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Cryonics: How Safe A Bet?


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Poll: Cryonics: How Safe A Bet? (84 member(s) have cast votes)

Cryonics: How Safe A Bet?

  1. Pretty damn terrified, cryonics is a huge question mark, a total crapshot. (36 votes [46.15%])

    Percentage of vote: 46.15%

  2. Strangely unworried, technology will almost certainly bring you back. (42 votes [53.85%])

    Percentage of vote: 53.85%

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#61 Infernity

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Posted 07 August 2005 - 09:38 PM

Oh heck! So you don't actually defrost and fix the problem in the original clone, but create a similar copy and fix it on the copied clone as still information and create it with no aging damage or whatever?

If it is so, then cryonics does not even worth it...!

[cry]

What if we won't make it in the next 100 year, what if I'll have to die???
All this never was, and some lucky lady exactly like me will just live my freaking life that "I" never had.

I don't wanna die!!!

Lets take it already!

I was really calm since I thought that in the worst case I can be cryoniced, but now, I feel it's not worth it!

[sad]

-Infernity

#62 John Schloendorn

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Posted 07 August 2005 - 10:06 PM

The religious-like belief here is really the belief in personal continuity. There is no evidence that "I" am something other than a momentary state of affairs that has some things in common with other momentary states of affairs. The fact that you have memories that suggest the existence of previous momentary states relating to your brain does not establish metaphysically relevant continuity between those states. Many key posters here just make up their own version of personal continuity out of thin air and that's what gets the discussion in trouble.

#63 bgwowk

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Posted 07 August 2005 - 10:30 PM

jaydfox wrote:

Most of the realistic scenarios for reviving cryonics patients involving using nanobots or other nanotechnologies to "scan" the cryonically preserved brain and create a sort of database of the entire layout of the preserved brain, down to the smallest features of each dendrite, axon, synaptic gap, etc.

At this point, theoretically, a "fixed" copy of this brain (by fixed, I mean one without the damage inherent to the freezing or vitrification process used, which includes both structural damage as well as toxic damage) can be created by a second set of nanobots in a new body.

References?!?? This is why I refuse to get into arguments about duplication in this thread. IT IS A TOTAL STRAW MAN.

Here is every cryonics revival scenario of any significant length I am aware of:

http://www.alcor.org...rOfTheBrain.htm

http://www.alcor.org...rOfTheBrain.htm

http://www.foresight...l#section03of06

http://www.alcor.org...suscitation.htm

NONE of these scenarios involve duplication, and only one of them mentions offboard reconstruction in passing (Merkle's), but then dismisses it in favor of more conservative in-situ repair and movement of original molecules back where they belong. Even these kind of major repair papers are becoming obsolete now that vitrification is used instead of freezing. The whole repair technology issue becomes irrelevant once reversible brain preservation is fully demonstrated, likely within the next ten to twenty years.

Infernity, when someone says something outrageous about cryonics, better check their references. What osiris and jaydfox have attacked in this thread is not even cryonics per se, but the much more basic idea of whether the same brain can be stopped and restarted and still be the same person--- something already widely accepted in medicine in for decades. I don't even think there is a credentialed bioethicist in the world who would debate the issue, which is amazing when you consider all the other silly things they would debate.

You wrote:

I mean it is the same brain, same experience, same body... Is it not same consciousness?

No kidding. Exactly. Don't let these guys deflect you with straw men. What they are really saying is that they believe the same material brain, same body, can wake as a different person even if in every measurable way nothing inside that person changed. And then they say that burden of proof is on those who claim survival?!? Go figure.

Philosophically, cryonics does nothing to continuity that isn't already accepted practice in medicine. Again, it is a double standard to pile on philosophical complaints about cryonics without being at least as vocal about equivalent things already done in medicine.

---BrianW

#64 jaydfox

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Posted 07 August 2005 - 10:30 PM

Oh heck! So you don't actually defrost and fix the problem in the original clone, but create a similar copy and fix it on the copied clone as still information and create it with no aging damage or whatever?

If it is so, then cryonics does not even worth it...!



What if we won't make it in the next 100 year, what if I'll have to die???
All this never was, and some lucky lady exactly like me will just live my freaking life that "I" never had.

I don't wanna die!!!

Lets take it already!

I was really calm since I thought that in the worst case I can be cryoniced, but now, I feel it's not worth it!

Don't worry, Infernity. People currently cryonically suspended will likely need some degree of nanotech similar to what I described in order to be revived.

However, cryonics institutes are continuing to study new "protocols" that will decrease the amount of damage caused during the initial suspension process. Even if we assume that current protocols preserve enough information for the nanobot scan-and-copy revival technique, which many people consider adequate for "successful" revival, there are still a couple of pragmatic reasons to improve upon the current state-of-the-art protocols.

First, better preservation means an even more accurate copy will be produced. Even if we accept that a really good copy is sufficient for one to "survive", an even better copy probably means a better degree of survival.

Second, better cryopreservation, with less damage, means that a less sophisticated revival technique can be used, and hence, one can be revived earlier. In some futurist scenarios, the people cryonically suspended last will be the first revived, since less work is needed, and the people suspendd first (several decades ago) will be revived last, due to the difficulties of fixing the extensive structural damage.

