66 replies to this topic

[JohnDoe1234]

Well, Don (alright if I call you by your real name?)... I was not aware of the terms Compatiblism and Incompatiblism (as it relates to this discussion), but I have spent the past 3 hours getting up to speed via the following sources:

http://plato.stanfor.../compatibilism/
http://www.rep.routl...ticle/V014SECT1
http://en.wikipedia....i/Compatibilism

And I still cannot find any sort of reasonable counter to the Determinist's argument. I am not saying that philosophers such as Hume and Dennett are "mucking things up", I am sure they have made significant contributions, however... just because they have been working on an idea for 300+ years doesn't give it the right to be right. It simply means that it will be a little more polished, but after reading through these two sources it seems that the theory can be de-railed simply by adding an element of mental illness to the problem... Determinism's argument is already established and there is no need for refinement as far as I can tell.

I would think that if there were an answer to the Deterministic theory it would have been posted here already... I do not understand how someone can escape the fact that a closed system must have a cause for an action taking place from within. Even open systems are subject to the same rules, except, they would need to regress infinitely. (I can try to expand on this if requested)

Maybe I am misunderstanding this whole Compatiblist argument, but it looks as if it is located on a very abstract level that is human-dependent, and which relies on the complexity of our minds and environments to explain itself (which is very bad). While reading these arguments put forth by Compatiblists, I can't help but to think that they are thinking on to high of a level, and that because of that, they are either misunderstanding Determinism, or... they are saying free will is compatible with merely a product of determinism: complexity... which it really isn't, it is only disguised by it.

They often say things like "You have the choice to continue reading this sentence, or you can just leave" Sure, for all significant purposes, you do... and it sure does feel that way, but I think they are missing the point of determinism. That choice they made, they may have flipped back and forth 15 times before they made their decision, but the fact still remains the same... that the operations that took place in their brains which lead to the final decision were governed by physical laws, which to my knowledge have not changed since the big bang (most likely the only seed).

Determinism does not inhibit one's ability to make decisions, to feel emotions, to see beauty, to way pros and cons... It simply means that everything that takes place, is orchestrated by physical laws which have no exceptions and hence leave no room for an agent/object to make decisions that are free from the influence of the system in which it inhabits.

Look, I do not like the idea of Determinism... it makes everything I do seem useless, and I feel as if I really can make my own decisions... but I must admit, it does make the universe seem more spectacular due to the fact that everything around us is just a product of a few quadrillion-quadrillion (just to throw some numbers) conditions that were initially set ~14 billion years ago.

No matter how much I dislike the idea of a 100% deterministic universe, I must accept it. I am not holding on to this theory because I like it, I am holding on to it because I feel it is correct. So, the instant I see an argument that disproves Determinism or at least casts serious doubt in my mind, I will be more than happy to drop the theory, but as it stands... I see no such argument.

Eirenicon, I am not sure I entirely understand what you are saying... How am I intuitively progressing further from it?

You are now just one intuitive step away from seeing the beauty of compatibilism. You get to keep your sense of free will precisely because you can't perceive the relevant dimensional infinities, all while it isn't necessary to deny determinism. Who could ask for more?

[Kalepha]

Eirenicon, I am not sure I entirely understand what you are saying... How am I intuitively progressing further from it?

I don't know what you mean by "it" but your sentence,

I think that attaining free will is like trying to count to infinity, sure can try it, and you can make progress towards it... but you will never get there.

to which I responded,

You are now just one intuitive step away from seeing the beauty of compatibilism. You get to keep your sense of free will precisely because you can't perceive the relevant dimensional infinities, all while it isn't necessary to deny determinism. Who could ask for more?

seemed to show that you would understand and accept compatibilism with barely a nudge, so there was no suggestion of your "intuitively progressing further [away]". Hard determinism and compatibilism share the attribute of each accepting determinism. They merely differ on how they deal with the concept of free will. A hard determinist will always say that free will is an illusion while feeling guilty about their illusion (and perhaps wishing that others would feel guilty too). A compatibilist will always say that free will is an illusion while not feeling guilty about their illusion (and perhaps wishing that others would stop confusing themselves with pointless guilt). Hard determinists feel guilty about their illusion because they arrive at their realism from the metaphysical perspective that their minds are able to perceive and make judgments about phenomena with nothing in reality left over. Compatibilists do not feel guilty about their illusion because they arrive at their realism from the epistemological perspective that their propositions and sentences have truth values and are not truth itself (outside of their instrumental character).

[JohnDoe1234]

Ahh, ok. I see where my confusion is coming from, I misinterpreted your sentence, I didn't read it as you just re-explained it...

But um... as for a nudge, as long as the nudge can dislodge my belief that everything that occurs requires a cause, then yeah... I'm just a little nudge away, and as for guilt, I'm not sure I would call it guilt (At least for me), but rather frustration. And like I said, I still do not see how free will and determinism can coexist... I am still going to be reading up on the theories, but so far, nothing has caught my eye.

[Kalepha]

All right, Joseph. As you're reading up on it, I'll try to think of a better way to explain some of this stuff without having to write a pompous monologue, and then I'll put it down if someone hasn't already explained it better or if you haven't yet found satisfactory answers. My goal is to show you how not to be frustrated with determinism and to show you this without you thinking that you have to abandon realism or else somehow become a "weaker realist" (in fact, you should be expecting to become a stronger realist).

