Theoretically, yes, we can create a duplicate of me as I sit here typing. I am trillions of potential people. Clones could be made from my skin cells, my heart cells, my kidney cells, etc., so I am hundreds of trillions more potential people.
I'm also a non-potential person, an actual, currently active, living, breathing, thinking, emoting person, sitting at this keyboard and typing rather slowly (60-90 WPM, hardly becoming of a self-proclaimed computer geek).
The cryonically preserved person is also trillions of potential people that could be made by copying the person, as well as hundreds of trillions of potential people that could be made from the cells of the preserved person's body. But, uh, not one currently active, living, breathing, thinking, emoting person.
I don't see why you equate people who might never exist with people who existed in the past. Your potential clones have never cared about their existence so you aren't morally obligated to create them. However, a cryonics patient used to be a thinking, feeling concsious being with a deep desire to survive. Thus, we are morally obligated to save them. Human rights don't die with the neural firings.
As for the duplication arguement, based on my tentative assumptions on the nature of consciousness, I think that all duplicates who share your experiances and brain activity would be 'you'. Therefore, it's not a question of whether arbitrarily many Cyborgdreamers have a right to exist; rather, it's a question of whether I should be present in arbitrarily many instances. I have an intense desire for one Cyborgdreamer to exist but I don't particularly want there to be several. Therefore, if I was cryonically frozen, there would only be a moral obligation to revive me once.