So even though Brian has no apparent concerns about being cryonically suspended, going into oblivion, and then having a copy that could just as well be some totally new person take his place, that doesn't mean he isn't hard at work trying to improve the vitrification protocols to better preserve the brain.

My hope is that, at some point, the protocols will become good enough that no sophisticated scan-and-copy technique will be needed to revive someone. Then I'd see a sliver of hope that such a procedure might preserve "me". And such a protocol might only be a few decades away.

So don't give up hope. Cryonics is improving by leaps and bounds each decade, and it might hopefully be good enough even for us "holdouts" eventually.

#65 bgwowk

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Posted 07 August 2005 - 10:38 PM

jaydfox wrote:

So don't give up hope. Cryonics is improving by leaps and bounds each decade, and it might hopefully be good enough even for us "holdouts" eventually.

Indeed. I hope we all live long enough to see the day when the continuity issue is the ONLY issue left to debate in cryonics. :)

---BrianW

#66 Mark Hamalainen

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Posted 08 August 2005 - 02:54 AM

But this is philosophical ground that was conceded by Osiris! That's why I said, "Ah ha!" Remember? I said that there are examples in medicine where normal brain activity stops-- doesn't even continue a little bit. Osiris countered by asking whether there might still be *some* things going on. By suggesting that even abnormal activity might constitute some kind of continuation, he opened the door for me to point out that there is always some kind of process going on.


Actually, what I said was that there are different degrees of activity that a brain is capable of, nothing more. I never 'opened that door' because I have always had that door open. Your debating tactics seem to rely heavily on manipulation of people's words, you might want to consider a career in politics.

This is what I mean by double standards. I suggest suspended animation for space travel (something totally unavailable), and I'm called immoral. Doctors recommend slowing or stopping brain activity for elective surgeries (aneurysm surgery is elective, not emergent) and you are silent.


Another good example. Space travel is not required for survival, so whatever you deem the risk of cryonics, it is unnecessary in this case. Alternatively, if you are dying and the only known medical procedure that might be able to save you requires halting of some level of brain activity, then it is necessary. Not a double standard.

Yeah, saw that one coming. Sorry, Osiris, he has a point. It is my contention that, if I were destroyed and replaced with a copy (or a dozen copies), each copy would make the same claim that I would make when I wake up tomorrow morning, i.e. that they are me.


Obviously, I said as much myself, that was part of my point... in terms of life extension I don't care about external people/measurements distinguising me. I care about my awareness and I care to avoid oblivion, it is internal. In other words, it is conceivable for internal death to occur without having an externally measurable result, the duplication argument makes this obvious.

Why the heck the defrost person will not be the same person, but a copy?!?!


Why would they? We simply don't know the answer.

The religious-like belief here is really the belief in personal continuity.


Good point John. I think I've mentioned it in other threads, but I should restate it here. If continuity does not exist, then it is futile to bother with life extension at all for your own sake. Given how central continuity is to experience, I find it absurd to assume that continuity doesn't exist. I can't even conceive of how experience would be possible at all without continuity. I don't have a philosophical proof for the existence of continuity, I just have my awareness of it, so until somebody can prove that it doesn't exist, I will assume that it does. Denying continuity is nihilistic to the extreme.

References?!?? This is why I refuse to get into arguments about duplication in this thread. IT IS A TOTAL STRAW MAN.


If you're not willing to explain yourself, then stop making these ad hominem attacks.

What osiris and jaydfox have attacked in this thread is not even cryonics per se, but the much more basic idea of whether the same brain can be stopped and restarted and still be the same person


Exactly.

something already widely accepted in medicine in for decades. I don't even think there is a credentialed bioethicist in the world who would debate the issue, which is amazing when you consider all the other silly things they would debate.


This is not a logical or scientific argument in any sense, and its one that you have fallen back on repeatedly. Not unlike Don's fallback on his precedent argument for physical processes.

#67 bgwowk

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Posted 08 August 2005 - 05:40 AM

osiris wrote:

Alternatively, if you are dying and the only known medical procedure that might be able to save you requires halting of some level of brain activity, then it is necessary. Not a double standard.

A coronary bypass is not the only known medical procedure that can save people from ischemic heart disease. If there were a real life threatening philosophical risk of oblivion by brain activity suppression, some people could try angioplasty instead. Even plain vanilla general anesthesia halts many levels of brain activity. Medicine manipulates levels of brain activity on a purely elective basis for everything from injury repair to boob jobs. Yet I bet I'm the first person you ever called immoral for suggesting elective alteration of brain activity. That's what I mean by double standard.

If you're not willing to explain yourself, then stop making these ad hominem attacks.

I didn't call Jay a straw man. I called dismissing cryonics by bringing up duplication paradoxes a straw man. I've already explained several times it's a straw man because you don't need to duplicate someone to reverse suspended animation anymore than you need duplication to reverse sleep. If you really want to get into a fruitless argument over duplication in which one side will never convince the other, I'll reluctantly participate in another thread if you dare start one. But not here.

This is not a logical or scientific argument in any sense, and its one that you have fallen back on repeatedly.