. . . as for a nudge, as long as the nudge can dislodge my belief that everything that occurs requires a cause . . .

And no, there should be no need to abandon causality either.

[Kalepha]

The notion of truth value was mentioned, and that can be used for this next attempt.

Examples of truth values: true, false, probabilities, wonderful, crap.

Hard determinists and compatibilists have in common that they feel a significant urge to assign truth values to these two sentences:

1. Determinism is real.
2. Free will is an illusion is real.

Honest hard determinists and honest compatibilists have in common that they assign very high probabilities to both of these sentences (if they actually went so far as to assign 'true' to both of these sentences, they might be on the verge of irrationality with respect to their battle-scarred reflective equilibria); so they are effectively in agreement at this point.

But that's where the similarity ends, because each has one more related urge and they happen to be different urges. The hard determinist has the compulsion to express, in one way or another, "Free will is an illusion, so stop acting like you think you have free will, in all your naïve splendor." However, the compatibilist will express, if sufficiently prompted, in one way or another, "Free will is an illusion. . . . So, anyway. Have a good day."

[DJS]

joseph: alright if I call you by your real name?

Sure, no problem.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

For some reason I am reminded of the serenity prayer my mother would recite when I was a child:

God, grant me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change,
the courage to change the things I can change,
and the wisdom to know the difference.

Of course, I believe that these virtues (serenity, courage and wisdom) can be self-manifested rather than bestowed “from on high”, but the underlying sentiments are apropos for this discussion.

eirenicon: The hard determinist has the compulsion to express, in one way or another, "Free will is an illusion, so stop acting like you think you have free will, in all your naïve splendor." However, the compatibilist will express, if sufficiently prompted, in one way or another, "Free will is an illusion. . . . So, anyway. Have a good day."

Hard determinists resent the necessary reality that comes with their conceptual framework and long for the illusion - they still maintain a certain amount of idealism in their hearts. Compatibilists embrace their reality and summarily move on to the task of constructing a meaningful existence.

[DJS]

I couldn't resist at least one Nietzsche reference for this dialog... [g:)]

The thought of eternal recurrence (link midway down the page)

The thought of eternal recurrence is central to the writings of Friedrich Nietzsche. As Heidegger pointed out, Nietzsche never speaks about the reality of "eternal recurrence" itself, but about the "thought of eternal recurrence." Nietzsche conceived of the idea as a simple "hypothesis", which, like the idea of Hell in Christianity, did not need to be true in order to have real effects. The thought of eternal recurrence appears in a few parts of his works, in particular §125 and 341 of The Gay Science and then in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. It is also noted for the first time in his posthumous fragment of 1881 (11 [143]). The experience of this thought is dated by Nietzsche himself, in the posthumous fragments, to August 1881, at Sils-Maria. In Ecce Homo (1888), he wrote that the thought of the Eternal Return was the "fundamental conception" of Thus Spoke Zarathustra [2].

Several authors have pointed out other occurrences of this hypothesis in contemporary thought. Thus, the anthroposophist Rudolf Steiner, who revised the first catalogue of Nietzsche's personal library in January 1896, pointed out that Nietzsche would have read something similar in Eugen Dühring's Courses on philosophy (1875), which Nietzsche readily criticized. Lou Andreas-Salomé pointed out that Nietzsche referred to Ancient cyclical conceptions of time, in particular by the Pythagoreans, in the Inactual Considerations. Henri Lichtenberger and Charles Andler have pinpointed three works contemporary to Nietzsche which carried on the same hypothesis: J.G. Vogt, Die Kraft. Eine real-monistische Weltanschauung (1878), Auguste Blanqui, L'éternité par les astres (1872) and Gustave Le Bon, L'homme et les sociétés (1881). However, Gustave Le Bon is not quoted anywhere in Nietzsche's manuscripts; and Auguste Blanqui was named only in 1883. But Vogt's work, on the other hand, was read by Nietzsche precisely during this summer of 1881 in Sils-Maria [3]. Blanqui is mentionned by Albert Lange in his Geschichte des Materialismus (History of Materialism), a book closely read by Nietzsche [4].

Despite his reading of Vogt, Nietzche's conception of the eternal recurrence of all things differs from other seemingly similar hypotheses, insofar as it is intrinsically related to Zarathustra's announcement of the Übermensch and the ethical imperative of overcoming nihilism [5] On a few occasions in his notebooks, Nietzsche discusses the possibility of eternal recurrence as cosmological truth, but in the works he prepared for publication it is treated as the ultimate method of affirmation. According to Nietzsche, it would require a sincere amor fati (Love of Fate) not simply to endure, but to wish for, the eternal recurrence of all events exactly as they occurred — all the pain and joy, the embarrassment and glory.

Nietzsche calls the idea "horrifying and paralyzing," and says that its burden is the "heaviest weight" ("das schwerste Gewicht") imaginable. The wish for the eternal return of all events would mark the ultimate affirmation of life:

What, if some day or night a demon were to steal after you into your loneliest loneliness and say to you: 'This life as you now live it and have lived it, you will have to live once more and innumerable times more' ... Would you not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse the demon who spoke thus? Or have you once experienced a tremendous moment when you would have answered him: 'You are a god and never have I heard anything more divine.' [The Gay Science, §341]

As described by Nietzsche, the thought of eternal return is more than merely an intellectual concept or challenge, it is akin to a koan, or psychological device that occupies one's entire consciousness, stimulating a transformation of consciousness known as metanoia.

