).

There is nothing in a "potential" or "drive" based theory of personhood to objectively pick among a cell nucleus, a bag with sperm and egg, an embryo, or a fetus as a starting point for personhood. They all have potential for maturation. They all require a specific environment to mature.

Any theory of what makes a human... human, must look at properties other than potential. Here's a clue: If you believe that crippling the development of an embryo makes it non-human, what about a genetic switch that turns off development at the age of 18? Presumably you would regard that embyo as human. From an immortalist perspective, it would be an ideal human! Now consider development triggered to stop at 10, 5, 2 years, 2 months, fetus, blastocyst. At what point does the development-inhibited embryo cease being human in your view? Thinking about that will help you think about what attributes truly make a human being.

----BrianW

[John Schloendorn]

Clifford, I'm sorry, but again you are not being faithful to your terms' definitions, and this time even worse: You are exploiting your ambivalence to raise the false impression of making a formal argument. Let me explain:

the human embryo is endowed with both the full intelligence and the relentless drive to mature to a full term human baby without the intervention of any external intelligence

"Drive" is ambivalent: It can mean:

(1) "the means for giving motion to a machine or machine part"
(2) "an urgent, basic, or instinctual need"

(merriam-webster online)

You concede:

I will agree that the embryo is not sentient in its earliest stages

Definition (2) would presume sentience on the part of the embryo. Otherwise it could not feel a need. Thus, the only definition of "drive" that is appropriate for the above argument is (1). But if definition (1) is used, then your argument describes a naturalistic fact, but does not define a value or judge the fact against one (Note what I said earlier about naturalistic fallacies). Thus the observation that an embryo has a drive(1) cannot support any ethical argument.

You clearly committed this naturalistic fallacy later:

The embryo does demonstrate a most powerful will to live in its incessant pursuit of maturity.

"Will" is not so ambiguous. The embryo demonstrates the drive(1), but not the will (= drive(2)). A will, or drive(2) cannot be demonstrated, given the lack of a means to read someone's mind. Only a drive(1) can. Thus, your use of "will" was inappropriate. E.g. When I am released 3,000 ft in the air, I demonstrate the drive(1) to fall, but it is invalid to infer from this the drive(2) = will to fall.
It seems to me likely that the average audience would value a drive(2) = will much higher than a drive(1). Thus, the way you are using ambivalent terms, and misusing common terms looks to me suspiciously like being designed to hide your naturalistic fallacy and misguide the unsuspecting audience in making up their mind.

Thanks for answering my questions. If I may, I would like to add another one:
What is your ethical stance on embryos, and which rules that you want others to follow does it imply?

[Clifford Greenblatt]

Clifford, I'm sorry, but again you are not being faithful to your terms' definitions, and this time even worse: You are exploiting your ambivalence to raise the false impression of making a formal argument. Let me explain:


"Drive" is ambivalent: It can mean:

(1) "the means for giving motion to a machine or machine part"
(2) "an urgent, basic, or instinctual need"

(merriam-webster online)

You concede:

Definition (2) would presume sentience on the part of the embryo. Otherwise it could not feel a need. Thus, the only definition of "drive" that is appropriate for the above argument is (1). But if definition (1) is used, then your argument describes a naturalistic fact, but does not define a value or judge the fact against one (Note what I said earlier about naturalistic fallacies). Thus the observation that an embryo has a drive(1) cannot support any ethical argument.

I fail to see how definition (2) presumes sentience. "An urgent, basic or instinctual need" can be experineced and acted upon intelligently without sentience. The intelligence which is acting in the case of a developing embryo is radically greater than the intelligence contained in the sentient minds of even the most gifted of humans.

Thanks for answering my questions. If I may, I would like to add another one:
What is your ethical stance on embryos, and which rules that you want others to follow does it imply?

Whatever legal protections you would consider appropriate for a newborn baby should apply to embryos also.

[John Schloendorn]

I fail to see how definition (2) presumes sentience.

Sorry, I did not strongly elaborate on this one. The reason is again related to the use of ambiguous terms with alternating meanings in a way that seemingly support the argument: Within the definition of (2), "need" is ambiguous. It can mean a mechanistical requirement (a), such as the need of an engine for fuel, or an emotional desire(b), such as the need of a human for love.

Need(a) again describes a naturalistic observation that does not involve a sentient person who needs. Thus, no one would benefit from the need being met, and no one would suffer from the need not being met. If this is the definition we're using for an ethical argument, then again: Naturalistic fallacy.