I agree that citing authority or common belief is not a logical or scientific argument in any sense. I do so for two reasons. First, when mainstream philosophers and medical scientists don't see a philosophical problem that you do, that doesn't mean they are right, but it does mean that your argument is far from obvious. Second, I do it to emphasize that in this thread cryonics is being unfairly held to higher standards than the rest of medicine. I just don't believe that you would log into the CCML (critical care mailing list) and start posting messages to ICU docs saying that "there is no reason to expect barbiturate coma to work" like you so casually did in this cryonics forum.

Denying continuity is nihilistic to the extreme.

I also prefer to regard continuity of self (to the extent I subjectively perceive continuity of self) as a philosophical axiom. Our debate centers on the physical conditions necessary for subjective perception of self continuity. To continue that discussion, please confirm your earlier statement regarding sleep. To wit: Internal feeling that you have survived a process is the ultimate test of whether that process preserves personal continuity. Is that your position?

---BrianW

Edited by bgwowk, 08 August 2005 - 03:44 PM.


#68 manowater989

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Posted 08 August 2005 - 04:16 PM

I hate to interrupt this fascinating philosophical debate, really I do, but I think what is being discussed here is more of a separate question or, at the very least, one that relates to the original poll by semantics only: by whether cryonics would "work", I simply meant the physical process of restoring homeostasis, warming someone back up, repairing damage with nanos (or whatever), and restarting brain activity. Not duplication, not creating copies and worrying about which one is the "real one", not making a new person using the original as a model, I'm talking about repairing the original body, in situ; a process that would consist of probably little more than moving some molecules around.

From a philosophical standpoint, yes, I can see the argument that that new person might just be built from a "template" of the old person within the same body, but from a purely scientific standpoint, that's not what I'm asking about. And anyway, I generally agree with Brian that that whole line of reasoning doesn't really stand up too well- the person is the person, if I were going to be rebuilt 50 years down the road within my same exact body using all my same molecules, just moving some of them around, and woken back up, I would not be too worried that that "wouldn't really be me". There may have been a time when I would have been, and I'll be the first to admit that the epistemological parameters of issues such as these are, thorny, to say the least, but I just don't think it's enough to present a positive problem.

#69 DJS

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Posted 08 August 2005 - 06:33 PM

JohnS: The religious-like belief here is really the belief in personal continuity.

Osiris:
Good point John.  I think I've mentioned it in other threads, but I should restate it here.  If continuity does not exist, then it is futile to bother with life extension at all for your own sake.  Given how central continuity is to experience, I find it absurd to assume that continuity doesn't exist.  I can't even conceive of how experience would be possible at all without continuity.


I also agree that is was a good point, but you do realize Osiris that John's critique was (obviously) directed at the position your camp advocates. [huh]

#70 DJS

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Posted 08 August 2005 - 07:23 PM

Jay

Well, the interesting thing is, I'm actually very confident that cryonics will work for other people. Don knows what I mean by this, I think. That's one reason I advocate it so strongly, even though I don't think it'll do me any good.

Objectively, reviving a copy of a person is just as good as reviving the original person, and I suspect that the technology will exist someday to even revive people frozen without good protocols, e.g. people just frozen without good circulation or cryoprotectants, etc. I suspect that the person revived will have slight differences, similar to the slight differences between a person in the year 2004 and the year 2005. A person frozen with poor technology back in the 1970's will more likely be as different upon revival as a person from 1995 compared to the same person in 2005. In other words, there could be noticeable changes to personality and quality of memories, etc.

But of course, subjectively, I hold only a very, very, very small probability that the person will subjectively be the same person, dependent especially on the method of revival; hence I don't think it will do me much good. But then again, I'd take that very small chance over the 0% chance of revival if I'm buried or cremated.


So, this new subjective consciousness would believe that it is you, it would have all of the memories and attributes of you, and acquaintances would believe that it is you. Yet it would not be you?!?

I sort of "know" what you mean by all of this Jay, but your position boggles my mind nonetheless. You are not just running counter to a functionalist account of consciousness, but to all of physicalism as well.

Key terms are being misused or misunderstood here.

Data processing is not identity, but it does produce awareness.

Database = identity

#71 bgwowk

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Posted 08 August 2005 - 07:25 PM

manowater989 wrote:

I simply meant the physical process of restoring homeostasis, warming someone back up, repairing damage with nanos (or whatever), and restarting brain activity.

If you have technologies capable of general analysis and repair at the molecular level, then none of this is a problem, even for people cryopreserved under bad conditions. By the criteria above, "everybody's coming back," as Mike Darwin used to say. The tougher question is where on the continuum between waking after successful surgery, and waking as an amnesiac clone, will your revival be? This is ultimately determined by how well the minimum information necessary to recover memory and personality is being preserved.

Our society has never come to terms with the fact that personal survival is not a binary question when brain changes are involved, even over decades of a normal life. Is the person that was me at age of 4 now dead? Probably mostly. [sad]

---BrianW

#72 manowater989

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Posted 08 August 2005 - 07:48 PM

Well, this is what I'm trying to ask, no-one has seemed to correctly understand the gist of my question: DO you think we will have those technologies, and, if yes, do you think that the cryopatients, let's say, all those preserved as of today on, will most likely make it in good enough condition to that point to be viable for purposes of that?

#73 bgwowk

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Posted 08 August 2005 - 08:57 PM

manowater989 wrote:

Well, this is what I'm trying to ask, no-one has seemed to correctly understand the gist of my question: DO you think we will have those technologies, and, if yes, do you think that the cryopatients, let's say, all those preserved as of today on, will most likely make it in good enough condition to that point to be viable for purposes of that?