In Nietzsche scholarship, the cosmological hypothesis of eternal recurrence is of extreme interest, being a crucial axiom of his philosophy. In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, part III, chap. 2, #2, "Of the Vision and the Riddle" (German; also called "The Vision and the Enigma," part XLVI in the Dover Thrift Translation) Nietzsche confronts his aforementioned inner demon and proves to him the reality of eternal recurrence, and this leads to a self-awakening in which the demon is exorcised. Nietzsche also described himself as "the bringer of eternal recurrence" in Twilight of the Idols. Much effort is still expended in attempts to understand Nietzsche's notebooks' fragmentary mentions of eternal recurrence.

[DJS]

I think that attaining free will is like trying to count to infinity, sure can try it, and you can make progress towards it... but you will never get there.

You are now just one intuitive step away from seeing the beauty of compatibilism. You get to keep your sense of free will precisely because you can't perceive the relevant dimensional infinities, all while it isn't necessary to deny determinism. Who could ask for more?

I had the same thoughts when reading that sentence. Maybe I should have placed my sarcastic devil in check and made an attempt at being more constructive.

Although I am curious to see whether the type of attitude which makes compatibilism appealing can be adequately communicated I must admit that I am skeptical about the possibility. Speaking from a personal perspective, there is a certain (for lack of a better term) spirituality involved that only came to me through experience. Reading, or having someone tell me about these “feelings” probably wouldn’t have had a major impact on my former self. Sure, I’d be thankful for the sharing of perspective, but would I actually have been able to relate in a meaningful way?

The palpable sense of time passing. Joy and sorrow. Moments of great signifcance. A never ending series of hellos and goodbyes. And at the end of the day there is only yourself, coming to terms with your own existence. How can I do this justice? How can I convey what words can not describe? *Sigh* Forgive my flare for the dramatic – it is my cardinal vice.

[Kalepha]

Hard determinists resent the necessary reality that comes with their conceptual framework and long for the illusion - they still maintain a certain amount of idealism in their hearts.

Don, unfortunately I think we should nitpick on something in particular which should be crystal clear: hard determinists do in fact possess the illusion of free will, and their propositional observances (the psychological correlates of sentences or truth functions, even perceptions in general) do nothing to eliminate the real illusion. And, of course, again, there isn't anything wrong with that. It is the only way we can have free will, and that is, by not being Block Gods. And if determinism is real, that then does the rest of the work in theoretically permitting Orderly Gods With Free Will.

Compatibilism: Who can ask for more?

Also, it could be noticed that I slightly deviate from some popular formulations of compatibilism, which actually want to say, "Free will is real." These formulations seem more ideological than necessary. They are panically striving for "independence" from distinct volitions, confusing free will and volitional will. All that ultimately does is create pointless anxiety and hence too many wasted states in confusion, because in trying to make 'independence' precise, especially if as a cognitive transidentity, who must take an unprecedented many points into account, it'll simply evaporate into meaninglessness while it exposes its monstrous inherent disutility. Until convinced otherwise, I'll continue to feel that the formulation having been summarized is more general and ultimately more powerful. Of course, as usual, I'll continually sustain maximum vigilance for potentially any of its inherent problems.

[Kalepha]

. . . confusing free will and volitional will. . . .

In other words, when conceptualizing about free will, if also thinking about volitional will and possibly as a consequence, from its excess semantic baggage, about avoiding, for instance, coercion, it might be indefinitely distracting from a potentially better comprehension of free will. [Edit: Actually, having first maxed out theoretical volitional will might sometimes be necessary to arrive at this utterant's minced compatibilism.]

Until devastated. Necessarily, free will is an illusion. Necessarily, to desire zero illusions is not to desire free will. Necessarily, if you do not desire free will, you have zero real imagination. Necessarily, if you really perceive free will and you also really desire it, you have a potentially unlimited real imagination.

Edited by eirenicon, 29 April 2007 - 02:08 AM.

[Karomesis]

First things first. How do I become a God-Man too?

Mike, you're a pretty smart guy. I'd say you're already halfway there. [thumb]

Hard determinists resent the necessary reality that comes with their conceptual framework and long for the illusion - they still maintain a certain amount of idealism in their hearts. Compatibilists embrace their reality and summarily move on to the task of constructing a meaningful existence.

[lol] [lol] and we live in a f-cking simulation as posited by Bostrom. what does it matter? and pray tell what constitutes a "meaningful" existence? does one have to demonstrate real non-reciprocal altruism? or deny oneself the pleasures before them? what of dicipline? does it legitamize the debauchery that unfolds consequent to its manifestation?

[JohnDoe1234]

Sorry for the late reply, but I have been busy with prom and preparing for final exams...

Hmm, This is interesting... It seems (from what I have gathered), that the only difference between Compatibilism and Determinism is the attitude taken when one realizes that free will is an illusion.