Need(b) has moral implications, because it does involve someone who needs, and suffers when that need is not met. Thus, need(b) has moral implications and can be used to support an ethical argument. But we agreed that the blastocyst is not a sentient person. Thus, it cannot need(b) anything.

[wolfmoon]

"An urgent, basic or instinctual need" can be experineced and acted upon intelligently without sentience. The intelligence which is acting in the case of a developing embryo is radically greater than the intelligence contained in the sentient minds of even the most gifted of humans.

Are you saying intelligence is an unconscious thing? An automatic, involuntary action? How can intelligence *not* be sentient? Common acknowledgment (global definition), aside from the information form of intelligence, states intelligence is something that is very conscious and very sentient. How can acquiring and applying knowledge not be sentient? The power of thought and reason not be sentient? I believe it is biological drive we are talking about here, and biological drive has nothing to do with intelligence or will unless we are applying it to a creator.

Don stated it nicely when he said it is potential vs. actual. Every egg in my body has the "potential" of being fertilized and carried to term. Every sperm in the male body has the "potential" of fertilizing an egg that may be carried to term. The potential for things are all around us and yet do not make them actual and/or present.

There is no question in my mind about the order of precedence in the potential vs. actual argument. When push comes to shove I believe the rational, logical being faced with the question - the life of my wife, mother, sister, daughter vs. a clump of "potential" will choose the actual individual.

Is life to be considered a blob of cells no more conscious or aware than the mole on my knee? Is it the possession of human bio that is required? We can keep a corpse alive with machines and said corpse has all the bio requirements of human life of course having once been a living being. Does this represent life, this artificially forced breathing and beating heart?

Interesting discussion, guys.

[eternaltraveler]

Interesting discussion, guys.

Indeed, unfortunately it is also a discussion that has 0% chance of going anywhere )

[Lazarus Long]

I am glad to hear the voice of an informed, intelligent and rational woman enter the debate as well. Thanks for joining Wolfmoon. [thumb]

I always get a leeetle nervous when a group composed only of men sit around trying to determine the validity of a fetuses' humanity and the woman's right to choose. I think we are all better served by a more balanced discussion of perspectives.

I think this debate has to go somewhere elrond because what Clifford has been presenting is the very best of the anti-abortion anti-ESC argument.

True we are not the most sympathetic audience for that position but also there are many glaring inconsistencies it would be wise to familiarize ourselves with because it promises to become a far more vociferous debate before too long.

[Clifford Greenblatt]

Sorry, I did not strongly elaborate on this one. The reason is again related to the use of ambiguous terms with alternating meanings in a way that seemingly support the argument: Within the definition of (2), "need" is ambiguous. It can mean a mechanistical requirement (a), such as the need of an engine for fuel, or an emotional desire(b), such as the need of a human for love.

Need(a) again describes a naturalistic observation that does not involve a sentient person who needs. Thus, no one would benefit from the need being met, and no one would suffer from the need not being met. If this is the definition we're using for an ethical argument, then again: Naturalistic fallacy.

Need(b) has moral implications, because it does involve someone who needs, and suffers when that need is not met. Thus, need(b) has moral implications and can be used to support an ethical argument. But we agreed that the blastocyst is not a sentient person. Thus, it cannot need(b) anything.

Thank you for elaborating on the definition.
From your elaboration it appears that sentience is essential to any moral argument about the personal right to life. I will agree that sentience is absolutely essental to the value of the person. However, a person is not sentient all of the time and sentience is not the same thing as intelligence. An unconscious but otherwise healthy person is not actually sentient but only potentially sentient. I do not think that you would regard a person as having any less value as a person during the periods that sentience is absent. From the earliest stage, embryos contain within them all the intelligence requried for sentience plus an active biological administration system to continually advance them to maturity.

Before continuing further, I need to ask you the following two ethical questions in an effort to further reduce ambiguities.

1. Should unemployed, drug addicted, thieves be put to death becasue their actual will is both self destructive and a detriment to society?
Or-
Should they be permitted to live because they may have a potential for rehabilitation?

2. Should suicidal mental patients be offered Kevorkian type services because they are driven to end their lives when they are sentient ?
Or-
Should their lives be guarded against their will because their will to live could potentially be restored through therapy?