All I know is that such technologies are physically possible, and maintenance of patients for centuries is physically possible. In other words, the laws of physics say we CAN do this. Whether the physically possible will become the physically actual is a social question, not a scientific one.

The social question is strongly (if not entirely) dependent upon the actions of cryonics supporters, and the effectiveness with which they communicate that cryonics is worth doing. In the words of Mako to Chuck Norris in "Eye for an Eye" as they come under massive gun fire while attempting to sneak past bad guys, "This is not going very well."

---BrianW

#74 jaydfox

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Posted 08 August 2005 - 09:18 PM

I sort of "know" what you mean by all of this Jay, but your position boggles my mind nonetheless. You are not just running counter to a functionalist account of consciousness, but to all of physicalism as well.

Key terms are being misused or misunderstood here.

Actually, not to all of physicalism, Don, though I appreciate the attempt to keep me honest. Under pure "supervenience" physicalism, any break in spatiotemporal continuity is sufficient to justify a claim that "I" am not preserved.

But under less strict forms of physicalism, reproducing all the relevant physical properties and processes should be sufficient. An exact copy, both in physical structure and in physical processes (which in theory would be the same (as long as we're only talking about non-quantum phenomena), given the same physical structure, since the processes act upon the material in a well-defined manner), could suffice, though cryonics wouldn't preserve an exact copy, so then we must downgrade to even less strict forms of physicalism, where "close" counts, just like with dancing and hand grenades, as the expression goes.

Of course, if there's a quantum aspect to our observers, such that "I" experience my consciousness, then duplication becomes theoretically impossible to actually "do" (since unknown quantum states can only be copied, not duplicated), though of course, in the highly unlikely situation that two brains somehow ended up in the same quantum states by chance (maybe someone brewed up a really, really hot cup of coffee), then duplication of one's very observer could be accomplished.

#75 bgwowk

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Posted 08 August 2005 - 10:17 PM

jaydfox wrote:

An exact copy, both in physical structure and in physical processes (which in theory would be the same (as long as we're only talking about non-quantum phenomena), given the same physical structure, since the processes act upon the material in a well-defined manner), could suffice, though cryonics wouldn't preserve an exact copy, so then we must downgrade to even less strict forms of physicalism...

Ahem. Again, cryonics doesn't preserve a copy. It preserves the material original, just as any medicine does, subject to the same issues of brain changes during unconsciousness as waking from surgery or coma.

Of course, if there's a quantum aspect to our observers, such that "I" experience my consciousness, then duplication becomes theoretically impossible to actually "do" (since unknown quantum states can only be copied, not duplicated),

Non sequitur. You continue to make the error that Don pointed out. Just because a process is necessary for awareness does not mean the process is your identity. Furthermore, the implication that we are continuously aware throughout our lives is an abuse of the term awareness.

---BrianW

#76 manowater989

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Posted 08 August 2005 - 11:15 PM

What else could cryonics supporters be doing to more strongly be boosting our position? We seem to be in a political climate where anything that could be radically helpful from medical, scientific, or social standpoints are immediately shot down by the knee-jerk ignorance of small-minded individuals who are intent on making sure nothing ever improves, with the relative (extreme) minority who actually know enough about what is going on and hold sensible opinions growing ever more seemingly powerless to effect any change of direction.

#77 bgwowk

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Posted 09 August 2005 - 12:44 AM

What else could cryonics supporters be doing to more strongly be boosting our position?

All I can say is watch your talking points

* vitrification not freezing

* life preservation not death preservation (i.e. cryonics stops the dying process)

* brain preservation not head preservation

* tissue repair and regeneration by nanotechnology

and focus on receptive audiences (immortalists, life extensionists, transhumanists, individualists). There is such a thing as being right too soon, and attracting too much attention from the wrong people (e.g. Alcor and Ted Williams). The biggest problem of cryonics is not that it isn't accepted by the world in general (let's be realistic), but that it isn't even widely supported by its natural constituencies (yet).

---BrianW

#78 Mark Hamalainen

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Posted 10 August 2005 - 07:42 AM

To wit: Internal feeling that you have survived a process is the ultimate test of whether that process preserves personal continuity. Is that your position?

That is the only test we have.

I also agree that is was a good point, but you do realize Osiris that John's critique was (obviously) directed at the position your camp advocates.

Either this is a lame attempt at sarcasm, or we really operate on completely disconnected planes of thought.

Data processing is not identity, but it does produce awareness

That is your belief. Of course, you haven't specified a type of awareness. I can assume you mean awareness in the purely information processing sense, but not specifying so is a conveninet way for you to preech to the choir, mock your philisophical opponents, and manipulate other readers impressions. Killed 3 birds with one stone, good job [thumb]

#79 DJS

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Posted 10 August 2005 - 10:02 AM

Osiris

Either this is a lame attempt at sarcasm, or we really operate on completely disconnected planes of thought.


Is your reading comprehension really so poor? Go reread John's post and take your foot out of your mouth.