I am looking for a very technical answer, I am still stuck on the whole causation issue, I am still having a hard time trying to figure out why Compatiblism even exists... I do not see how one can think that free will and a deterministic system can coexist (as mentioned in a previous post). In my mindset, once you accept that a system is deterministic (e.g. the only kind of system possible), one instantly forfeits free will. It doesn't matter how many different emotions you feel, how many different choices you can make, how many times you flip between them, or how you observe the universe... to me, causation is the death of free will... am I totally missing something here?

Here is a little quote I pulled from wikipedia on the subject, I think the last sentence is a perfect description of what I think, however, the use of the word 'agent' in the second sentence is kind of vague, and so I don't really understand what the sentence is trying to get across.

Compatibilism, as championed by Hobbes, Hume and many contemporary philosophers, is a theory that argues that free will and determinism exist and are in fact compatible. The Compatibilist definition of free will states that free will is not the ability to choose as an agent independent of prior cause, but as an agent who is not forced to make a certain choice. Determinists argue that all acts that take place are predetermined by prior causes. Because human decision is an act that is not exempt from prior cause, by this definition, some determinists known as hard determinists believe that free will thus becomes an illusion.

I am very new to the philosophy scene, and I am still learning terms left and right... so please bear with me [thumb]

Thanks guys for taking the time to help explain this to me.

--- EDIT ---

However, the compatibilist will express, if sufficiently prompted, in one way or another, "Free will is an illusion. . . . So, anyway. Have a good day."

Compatibilists embrace their reality and summarily move on to the task of constructing a meaningful existence.

This is also interesting, as I have stated, I do not believe we have free will, and I cannot change what happens... (but I feel that I am changing it), I don't normally sit and dwell on the issue, but it does nag at me here and there; for instance, when I am hanging out with friends just having a good time I sometimes cannot help but to think that we are just a huge collection of molecules and chemical reactions that are obeying the laws of physics and hence are of no real significance. I just try to remind myself that for all important purposes, my mother's love does matter, these emotions that I feel do matter, and the things that I do that I enjoy... do matter.

One thing that intrigues me is that this deterministic system that we inhabit has managed to acquire the ability to ponder its own deterministic nature.

Edited by Joseph, 29 April 2007 - 06:22 AM.

[Kalepha]

I am looking for a very technical answer . . .

Unfortunately, it's very simple.

Free will cannot be a non-illusion. By definition, free will is an illusion. You have this illusion, and you believe that you have this illusion because you would affirm that 'free will is an illusion' is true. Suppose that you desired zero illusions; then, by definition, you would desire not to have free will. If you were God1 of universe U1 and U1 was relatively so simplistic that you bounded it, you would have no free will, because you would not have a horizon, beyond which is yet more unexplored reality, that required you to make choices and have an outlook for its real delineation. As long as you theoretically have unexplored reality, you have free will, necessarily an illusion. But if you're a self-bounded system, which would be stupid if you're a mathematician god, you would have no horizon, no reality left unexplored, and thence no free will, an illusion, necessarily.

[DJS]

Don, unfortunately I think we should nitpick on something in particular which should be crystal clear: hard determinists do in fact possess the illusion of free will, and their propositional observances (the psychological correlates of sentences or truth functions, even perceptions in general) do nothing to eliminate the real illusion. And, of course, again, there isn't anything wrong with that. It is the only way we can have free will, and that is, by not being Block Gods. And if determinism is real, that then does the rest of the work in theoretically permitting Orderly Gods With Free Will.
-------------------------------------

Free will cannot be a non-illusion. By definition, free will is an illusion. You have this illusion, and you believe that you have this illusion because you would affirm that 'free will is an illusion' is true. Suppose that you desired zero illusions; then, by definition, you would desire not to have free will. If you were God1 of universe U1 and U1 was relatively so simplistic that you bounded it, you would have no free will, because you would not have a horizon, beyond which is yet more unexplored reality, that required you to make choices and have an outlook for its real delineation. As long as you theoretically have unexplored reality, you have free will, necessarily an illusion. But if you're a self-bounded system, which would be stupid if you're a mathematician god, you would have no horizon, no reality left unexplored, and thence no free will, an illusion, necessarily.

After even minimally acquainting oneself with the field of cognitive psychology, the prevalence of subjectively experienced “illusions” becomes apparent. The cause of these illusions is that Darwinian evolution selects for optimized fitness and not accurate correspondence with reality. I do not however believe that our sense of Free Will (FW) is one of these illusions. In fact, I do not believe that it is an illusion at all, but a qualitative aspect of Being. FW, if that is what we are to call it, is the subjective experience of surprise that arises from an incomplete knowledge about our internal constituency (and all of the causal factors that went into it) as well as the range of reactions that might occur with an exceedingly vast array of external possibilities. The only time that FW becomes an illusion is when the concept is idealized in the libertarian fashion.

Furthermore, from my perspective this qualitative aspect of Being will always be present because there will always be unexplored reality and thus always incomplete subjective knowledge. As Popper once said, “Our knowledge can only be finite, while our ignorance must necessarily be infinite.”

[DJS]

Joseph: Sorry for the late reply, but I have been busy with prom and preparing for final exams...

Your prom...wow. Forget this geek stuff and go have some fun - just don't do anything stupid like I did after my prom. [lol] For your age, you have already acquired an impressive level of knowledge.