[John Schloendorn]

So we're back to potentiality. I still do not value potentiality, for the same reasons started earlier, which you have not commented on so far. Thus, as for your questions:

1. They should be permitted to live but this is not because of their potential value, but because of their actual value. Although some of the groups you cite can be said to have destructive elements, these are far outweighed by their actual value as sentient human persons. The more severe case of murderers was recently discussed here.
2. is more difficult. In general, I would prefer to see the suicidal alive, again not because of potential, but because of their actual value as human persons in spite of their self-destructive tendencies. But in some cases, I understand that the conscious decision to suicide is something so intimately personal for the person who wants it that I should have no say in the issue. The problem is with deciding which cases of suicidal behavior constitute such cases of conscious decisions and which cases don't (e.g. the latter may be more similar to "drive(1)"s, like falling when released 3,000 ft in the air. In reality I guess we're facing a spectrum between those extremes and one has to put the line somewhere. So if I had to deal with such cases on a daily basis, I would probably decide case-by-case how strongly I would attempt to force the person in question not to suicide. (I don't think I would offer any "services", thereby encouraging the person to take them) But I think I could not defend my particular decisions in the blurry part in the middle of the spectrum. Though they probably could not be rationally attacked either.

Sometimes we indeed do seem to value unconscious persons less. E.g. we think that it's ok to perform major surgery on them, while it's not ok to perform it on conscious persons. This of course does not apply when it begins to violate the person's past actual will (e.g. to wake up again). See the asymmetry of time I invoked earlier.
But my main point from the asymmetry of time is that the suicidal might have now, and might have had in the past an actual desire to have their lives restored to be worth living through therapy. In some cases, we might consider respecting this past desire, by forcing them to live through a transient dark period, and fix them later (if that's possible).

[John Schloendorn]

Aside, if you're saying that

Whatever legal protections you would consider appropriate for a newborn baby should apply to embryos also.

then you're saying that none of the actual differences between a newborn baby and a blastocyst has any (legal) value. This seems to fly pretty much in the face of what you have said earlier about the value of sentience.

[Clifford Greenblatt]

What intelligence? You refer to it again in your last post.

I think you have a difficulty accepting the idea of intelligence existing in anything other than a brain or an advanced AI computer.
I examine the first definition.

The capacity to acquire and apply knowledge, especially toward a purposeful goal.

The fertilised egg certainly does have and does apply all the knowledge needed to work through all of the fine details of developing a complete human biological system to maturity. How many scientists have this kind of ability? Such a development is certainly a purposeful goal. The only difficulty I have with the above definition of intelligence is in the part about acquiring knowledge. If someone already has all the knowledge needed to complete a highly advanced task then you may argue that the process of applying that knowledge to the execution of the task does not involve intelligence. You may argue that additional knowledge would have to be acquired in the process of executing the task in order for intelligence to be involved.

1 a : the ability to learn or understand or to deal with new or trying situations b : the ability to apply knowledge to manipulate one's environment or to think abstractly as measured by objective criteria (as tests)

The developing biological system acquires raw materials in the form of nutrition from its environment and then processes and distributes those materials throughout the system to supply the growth and development process. The developing biological system is continually dealing with new situations as the fast growing network of cells must be coordinated and directed to perform a wide range of advanced functions.

An interesting question is that of whether the intelligence contained within the fertilised egg is sufficient to generate sentience. Do you think sentience is a natural process or do you think that sentience transcends nature? If sentience is a natural process, then the fertilised egg does contain all the intelligence along with the full set of required mechanical means to generate sentience. If sentience transcends nature, then the biological system can generate the environment for sentience but cannot generate sentience itself.

[Clifford Greenblatt]

then you're saying that none of the actual differences between a newborn baby and a blastocyst has any (legal) value. This seems to fly pretty much in the face of what you have said earlier about the value of sentience.

There is also an enormous amount of difference between a newborn baby and gifted and talented mature adult. Does the newborn baby have a much lesser value?

Let us take this argument even one or more steps further. Suppose you manage to survive long enough to be transformed, through a long series of transhuman and post human conversions, to become a fully functional member of a type III civilisation with a radically higher intellectual capacity than you have now. Would the value you had as a newborn baby be radically lower than your value as a fully mature member of the type III civilisation? Or, would you be greatful that you life was not ended as a newborn baby?

Edited by Clifford Greenblatt, 16 June 2005 - 10:36 AM.

[eternaltraveler]

(Lazarus)

True we are not the most sympathetic audience for that position but also there are many glaring inconsistencies it would be wise to familiarize ourselves with because it promises to become a far more vociferous debate before too long.

The problem lazarus, is that I don't think Clifford is basing his reasoning on any of the arguments he is telling us. If he was he would see the glaring inconsistencies by now. He's using arguments people use who have dead set beliefs, and they want to make their beliefs seem reasonable under another's belief system.

You are right though. It is good to thoroughly learn what these inconsistencies are so that we can show them to others who might otherwise be fooled (simply because they don't bother to think about it that much i.e. most people).