That is your belief.  Of course, you haven't specified a type of awareness.  I can assume you mean awareness in the purely information processing sense, but not specifying so is a conveninet way for you to preech to the choir, mock your philisophical opponents, and manipulate other readers impressions.  Killed 3 birds with one stone, good job  [thumb]


Yes, this is one aspect of my belief and I was stating it to clarify my position, as well as to point out where I believed Jay was mistaken. There is no harm in that, and it certainly wasn't meant to be offensive.

Also, since our recent debate my position has really been evolving (thank you). I have come to realize the absolute illogical nature of epiphenomenalism. Awareness IS the subjective manifestation of information processing. Dualism is an inferior position in relation to physicalism and I am going to create a thread demonstrating my logic shortly. *readers of this thread, apologies for the interruption*

#80 Mark Hamalainen

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Posted 10 August 2005 - 07:54 PM

Is your reading comprehension really so poor? Go reread John's post and take your foot out of your mouth.


Obviously if continuity didn't exist that would be at odds with my philosophical idea. My point was to assume so was nihilistic, so for any useful purpose, such an assumption can be ignored. bgwowk explained as much.

I look forward to your "proof"

#81 bgwowk

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Posted 10 August 2005 - 10:07 PM

osiris wrote:

Obviously if continuity didn't exist that would be at odds with my philosophical idea. My point was to assume so was nihilistic, so for any useful purpose, such an assumption can be ignored. bgwowk explained as much.

We have a perception of self and perception of self continuity of self over a lifetime. John argues that this perception is illusory. Depending on one's axioms (e.g. assuming self is tied to particular atoms or a very particular set of memories), this view can be defended. However, like you, I don't find this view particularly useful. I prefer to adopt perception as an axiom, and then develop models of physical reality to explain my perception.

Having said that, while I regard perceived self-continuity as self-evident, it by no means follows that uninterrupted continuity of a physical process is necessary for this perception.

QUOTE 
"To wit: Internal feeling that you have survived a process is the ultimate test of whether that process preserves personal continuity. Is that your position?"

That is the only test we have.

Indeed. That being the case, consider the implications of materialism. Materialism says that all our subjective experience (including feelings we have survived a process) is correlated with brain activity, and therefore the same brain activity must always cause the same subjective experience. The reason sleep passes the continuity test is simply because our brain before and after sleep is operating in a sufficiently similar way, causing the same sense of self. The corollary is that it doesn't matter what happens during sleep (e.g. biostasis), as long the brain wakes in the morning with the same structure and activity it would have after a night's sleep. Materialism implies that the feeling of continuity must be the same whether there is biostasis during sleep or not. Therefore biostasis (if done well enough) passes the only continuity test we have.

---BrianW

#82 jaydfox

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Posted 11 August 2005 - 07:22 PM

Materialism says that all our subjective experience (including feelings we have survived a process) is correlated with brain activity, and therefore the same brain activity must always cause the same subjective experience.

The "same subjective experience" isn't the part we're disagreeing about. It's the "experienced by ‘whom’" part that we're struggling over...

#83 jaydfox

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Posted 11 August 2005 - 07:54 PM

Data processing is not identity, but it does produce awareness

That is your belief. Of course, you haven't specified a type of awareness. I can assume you mean awareness in the purely information processing sense, but not specifying so is a conveninet way for you to preech to the choir, mock your philisophical opponents, and manipulate other readers impressions. Killed 3 birds with one stone, good job [thumb]

Yes, this is one aspect of my belief and I was stating it to clarify my position, as well as to point out where I believed Jay was mistaken. There is no harm in that, and it certainly wasn't meant to be offensive.

Actually, I didn't want to comment on this one, because what I'm about to say will get me accused of making religious statements or contriving a spiritual, non-physical soul. It's not my intent, so I've tried to think of the most outlandish metaphor possible to ensure that I'm not taken seriously as attempting to make an "accurate" metaphysical suggestion of the nature of consciousness.

Okay, let's say that we're watching a play. We are the "objective observers", scientists perhaps, or perhaps philosophers, or aspiring immortalists.

One of the characters in the play is the Black Knight, who as you can imagine, dresses in a black suit of armor, so that we cannot see the actor.

Now, Jay has been cast in tonight's rendition of the play. Jay is performing well, saying his lines exactly as specified in the script.

Now, during the intermission, Don locks Jay in a closet and performs the Black Knight in acts III and IV. No one in the audience can tell, for Don is following the script.

Now, what is the identity here? Is it the Black Knight? Or is it Jay, later replaced by Don?

Getting back to the real world, Don is saying that the identity is the Black Knight. Change the actor, and the identity has not changed. I suppose this is correct, as far as the "objective" world is concerned. But subjectively speaking, what is the identity? The identity has changed, even though no "objective" observer could tell.

Of course, in these discussions, when talking about the subjective identity we intend to preserve, we put I in quotes, so that "I" am preserved, or "I" am not preserved.

In the play example, "I" is Jay, so "I" am not preserved during acts III and IV, even if no member of the audience can tell there was a switch.

Of course, then one must question, if Jay and Don are physical, then why can't we just copy them as well? If we can copy the Black Knight, why can't we copy Jay and Don. Well, perhaps we can. However, the mere act of copying the Black Knight is not sufficient to copy Jay. The Knight could still be played by Don. Just copying the atomic layout is not guaranteed to copy Jay, not when we have no theory yet on how qualia and the subjective observer exist at all (unless we want to consider them an illusion... nah...).