Best,
Don

[DJS]

I do not see how one can think that free will and a deterministic system can coexist (as mentioned in a previous post). In my mindset, once you accept that a system is deterministic (e.g. the only kind of system possible), one instantly forfeits free will. It doesn't matter how many different emotions you feel, how many different choices you can make, how many times you flip between them, or how you observe the universe... to me, causation is the death of free will... am I totally missing something here?

Here are a few points that I'd like to highlight from the wiki article on compatibilism:

A compatibilist, or soft determinist, in contrast, will define a free act in a way that does not hinge on causal necessitation. For them, an act is free unless it involves compulsion by another person. Since the physical universe and the laws of nature are not persons, they argue that it is a category error to speak of our actions being forced on us by the laws of nature, and therefore it is wrong to conclude that universal determinism would mean we are never free.

Further, according to Hume, free will should not be understood as an absolute ability to have chosen differently under exactly the same inner and outer circumstances. Rather, it is a hypothetical ability to have chosen differently if one had been differently psychologically disposed by some different beliefs or desires.

-----------------------------------
I think we could agree that our "identity" is our unique neural configuration. Our "will" is an aspect of this identity. With our "identity" comes certain preferences, desires, behavioral characteristics, etc etc. You do what you do because you are what you are (damn, these free will topics always get me to make statements like this [lol] ). To desire to do differently would be to desire to be someone different. I am satisfied with who I am and what I am planning to become so I possess an attitude that affirms my "Being". I view my relative level of freedom as a product of restrictions (both internal and external) being imposed on me - on my ability to do what it is in my nature to do - minus my efforts to override these restrictions.

What I have stated above is the simplest way I know how to express my perspective. I have a decent level of knowledge in areas like free will, determinism, cognitive psychology, human will, yaddayadda...but trying to refine my message too much would probably just amount to circumlocution and dense circular philosophical arguments sooo there ya go... I can discuss the topic further but those are my basic sentiments.

[Kalepha]

. . . I do not believe that it is an illusion at all, but a qualitative aspect of Being.

If cognitive psychology reveals the prevalence of illusions, then qualitative events can be illusions. We would agree that we don't apprehend this by the qualities of low-symbolic acquaintance but instead by the qualities of high-symbolic acquaintance. Therefore, I don't yet see how the implication here, that an illusion cannot be a qualitative aspect, would have to follow.

The only time that FW becomes an illusion is when the concept is idealized in the libertarian fashion.

I believe that if free will is not an illusion for an agent, it means that the agent is not embedded in a causal reality. Free will as not an actual illusion is libertarian, while free will as an actual illusion is compatible with determinism (and, in my opinion, with a broader outlook). That seems as it does through the qualities of high-symbolic acquaintance. I would agree that the non-illusory sense of free will is a low-symbolic acquaintance, just not as a high-symbolic acquaintance, the kind which is sometimes important to understand what isn't always more immediate from perception in general.

[Kalepha]

Let me try to be clear about why I, in particular, believe it's important to distinguish between free will and volitional will for the best, as of yet that I feel I can accept, understanding of compatibilism. This is besides the obvious reasons that I've already outlined for coopting compatibilism. They don't explicitly illustrate why being concerned with volitional will rather than free will is very likely a distraction from the better conception.

It is enough to see that volitional will is compatible with determinism when our idea of volitional will is simplistic. A simplistic volitional will is mainly committed to being concerned with avoiding conflicts with other volitional wills and is probably biased with thoughts about avoiding incidents like extortion or coercion on the Homo sapiens scale. On this relatively narrow view of compatibilism, one is possibly thinking, 'As long as no one or no destructive asteroid is getting in my way, that's enough to be free in a deterministic system'. But a less simplistic volitional will has more subtle concerns and will ultimately fail as it honors free will as necessarily an illusion and succeeds simplistic volitional will.

If a volitional will is scientific at all, it will find that prediction is one of its most important tools. But even some scientific volitional wills, the ones with an even more cautious conception of realism, can be careful about any potential problems with their heedless scientistic deferentialism, if there are any. Unfortunately, there are. Volitionally, one might desire, at least hypothetically, not to be fully predictable, a possible circumstance in a universe populated with scientific volitional wills. This futile volition shall observe, under reflection, that avoiding this circumstance is theoretically impossible and therefore renders volitional will inadequate (unfortunately, only in retrospect, which requires an intuition for challenging volitional will to begin with, and who really wants to do that?) for bearing a refined meaning of free will in a deterministic universe.

I wish I had expressed it better, but the idea is the same, that volitional will is completely and negatively inadequate for an account of compatibilism:

Upon reading the AI dialog, some might invoke a paradox from a hypothetical scenario consisting of a real-time correspondence between a predictor and a predictee.

The scenario goes like this. The predictee agrees to do one of two pre-specified actions. The predictor must communicate to the predictee which of the two actions the predictee will do before the predictee does it. Let the predictee appear like a typical human, and let one of the two actions be either the raising of its right arm or the raising of its left arm.

The paradox invoker is thinking that when the predictor communicates to the predictee that the latter will raise its right arm, all the predictee has to do is raise its left arm, and likewise inversely. To that paradox invoker, any predictor, including an omniscient predictor (what the paradox turns on), is unqualified to be labeled 'the predictor'.

The scenario shall require an additional element to help persuade the paradox invoker that it might be possible for the scenario's ontology to subsume a consistent label-worthy predictor in a way that's still interesting.