Just because the qualia are the same, that doesn't mean that the internal observer is the same. Of course, we could get into a semantic argument about qualia being subjectively dependent, so that if experienced by a different subjective observer, they are different qualia, so if the qualia are the same, then by definition the subjective observer is the same. But then what we originally meant to say was that physicalism predicts the type of qualia, and "I" would experience the same type of qualia as a copy of me who is not "me".

Under global supervenience physicalism, identical physical processes might cause the same types of qualia, but it does not follow (though of course it might be) that the qualia are experienced by the same subjective "observer". Under the less strict local supervenience model, it may indeed follow that the qualia are experienced by the same observer, in which case one's subjective awareness does literally jump from one's original to an exact copy.

Of course, cryonics throws in another wrinkle, since the version of me before cryonics and after are not exactly the same, so even with local supervenience, it's no guarantee that "I" would subjectively awaken in the revived body (this is what I meant by not being an exact copy: the version prior to cryonics and immediately after revival are spatiotemporally separated, so I made liberal use of the word "copy"; I apologize for the confusion, but I suppose I should have realized that, with all the semantic differences we're experiencing, I didn't need to add to it...), even with local supervenience physicalism. Now we must step down to an even less strict form of materialism...

#84 jaydfox

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Posted 11 August 2005 - 08:05 PM

By the way, my main point in bringing up the Black Knight and his actor is that I was trying to make concrete a concept I've been trying to get across, but which some here either completely don't understand, or they just so overwhelmingly reject it that they pretend they don't understand.

I don't contend that identical molecular/chemical reactions taking place in a copy of a brain would fail to experience the same qualia as the original, and hence could operate just fine in the place of the original, and would even be objectively the same, at least for most if not all intents and purposes.

However, I've been contending that the qualia and the subjective observer aren't the same thing, since a different subjective observer could experience the same qualia. This has been rejected out of hand so many times that I'm beginning to think that maybe a couple people here just don't understand the concept I'm trying to convey. Hence the Black Knight. To the audience, he acts the same before an after the switch. Here, we might say that a copy experiences the same qualia, and functionally would even perform the same, think the same thoughts, etc.

But the subjective observer that is the "object" (to use a vague noun) that experiences the qualia is different, be it Jay or Don, in this example. Create a copy, and it's not a foregone conclusion that one's subjective awareness continues. Jay isn't experiencing the third and fourth acts of the play; he's locked in a closet, for Pete's sake! Make a copy, and one's subjective awareness doesn't automatically jump to the copy. Perhaps it will, perhaps it won't, none of us knows, but a couple of you argue that the mere concept that one's awareness wouldn't jump to the copy is pure rubbish. Well, Jay is not Don, and clearly, Jay isn't experiencing acts III and IV. I can't make the concept any clearer. Can I at least get a confirmation that the concept is understood. If not, we can save ourselves some trouble and cease debating this.

#85 Mark Hamalainen

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Posted 11 August 2005 - 08:47 PM

I can't make the concept any clearer. Can I at least get a confirmation that the concept is understood. If not, we can save ourselves some trouble and cease debating this.


Indeed, well said Jay.

An idea can't be proven if you've embedded the assumption that your idea is true in your proof.

#86 bgwowk

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Posted 12 August 2005 - 05:43 AM

jaydfox wrote:

The "same subjective experience" isn't the part we're disagreeing about. It's the "experienced by ‘whom’" part that we're struggling over...

Of course, but I wasn't talking to you, Jay. ;) I was addressing osiris, who despite your earlier warning went ahead and agreed that the extistence of the feeling that a process has been survived "is the only test we have" for whether a process preserves personal continuity. If feelings are the result of physical states, then trivially it doesn't matter whether there is inactivation during sleep as long as the waking state that causes the feeling of survival occurs nonetheless in the morning.

Several different physical requirements for personal survival have been suggested in this thread. In general terms they are

1) Uninterrupted waking consciousness
2) Uninterrupted process (process unspecified)
3) Recurrence of physical brain states that generate the feeling of being oneself

Recall that osiris dismissed (1) thusly:

My test for the survivability of sleep is simply to go to sleep and wake in the morning, something I have done many times and am aware of surviving. That awareness is internal and not directly observable for anybody else.

I therefore dismiss (2) thusly:

My test for the survivability of brain inactivation is to overdose on barbiturates and wake in a hospital ICU days later, something some people have done several times and are aware of surviving.  That awareness is internal and not directly observable for anybody else.


To some extent, whether one believes in (1), (2), or (3) is a matter of philosophical taste. I actually know a guy who believes quite strongly in (1), and avoids general anesthesia like death itself.

But this much is certain: If you adopt any criterion for survival more stringent than (3), you are saying certain people at certain times (e.g. barbiturate coma survivors, cardiac arrest survivors, cryonics patients, etc.) are not the people they believe themselves to be, but rather illegitimate continuations of a person now dead. Now that's nihilism! It's also a recipe for human rights violations.

There is a good reason why real-world medicine long ago dismissed (1) and (2) above. When you have a patient who wakes up, is recognized by their family, wants to go home with their family, and expresses great happiness to be able to continue their life, that patient will be damn upset if you sign a death certificate that puts their estate into probate.