Let the predictor appear like a typical human. Let the additional element be the predictor putting its arms behind its back, hands duly hidden from the predictee, and indicating a prediction, simultaneously with communicating to the predictee a prediction, by extending the index finger from the fisted hand of the corresponding predicted action.

The communicated predictions won't always correspond with the hidden predictions. The communicated predictions will either never or sometimes – likely sometimes, given the predictee's understanding of the situation – correspond with the predictee's actions.

After, say, a trillion trials, it's possible – without paradox and in a way that's hopefully still interesting with respect to the perceived problem – for the predictor to be, in fact, a consistent label-worthy predictor, by having been correct in every single one of its hidden predictions.

Link

Edited by eirenicon, 30 April 2007 - 11:41 PM.

[JohnDoe1234]

Through all of my reading, about the only difference between determinism and compatiblism I can find, is the attitude taken towards the realization that free will is an illusion, is this any closer? Overall... I am still completely lost, and I understand if you guys classify me as a lost cause... [glasses]

Furthermore, from my perspective this qualitative aspect of Being will always be present because there will always be unexplored reality and thus always incomplete subjective knowledge. As Popper once said, “Our knowledge can only be finite, while our ignorance must necessarily be infinite.”

This and also what eirenicon mentioned about 'unexplored reality' is interesting... When you say unexplored reality, are you meaning something to the effect of: a portion of a system that has not yet had an effect on any other portion of the system? That is the closest way I can approximate it, and if that is so, I don't understand why it was even mentioned, it seems like it would be a given. If it has the potential to effect a portion of the system, then it is perfectly in line with determinism, if this unexplored reality is located in a place where its effects on the rest of reality (the system) cannot be mediated... then it is an entirely different system in itself and has no relevance.

A compatibilist, or soft determinist, in contrast, will define a free act in a way that does not hinge on causal necessitation. For them, an act is free unless it involves compulsion by another person. Since the physical universe and the laws of nature are not persons, they argue that it is a category error to speak of our actions being forced on us by the laws of nature, and therefore it is wrong to conclude that universal determinism would mean we are never free.

I do not understand this reasoning at all... people are comprised of matter and energy just like the rest of the universe, and hence obey the exact same laws, why would it be any different than nature forcing a decision on you?

Further, according to Hume, free will should not be understood as an absolute ability to have chosen differently under exactly the same inner and outer circumstances. Rather, it is a hypothetical ability to have chosen differently if one had been differently psychologically disposed by some different beliefs or desires.

Agreed. But that only backs up determinism's claim that free will is an illusion does it not?

I believe that if free will is not an illusion for an agent, it means that the agent is not embedded in a causal reality

Right, not embedded in that causal reality, however... the agent must be a part of another causal reality.

It is enough to see that volitional will is compatible with determinism when our idea of volitional will is simplistic. A simplistic volitional will is mainly committed to being concerned with avoiding conflicts with other volitional wills and is probably biased with thoughts about avoiding incidents like extortion or coercion on the Homo sapiens scale. On this relatively narrow view of compatibilism, one is possibly thinking, 'As long as no one or no destructive asteroid is getting in my way, that's enough to be free in a deterministic system'. But a less simplistic volitional will has more subtle concerns and will ultimately fail as it honors free will as necessarily an illusion and succeeds simplistic volitional will.

Yeah, the simplistic view does have some glaring errors if that is true.

--- Maybe I can attempt to clarify what I am thinking... ---

Let's say you have a computer simulation of a bag of 100 trillion toothpicks, your computer is powerful enough to keep track of every aspect of each toothpick and anything that might affect it (down past the subatomic level). Now, you can alter any one of these parameters, you can change the way you dump the bag on the simulated floor, you can change its velocity, you can change the force of gravity, you can change air resistance, you can even change the mass distribution of each toothpick.

Now, you start two parallel simulations with Exactly the same initial parameters... you dump the bags... and wow, you observe that they have formed extremely complex patterns of toothpicks all over the floor, you can see W's, V's, X's, boxes, zigzags, and even the occasional smiley face... this is just a product of probability, you also note that both simulations progressed exactly the same way, in neither one did a toothpick mysteriously change its trajectory and land in an alternate location (Free will)... and if you let arrays of simulations affect one another, they essentially become one giant simulation (parallel universes interfering with one another). So, how is our universe any different from this very large bag of toothpicks?

EDIT: Grammar

Edited by Joseph, 01 May 2007 - 03:02 AM.

[DJS]

Nate, thanks for the clarifier posts. Suddenly what you were attempting to communicate all clicked into place. Good stuff. [thumb]

eirenicon: Volitionally, one might desire, at least hypothetically, not to be fully predictable, a possible circumstance in a universe populated with scientific volitional wills. This futile volition shall observe, under reflection, that avoiding this circumstance is theoretically impossible and therefore renders volitional will inadequate (unfortunately, only in retrospect, which requires an intuition for challenging volitional will to begin with, and who really wants to do that?) for bearing a refined meaning of free will in a deterministic universe.

I wish I had expressed it better, but the idea is the same, that volitional will is completely and negatively inadequate for an account of compatibilism:

I believe we might have gone down this road before, albeit from a different angle (unless my memory is betraying me). You are correct, definitively avoiding the circumstance is theoretically impossible since (a) infinite complexity is a mathematical limit which can only be approached and (b) in the realm of “all that is possible” there would exist an infinite subset of entities further along their approach to said limit. However, I do not believe that this dethrones volitional will as a viable concept, particularly in regards to the “sense of freedom” it allows for. I say this because, even if ontological speculations become (or already are) ontological realities, the subjectively experienced “illusion” of unpredictability would still remain intact – excluding incidents of “molestation” between incommensurate volitions. (and what would be the motivation of a trickster God anyway?) Having the desire and committing to action which attempts to avoid predictability seems prudent, but stressing over the existential risk would, as far as I can tell, equate to contemporary volitional agents unduly stressing over the possibility of getting mugged at gun point or obliterated by some killer asteroid. Ergo, the problem is not the workability of volitional will with compatibilism, but inter-agent relations. Being that the motivations for malign interaction are unclear, and with a potential solution in the spirit of a Kantian categorical imperative which rests upon the understanding that volition free will is relative and always vulnerable, I do not see this as an insurmountable problem.

[DJS]

Joe (I'm not ignoring your post. I'll try to craft a response sometime soon. )

[JohnDoe1234]

Yeah, it's quite alright, I don't mean to be taking your guy's time with repetitive questions, I might as well just keep doing research on my own since this doesn't seem that it can be answered very easily...

But still, any input is greatly appreciated [lol]

[Kalepha]

Not a problem, Don. Thanks. I don't think we're uncomfortably distant now as we were in our compatibilisms. It is clear that we have a common understanding that an appropriate conception of free will needs not be expensively preoccupied with avoiding volitional predictability. Perhaps this was always obvious to you. It just wasn't always obvious to me, and so I needed more of a "geometric" solution. I don't see anything wrong with saying that volitional will is compatible with determinism, as long as I also have the opportunity to add that volitional will is an illusion, along with my elementary reasons for tending to simplify to free will and its being an illusion. Perhaps if I wasn't trying to build a bridge . . . [tung]

Joseph, I'm sure we're glad to try helping, especially since we believe that compatibilism is positively meaningful, despite however which way we might interpret 'free will is compatible with determinism'. Perhaps my particular interpretation is constructed simply from the sense that regardless how well minds can map reality, with determinism making it intrinsically easier to make maps and as the last thing that should be an excuse for distress, they could never be perfect anyway, and this should be a good thing if we intend to be unbounded in some manner or another. But I will also consider a more specific response to new points you bring up.

[DJS]

Yeah, it's quite alright, I don't mean to be taking your guy's time with repetitive questions, I might as well just keep doing research on my own since this doesn't seem that it can be answered very easily...

But still, any input is greatly appreciated  [lol]

Nah, don’t sweat it. I echo Nates’ sentiments. Attempting to communicate myself effectively with other intellectually honest cognitions is enjoyable. “He must never ask of the truth whether it brings to him profit or a fatality.”

Perhaps if I digress initially from the FW debate I can provide you with better context….

I do not believe we have free will, and I cannot change what happens... (but I feel that I am changing it), I don't normally sit and dwell on the issue, but it does nag at me here and there; for instance, when I am hanging out with friends just having a good time I sometimes cannot help but to think that we are just a huge collection of molecules and chemical reactions that are obeying the laws of physics and hence are of no real significance. I just try to remind myself that for all important purposes, my mother's love does matter, these emotions that I feel do matter, and the things that I do that I enjoy... do matter.

This nagging frustration that you feel, this annoying itch that claws at the back of your mind whenever you let it, is Nihilism. It is a core aspect of the human condition or, more broadly speaking, the condition of “Being”. This ultimate existential challenge/threat faces each and every one of us, and we all deal with it in different ways. Some Most of us retreat to irrational frameworks which possess a self-sustainable level of internal consistency and also repel external threats to this consistency. For all intents and purposes (meaning subjectively, psychologically, and for the time being), this solves “the problem”. Then there are those of us, a distinct minority, who embrace varying degrees of rationality (I won’t insult your intelligence by trying to explain what it means to be rational).

I would argue that pure nihilism can not be endured (edit: or for that matter, even truly embodied, as it contradicts itself). It must be overcome, at least to some extent. Lesser degrees of nihilism can be tolerated and are experienced as angst (that nagging feeling). Overcoming nihilism requires the construction of what we refer to as “meaning”, “purpose” or “significance” which, from a functionalist standpoint, and regardless of the specifics, would simply refer to the aspects of a framework that allow a cognition to persevere over time.

Yet if we are to be rational, then we can not allow our realism to be corrupted by our desire to imbue our existence with significance. As causality, and with it the proposition of determinism, are core aspects of a rational framework, they must be reconciled with any attempt to arrive at meaning. And that, really, is what Compatibilism is all about. You can embrace free will without reservations (Libertarianism), which bolsters meaning at the expense of rationality. Conversely, you can decide to deny free will (Determinism) which is rational, but also masochistic. Or, rather than veering off to either extreme, you can attempt to reconcile the two imperatives (Compatibilism). In terms of functional endurance, the latter option would appear to be superior.