I don't ever want to wake in a hospital with a bunch of philosophers at my bedside second guessing whether I'm really who I know I am, and that's why my criterion for personal survival is (3). (3) is also certainly in the best interests of my friends and family who depend on me doing whatever it takes to be there for them, rather than dismissing life saving treatments because of concerns that have no basis in objective reality--- the only reality that matters for them. Of course, that's the only reality that matters for me too, inasmuch as objective reality is the cause of subjective experience.

---BrianW

#87 Mark Hamalainen

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Posted 12 August 2005 - 06:46 AM

The "same subjective experience" isn't the part we're disagreeing about. It's the "experienced by ‘whom’" part that we're struggling over...

Of course, but I wasn't talking to you, Jay.


Way to conveniently avoid addressing any of jay's logical arguments. [thumb]

;) I was addressing osiris, who despite your earlier warning went ahead and agreed that the extistence of the feeling that a process has been survived "is the only test we have" for whether a process preserves personal continuity.  If feelings are the result of physical states, then trivially it doesn't matter whether there is inactivation during sleep as long as the waking state that causes the feeling of survival occurs nonetheless in the morning.


Actually, my point was that the only test we have for survivability is internal, there is no external test, something that jay has also pointed out, and which you have conveniently ignored.

1) Uninterrupted waking consciousness
2) Uninterrupted process (process unspecified)
3) Recurrence of physical brain states that generate the feeling of being oneself

Recall that osiris dismissed (1) thusly:

My test for the survivability of sleep is simply to go to sleep and wake in the morning, something I have done many times and am aware of surviving. That awareness is internal and not directly observable for anybody else.

I therefore dismiss (2) thusly:


Dismissing 1 does not entitle you to dismiss 2 because 2 is not really a point at all if you aren't more specific. You are purposefully oversimplifying the situation with meaningless semantical arguments.

My test for the survivability of brain inactivation is to overdose on barbiturates and wake in a hospital ICU days later, something some people have done several times and are aware of surviving.  That awareness is internal and not directly observable for anybody else.


I assume you haven't tried this experiment? Again you're completely ignoring the internal vs external problem. Given how clearly jay just presented it, I can only assume that you are completely unable or unwilling to understand. From the rest of your post, the latter seems likely.

But this much is certain: If you adopt any criterion for survival more stringent than (3), you are saying certain people at certain times (e.g. barbiturate coma survivors, cardiac arrest survivors, cryonics patients, etc.) are not the people they believe themselves to be, but rather illegitimate continuations of a person now dead.  Now that's nihilism!  It's also a recipe for human rights violations.


We are not saying anything absolutely, we are pointing out possibilities and unknowns. And its hardly nihilism in any case, no more than assuming that incineration causes death.

There is a good reason why real-world medicine long ago dismissed (1) and (2) above.  When you have a patient who wakes up, is recognized by their family, wants to go home with their family, and expresses great happiness to be able to continue their life, that patient will be damn upset if you sign a death certificate that puts their estate into probate.


This is and has been the root of your argument from the beginning. Not what is logical, but what you want to believe.

of concerns that have no basis in objective reality--- the only reality that matters for them.  Of course, that's the only reality that matters for me too, inasmuch as objective reality is the cause of subjective experience.


As I said, if you assume your philisophical ideas to be true from the outset... i.e. assume that all there is to the world is the black knight.

#88 eternaltraveler

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Posted 12 August 2005 - 07:15 AM

I was once strongly opposed to Brian's ideas on this mater in a thread dealing with duplication scenarios.

Since then I have thought about it much and come to the conclusion that in such a scenario it is entirely up to you whether you choose to believe or disbelieve that your central self is preserved. Just as someone could choose to believe that they perished during the sleep each night, or choose to believe you perish every moment, with a new version of you born each Planck instant.

As such it becomes a matter of pragmatism. So long as you feel you have continued, you have.

#89 jaydfox

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Posted 12 August 2005 - 10:19 AM

As such it becomes a matter of pragmatism. So long as you feel you have continued, you have.

Some men are disappointed when they have a daughter rather than a son. They could have raised up that son to be like them, to live on through that son. But the daughter, well, she points out what should otherwise be obvious: the child is a different person, and one does not literally achieve immortality through their child.

Some men are disappointed when they have a son, if the son looks like the mother. Somehow, if the son "looks just like his dad", then they feel that they can live on through the son.

Some men are disappointed when the have a son that looks just like them, but it becomes obvious as the child ages that he does not have his father's personality, or his knack for math, or his love of music. Somehow, if the son just acted like, and reminded everybody of, his father, then the father might somehow live on through the son.

Some people are today disappointed that they can't clone themselves. Somehow, if they could just have a genetically identical, and hence phenotypically nearly identical, child, then they could somehow live on through that child.

Some day we'll have the technology to make functional duplicates, whether at the larger neuronal level, and perhaps even at the atomic level. Because somehow, we might live on through our duplicates.

But perhaps the disappointment of the father who wanted a son and received a daughter should be telling us something that is so obvious that some here fail to see it: separate body, different observer. We can no more live on through a duplicate than we can through a totally different human being, or a cow for that matter. Memories and personality do not one's observer make.

So the person that wakes up from the coma isn't necessarily the same person, the same internal, subjective observer. Of course, this causes Brian some philosophical issues about estates and the discomfort of relatives. Well, that's a terrific reason to assume then that the person who awakens from the coma must be the original, because otherwise, we'd have weird issues to live with.