Unfortunately, as the scope of one’s realism expands, the complexity of the reconciliation that is demanded by Compatibilism also increases. This is alluded to by Nate when he makes comments like: “It is enough to see that volitional will is compatible with determinism when our idea of volitional will is simplistic.” When Hume developed his Compatibilism 250 years ago (and even with contemporary “traditionalist” philosophers), “Being” was conceived of in a restricted sense, namely, as “human being”. [8)] Now at the forefront (or fringe, depending on your POV) of philosophy there are futurist speculations about advanced, theoretical states of Being that require a complete redress of age old philosophical issues. So…in order for some of this dialog to be comprehensible, you’d have to entertain an "unconventional" sort of conceptual framework.

Anyhow, I apologize if I’ve lectured you on a bunch of stuff that you already know. I’m just not sure where you’re at in terms of your understanding.

Best,
Don

[DJS]

I don't see anything wrong with saying that volitional will is compatible with determinism, as long as I also have the opportunity to add that volitional will is an illusion, along with my elementary reasons for tending to simplify to free will and its being an illusion. Perhaps if I wasn't trying to build a bridge . . . [tung]

hhmmm, I still have issues with this which I'd like to elaborate on at some point, but I'm already way past my bed time...

[Kalepha]

Just in case, then, here are a few extra points I hope would be considered. [sweat]

1. While I agree that we shouldn't normally be concerned with unfalsifiable hypotheses, we should have a cognitive awareness of at least one, if for no other reason that it entails an unprecedented exploitable loophole as a direct consequence of science: My volitional identity can be completely modeled by another volitional identity.

2. I am not interested in the actual motivations of a higher power, since I'm not impressed by the notion that other volitions can be puppeteers or murderers (which, by the way, is one reason why I'm not impressed with any Singularity scaremongering). Hence, it should be taken into consideration that I'm motivated merely through intellectualism, meaning that my gambit is to offer the game.

3. When I say "bounded" or "unbounded" in this context, I'm careful not to qualify them because of the sheer generality with which we're dealing. If I'm being fully modeled by a higher volition, an unfalsifiable condition, then there must nonetheless be a truth condition corresponding to the truth value of 'true' for 'free will is an illusion'. That truth value cannot be 'false', because if it were, it would generate the contrapositive, which cannot be done (well, at least it shouldn't be done).

[DJS]

Apologies for the delay, I've been occupied.

I completely agree with you that compatibilists making the claim "Free Will is real" is overly ideological, although the temptation should be obvious enough, and somewhat understandable when you consider how most highly contentious areas of philosophical inquiry suffer from the "polarization of paradox". My having semantical issues with your use of the term "illusion" might just be another example of slightly differing, as you would say, epistemological biases that exist between us. By now I'm sure you're aware that I am a functionalist who endorses the concept of supervenience, yet still, in the spirit of being intellectually honest with myself, I must admit that their is a mysterious aspect to our subjective experience. In that light, would one consider qualitative experiences, such as the quale of blueness, real? (clearly a complex and current unresolvable question) I view the subjective sensation of freedom or autonomy as being similarly paradoxical and because of this I have a difficult time definitively labeling it as an illusion. Honestly I am more predisposed, as I've stated previously, to viewing the sense of autonomy that comes with possessing a perceived state of "unboundedness" as an essential property of Being. But intuitions will differ.

Also, wouldn't you agree that entertaining the perspective of a higher order volition evaluating a lower order volition is roughly the equivalent of how traditional hard determinists conceptualize the free will debate through the lense of omniscient objectivity? If there are substantive differences between the two heuristics, what do you see them as being?

And finally, since the compatibilism/incompatibilism debate has resurfaced in my mind I decided to check back in on a fairly new blog I found last year on Agency Theory. Lo and behold, who submitted the most recent blog entry but Kip Werking, a hard determinist and author of the The Transhuman Condition.

I thought you guys might enjoy, so here's the link: Pereboom on the Weirdness of Compatibilism

[DJS]

From what I've read of it so far, this is an excellent paper by Kip. [thumb]

Who's Afraid of Creeping Exculpation?: The Costs of Hard Compatibilism and Benefits of Free Will Denial

[DJS]

An opposing view point by planetp that is referenced in the "The Transhuman Condition" thread:

Super Free Will: Metaprogramming and the Quantum Observer

And here's a thread with the "vexatious" [lol] debate between Kip Werking (John Doe) and Paul (planetp):

Super Free Will: Metaprogramming & QM

Paul is a bit too mystical for my taste, and I strongly reject his views on QM being relevant to the discussion as it amounts to attempting to solve a mystery with a mystery. With that said, my perspective does share some similarities with the concept of "meta-programming" and Paul's statement that "freedom comes from knowledge" also rings true for me.

[DJS]

vague thoughts...

From a logical and ethical standpoint I agree with Kip's Who's Afraid of Creeping Exculpation? in its entirety. But I still recognize it as an interpretation. And the very essence of my Being revolts against this interpretation!
----------------------------------------
The analytic school views continental philosophy as being pretentious gibberish.

The continental school views analytic philosophers as spiritless automatons.

What this demands - synthesis.
------------------------------------
The only true "causa sui" is reality itself.
Real FW demands that an agent is a causa sui.
The more an agent becomes reality, the closer it gets to a state of real FW.
Reality is infinite.
Agents are finite.
Infinity is a limit which can be approached by a finite process of Being, but never arrived at.
FW is a limit which can be approached by Being but never arrived at...so the journey is never ending.