But what sort of weird issues will we have to deal with when we're making duplicates? It's not the issues that matter. It's what should be obvious: a copy can and probably does have a distinct observer. Memories and personality do not a subjective observer make. Give me Don's memories, and it's still my observer, not his. I may switch from playing the Black Knight to the White Knight, but it's still Jay in the costume; I didn't become Don by changing my outfit.

Now I'm not saying I believe a person awaking from a coma has a new observer; I'm actually leaning away from that, but it's a serious enough break in continuity to beg the question. Does this mean the world will be in shambles? Well, there's still just one of the person, so we don't have all the issues that duplicates would create. And the person is alive, does have an observer (whether the original or a new one), and we can't tell objectively any different, and that observer has a set a of memories that tells him or her she's entitled to the previous tenants property and family. So, um, we kind of do what's just natural and obvious, which is to let this potentially new person (or not, we'll never know, at least not with today's technology) live on without bugging them with philosophical objections and inquiries. Doesn't mean we have to accept Brian's (3), we can accept (1) or (2) and still let this person live their (possibly newly acquired) life in peace. It's not like the new observer loses all human rights because he/she isn't an original. Quite the contrary, I feel it's the observer, and not the memories/personality, that has the inherent rights. The memories/personality is like art, or literature: it's just information slapped on top of the observer.

#90 manowater989

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Posted 12 August 2005 - 12:31 PM

I am honestly really surprised that you believe this, Jay. I kind of got what you were saying, with the black knight and all that, and have been thinking a great deal about both sides of this issue, even before had been leaning more towards Brian's position but was still concerned enough by yours to raise fairly serious issues.

But that last post, what you're saying, I just don't see how you can defend THAT as making any sense. Sure, you can't KNOW for certain that an objective observer has survived, but that leads me into my philosophical background, you can't exactly know anything, (the whole branch of epistemology, Descartes' deceiving demon, The Matrix and all that) especially when perspective is concerned - but in science and, basically, in life, we concern ourselves with things that we can observe to be true. As someone else said, if that was the scenario, you basically would die every Planck instant, indeed, "you" would never really be "alive" in this super-demanding sense you are suggesting, we would never be there long enough. I think we're more like a piece of animation, in that sense: we only seem to have a continuous existence because the moments or individual "frames" pass much faster then we can ever register: as long as all the frames are preserved, the cartoon can always be played again.

To me, your belief seems to be of a somewhat backwards, almost religion-like nature, really what your talking about more or less is a fundamental "soul", whether or not you are careful to avoid use of that word- your soul is kind of an opposite of the traditional idea of a soul, instead of being immortal and fundamentally indestructible, you seem to posit a kind of "supermortal" soul, one which is so fragile and impermanent that any minor bump or bruise in flow of continuity extinguishes it, a soul that can be destroyed even within the case of a normal, living lifetime, albeit under rare circumstances, but the basic concept is no less unprovable or unrealistic than the judeo-christian soul, and probably even more unreasonable. Assigning arbitrary significance to individual portions of nature, which are more complex but no more "special" or operate on no different fundamental principles than anything else. Look at where we came from, unless you don't believe in evolution, either. I really don't mean to, like, persecute you, I know you were expecting that, but it just seems like, perhaps without meaning to, you are progressive on many issues but still cling to outdated lines of reasoning, though by other names, on others.

At what point does intelligence begin, and where does it end? The answers are vague and imprecise, not absolute and defining. I agree that perfect duplication raises more difficult and harder-to-resolve issues, and I do see how the two scenarios could be compared, BUT, they are not the same, even in theory, and even with duplication, I am not at all convinced that they wouldn't both be you at the exact moment of duplication, as to which one's "eyes you would be seeing out of", I don't exactly know- granted it boggles our minds because such a thing is hard to conceptualize, maybe split-sceen awareness ;), but I think that if and when such a thing actually happened (quantumality might make it impossible, --ed.), I think the actuality of the situation would be something self-consistent and necessarily rational, without the complication of many possible yous inhabiting a messy phantom neverland between actually being the person they think they are and sort of not. And to say that awakened coma patients are already living there, as someone who has extensively studied science, philosophy, and life, I can with some authority say that's just dumb, and more important, I can't see it being true, no matter how you slice it. If you think I'm wrong, can you offer any more compelling evidence?

P.S. When I started this thread, and up till now, I remain more interested in the hard science and social viability of cryonics than the philosophical conundrums, I think that whole thing deserves it's own thread, and probably belongs more on Philosophy. Any chance I could get you all to focus more on those aspects, and worry about "subjective survivability" or not ONCE we're sure we know how to, technologically and actually, survive it at all? I realize that to those in the camp that are convinced it isn't aren't worried about this if they think it won't save them anyway, but, I mean, that is just, to me, so irrational that it holds up legitimate work as to be considered dangerous. Then there's the people who think that even with continuous survivability, you lose yourself slowly because you change over time and lose old memories. Where does it all end? If you look hard enough, you can always find ways of twisting it to describe even successful processes as failures in some way, shape, or form, but at the end of the day, electricity either turns on lights or it doesn't.

Edited by manowater989, 12 August 2005 - 01:16 PM.





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